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
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


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*Yours Truly*  
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THE

# RESURRECTION LIFE;

OR,

"BEYOND THE GRAVE" EXAMINED.

BY

REV. I. VILLARS,

OF THE ILLINOIS CONFERENCE, METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH.



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## PREFACE.

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IN 1878 Bishop R. S. FOSTER delivered three lectures before the Chautauqua Assembly in which much interest as well as controversy has been awakened upon the doctrine of future life. The lectures have not generally been conceded as agreeing with the accepted faith of the Christian world. The book which I now introduce without apology or explanation to the reading and thinking public is an examination of the bishop's argument. Such a work has been expected sooner. Its publication has been solicited by some of the leading minds of the Church. It was prepared without this purpose in the midst of pressing pastoral labor and for my own personal satisfaction. It has not been suffered to so remain. The work is divided into two parts. The first is based upon the belief that the bishop's argument necessitated a restatement of the argument, the relation of reason to revelation, as well as the office of reason. The restatement of the argument of death as a penalty for sin is also thought to be necessitated. Should the reader desire to come at once to the investigation of the argument in "Beyond the Grave" he can do so

by beginning the perusal of part second. May this argument carry hope, light, comfort, and salvation to many hearts and homes now shrouded in the sadness of the grave.

I. VILLARS.

PANA, ILL., *March*, 1881.

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# THE RESURRECTION LIFE.

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## PART FIRST.

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### CHAPTER I.

#### PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

THE literature of the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead and immortality of man is all but beyond human computation. It is found on the shelves of every library in the world. Perhaps no subject has produced a greater variety of writers. The views may be said to be as various as the writers. It scarcely seems possible that there should be room for another book. The prime motive in preparing this volume is my own satisfaction with reference to the doctrine involved. After years in the ministry, the most of which time has been spent in localities of conflicting views upon almost every doctrine of Christianity, and especially that which pertains to the future state, I have concluded to place in permanent form my own conclusions. This thought never came to me until the recent publication of "Beyond the Grave," by Randolph S. Foster, one of the bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church. It is not my purpose to lay claim to such an examination as will satisfy every mind, but, as I said, my own personal satisfaction in giving the subject, of which the title of the bishop's book is the best name, a more extended consideration than is possible in pulpit discourse. There is so much interest in the doctrine of the resur-



rection state that almost any thing said on the subject attracts public attention. There are but few people who do not believe in a future conscious state of existence. It seems to be intuitive. There are few who deny that this present state has much to do in creating and measuring the happiness of the future one. The red man of the forest believes in the spirit land. He believes if Indian has been a brave warrior here, or a successful hunter and swift in the chase, and accurate with his hatchet and arrow, that he will be all these in the future of his existence. Hence his burial with the implements of war or of the chase, that he may have the wherewith to follow his favorite pursuit when he reaches the land of the Great Spirit. Similar attestations of faith in a future conscious existence are found among all tribes and nations. They are not alone the property of civilization.

Many have arraigned the doctrines of Christianity as coming from heathen origin, because, as skeptics say, there are similarities between them and heathen faiths. Did it ever occur to these same persons, the probability and the possibility of the existence of these same beliefs among heathens coming from Christian revelation? The similarity being so great the natural inference is, that, being deprived of revelation, they have been traditionally handed down and have undergone the changes and perversions that would surely befall them in the hands of depraved humanity where access could not be had to the original documents as an infallible guide. The great variety of views held by Christian people and the world in general with reference to Christian doctrines, has been used by the skeptical world as equivalent to proof against their truthfulness. But this does not follow. As to the facts of revealed truth the Christian world is a unit. They have disagreed as to the *mode* of these facts, and that is all. Now, if I am correct in this statement, let no man deny the truth simply because we are not all agreed as to its *mode*.

It is clearly seen that there is a similarity of argument among those who have written on the future state. The "line of thought" followed may be termed a "beaten path," from which it is somewhat of relief to turn aside. But in turning aside from a beaten path, it does not follow that we turn aside from the truth; nor because we have turned aside into other lines of thought, does it follow that old lines of thought are false. We all recognize that there is somewhat of meaning and pleasure in the adage, "Variety is the spice of life." It may be so in theology as in other things, without any violence to either theology or truth, but to the contrary. It may magnify both in the affections, because variety magnifies our interest in them. Bishop Foster has stepped aside from the beaten path. But whether he did it in accord with the above principle I am not prepared to say. In fact, the bishop confesses himself to be at a loss to know, with all his labored thinking, whether he has or has not reached a conclusion. After carefully reading his argument, and giving it all the consideration I have thought possible in so limited a time, if I should give my opinion as to what the bishop thought of his own reflections as he held them up before him, or viewed them from any stand-point he might choose, they were, in his own mind, unsatisfactory.

But he has stepped aside from the beaten path of argument. If, therefore, I shall attempt an examination of "Beyond the Grave," I shall have to follow his footsteps and, so far, be considered also out of the beaten path. If I should be asked to give the argument and theology of "Beyond the Grave" a name in the domain of eschatology, I would be compelled to decline the task as impossible. It is not orthodox. There seems to be an effort to give us something new, with a fear of leaving something old; and yet, with the impression that the generally accepted doctrine is erroneous, a disposition to deny it and yet not be chargeable with error, and seemingly to

be a connecting link between the generally received orthodox view of a literal resurrection and that held by Universalists and Unitarians. It is an effort at a wedding of the two if the parties have no objection—a compromise, at least, between orthodoxy and liberalism.

It is a difficult task to bring the bishop's argument down to a definite basis that we may predicate premises from which to draw conclusions. For instance, take such statements in comparison as in note B, page 243: "Further, we are constrained to believe, that, left to the mere working of natural law, man would have died. He most certainly included in his created constitution tendencies to death, which, *unhindered*, would have culminated in that result." Compare with this statement the one on the same page: "And yet we accept the idea that, had he not sinned, he would not have died; the naturally mortal, as to his organic life, would have been, by special supernatural interferences, made immortal. The disorganizing tendencies would not have been permitted to reach the catastrophe of life's overthrow and organic dissolution."

Here is the tangle of logic that may give him an advantage over any who would attempt an untangling of thought or solution of the riddle. The language seems to be to mystify—to befog and not to give a clear and definite statement of the question. This condition of things is confirmed when we look at the remark with which his words are prefaced: "Man was made for permanence of life;"—then proceeds to the contradiction and confusion of the question—"but in this statement we do not mean that his animal life, as such, in its present form was to be permanent, or that he was to remain forever in a body on the earth." . . . "And yet we accept the idea that, had he not sinned, he would not have died!" This view of the subject is not new, and is held by eminent scholars, but for all that it is in conflict with the best thinkers, and is very misleading in its tendency.

"It is a common idea," says Dr. Davies (author of "Justification by Faith"), "with Biblical students that 'Adam would not have died if he had not sinned; and that if he had not sinned he would not have continued in the state God made him; but after having served a probation he would have been taken into a higher stage of being. If he had remained pure he would have entered into another and higher plane of life.'"

Grant this, but the Scriptural inference is that that "higher plane of life" would have been just what a "literal" resurrection of the body will introduce us to. It is the bringing man to what God designed him in creation, death or no death, and the transformation to the glorified state related to the literal body and not a substitution. The bishop's argument is in conflict with this latter and Scriptural theory.

There are other objectionable features in the argument. The one in my mind at present has more specific reference to the manner in which the theories of others who have gone before him in the argument is treated. For example, the general implication is made that all passages of Scripture that have been uniformly construed as teaching a literal resurrection will not bear such a construction under more advanced knowledge of their meaning. There is too much of sophistry in this. So much is said about progressive knowledge, and especially by those who have delved deep into scientific lore, that the impression seems to have been rapidly growing that "progressive knowledge" means the unseating of old established truths and their substitution by new discoveries, so that through skepticism the Bible itself will have to give way before "progressive knowledge."

On this point Bishop Kingsley pertinently said: "The truths of revelation are not like some *machines*, which require to be *remodeled* and *improved* from time to time in order to suit the improvements of the age; nor like some

garments, that must be cut and made over every six months to be in fashion. If they were, there might be some propriety in talking about the law of progressive knowledge, as applied to the doctrine of the resurrection. Then, indeed, we might send to the East every Spring and Fall for our *theology*, as we now do for our *fashions*. But the doctrines of the Gospel are pure, *unchanging*, and eternal truth."

If "Beyond the Grave" had only been a discussion of the doctrine of the *intermediate state* of the dead it would have created but little controversy. As to what he says of the state of the soul after death, of its consciousness, of thought, activity, advancement over its earth-state and its progress in knowledge, etc., there can be but little if any disagreement. It is an able discussion of the *intermediate state*, and his book could have been better understood if it had borne that title. As it is, it will be difficult for two persons to be agreed as to its import. It is destined to take its place on the shelf of eccentric literature and pass into that obscurity that all eccentricity seems to inherit, and never pass for authority in settling the great question assumed to be treated therein. The position of the writer may give somewhat of weight to the argument, but in the permanency of the settlement of any question in the mind and heart principles take precedence when persons and positions are forgotten.

The impression made upon the mind is that "Beyond the Grave" is a labored argument to prove that the generally received doctrine of the resurrection of the dead is not true. Perhaps I am mistaken, but this will be the natural inference by all who will read the argument.


The most extensive notice that has come under my observation is that from the pen of our learned Dr. Curry, editor of the *National Repository*, whose views upon the doctrine of the resurrection are well known to the religious world. Perhaps his perception of the scope of "Be-



yond the Grave," and the particular point it would elucidate would be the most intelligent statement concerning the real import of the argument that he would have evolved so that our perceptivity might grasp its meaning. There is a sort of luxury, religious monopoly or theological exclusiveness, that some men in some particulars enjoy in being unlike any one else. They would in a certain measure be lost sight of if this were not the case.

I take it for granted that Dr. Curry gives an intelligent statement of the doctrine desired to be presented in "Beyond the Grave." In the September number of the *National Repository* (1879), in a lengthy editorial notice of the book, he says, after stating the possibility that much of it may have been the product of feelings or experiences that may have grown out of bereavements that may have carried the thoughts from the anchorage of unbiased reason into morbid imagination, etc., that "in this case that dangerous liability has been effectually avoided by rejecting all other authority, and carefully examining to know what the Bible does clearly teach, and testing by that standard whatever intimations might come to him from any source relative to the subject in hand. And, having adopted this method, the rejection of a multitude of fancies that have long passed muster as Christian doctrines, and of mediæval legends that have become interwoven into popular faith, followed of necessity. It imposed upon him the necessity for a more rational (not *rationalistic*) method of Bible interpretation, with corrected views of the character of the divine revelation, and for the rejection of the whole system of pious frauds which sets out with a predetermined purpose to find the sought-for doctrines in the Bible, or to put them there by a false exegesis. And yet, after all this apparent boldness and reckless excision of whatever seems to be of doubtful authority, it is gratifying to observe how very little that even appears to be valuable is lost by the process. Some old outworks of the

citadel of truth, that added nothing either to its strength or its beauty, have been abandoned as untenable; and some of the long-cherished furniture and implements of the Christian household are replaced by others, simpler and more effective. *Especially does this method purge out the entire system of materialistic literalism that pervades and permeates the popular creed, and twines itself like a damaging parasite through all our believings and feelings, our faiths and hopes, respecting the future life, to make room for the pure and holy spiritualism taught by Jesus and John and Paul. Possibly with these better views there would be less of blind and unreasoning dogmatism, as there would also be correspondingly more of simple faith in God and of joyfully awaiting his revelations of the future. . . .*

“ We have looked with lively interest through this discussion for a reasonable affirmation or denial of the popular doctrine of the resurrection of the human body. Nor has our search been a fruitless one; though we fail to find a direct reply to our query. After reading only the first lecture, any one might say that, in view of its teachings, such an event is neither desirable nor reasonable, nor agreeable to the Word of God. If the body is only a *pro tempore* makeshift for its spiritual occupant—useful in a poor way, but expensive and inconvenient, perpetually getting out of order, and all the time tending to decay; and since the spirit is rapidly outgrowing its covering, as a boy outgrows his last year’s clothing; and since death is a practical liberation of the prisoner—the emancipation of the bondman (and all these things are there taught us); and since the body at last falls to decay and dissolution, rendering back ‘earth to earth and ashes to ashes,’ apparently, without either the promise or the potency of living again, the answer to the question of the coming again of this material mass must first of all be, *cui bono?*—for what purpose? Our guide and teacher has most effectually proved to us that there is nothing to be desired in such an occurrence. 

“It is very evident that our author saw and felt the logical force and tendency of his arguments, but he draws back from his own conclusions, and hesitates to follow out his arguments to their final analysis. He must, however, discard some of his own premises or accept the responsibility of their logical outcome. *But the former alternative he will find to be impossible.* The mind that has come to anticipate a state of being in which ‘there is nothing that pertains to the body, either its necessities or its pleasures, that would be agreeable to carry up through eternity,’ and to think of it as ‘too circumscribed an instrument—too much fettered by natural law—too narrow in its possible uses to furnish the outcome of such a life as is contained in its [the soul’s] possibilities,’ will certainly not hope to recover again such undesirable possessions and conditions. *Only a revelation from heaven, so certainly and explicitly given as to preclude any other possible meaning, could render such an event probable; and this our author clearly shows is not the character of the deliverances of the Holy Scriptures or the premises.* They indeed speak of a ‘spiritual body,’ but that is something quite different from a *material* mass, however highly attenuated; and the promised ‘clothed upon’ should not be so construed as to contradict the explicit declaration that ‘flesh and blood shall not inherit the kingdom of God.’ A personally individualized being must, from the necessities of our mental constitution, appear to our apprehension as a something—a body; but not, therefore, of necessity, beset with any of the properties or accidents of matter. ‘There is a natural body,’ in which we now subsist, corruptible and decaying; and ‘there is a spiritual body,’ which is no other than our ‘house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens.’ This seems to be about the purport of the teaching of the premises laid down in these lectures. Our Lord very clearly and forcibly declares the fact of a future life; but he nowhere sets forth in detail its characteristics and conditions. What

will be the nature of our 'spiritual body' we are not informed affirmatively; but there is abundant proof that it will be widely unlike the body that now is. All this Bishop Foster teaches in these lectures, either by explicit statements or by necessary implications.

"Some of the side thoughts brought into view in the course of these discussions are especially suggestive. The question of bodily identity, Is there any such a thing, and, if so, in what does it consist? naturally occurs at this point. If bodily identity consists in sameness of materials aggregated in an organic form, then, evidently, there can be no such thing; for all living organisms are perpetually changing their elementary constituents, just as the materials of a running stream are never the same at different points of time. And yet the river has its individuality, and until it runs dry and ceases to exist, its continuous identity. And so has the human body, in common with all other living organisms, its proper identity, which, however, does not depend on continued sameness of materials, but on its individualizing life-force, and, like all other material organisms, it ceases to be at the end of its vital career. And, if the bodily identity ceases at the end of the animal lifetime, what is that which shall 'come again' at the resurrection? *Bishop Foster meets this with a direct disclaimer of any expectation of the restoration from the grave of the 'identical body' in which the man lived on earth, and so sweeps back into the domain of fancy, all the scenic imagery of the 'breaking graves' and 'yielding seas' and the 'standing up' of 'a very great army' at the sound of the archangel's trumpet. In respect to the alternate theories of the old bodies being restored, or of the 'emergence [when we are not told] into total dissimilar ones,' he decidedly prefers the latter, but he is not equally explicit as to whether or not these 'dissimilar ones' will be made up of any possible form of earthy matter. In another place, however, he leaves no room for any doubt that he would answer that question with a decided negative. He*

also tells us that the resurrection is nowhere in Scripture predicated of the body, but of the person, which position will be called in question by more than a single class of objectors; and its settlement will require the determination of the rather occult question, What is personal identity? and also the fixing of the sense and scope of the New Testament word, *σῶμα*—body. . . .

“The arguments drawn from the Bible, usually relied on to sustain what is here called—with an over-liberal concession—‘the general opinion’ (we would rather say the popular or vulgar opinion), are disposed of rather summarily. *It is expressly denied that the terms used to designate the ‘resurrection’ imply the emergence from the grave of the same body that was laid there, but rather do they teach quite the opposite. The argument drawn from Christ’s bodily resurrection is pronounced wholly irrelevant, since that restoring to life of a dead body was in no sense a pattern or pledge of the promised resurrection of all men; nor was that body in which the Lord was seen for forty days the same with which he has gone into heaven, which latter, and not the other, is to be pattern of the glorified bodies of the saints in the resurrection.*”

The purpose in giving this quotation from Dr. Curry is to present to the mind the perception of a representative mind of a certain school of thinkers of the true import of the bishop’s book. If I had drawn these conclusions myself I would have been subject to the charge that the opinion formed would have been but one of the many, and therefore unnecessary and impossible of notice, but when it comes from one of the oldest thinkers and journalists of this nation as well as of the Church, it commands consideration. I shall take the liberty to say that Dr. Curry certainly knows what Bishop Foster has evolved in his book. When, therefore, I shall select these conclusions from which to review the lectures I shall feel a security against the charge of misrepresentation. I shall find myself in eminent company, who understand the bishop’s teaching to be the

same as my statements of them would be should I have gone forward and made them. The difference between the doctor and myself is, that while he states them correctly he also indorses them as in the main correct in contradistinction to the "popular," "general," or "vulgar" acceptance of the resurrection as taught in the "popular creeds." While I would draw the same conclusions concerning the bishop's meaning, I neither indorse his doctrine nor Dr. Curry's indorsement of them. Dr. Curry evidently feels comfortable at the thought that a distinguished scholar and minister has come over to his school of religious and theological "freethinkers;" but, like all other sorts of "freethinking," it will take its usual seat in the background, while the great body of "generally" received truth, held by the "popular" or "vulgar" faith, will, with its stately massiveness, move onward, only now and then feeling an almost imperceptible breath of chilliness upon its cheek from some one who would, if he could, rob it of its warmth and life. It is "cool comfort" to find ourselves the slaves of "popular creeds" and "dogmatic" teachers of iron-bound theories that refuse to yield to "progressive thought," etc., but we will accept the comfort, confessing that our eyes are too dim to see that we are any more victims to this state of things than other more pretentious "freethinkers" in religion are to their own opinions.

It is not out of place to say that there is the semblance of presumption in any one, no matter what his position or ability, to stand up in the face of the ages and combined learning of the same, and speak as if these ages were ages of ignorance. I believe in progress, of research and investigation of new phases of thought and truth in science and revelation, but with all this I do not believe that old, essential faiths have undergone a shadow of a change. The ripple that has occasionally occurred upon the surface of the same has never reached the depths of truth, and the great, deep current has moved steadily along, bearing upon



its bosom its freight of human hopes and fears to a port of comfort unending. I assert my freedom of thought—freedom from any “enslavement” of “popular creeds” as much as any religious “freethinker,” when, after due examination, I, of my own free will and accord, take upon me the baptismal vows, as others have done who have entered the Church legitimately, when I say, in the presence of God and the congregation, “I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth; and in Jesus Christ his only begotten Son our Lord; and that he was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary; that he suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, *dead, and buried; that he rose again the third day; that he ascended into heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty, and from thence will come again at the end of the world to judge the quick and the dead.* I believe in the Holy Ghost, the holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints; the remission of sins; *the resurrection of the body, and everlasting life after death.*” “*All this I steadfastly believe.*”

Upon the average mind the effect of such a course of reasoning as laid down in “Beyond the Grave” is, that nothing is settled. A Congressional friend of mine had conceived the usual idea of “*positive science*” as teaching something settled and definite, and was disposed to look upon it as unsettling the Mosaic account of the creation of man. I placed in his hands that excellent work of Southall’s on “The Recent Origin of Man.” After perusing it he said to me, “The conclusion I have come to of modern science is, that nothing is conclusive, nothing is settled.” He thanked me for my kindness, and the result of his examination was a higher regard for the Scriptures.

Now this unsettling process is the legitimate result of the bishop’s line of argument. The first impression made upon the intelligent mind is, that he himself is unsettled upon the subject treated; that he has not the substantial and definite view of the doctrine he has discussed in his



book that he has of other vital doctrines of the Bible. The book is a virtual confession throughout that as to the future state nothing is known, save indefinitely, and that positive conclusions can not be drawn. An honest skeptic turning to this book for light, as such a one would naturally turn to a superior mind to settle his troubled thoughts, would be constrained to turn away with the lament that "nothing is settled." I am very sure that this inference will be drawn by a majority of those who read the lectures. It is certainly the inference drawn by Dr. Curry in the quotation I have made from his editorial in the *National Repository*, save in the positive denial of a literal resurrection.

Now I claim that truth is settled, that the doctrine of the resurrection of the body is a settled doctrine. There is a tangibility about it upon which we can lay hold. I believe, farther, that heaven is a *tangible place*—not all spiritual, not all ethereal, but *terra firma*, so to speak, as well as earth. I see no more mystery, inconsistency, or any thing else more difficult or inconsistent, about the idea that God has a tangible world somewhere in space, where real bodies, earth-born, exist, than I do in the thought that God has hung this tangible earth in space and placed tangible bodies upon it. No intelligent skeptic can read the Bible and then turn away and say that the doctrine of man's immortality is not fixed.

Another objectionable feature in the bishop's discussion is, that things are so hard to be understood. To finite minds like ours every thing seems veiled; we will have to wait and see after we have shuffled off this mortal coil. I demur to such teaching. Was revelation given for angels, or men? Was it for the instruction of seraphs around the throne, or for fallen man? Was it to mystify our understanding, its beauty and hope reserved for futurity, or given that heaven's light might illuminate our earth-bower of shadow? I claim that whatever God has of revelation

that would give benefit and preparation for the heavenly state, was to bring that state so much down to our powers of perception that the revelation would be so *definite* and *fixed* that man can act understandingly. Therefore I claim that theological "dust" is not to be thrown into the eyes of the simple of heart and mind as to make them believe that revelation is so indefinite that it presents the very doctrines that of all others most interest us to be so difficult of understanding that no definite conclusions can be drawn concerning the same. Is it not a fact that the entire highway of revealed truth was designed from the beginning to be so plain that "wayfaring men, though fools, need not err therein?"

Our translators have deceived us, our Lord Jesus Christ himself has imposed upon our credulity, if the resurrection of the *body* be not true. At the grave of Lazarus the sisters gave expression to every phase of faith in the "resurrection of the body" which should occur "at the last day" held in the "popular creeds," and if they were the *victims* of said creeds, Jesus Christ, Master and *Teacher*, leaves them "hoodwinked," blindfolded, gulled with the "*vulgar*" idea that a resurrection of the *body* was a thing to be realized.

It is my purpose to examine the argument contained in "Beyond the Grave," and see wherein it agrees and disagrees, not only from the "popular" faith, but from the plain and truthful teachings of the Scriptures.

It is admitted concerning questions involved in this discussion, as Peter said of Paul (2 Peter iii, 16), that there "are some things hard to be understood, which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do the other Scriptures, unto their own destruction," but while understanding is not a condition of salvation but a commendable aspiration of the human mind in its activities, still the *facts* of revelation are so patent that when we see them with the naked eye we accept them. Hence, we

accept readily what is revealed. The resurrection of the body is a *revealed fact*. The demonstration of it has been made, not to the understanding but to the observation, so that it is a fact of conscious truth. "Secret things belong unto the Lord our God, but those things which are revealed belong unto us, and to our children forever, that we may do all the words of this law."

The resurrection is not a secret. It is revealed. It is demonstrated. When we are told that some shall come forth unto everlasting life and others to shame and everlasting contempt, we are not blind to the significance of the lesson of the resurrection. In all manner of conversation we should be holy, that when the moment does come we may be found in him, "not having our own righteousness but the righteousness which is by faith in Jesus Christ."

In this controversy may the Spirit of Christ mold every thought and word. I am conscious that an error has been committed. Its investigation will result in the firmer establishment and vindication of truth—truth long established—truth that *abideth* forever, truth so interwoven throughout our whole nature that we have sung it in our songs, written it in our "creeds" until it has become "popular," the faith of the people, of the millions, and will continue to be until at last the climax shall be reached: "Behold I show you a mystery; We shall not all sleep, but we shall be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound and the *dead shall be raised incorruptible*, and we shall be changed. For this *corruptible* must put on incorruption, and this *mortal* must put on immortality. So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory? The sting of death is sin, and the strength of

sin is the law. But thanks be to God who giveth us the victory, through our Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore, my beloved brethren, be ye steadfast, unmovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, forasmuch as ye know that your labor is not in vain in the Lord." 1 Cor. xv, 51-58.

## CHAPTER II.

## COMPARATIVE VIEWS.

“WE live in an age,” said Rev. Dr. Adams, of the Illinois Wesleyan University, in a conversation with the writer, “when every man has a right to believe what he pleases without molestation, just so that he behaves himself.” The remark was made with reference to that growing indifference and contempt of established truth that seems to characterize the age.

It is not designed to make the impression that new truths shall not be diligently sought after, or that any limit should be placed to investigation, that I would utter a word of caution, but that I might have somewhat to do in checking the growing disposition to believe that because a thing is *new* it must be true, and because a thing is *old* it must be *false*—or, perhaps, *obsolete*. A thing is not true because it is *new*, neither *obsolete* because it is old. The term *obsolete* can never be applied to truth, to revelation; for truth is never *obsolete*. It is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. Heaven and earth may pass away, but God’s Word, never.

If the doctrine of the resurrection was true eighteen hundred years ago—and it was so considered as to be taken literally as it fell from the lips of the Master, and he permitted it to so remain in its literal meaning, with every word and action confirming the same, instead of correcting the error had the literal idea been a mistaken one—I take it for granted that the doctrine of a literal resurrection is true now. I have thought it appropriate at this point to insert a chapter of comparative views on this doctrine,

enabling the reader to take the bearings and soundings of the argument.

Should I intimate that "Beyond the Grave" was more Unitarian than Methodistic in this argument, that would not matter; it would still have the advantage *if* Unitarianism is true and our position as a Church false on this doctrine. Truth is the thing sought for. "Are these things true?" is the question of the hour in this controversy.

Dr. Curry says: "True, our latest and best bodies of divinity simply reiterate the views and opinions of the past centuries, with only slight and incidental modifications, some styling such *crudities* 'the Protestant doctrines,' and others setting them down as the 'accepted doctrines of the Church;' both of which are correct in part, yet not therefore removed beyond free inquiry and intelligent questionings." Of this latter sentence, certainly not. But the question is naturally suggested, Is it to be taken for granted, as the inference surely is thus made, that because the *standard* faith—the "generally received" view of the resurrection—is "simply," in published divinity, at present, a "reiteration of the views and opinions of the past centuries, with only slight and incidental modifications," that the doctrine of the resurrection as thus taught is not entitled to acceptance? Would not reason rather indicate that because this doctrine of a literal resurrection has endured the siftings of controversy throughout the "centuries" with but "slight" modification, and that "incidental," it was therefore entitled to credence? Would not this fact make a strong case in its favor in any court in civilization if the doctrine were put on trial and weighed in the usual scales of legal evidences?

It is well not to be thrown off our guard by this common argument of doubters that because a thing is old and has a "beaten path" it is not to be revered. Some of us prefer to travel in beaten paths, for they generally lead us somewhere—to some citadel of truths; but some of the

unbeaten ones, that have not yet worn the grass from under the feet, on the other hand, lead into the forest—of rayless underbrush—of confusion. The highways of the Holy Land, the most beaten paths, led to cities of refuge. Fleeing from error, it is not unsafe to inquire for the cities of refuge that were not so obscured as to be difficult of seeing, but were upon well-defined localities, seen by the natural eye, and *easy* of access. “Stand ye in the ways, and see, and *ask for the old paths*, where is the good way, and walk therein, and ye shall find rest for your souls. But they said, We will not walk therein.” Even in the prophet’s day there were “advanced thinkers,” men of “progressive thought,” that cared but little for “old ways” of thinking.

One thing can not escape the observation, that much of the laxity in the Church, and particularly in the state, grows out of this reckless “freethinking”—“freethinking,” falsely so called—that carries with it a recklessness of moral results. But stages of this strike the people of different countries like contagion, and when it is dying in one country it will have crossed the waters and be rampant in another. This is true of German rationalism, and the same thing applies to the breaking out of other fevers in the domain of theological controversy. Happy will it be if, instead of the skeptic saying that the Christian has no fixed principle or hope, he be led into the light and liberty of truth. There seems to be a bid for liberalistic reputation and influence; but, when it is secured, what does it amount to? Who is bettered by it? Who is advanced by it? Some one may gain a little notoriety that will be but momentary—a comet in the heavens with pretentious trail—but whose existence is short, and whose very presence creates a chill of atmosphere, a shudder in the natural world that makes all nature long for the warm rays of the rising sun. In theology, the moral effect is bad. We call all such “freethinking” by whatever name



we may, but unless there is a check somewhere its demoralization is soon seen and felt.

Take a first-class illustration of this truth, only in connection with another subject in which the same principle is involved. Who can doubt that such truckling is fraught with evil consequences? I refer to the utterances of Rev. Henry Ward Beecher in his pulpit discourse on the Fourth of July, 1880. He is represented as saying: "It is a gigantic lie, told with much circumstantiality, that men were created perfect and then fell; that in Adam and Eve the human race fell all around. . . . God did not make a bad job, and then paint it pretty and plaster it up. . . . In a sense, God made laws to be broken. . . . The idea is to be disclaimed and trampled under foot that men must do thus and thus to be destroyed. I do n't hold the theory of the atonement. . . . I reject the Mosaic economy, and take a larger view of Christ's work. . . . The truths of the Bible are not to be swallowed whole, but to be sifted."

Where can there come any benefit to Christianity from utterances of this kind? If the Bible is the word of God, as Christians believe it to be, Mr. Beecher can not "take a larger view of Christ's work" than God.

As a question of *similars* and *dissimilars*, it looks very much as if Mr. Beecher and our own Bishop Foster had been training in the same school of thought, save that the bishop uses more elegant English with which to express himself. The same thing is said, but in entirely different words. Mr. Beecher says "it is a gigantic lie that man was created perfect and fell; that in Adam and Eve the human race fell all around. God did not make a bad job, and then paint it pretty and plaster it up. *In a sense, God made laws to be broken.*" "Beyond the Grave" only says: "We are free to confess that we can see nothing in the nature of man to exempt him from the common law of death, so far forth as he is animal. Further, we are con-

strained to believe that, left to the mere working of natural law, he would have died. . . . And we accept the idea that, had he not sinned, he would not have died." As death, according to this argument, is necessary to the highest development of the spirit of man, it was necessary that a law be violated to bring it about, and in so far of logical necessity agrees with Mr. Beecher, that God made some laws to be violated. Desirous of making other comparisons space will not permit of an enlargement of thought and argument at this point.

In Manford's *Monthly Magazine*, published in Chicago (March number, 1867), we have held up in contrast the Universalist's and orthodox view of several vital Christian doctrines. I give the Universalist's view as taken from that magazine, and see if any similarities to Mr. Beecher's or Bishop Foster's views can be detected. "The Universalists believe that the 'Fall of Man,' so-called, in the garden of Eden, was foreseen by the Creator, and that he wished it to take place. He designedly placed the temptation before Adam and Eve, and foreknew and *foreordained* their fall. He not only foresaw that they would eat of the forbidden fruit, but he designed and purposed that they should; for it was necessary that they should be tried and tempted, and that they should pass through the state of evil. Before they fell they were indeed innocent, but their innocence was that of an infant child. They were innocent, but they were not holy, for holiness implies choice. They were in this respect precisely like infant children. They knew not the difference between good and evil, happiness and misery. How could they know what good is without knowing something of evil? How could they know or value happiness without knowing something of its opposite—misery? Hence it was necessary that they should have an experience of evil, that they might know the nature and value of good, and know that obedience is sweet."

If I had not made the quotation from Mr. Beecher I

would stop at this point in quotations from Mr. Manford; it is only with a view to the remark of Mr. Beecher's denial of the atonement that I make the following from the magazine referred to: Universalists "believe that the *death* of Jesus was that of a *martyr*, and that he died as a witness for the truth. They do *not* believe that there was any efficacy in his death, except as it reveals his character and touches our hearts. They reject the idea that he died to reconcile God to man. There was no need of that. It was man, and not God, that needed to be changed."

In a work of this character space can not be given to the discussion of the doctrine of the atonement—the grandest theme on human hearts and tongues—but will have to confine the argument exclusively to the subject in controversy.\* A general statement will be found, on examination, to be not far from correct, that a tissue of thought, vital in the bishop's argument, running through his lectures, that in a degree he holds views that harmonize with Mr. Beecher, "that some laws were made to be broken," and with Mr. Manford's Calvinistic Universalism, that things in the fall and its results were about as God would have them—"designing" and "*foreordaining*" them to that end.

Let us open "Beyond the Grave," at the 151st page, and at the bottom read:

"Before we proceed to state and examine *theories* of the resurrection, it may be wise to correct some *misleading pre-conceptions*." Now, what are they? "Chief among these is the *groundless imagination* that man was *designed* to be immortal as he is; that but for sin he would have remained forever in the body with which he was at first invested—a deathless earthly man. It is easy to see how this *imagination* would become misleading in any attempt to conceive or formulate the doctrine of the resurrection." "If

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\* For discussion of the doctrine of the atonement see the author's work, "From Pit to Rock."

the *imagination* is false it should be dispelled before a theory is formulated." "That it is false" "in *every particular* we think there can be no reasonable doubt. It may be possibly true that natural death to man is somewhat the result of sin." (But the bishop doesn't believe it was.\*) "But, if true, it is certainly an exceptional case. Death to all other creatures was undoubtedly a provision in the original constitution of things—is natural." He would have man no exception to the original law or "constitution of things." We do not assert that this is true of man; but we do assert this, that he was not originally intended to remain in a body like that given him at creation. It was a temporary arrangement in any event. Had he not sinned, and so become subject to death, he would, nevertheless, in some method, have been delivered from his earthly body. Then we are not to reason from this earthly body to the resurrection body. If, under the original plan, he would in time have put on a new body, unlike the present in its wants and uses and substances, so, we may infer, it will be in the resurrection." . . . "Left to the mere working of natural law, man would have died" (243); and . . . "as to his organic life he was naturally mortal."

Thus we have some of the *similars* between men belonging to radically differing schools. At this point let us examine the bishop's argument as to

#### THE CAUSE OF DEATH.

He has closed the door against the examination, if we are compelled to accept the precedent laid down by himself. There is a *cause* of which *death* is the *effect*. Will the

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\*The *possibility* that death was "somewhat the result of sin" is so worded as to form "somewhat" of a contradiction to the positive statement of the bishop elsewhere. "If true, exceptional" is equivalent to doubt, and in the argument an implied denial.

bishop call this proposition a "groundless imagination?" or "*false in every particular?*" Before what tribunal is the case to be tried? The bishop decides that the Word of God is not the arbiter in this case.

At this point we are met with a very grave contradiction in his argument. Open "*Beyond the Grave*" at note A, page 229-242. If the note is to be understood correctly it certainly teaches a scientific demonstration of the eternity of matter. Not that matter is *from* all eternity, but that none of its elements are lost in death. God started all things into existence—*created* matter. It is scientifically demonstrated that it had a beginning, but it is not scientifically demonstrated that it will suffer annihilation. This is the burden of note A. Note B. proceeds to an assumption of a contradiction without a demonstration. If the argument includes man as in common with all other matter earthy, it can not escape the scientific fact of its unlimited duration.

#### THE SCRIPTURAL ARGUMENT.

Has the Bible any thing to do with this argument? The bishop says (Sec. 1, page 13), "There are three possible methods of conducting the discussion. These are, First. To assume every thing, and give wing to imagination and feeling. Second. To treat it exegetically, as purely a doctrine of revelation. Third. To submit it to the reason, and examine it in the light of all the facts bearing upon it which lie in the circle of our intelligence. The grandeur and obscurity of the subject invite the first; reverence for the Scripture and Christian impulse indicate the second; *the claims of intelligence*, and the deeper wants of reason and the soul, call for the third. *Aiming at the best and most permanent results, we adopt the third method.*"

It will be discovered by this indication that the questions in controversy (man's death among the rest) are to

be settled by a special exclusion of the Scriptures.\* The bishop prefers "the latter"—"the claims of intelligence, and the deeper wants of reason and the soul," "call for the *third*."

Is any man ready to believe that the "claims of intelligence and deeper wants of the soul" call for any thing greater than the Scripture presentation of the subject? Has "reason" unsettled revelation on questions of such high import?

And when the bishop says, on page 14, that "there are many who are impatient of objections to their cherished beliefs," etc., does he mean to intimate that this subject is not safe when "treated exegetically, as purely a doctrine of revelation?" and that "reverence for the Scriptures and Christian impulse" is to give way to the "claims of intelligence, and the *deeper* wants of *reason* and the soul;"—that is, do I understand him to teach that scientific "intelligence" and "reason" uninfluenced by *true* exegesis of the Scriptures upon any controverted point is competent to meet a deeper want of reason and the soul than all else, and that in consequence of this, revelation is not accepted as sufficiently authentic to be a satisfactory court before which to try the case?

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\* It may be objected that the bishop purposes three things: (1) To examine all the facts of science that bear upon the question. (2) To examine all the testimony of revelation. (3) To accept of the testimony of revelation as the ultimate supreme authority: and this inference may be based upon the statements on pages 10, 12, 70, and 109 of the bishop's book.

In answer it may be said: This argument is not supposed to proceed upon what the above may *assume*, but upon what the bishop logically *does*.

N. B. The first argument is supposed to be from the stand-point of science and reason. The next is the Scriptural argument, but the former contradicts the Scriptural teaching, and the latter is interpreted to suit the so-called scientific conclusions. I do not say that this is intentional, but it does logically result from the argument presented.

Do not let the impression be made that I am to debar myself from "reason's" sway or "intelligent" search of scientific light. My experience has led me deep into its store-houses of thought and truth; but as to its revealing to me any new truth—any food for "reason" or "intelligence" not found in a faithful exegesis of Scripture with reference to the fall, mortality, and the future state—I have not found any thing yet but what drove me more and more to recognize revealed truth as only sufficient to meet the greatest want of "reason" and "intelligence."

I say, therefore, that a precedent shall not be laid down that will exclude the revealed truth from a place in the settlement of this question of death and the resurrection. There is a sort of popularity that some are seemingly seeking, or aspiring to, recognized in the manner in which some men seem inclined to dispose of revelation. I hardly think they mean just what they say, but the manner in which they say it is exceedingly hurtful to truth instead of promoting respect for it. This evil was referred to in one of our religious journals a few years ago in the following language: "In the Tyndall dinner at New York, . . . addresses were made by Rev. H. W. Beecher, Professor Hitchcock, and others. Mr. Beecher somewhat surprised his friends by turning to Professor Tyndall, and saying that he considered him a priest, ordained, and in the same diocese with other priests or preachers, 'only preaching a little different doctrine.' 'I hail,' said Mr. Beecher, 'all discoveries that science can make, and when these discoveries, one after another, shall have been so netted together that they can throw light upon obscure places, if it obliges me to change a doctrine, or a theory, or my philosophy, I love the truth so much that I will change any thing for the sake of the truth.'"

This was all right so far as it went, but considering the speaker, and especially in the light of more recent utterances, there is a serious significance in his words. It



is bandying with truth. He may have said it with the unexpressed sentiment that Professor Tyndall would never be able to unsettle revealed truth, and thus play with the professor and his theory after the manner of a coquette, or he may have given a half expression of belief that Mr. Tyndall had unsettled some statements of Scriptures, and, therefore, he would exchange his Bible for Tyndall's philosophy.

Suppose there are "obscure" truths in the Bible; is it not a fact that some of the most obscure passages to us, a few years ago, are now made plain and satisfactory by research? Had we not better wait patiently the time, and not be hasty, believing, in like manner, that its obscurity, or so much of it as will promote our best interest, will also pass away? All science is so rapidly ratifying the Scripture narrative, and all history corroborating its record, that I confess an inclination (commendable in any one) to the "imagination," though "groundless" in the estimation of some, that there is a greater probability of the Scriptures being correct than all others. In the circumstance alluded to it is said that "Professor Hitchcock, who followed Mr. Beecher, evidently felt that his friend had been careless in his statements, or that his words were liable to misconstruction; and so, the first thing on being introduced, he said: 'I came too late into the world, sir, to meet your honored father; but, with the tradition of his fine and saintly character, I should be quite ashamed to apologize for being one of those Presbyterians whose pulse the profession has quickened a little here. It seems, sometimes, as though science and religion had met in a very narrow path, on a very dizzy ridge, and were interlocking their antlers in a struggle that must be fatal to one or the other. If it must come to this, I think history suggests that not religion but science must go down the cliff'; for mankind at large manage to get along very well without much science, but mankind at large have never managed to get

along without religion. Skepticism may endure for a day, but with the sunset and the starlight comes either religion or its disease, superstition; and superstition is the vengeance of Providence on skepticism, sure to come. But there is no need of any such issue; the path is broad enough both for science and religion, and those scientists are greatly mistaken who suspect distrust and jealousy on the part of the best representatives of the religious sentiment."

I have thrown in this incident to illustrate, on the one hand, the recklessness of statements by one class, and the deep feeling of regret on the part of others who can lay just as great claim to ability of "reason" and "intelligence" as they, and whose "intelligence" and profound research entitles their utterances to freedom from the charge of being based in "unfounded imagination." Yet this man has a "popular creed," and has dared to "formulate a theory" upon the doctrine of a literal resurrection of the dead.

I would call attention at this point to a false impression made by "advanced thinkers," and that is, in a general way, the pulpit and Christian teachers "are impatient of objections to cherished beliefs," "the intimation of them grating harshly upon their sensibilities irritates them." I believe that no class of men are so anxious to obtain light from any source as the Christian ministry; in fact, the authentic, scientific thought of the age, as it "formulates" itself into "theories," is by Christian thinkers, and has established rather than unsettled "cherished beliefs." It is because of my own conclusions from looking at truth from scientific stand-points at my command that I am more tenacious than ever of the thought of the immovableness and unchangeableness of revelation on the vital doctrines.

With these remarks I close this chapter, which shall stand as an introduction to the one to follow, on death,

and why it comes to man. For a further discussion of this subject Chapter III is written, and to it readers are invited to pass and look at its pencilings, and draw their own conclusions as to its correctness of statements as viewed in the light of *revelation* first, and then *reason*—the *revealed* record is *reasonable*.

## CHAPTER III.

## DEATH.

“WE are free to confess that we can see nothing in the nature of man to exempt him from the common law of death, so far forth as he is animal. Further, we are constrained to believe that, left to the mere workings of natural law, he would have died.”—*Bishop Randolph S. Foster.*

“Wherefore as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned.”—*Paul.*

“As to his organic life he was *naturally mortal*; and yet we accept the idea that, had he not sinned, he would not have died; the naturally mortal, as to his organic life, would have been, by special supernatural tendencies, made immortal. The disorganizing tendencies would not have been permitted to reach the catastrophe of life’s overthrow and organic dissolution.”—*Bishop R. S. Foster.*

Here is a dilemma. The bishop has either drawn himself into it, or, if his position is correct, he has drawn us all into it. The position taken, compared to the direct statement of the apostle Paul, is exceedingly unsatisfactory. Is not the argument subject to the charge of inconsistency when it is said, in one breath, “that, left to the mere working of natural law, man would have died,” and with the next, “had he not sinned, he would not have died?”

The death of man physically as a *penalty for sin*, being an admitted doctrine of the Church, and by the Church held to be the teaching of the Scriptures, the argument of

the bishop antagonizes this doctrine, which he has promised to defend, by bringing in the theory that death would have resulted by natural law without sin, thus encouraging erroneous doctrines as compared to the faith of the Church, instead of banishing them and encouraging others to do the same.

The doctrine of the "resurrection of the dead"—that of a *literal*—a *bodily* resurrection—a material resurrection, has been a "cherished doctrine" of the Church in all ages. It is incorporated in our ritual prayers to be offered by the side of the dead—we commit their "*body* to the ground, earth to earth, ashes to ashes, dust to dust; looking for the *general resurrection* in the last day, and the life of the world to come, through our Lord Jesus Christ; at whose *second coming* in glorious majesty to judge the world, *the earth and the sea shall give up their DEAD; and the CORRUPTIBLE BODIES of those who sleep in him shall be changed and made like unto his own glorious body,*" etc. It is incorporated in our baptismal covenant that we believe in "the resurrection of the *body*, and everlasting life after death"—this we certified we "steadfastly believe;" therefore when we characterize this "cherished doctrine" of the Church as based in "unfounded imagination," we have erred. These doctrines are still the "cherished doctrines" of the millions, thousands of whom are learned in scientific research and Scripture truth and exegesis, and who are quite certain that they are justifiable in clinging to their ideas of *literalism* in preference to this "advanced" idea of "higher spiritualism."

There is in the bishop's argument an exaltation of human reason and intelligence over the Word of God, which he assumes is only appealed to from "reverence" and "emotion." It is difficult to believe that he intends to make the impression that the words indicate; that is, that in the settlement of any thing by Scripture, "exegetically, as purely a doctrine of revelation," that "reason"

and "intelligence" are not operative in reaching a conclusion, and that they are excluded by the idea that "reverence" for the testimony, and emotion, enter in. He certainly does not hold (his words to the contrary) that "the claims of intelligence, and the deeper wants of reason and the soul," are in the abstract of a higher order than is represented and contained in the Word of God.

If "the claims of intelligence, and the deeper wants of reason and the soul," are competent to settle such a question as we now have in controversy—nay, *more* competent than the exegesis of purely a doctrine of revelation—for what purpose have we a revelation given? Just apply this question, that relates to any question of faith and practice, and I ask, again and again, for what purpose is a revelation given if "the claims of intelligence, and the deeper wants of reason and the soul," meet the demands of the occasion?

It may be answered, as we have it by implication in his second proposition, that the purpose of revelation is simply to produce "reverence" and "Christian impulse." But this is not necessary in the presence of not only an implied, but, by the bishop, a positively stated, greater power; for if "to submit it to reason, and examine it in the light of all the facts bearing upon it which lie within the circle of *our* intelligence" "meet the claims of intelligence, and the *deeper* wants of *reason* and of the *soul*," where is there room for any thing greater? And if it is necessary, as it is, that "reverence" and "emotion" be produced, and the bishop has suggested something greater than "pure doctrines of revelation," "exegetically" rendered, as meeting a "deeper" demand of the only faculties that can be appealed to, namely, "reason," "intelligence," and the "soul;" if this appeal can not awaken "reverence" and "emotion," then nothing else can.

He is welcome to the result of his own logic. I have not made it for him. There may be back of it a motive

that will modify it or radically change it if it had been expressed; but not expressed, and being unknown, and the argument of the lectures drifting in the channel I have indicated, it leaves his argument in the dilemma of supplanting revelation with something which he claims to be more potent for reaching the demands of reason, intelligence, and the soul.

It will be discovered that I have not left the landing from which he would have us launch forth on this ocean of thought. I am still dealing with his first principles—the foundation upon which his structure rests. It will also be discovered from this harbor, as we look away out at sea, that, while the sun may shine brightly above us, yet the white caps tipping on the crest of the wave and nodding to the winds indicate a rough sea. We have pulled up anchor, in the argument, but the vessel seems indisposed to leave the shore. There are attractions that seem to hold it there. Let us suppose that it is to take on more precious freight; that when the sails fill, and the vessel is well out among the waves, that it will ride more steadily for its tardy starting, and that the white caps may be tipped respectfully toward our banner as they behold the majestic truth of which we are freighted. The voyage may not be a pleasant one, but profitable, for all that. Some cruiser may assail us. Some man-of-war may throw his shot across us, and sharp-shooters may eye us closely; but one thing I would inscribe upon the banner over us, and under it sail, and under it fight for the settlement of all contested territory, "*Thy Word is truth.*" This *I* shall claim, and will not only appeal to "reverence" for truth and awaken the highest and holiest emotions, but will also meet "the claims of intelligence, and the deeper wants of reason and the soul."

The reader (if reader this ever has) will not demand an apology for drifting away from the heading of this chapter, and with but little explanation will see, what is



almost a necessity, the importance of stepping aside and devoting a chapter to *Reason*, its office and work, how far it has to do in the settlement of truth and in the origination of truth. It would be almost violence to the subject under consideration, should I not step aside to do that now.

The following chapter may be considered parenthetical in the argument, and, when it is completed, we shall return to this part of the subject under consideration.

## CHAPTER IV.

## REASON.

REASON is defined to be "the faculty or capacity of the human mind by which it is distinguished from the inferior animals; the higher as distinguished from the lower cognitive faculties, as sense, imagination, and memory, and in contrast to the feelings and desires, including conception, judgment, reasoning, and the intuitional faculty; the intuitional faculty, or faculty of first truths, as distinguished from the understanding, which is called the *discursive* and *rationative* faculty."

It is from the stand-point of this definition that I desire to present a few thoughts upon *reason*. But before I proceed I would be glad that my part of the discussion be laid down for a moment, and that the reader open the most excellent cyclopædia of M'Clintock & Strong to the definition of *reason*, and also to *faith and reason*, as well as "Watson's Theological Dictionary," on the *use of reason in religion*. These would be quoted in full in these pages were it not for their length. The argument will not be fully understood as it exists in my mind without the reader becomes acquainted with the thoughts of the writers referred to.

By referring to reason in the manner I do, the impression must not be made that I underrate its office and power. This is not so. I have only desired to put reason where it belongs, and by the time I complete this chapter I will be better understood.

In all ages, where, primarily, peoples have risen to a high state of intellectual greatness by the favor of God,

there seems to have been a point beyond which they could not pass in their onward and upward flight without vanity—without taking to themselves the credit of their advancement. Something of this was referred to by Paul when he saw the drift of things naturally the fruit of *reason* uninfluenced by a higher law, the law of God, when he said: “For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe; for the Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom: but we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God. Because the foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God is stronger than men.” Hence, the preliminary of these words: “For the preaching of the cross is to them which perish, foolishness; but unto us which are saved, it is the power of God. For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the disputer of this world? hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?”

The point I want to make is this: Great as is the capacity of reason, it is still finite, and that the infinite God, has given us a revelation which reason could not have originated; and yet it is reasonable to accept it—to believe it. There are many things we can not understand. If we could we would be as wise as God. As long as we are finite and God is infinite this will continue to be so—and that will be throughout eternity. To reject a thing because reason can not comprehend it is to hasten to find out God to perfection; and this would be foolishness, because the finite worm in the little moment of its earth sphere could not grasp a problem of the Infinite and solve it.

But another error that I would combat is the implica-

tion in the bishop's argument, that the solution of such a momentous truth as our state *beyond the grave* is to be more perfectly reached by the exercise of "reason"—that we can reach a more correct "examination of it in the light of all the facts bearing upon it which lie within the circle of our intelligence." I understand by this process that the "light" and "intelligence" of a treatment of this subject "exegetically, as a doctrine purely of revelation," is excluded, and that the "light" and "intelligence" with which the problem is to be solved is outside of Scripture—is within the domain of "*reason*," etc.

I assume to say that if the lectures given are the results of this attempt he has not succeeded in making his point. He proceeds with the same spirit common to earnest but mistaken men who propose to "reason out" a problem that requires divine and infinite wisdom to solve. I heard a university president say that what did not commend itself to his reason he would reject. I can see how a man can say such a thing, but I can also see how, before he has followed up his position very far, in things that pertain to infinite wisdom, he will take back a great deal, at least until he falls again within the compass of his own finite character.

The office of reason in its relation to revealed truth has been greatly misapprehended, and by others, misrepresented. The same thing may be said of the claims of revealed truth upon the reason. Take one passage as illustrating the correctness of this remark: "*For we walk by faith, and not by sight.*" We sing an old stanza,

*"Blind unbelief is sure to err,  
And scan his works in vain;  
God is his own interpreter,  
And he will make it plain."*

But such has been the misapprehension growing out of wrong interpretation that when the skeptic reads the above text it retorts against our song, and says that *faith*

is *blind*; and further, not only the text, but in fact the whole Bible presentation of faith is held up as a thing without eyes, ears, judgment, reason, or choice of its own—and that to “walk by faith and not by sight,” is to be led by priest, bishop, or pope, who dictate action and opinion, and in whose hands is the individual conscience to mold it at their will and pleasure, or, as the New York *Tablet* puts it, “There is no such thing as private conscience and freedom of judgment.” This expression of sentiment is familiar to us all, as dwelling upon the lips of every writer who has used his pen against the Christian religion.

There are two points of assault from which they attack the citadel of truth, one from the Calvinistic and the other from the Romanistic point of view. Choosing the bad side of both these systems, and forgetting that there is a large body of evangelical Christians who can no more indorse what these skeptics condemn than they can themselves, they proceed as if they had a surety of success against the Bible when they have refuted the bad phases of Calvinism and Roman Catholicism, and I confess they have had an easy task of it if this was all they had to do. But they have not touched truth. They have dealt, and not too severely, with human appendages with which men have surrounded truth, but after they have torn these away and discovered the living truth within, and assaulted that, I assume to say that they have not picked the most imperceptible mite of gravel from the granite rock, and it looks forth upon us with the same granite gravity and firmness as when it was first given by the Great Giver of truth.

A noted so-called literary man\* is represented as saying that “there are but two sides to human thought and belief, one that to a *priest-ridden* religion and blind belief, the other to rationalism or freethinking.” What subtlety—what allurements in that expression “rationalism or free-

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\* Emerson.

thinking!"—as if we who beg leave to differ with "rationalist" or "freethinkers" were not as free in our thinking as they possibly can be. Why is it irrational for me to think for myself? Why am I any more enslaved in my thinking than any rationalist or freethinker when I of my own free will and accord arrive at conclusions he can not accept? Does my rationalism depend on accepting his views? I claim I am as rational as he, as much a *freethinker* as he, though he and I may come to different conclusions of thought. I arrive at my conclusions by the exercise of the same human reason that he does; my thoughts are as fully free as his. I deny that any man must go entirely over to rationalism, falsely so-called, to be a *rationalist*, or that he must give up all thoughts of God, revelation, and religion save only the deductions of his own mind, "reason," or consciousness. I deny that a man is a slave in intellect or blind in reason because he seeks the aid of revelation and religion to reinforce the faculties God has given, but which are marred and weakened by the touch of sin. Those who are disposed to act to the contrary are welcome to the record of the past to prove the fruit of their endeavor.

That reason is powerful I admit. That it can reach all but perfection, the art and learning and poetry of the ancients attest, but with the highest attainment the heights themselves became rotten and fell. Reason can not go far without God without tumbling over a precipice of ruin. Greece and Rome, and back of that Babylon and the world's past learning, leave scarcely a stone to mark the spot of its existence, and yet it was the apex of reason that evolved the ruin of the past greatness of these. The rationalist can take to his credit, if he will, the darkest days of France, when they enthroned the *Goddess of Reason* in the person of a woman, and worshiped her, as if the very men who denied God must still have an object to worship. Rationalists are welcome to the fruit that was born of that

revolt against God and religion. A scene like that has never been known where "pure and undefiled religion" prevailed. Let any well authenticated history of France and of the time referred to be read, and my remarks will be proven true.

Germany and France to-day are living witnesses to these statements in their struggles to restore the dominion of evangelical truth and destroy the fruit of their rationalism—the corruptest years ever known in their history—by reviving a love for the Word of God and the life and purity it gives. How well this is being done is attested by the fact that the schools of rationalism are begging students while those of the evangelicals are full and running over. Begin at the beginning, and reason from cause to effect, just how long would it take the bishop's logic, as this question of man's fall and immortality is to be submitted to reason and examined in the light of the facts bearing upon it which lie in the circle of our intelligence, I say how long, with such setting aside of the Word of God, would it take to produce just such results as we have hinted at in these last remarks? You may laugh the fear to scorn, but if there is any thing in the law of cause and effect, and if we are allowed to reason from the same, I assert, without fear of successful contradiction, that this is where the fall of once great empires began, and their return to dust and ashes is where they ended.

Like causes produce like effects, and it is difficult to believe that this overlaudation of "reason" and human "intelligence" in this latter day will help a restoration, where they have precedence in settling a great and vital doctrine of *revealed* truth over "pure revelation." Is it not time to call a halt? We will give reason its dues and assign it its proper place before we close this chapter.

But to return to the statement of Mr. Emerson, who has really expressed the feeling and sentiment of his class of thinkers, whether of his particular school or not. In



spite of a universal evangelical and Protestant protest, skepticism insists that Christianity is only to be known in the worst phases of Romanism, in its blind trust in the priesthood (hence the expression by Mr. Emerson, "priest-ridden religion"), and surrender of its judgment, conscience, and reason to the same in matters of faith and doctrine. Hence Volney, Voltaire, Thomas Paine and others, with not an exception to my knowledge, play largely and long on that single string. After they have thus paid their respects to the worst phases of Romanism they turn to the worst phases of Calvinism, and sing them a song, compared to which the imprecatory psalms are as warbling sweetness. If Romanism, in its offensive phases, is representative Christianity, then must we concede that the charge is correct, that the Christian idea of faith is deaf, dumb, and blind, and that a Christian who is made such after this pattern has eyes, but sees not, ears but hears not, etc., more like the graven images that heathens worship.

But skepticism must learn moral honesty in its judgment of Christian belief. It must learn to separate Christian truth from all human appendages. It is not the Church that makes faith (per Romanism), but faith that makes the Church. A correct judgment of Christianity can only be arrived at by looking at it from the standpoint of its Founder, and not from human weakness and errors that have been imposed upon it by men in the name of religion. Where, in the whole range of God's revealed Word, does it appear, when he speaks to men, that he holds them as of duty bound to be dumb and blind, etc., and who have no judgment, reason, or discernment of their own? From Genesis to Revelation, I fail to discover such a low estimate of man, save here and there where sin has made him such, and the office of religion was offered to create a contrary state. God everywhere addresses us in revelation as *rationalists* in the true sense.\*

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\* Compare Psal. xxxii, 9.

But, mark you, he does not address us as the bishop does; that is, that the great problems of sin, and *beyond the grave*, are to be "submitted to reason, to be examined in the light of all the facts bearing upon it within the circle of *our* intelligence," and that this, in contrast with the idea that "it is purely a doctrine of revelation to be exegetically considered," meets "the claims of intelligence, and the *deeper* wants of reason and the soul." God says of all things that pertain to man's highest interests for time and eternity, of instruction thereon, "I am the Lord, and beside me there is no other." *He* speaks and we listen. Do not get a wrong impression. He speaks to us, not in a sense in which "reason" or "intelligence" could of themselves evolve a solution of the problems involved, not that we are *above* instruction from revelation, though that, according to the bishop, only called for "reverence" and "impulse;" but God proceeds upon the principle that, *rational* as we are, it is a fact that our rationalism consists not so much in originating truth as it does in our perceptivity of it, with power to receive the truth when presented, truth that is always above us.

It may be a proposition not acceptable to the ear of many when I hold that man is blind in the matter of *originating* truth, and that this proposition is as true in its application to skeptical rationalists as it is to others who hold to "popular creeds" and "cherished beliefs."

To explain: When I say we are rational creatures, I mean that our *rationalism*, our reason, our private judgment, have eyes, ears, and reason, not to *originate* light and sound and truth, but to perceive the existence of these—the existence of truth—truth that has always existed, and as much though we had been born idiots or never born at all.

Skepticism is guilty of the irrational position that truth is originated by human reason. If it shirks this proposition, then is it bound to accept the existence of truth

separate and apart from reason. If it does this it might just as well at once come over to the ground of a divine intelligence and revelation, for it can not escape it coming so far. But this they do not want to do. It robs them of somewhat of honor, that they had taken to themselves, of competency to originate something; and not to be able so to do is a great humiliation. Letting them have their own way, then, suppose that men had all been born monkeys or idiots, would that have proven that truth could not exist because there were no creatures but monkeys and idiots? It might be replied that there could have been no written revelation of it. Suppose that to be true. Burn up every Bible on the face of the globe, and would it not be just as much a truth that "the wages of sin is death," unwritten as well as written? How has the idea prevailed that for a thing to be true it must be written? It is not true because it is written, but it is written because it is true. But why was it written? For the simple reason that that wonderful *reason* which some laud to the skies was incompetent to keep an infallible truth unimpaired, and that a written revelation was a necessity, not for the truth's sake, but for *fallible reason's* sake. These things were *written* for our instruction.

The very fact that God has given us a revelation of himself to man is an overwhelming testimony to the incompetency of human reason of itself to solve the problem of evil, of human destiny and future existence. If this is not correct, and I am mistaken as to the limit of the powers of reason, then is a revelation not necessary. Some skeptics go so far as to say that revelation is a trammel to reason. Very well, there are countries where they have it not, and how do they succeed? Did you ever hear of any such superior to Christian lands and peoples? Tell us of one country made better because it is without the Bible. If this skepticism be true, then Bishop Thomson was correct when, on the same point, he said, "Turn the Bible

out and turn the Indians in." It is not true. Some of us still remember and feel the thrill of the words of sainted Bishop Janes, in alluding to this very subject: "The best man you ever knew was a Christian, and he was better for his religion." His religion was that of the Bible. It rose superior to his reason, and reason laid hold upon it and was elevated by it. Blot out the race, and do you blot out truth? When reason *perceives* truth it perceives that which had an existence before it—reason perceives the pre-existence of truth—and that it will exist to all eternity, though reason and thought and judgment should perish. Reason *creates* nothing—it originates nothing—but it perceives and arrives at a knowledge of created things—things and truth already originated of God himself.

Another assumption of skepticism is, that God has not revealed himself definitely—what he has given is not sufficient to meet the demands of reason, etc. My judgment is, that God has revealed all of himself that it is possible for him to reveal, when we consider the character of the creatures to whom the revelation is made. Man would have thought and known much less about God than he does if the revelation had exceeded what it has been or is.

God has respect to the limited capacity of his creatures. A million years hence there will be no more of God than there is now. But will we not know more of God then than we do now? Yes; certainly. But will that be because God will reveal more of himself? Will it not rather be because in our flight, in development of our perceptive powers, we have drawn nearer to him, entering more fully into the secret place, the holy of holies, and possess or will have attained unto a more perfect knowledge of him? Is not the import of the words that if we draw nigh unto him he will draw near unto us this, that he who is in every place, in a certain sense, can not be any nearer than he is, but by our approach in spiritual attitude and purity, the presence is made more conscious, and it be-

comes more and more a matter of realization the higher we ascend the hill of heaven and merge into the light of his countenance? We must rise to the heavenly state to know God and heaven, and to become intimately acquainted with them; but remember, fickle *reasoner*, that the pathway from the highway of life that leads up to the gate of the Eternal and into the mansions of light is not one of your own making; it is made of rays of light, not from reason's brightest intellect, but from the revelation of the Eternal One, and it is impossible to ascend by any other way. "Thy Word is a lamp to my feet, and a light in my pathway," is the confident expression of every confiding heart.

Again: What is said of the independence of revealed truth over reason, and its superiority over reason, as well as reason's dependence upon it, is also applicable in every department of thought.

First: It is applicable in the law of nature. It is possible that reason can not comprehend all of *nature*. But does only so much of nature exist as reason comprehends? Nature is, in spite of this absence of reason's comprehension. What would you think of the man who would claim that, as human reason comprehends the workings of nature's laws in the movements of the planets, it therefore originated the system of law by which they are governed? that because the eye discovers light, it therefore created light? that because the ear hears sound, and the reasoning faculties and perceptive powers define it, therefore these in unison created sound?

These questions may seem foolish, but they are just as applicable in other domains. They, therefore, apply in the moral and spiritual domain. Reason can not comprehend all; it does perceive and comprehend a part. Reason *apprehends* a great deal more than it *comprehends*. Reason does not reject because it can not comprehend. It accepts what it *apprehends*. But whether it can or can not com-

prehend, truth exists all the same. It would be indeed a pretentious man who would say that because he understands the moral law he originated the Ten Commandments.

The principal fault is, that while the head may say to the heart, I have no need of thee, and the heart in return say, I have no need of thee, that sometimes the heart gets ambitious of aggrandizement, and the head being subject to flattery from that direction, they lay plans in unison to run the engine themselves; and just as sure as they do it they will ditch the engine. They think that life and law are a single track—no stations, switches, or trains to consider; no table of time, conditions, or rates—and the first thing they know they are not only off the track, but tangled all up in wreck and underbrush.

George Bally has fitly said:

“With scanty line shall reason dare to mete  
The immeasurable depths of Providence?  
On the swoll’n bladders of opinion borne,  
She floats awhile, then, floundering, sinks, absorbed  
Within that boundless sea she strove to grasp.  
Shall man, here stationed to revere that God  
Who called him into being from the dust,  
His mortal scheme implead, and, impious, cite  
The Almighty Legislator to the bar  
Of erring intellect?”

What does reason do, but explore a field already at its hand? Was gold not in existence before its discovery, or did its discovery create it? Reason has *created* nothing, but it has *discovered* much, and I thank God that its greatest discovery is reason’s God. But stop. Is that correct? Rather, is it not true that the God of reason has discovered himself *to* reason, and had he not done so what evidence have we that reason would have ever discovered him? How futile the assumption that in any thing it has originated that which it discovered. Columbus discovered America, but did not originate it. The same may be said

of reason when truth exists. It can *discover*, and that is *much*, and that is *duty*.

But this argument assumes a very important aspect, especially when we apply it to Bishop Foster's *Thirdly*, in which he prefers to base his argument on the *future state* on "reason," etc., rather than on "*pure revelation*."

For instance: when, as in the text, we say "we walk by faith, and not by *sight*"—that is, not by logical deductions nor natural inferences, nor conclusions evolved by reason from the general conditions of things, but by "ex-egetically" considering the subject under consideration "as purely a doctrine of revelation"—Paul would bring the reasoner to understand that this latter is the only rule and law by which he can draw his conclusions as to the *state beyond the grave*. Now to the point. This expression, "We walk by faith, and not by sight," appears but once in the Word of God. There is nothing like it elsewhere in the Scriptures. It must, therefore, be understood in direct connection with the subject under consideration by the apostle, and deductions must be drawn accordingly. Mark you, Paul is not in this connection, as a skeptic would intimate, exhorting the Corinthians to the exercise of a blind faith, a blind submission to priestly dictation, but to the acceptance of a divinely revealed truth. Not a surrender of conscience and judgment into the hands of an ecclesiastic—that is not it. He has under discussion the momentous doctrine of immortality, of the future state, of a sphere of existence more unknown to mortals, so far as natural sight is concerned, than that of the winged butterfly to the worm still in its cradle, yet to be full-fledged for the flight, and much less understandable, except as God reveals it to us in his Word, where our eyes may in some measure see, and our ears in some measure hear, of the ecstatic abode sufficiently to constrain us to plume our wings for the flight, to be away, for that we may some day inhabit that sphere.



Bishop Foster has essayed to tell us that so much of that state as may be known to us here is very indefinitely portrayed in the Scripture. "To submit" this subject "to the *reason*, and examine it in the light of all the facts bearing upon it which lie within the circle of *our* intelligence," is, in his judgment, the preferable way to solve the problem. He says, referring to the last sentence in the quotation, "*Aiming at the last and most permanent results, we adopt the third method.*"

So far as he takes this method he walks by *sight* and not by faith. May I call his attention to the fact that he proposes here to unfold by ocular demonstration and process of "reason" and "human intelligence" a matter that God himself has put beyond such a solution? Again, it is about the only subject in the whole revealed Word of God of which it is expressly stated that it is not to be settled in that way, but that with reference to the resurrection of the dead and *beyond the grave*—the *future state*—Paul expressly says, that for information on that subject, "reason," "wisdom," "human intelligence," are not considered in the count at all, for "we walk by faith and not by sight." That means it all. I claim that at the tribunal of revelation only this subject is to be settled, and that all other considerations of it are futile of settlement, opinions as various as the faces of the race, or leaves upon the trees. Therefore, a doctrine that belongs to another domain than this—a state that has no affinities for ours, so much so that travelers to those shores never return; a condition of things, a state, a world, that mortals can not look into until death conveys them thence, must and only can be a matter of "pure revelation" if we know any thing about it at all, which revelation "aims at the best and most permanent results."

It is a very interesting process to witness, for a man to attempt to settle "by sight" what is expressly and divinely said to be only a matter of revelation, and there-

fore with reference to it we "*walk by faith*" in what is *revealed*. The question I now propound is, Are we ready to accept the Scriptures as authority on the specific doctrine that it claims to be the sole and only authority for, Bishop Foster's "deeper wants of the reason" to the contrary?

About matters that pertain to *present* attainments, beliefs, and duties, etc., Paul says, "That faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the Word of God," teaching diligent search after truth based upon evidence at hand, on which we rest our reasonings; but in reference to the future state, in a sense in which it is not applicable to any thing else, we take the Word of God as authority, and "*walk by faith*" with reference to a state that does not come within the domain of "*sight*." It is settled by what the Scriptures say of it, and by them only. We therefore can not know of the future state by analogy. The nature of it is not arrived at by deductions of thought. It belongs to the unseen. We must accept the statements of "*pure revelation*," for there is no other method by which we can have knowledge of it. It is not known by ocular demonstration. Eye hath not seen it, nor the ear heard it, nor the heart's perceptions or longings possess any idea whatever of it, save what is revealed. The same may be said of the *intermediate state*. Perhaps it is more of the intermediate state alluded to by Paul than the final condition of the righteous in these words, but that does not alter their sense.

Facts that belong to the domain of God and of futurity can only be known as God reveals them. This he has done in the Scriptures. It is with reference to this unseeable state of the future and undemonstrable, that Paul says, "For we which live are always delivered unto death for Jesus' sake, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in our mortal flesh. So death worketh in us, but life in you. We having the same spirit of faith, according

as it is written, I believed, therefore have I spoken; we believe and therefore speak; knowing that he which raised up the Lord Jesus shall raise up us also by Jesus, and shall present us with you. For all things are for your sakes, that the abundant grace might through the thanksgiving of many redound to the glory of God. For which cause we faint not; but though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day. For our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory; while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal. For we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle be dissolved, we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven; if so be that being clothed we shall not be found naked. For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened; *not for that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life [immortality].* Now he that hath wrought us for the *self-same thing* is God, who also hath given unto us the earnest of the Spirit. Therefore we are always confident, knowing that, while we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord (*for we walk by faith and not by sight*); we are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord. Wherefore we labor, that, whether present or absent, we may be accepted of him."

Now, all will concede that here is a state of things alluded to as existing upon the occasion of the occurrence of death. But the "*mortal*" is "*made*" for "*immortality*," and *it shall be swallowed up of the same*. This is a subject about which nature, science, art, and reason can give us no information, and becomes, therefore, on our part, a

matter of pure faith in what is revealed—faith in the veracity of God upon the subject of our immortality. As God reveals through nature and nature's law the mode of nature's existence, he also, in his Word and in Christ, reveals to us the *fact* and *mode* of our future state. This addresses itself not so much to the outward vision, but to our inner faith, and thus we walk, not by sight with reference to things unseen and unseeable, but by faith—by faith because of the unseeableness of things referred to, and because the facts alluded to belong to a domain that can not be demonstrated in this; God must speak from beyond—we listen and believe.

And this is not blind faith, though we do not walk by sight. Taking God at his word is not blindness. Taking a fallible priest at his word would be. The difference is plain—one is the great and infinite and unerring God, the other is fallible, and perhaps sinful, man.

Have we not the strongest reason to believe that what God has said to us of the resurrection, heaven, endless life, joy, and uninterrupted peace, will be true? Will he be true of all else, and only indefinite and uncertain in this? Will he put the cup of immortality to our lips, and about the time we would quench our thirst from this goblet of revelation dash it to the earth, and tell us, in cold, unfeeling language, that we must submit it to erring "reason, and examine" it in the light of all the facts bearing upon it which lie within the circle of *our* intelligence?" and that this process meets "the claims of intelligence, and the deeper wants of reason and of the soul?" Is this the way? Do we know more than God about it? If this can be accomplished without revelation as our authority and guide, then have we no need of revelation.

That about which the apostle is speaking can not be seen by natural vision; it does not come within the compass of "facts" that "lie within the circle of *our* intelligence;" it is beyond all these, but it is there to be revealed

to our "intelligence" and "reason"—revealed because of our inability to evolve the truth of it. We believe it as of revelation; and because the eye can not see and the ear hear, still, for the assurance given in the past revealed evidences, Paul is willing now to make it a matter of pure faith. This is the crowning virtue of the heart.

All the apostles had seen Christ. Five hundred others had been witnesses of his resurrection, etc., and now Paul claims that honor; and from this onward he wants no better testimony of future existence and glory. It is also remarkable that revelation asks no better evidence than its own statements, and that such a faith in immortality is without demonstration save by the simple utterances of God and the example of Jesus Christ. Such a faith and hope are inseparable. Paul, waiting for this future redemption of the *body* from the grave, says (Rom. viii, 24): "We are saved [in the resurrection] by hope; but hope that is seen is not hope: for what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for? But if we hope for that we see not, then do we with patience wait for it;" or, in other words, with reference to the immortal state, in our earth-sphere, beyond the reach of human sight or comprehension, we walk by faith in the revealed truth of it. If there is no heaven, no immortality, then *faith* and *hope* may be blotted from all languages and from all hearts as useless and meaningless words. Read the eleventh chapter of Hebrews, and see how often in that catalogue of worthies *faith* relates to immortality. By faith . . . Moses endured as seeing him who was invisible. "Others were tortured, not accepting deliverance, *that they might obtain a better resurrection.*"

One thing I demand in this argument, and that is, that we make the Scriptures the court of appeal on the question of immortality. I think all will concede it as the only true settlement.

One weariness of illustrations that do not illustrate. I do not object to parables where they are used as Christ

uses them. In his hands they illustrate something. But I suggest to any intelligent critic the propriety of a second and deliberate analysis of any or all of the bishop's illustrations, and he will not find *one* that illustrates the subject for which he has chosen it. My reason for this delicate statement is, that the arguments are so unscriptural, and we of the "popular creeds" and "cherished faiths" have been so in the habit of regarding the Scriptures as the Word of God, that we fail to see the point to an illustration of the future state that does not accord with those Scriptures. We may be smiled at for our credulity, but there is great simplicity and force in the truth. What analogy between the telegraphic illustration and the future capacity of the soul in its communications! Of course, it will not apply where the bishop wants to rule out the possibility of any *materiality* in the future state, for there is no telegraphy where there is no materiality. Now I make another proposition, and a fair one, that is, upon the principles of true arbitration and settlement of disputed points, and as he is disputant opening the controversy, he will choose his arbiter, which he may style Nature—which embraces all its law, etc. The attorney before this arbiter, and in behalf of the bishop's argument, we will call, "Submit-it-to-reason-and-examine-it-in-the-light-of-all-the-facts-bearing-upon-it-which-lie-within-the-circle-of-our-intelligence"—a very long name, I know, but one that is very comprehensive and suggestive. He shall choose that individual. I will choose one by another name: "Word-of-God-which-is-the-only-rule-and-the-sufficient-rule-both-of-our-faith-and-practice"—another long name, and also very suggestive and comprehensive. With these two we consent that they shall choose a third. We will call this person "Interpreter-of-the-fall-of-man-and-his-immortality-in-the-light-of-the-revealed-mind-of-God-who-would-have-no-contradictory-interpretation-between-revealed-and-natural-truth." Now we have a very comprehensive and significant court

before which we take our case upon which we have disagreed. We certainly have chosen eminent personages—eminent in authority, eminent in truth, in integrity; and if there is seeming disagreement in the minds of our choice, the third party chosen by them will certainly deal fairly with all. His name indicates harmony. If this can be accomplished much good will have been achieved.

I take it for granted that the case is ready for arbitration. Very well. We will let these arbiters make up their case as we proceed with the trial, but for the entertainment of the reader will say, by way of prophecy, that this arbitration will result in showing the bishop's bird and "fish story" and "amazing" figures as the most absurd illustrations in the argument. To abbreviate, we have each consented, I to take the Word of God, he to take nature, and the third party is harmony of interpretation, save that the Highest has precedence in the argument and testimony—that is God. This is not a compromise, it is coming to right conclusions upon the principles of truth. The reader will find as we proceed with the argument the application of the above principles. To continue our argument upon *Reason*. *Truth* is the thing to be attained. Just here is another department of faith. It perhaps puts faith in a more understandable relation to reason, that is, "Faith cometh by *hearing* and hearing by the Word of God." God never issued a decree of predestination or election that saved a soul beyond the existence of conditions made contingent upon the volition or exercise of man's will. Faith is not decreed. Man has faith in its primary element very much as God has given him eyesight. Man can not deny this. He may deny his eyes, and possibly may have none; still, though he be stark blind, yet you have never seen such a man but had indentures or cavities where eyes ought to have been and where eyes were intended. So a man's condition, morally, when he says he has no faith. He is a monstrosity—a deformity. While he may say,



"I do not believe this or that," still he finds himself caught upon a hook of faith, and he is seen floundering hither and thither in the waters of confusion, of conflicting theories and philosophies, and no difference how far out he has drawn the line in his meanderings, still when he stops his floundering and rests for breath he finds himself on this hook of faith. He can not get away any more than he can get away from his eyes and ears, unless he would put them out, which he may possibly do. If the destructive element has mastery he may by violence ruin all. But, unlike the fish, God makes it contingent upon the man's own volition or choice as to whether he will be brought ashore. Peter was to be a fisherman of men, but the men were not *forced* ashore; they came of their own accord. The Bible places faith upon the most intelligent basis: "Faith cometh by *hearing*." Intelligence and reason is the foundation of *faith*. No man can believe without testimony on the subject to be believed. For instance, Bishop Foster says that faith in immortality is in the Christian's creed, but that also God's revelation of the future state is indefinite. Logically, the revelation that gives indefinite intelligence on the doctrine of immortality gives but an indefinite faith. We are thus warned against the formulation of theories upon the resurrection from the revealed Word. Testimony with reference to Christian faith comes from God. Faith and ignorance are incompatible. "What! can not an ignorant man believe in Christ?" Ignorant in what? "Well, must a man have an education, understand the agreement of science, etc., with revelation before he can accept the Gospel?" you ask. Educated in what? A man may be well informed about many good and useful things, but ignorant of the facts of the Gospel. He can not believe unless he is intelligent upon the things to be believed. Why? "Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the Word of God." No man can believe a thing of which he has not heard. If he believes in Christ it is

because he is *informed* of Him. The intelligence necessary to faith is to acquaint one's self with the truth of revelation, and this a man may do and be ignorant of other things. And this intelligence is that which is essentially necessary to the elevation and salvation of men. All else without this may make him but a polished villain. It is fashionable not to look upon the man well informed in the Scriptures as an educated man. Why is he not as much an educated man as he who is learned in every thing else and yet ignorant of the Scriptures? The man who knows God's truth is the better educated of the two, for he is a double scholar; that is, he is informed of both worlds and of both departments of life here, the religious and practical, while the man ignorant of the Scriptures knows only of the secular and temporal.

Many people are passing currently as educated who are unacquainted with the very rudiments of intelligence, especially with reference to the facts that have been revealed to us. They can tell you how many pounds to the bushel of the various products of the soil and all about the markets and stock, but when you ask for some definite knowledge that indicates search for intellectual and spiritual food their information is very indistinct. Faith draws a focus on testimony and rests its case there.

It is therefore both intellectual and moral. Faith is a house with two stories. The first story is laid in intellectual foundations. It hears and asks, Are these things so? It arrives at conclusions, and these conclusions of evidence are where the case *rests*. The *resting* of that faith is the second story of the structure—the faith of *trust*. As to the acceptance of truth there is no such a thing as faith without personal intelligence and testimony on the thing to be believed. I reject that Romanistic idea that intelligence is to be excluded from the domain of faith. Skepticism has made a club of this with which to break our heads. Faith says, "*Search*," etc. It also says, "Come, let us

reason together." It therefore means investigation, the employment of the reasoning faculties. The incident is familiar of Doctors McCabe and Rust, down South, teaching a set of colored deck hands how to unload brick from a wharfboat, by tossing them from one person to another, and not by the endless tramp with a few bricks on the head. The negroes looked on in amazement, and when they saw the point one burly fellow leaned back in great laughter and said, "Dat is berry nice, massa; but den what is de head for?" They are learning what the head is for. "The eye can not say unto the hand, I have no need of thee; nor again the feet, I have no need of thee." (1 Cor. xii, 21.) The same may be said of heart and head. Reason and faith (and that means reason and revealed truth) are joined of God together, and let no man put them asunder, though it be dictated by pope and priest.

It is a noticeable feature of revealed truth that it recognizes faith as resting upon the basis of intelligence. In no instance are *impressions, feelings*, etc., taken as indications of true faith. The highest type of faith is not passive, but to the contrary. Hence, in every instance God calls to the exercise of intelligent judgment and reason in matters of faith. He says: "Stand ye in the ways, and see and ask for the old paths, wherein is the good way," etc. (Jer. vi, 16.) "To the *law* and to the *testimony*." (Isa. viii, 20.) "Remember ye the *law*, . . . with the *statutes* and *judgments*." (Mal. iv. 4.) "Search the Scriptures," etc. "I have found him of whom Moses in the law and the prophets did write." He searched. No man can, consistently with the Scriptures, form an idea of faith that would fold its hands and close its eyes, and let God mysteriously guide him as he does inanimate matter, or even as much as he does in the case of the birds, etc. "He heareth the ravens," etc. "The young lions do lack and suffer hunger." "Not a sparrow falls without the Father's notice;" and *are not ye of more value than many*

sparrows? If so, so also is your faith of a higher type than theirs.

If you will tell me the difference between the birds of the air and beasts of the field and yourself, I will tell you the difference between the faith they exercise and yours. Yours is that of a moral intelligence, a *rational* creature. Your faith is of a higher type than theirs, as you are a higher type of being. These may rove over forest and field, and *instinct* prevents them from touching a poisonous herb. Put that herb in the hand of a child, and it will thrust it at once into its mouth and be poisoned. But *instinct* is not *faith*. It may have some of the elements of it. It is not by *instinct* that the soul finds its first longings after God; it is deeper than instinct. *Passiveness* is not *faith*. You, as well as your child, learn from *evidence*, from intelligent deductions, that that plant is poisonous; on that testimony you believe it to be a fatal poison, and shun it. God does not protect you on the grounds of any other kind of faith than that here indicated.

Just so is it in the work of the soul's salvation. God puts you upon your intelligence, and upon that intelligence you *act*, you *rest* your case; that *resting* is *faith*. This *resting* upon intelligent testimony is the second story in this structure of faith. The first was the faith of intellect, which laid the foundation of the true and complete fabric on testimony. It is the faith that accepts the historical evidences of truth, of the atonement, etc.; but that is not enough without the second department of faith. He who only accepts intellectually the facts of the Gospel has only half-faith—only half believed. But he who accepts the *facts*, and then *rests* his case upon them with a sure confidence in the evidence given, has a *whole faith*, entire faith, and finds himself governed by the same. He knows, better than I can tell, the solid comfort that flows to his heart from such resting.

## “WHAT IS TRUTH?”

Just at this point comes the most difficult problem that faith, reason, and intelligence have to settle, and that is contained in the question, “What is truth?” Happy will it be for us if we do not turn away before it is answered, as Pilate turned away, either in contempt of Christ, or with what he thought a well-grounded conviction that it could not be answered. If the former, he was wicked in the offense; if the latter, then do I use his admission as wonderful testimony against all who assume to settle revealed problems too intricate for the reach of human reason by “human intelligence.” Pilate had tried it. The wisdom of the ages has tried it. But, after it all, “the wisdom of the world is foolishness with God.”

One man stepped forth amid the conflicting opinions of the centuries, the Babel into which unaided reason had led the human intellect, amid the anarchy of thought, and said, “I am the Way, and the Truth, and the Life.” From that moment the question has been settled. If God is the fountain of wisdom, then are we told that “Christ is the wisdom of God.” Wisdom has found itself embodied in personality, and without such a revelation of it I think the question, “What is truth?” would have never been answered. In Jesus Christ I find every thing that I want to know.

I think at this point the reader has the key to the rest of my argument. If Jesus Christ is the *Light* of the world, the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world; if he was the answer to every problem that vexed our nature; if he came to cast light upon our pathway, assurance where there was doubt, gladness where was sorrow, life where there was death, immortality where there was nothing but decay,—then am I certain that the solution of the problem of this discussion will not be a difficult one. Who denies this office to Christ? Who

believes that he did not come to be all that I have spoken? In him, to those who sit in the valley and shadow of death, light is sprung up. While he came into the world to throw light upon the human pathway, none of us are ready to concede that at the grave his light went out. It streamed forth in one continuous blaze from the cradle to the cross, to the grave, through death, to the throne. He is the solution of the problem that reason can not solve, "What is truth?"

If, without the aid of revelation, reason could have attained perfection and truth, it has had ample opportunity and freedom to do so. Have the past achievements of reason, with all the combined wisdom of the ages, been the product of a single thought that has thrilled the heart of humanity as *truth*? No. On the other hand, is it not a fact that, with the highest attainments of human reason, its sway has produced but a confusion of opinions and tongues? Why was all this so? Because human reason does not contain in itself the *authority of truth*. That rests with God, who is its originator, and it is fallacy for man to dream of originating that which alone belongs with God. Here is the secret of the wreck of human failure as reason assumed to take the seat of God. Just there, too, is where the bishop's argument will fail, because from the beginning he assumes to find something that meets the claims of reason and the soul more than "pure revelation," "exegetically" considered. I feel that the battle is fought and the victory is already won, and would at this point lay down my pen were it not for the pleasure I have in looking into and seeking after truth.

I shall take the liberty to extend this chapter on reason to greater length, for I know that if the reader's interest will increase with mine, he will desire me to continue.

*What is Truth?*—Dr. Whedon remarks upon this question that "Pilate supposes that he had applied a finisher—all the philosophy of the age in which he lived had decided

that man could know but this: that is, *that nothing could be known*. That higher truth is undiscoverable—that, in fact, there is no absolute truth—no difference between ultimate truth and falsehood, were the conclusion at which highest human thought had arrived. And what the philosophers taught, political and military men thus accepted. It was, therefore, readily and generally agreed that visible and tangible things, things of sense and of the present world, were all. Talk to such a man in a high strain of philosophic, religious, or divine truth, and his reply is: ‘Bah! What is truth? I understand positive science, but as for your higher truth, it is a chimera.’ He waited for no answer, because his very question was intended to deny the possibility of all answer.”

But Pilate’s answer to the Jews, when he went out to them, was unconsciously the answer to his own question, What is truth? that is “I find in him no fault at all”—and this is *truth*. “I am the life, and the truth, and the way; no man cometh to the Father but by me.” “All things are delivered unto me of my Father; and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him.” (Matt. xi, 27.) If in Him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily—the treasures of wisdom and knowledge—then is it true that *truth* is to know God and his son Jesus Christ. Thus Paul (Phil. iii, 8), said, “I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord: for whom I have suffered the loss of all things, and do count them but dung, that I may win Christ, and be found of him; not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God; that I may know him and the power of his resurrection,” etc.

In the matter of truth God wants men to accept facts, and not undertake the solution of mysteries, and demand



their solution as a condition of belief in the truth. "Secret things belong unto God," etc. Nearly all dispute takes place on the *mode* of truth. Some are disposed to reject truth or hold it as risky or improbable, when its *mode* is not comprehended, when, at the same time, the truth is apparent. Is it reasonable to reject truth when men know it, believe it, but can not explain its *mode* of existence?

Here is a most wonderful revelation. "The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and *truth*." Away with your clamor about understanding, etc.; there *truth* stands out before you, personified—aye, more, a person, character, life—and you can see it and know it in him. Your cavil is at an end unless you shut your eyes on Christ. Look at him. Hear: "He that hath the Son hath the Father also," and that is enough. *Momentous truth!* What more can the soul or reason want? To want more is to be more than *infinitely* greedy, for you have all—the Son and the Father also. Can you take in more? This Word, Christ, and *truth* made flesh says, "I am the way," the highway on which the wayfaring man though a fool need not err—the "*truth* that comes within the ear-grasp of every child, the life, that enables all who receive him to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name."

"In Him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily." He therefore says "I am the truth, life, and way." "The resurrection and the life, and God giving us Christ hath given us all things else, even the *resurrection*." "Therefore, let no man glory in men: for all things are yours; whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come; all are yours; and ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's." Stop and "exegetically" consider this text; and see if you are not rich enough.

If your wisdom is such that you can not understand the "truth as it is in Christ," then can a little child lead you. A child's heart can take it in. We may darken counsel by a multitude of words, and will miss the mark; but when Christ says, "I am the way, the *truth* and the life," he stands before us in a revealed attitude, and *truth* is seen and felt. Thus: "That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of Life."

Let the reader proceed in this direction, and the question, *What is truth?* is readily solved. But the truth will grow upon him more and more.

#### THE OFFICE OF REASON.

What, then, is the prerogative of reason? Rev. Asa Shinn, who it must be confessed has written some very excellent things, uttered the truth, about as nearly, perhaps, as any human writer could when he said: "Too much attention to the works of nature, with a view to form a religious system from that source exclusively, is apt to give rise to a vain philosophy, and to terminate in infidelity; an adherence to the Bible, to the disparagement of creation, produces an authoritative bigotry, and a disposition to demand the surrender of man's rational faculties;\* while a pretense of being led by the Holy Spirit in every thing, in a way of infallible inspiration, is commonly observed to generate a spirit of enthusiasm, which undervalues alike both reason and revelation. Therefore, the course of true wisdom and piety is to use the good gifts of our heavenly Father in harmony, and consistently to avail ourselves of their joint operation, in conducting us in the way of everlasting happiness."

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\* The Bible does not demand such a surrender, but the effect would be as if it did if man by exclusiveness put it in that attitude.

This is wise advise, but it does not involve the necessity of surrendering the Word of God as authority on questions that relate to eternal life.

In answer to part of Rev. Mr. Nelson's argument on "The Cause and Cure of Infidelity," Mr. Shinn remarks that in it is urged the common argument in favor of the Bible, that "reason is insufficient, and has led the world astray." I will further define my position when I have done with this author. His argument against Mr. Nelson's position is very interesting. "'Those ancient Greeks,' says Mr. Nelson, 'had great statesmen, orators, and poets. Succeeding ages have gazed at them; they believe that to stand that only son, that promising boy, on an altar, and whip him until his entrails could be seen through the quivering flesh, would please Diana. Are you admiring the wealth or polish of the Carthaginians? They believed *sincerely* (so sincerely that they practiced it) that it would please God if one or two hundred of their children at a time were cast into that red-hot metallic statue. Just such things were believed by Romans, Medes, Elamites, and all the people where that singular old book did not circulate. Reader, if you believe that reason did always teach to avoid those cruel enormities where the Bible was found, but never did happen to instruct better where that page was not, then we have no further argument with you at the present." (Nelson's Cause and Cure of Infidelity, p. 101.)

"Here," says Mr. Shinn, "it is supposed that where the Bible is not, 'reason teaches' and 'instructs' mankind, and always leads them wrong; and that there is no way for them to find the truth but to forsake reason and follow the Bible. For if they lead to essentially opposite results they can never co-operate. How does a man follow the teachings of reason but by a candid exercise of the thinking faculties, in judging according to the evidence presented to his understanding? When 'the heavens declare

the glory of God,' does not a man follow reason by giving a candid attention to the declaration? It is God that furnishes the instruction, and for us to devote a candid attention to it is to follow our reason, unless it can be made to appear that to regard the works of the Lord, and to consider the operation of his hand, is an unreasonable exercise of our reasoning faculties. It is presumed that there are few who will venture to affirm this. It may be said, perhaps, that men go astray because they are not attentive and candid in surveying God's visible creation. Then they do not follow the teachings of reason, but the dictates of prejudice and passion; for it is presumed no one will undertake to show that when a man is inattentive and uncandid, he thereby evinces a *reasonable* exercise of his understanding.

"Again: When men attentively and candidly search the Scriptures to ascertain what are the instructions of God in his Word, are they not then following their reason as much as they are when in the same way they meditate upon all his works? Mr. Nelson's whole book is intended to furnish arguments with which to convince men that they should believe the Bible. Does he not wish them to give these arguments a fair examination? But this would be to follow reason, unless it be said that such attention to argument is an unreasonable thing. Hence it is obvious that when men consider the evidence and import of the Bible, they follow reason as their guide as much as they do in properly studying the visible works of God. In neither case is reason the source of evidence or instruction, but only the recipient; and in both cases the same God is teacher, who will never contradict himself, or teach delusion through one medium of communication any more than through the other.

"Reason, it may be said, is too weak to learn any thing of God in the works of creation. But it is the same weak reason that is called upon to receive truth from the Bible. The latter, it is admitted, furnishes more instruction than

the former; but is reason too weak to learn a small lesson, and at the same time strong enough to master a *greater* one? The only reply that can be given to this is, that the instructions of God in nature are not so intelligible as in revelation. They are sufficiently intelligible to lead the attentive and candid mind into the truth; otherwise it will follow either that, in the works of creation, God did not design to communicate truth to man concerning himself, or that he could not make himself understood by those whose mental faculties were formed by him for the purpose of receiving his instruction."

Perhaps the best answer to this is, that God did not from the beginning design that nature should be sole revealer of the divine character and mind, and that personal converse with Deity direct was the avenue of man's original knowledge of God; and that this being interrupted by sin, the study of nature, however candid, could not be as intelligible as when man had the double light of nature and nature's God.

He continues: "But all theory, we are told by Mr. Nelson, must surrender to facts. 'Romans, Medes, Elamites, and all the people where that singular old book did not circulate, believed sincerely that it would please God if one or two hundred of their children at a time were cast into that red-hot metallic statue.' Without stopping at present to demand proof that 'all people where that singular old book did not circulate,' actually embraced these delusive enormities, we would be glad to have an answer to the following questions:

"First. Did the voice of God in nature ever *teach* people that it would please him 'if one or two hundred of their children were cast into that red-hot metallic statue?'

"Secondly. If it did not, were any people ever led into such barbarous delusions by attentively and candidly surveying the works of nature to the best of their ability?

"Thirdly. Would it not be reasonable for people every-

where so to attend to the instructions of God in his works as to avoid such evil practices?

“If it would, it then appears that men have been led into such practices, not by following their reason, but by departing from its dictates. As they did not like to retain God in their knowledge God gave them over to a reprobate mind. (Rom. i, 28.) If such facts prove the inadequacy of human reason or deficiency of the instructions of God in nature, similar facts will equally prove the deficiency of the Bible. When heretics were burnt by scores and hundreds at the stake, the rulers of the Church called it ‘*an act of faith,*’ and said that they did God’s service, and were led into this barbarous conduct by the instructions of the Bible. This is as easily proved as it is that any heathen under heaven was ever led into the practice of like barbarities by an attentive and candid examination of the teachings of God in nature; that is, by following reason. Men are led into these enormities by following the dictates of pride, passion and superstition and malignity, whether they live in Christian or in heathen lands.

“But, to come to Protestant Christendom. Have not men been telling us for more than two hundred years that the Bible has taught them to believe that God, from all eternity, elected a few of mankind to salvation and reprobated all the rest to damnation in such a way as to make the number of each absolutely definite, and their fate eternally unalterable? Do they not profess to have been taught by the Bible that there are elect and reprobate angels, and elect and reprobate infants?

“Now, if men believe there are infants in hell not a span long, who were ordained to endless misery from everlasting, what character of God is conceived by any heathen which is more directly calculated than this doctrine to support the inference “That it would please God if one or two hundred of their children at a time were cast into that

red-hot metallic statue?" The thing we contend for is, that neither the Bible nor the creation exhibits such a gloomy character of God; and therefore that neither of them gives countenance to the conclusion that barbarous practices will be pleasing to his sight.

"Such practices are appealed to as facts which show the weakness of human reason; but they only evince the stupidity of willful ignorance, and the inexcusable indulgence of human passion and malignity.

"We are told, however, that heathens are '*sincere*' in their belief, that God is pleased with such cruel practices. And were not both priest and people in Christendom "*sincere*" in their belief that God was pleased when he saw heretics burnt at the stake? Was not Saul of Tarsus *sincere* when he breathed out threatenings and slaughter against the disciples? But does it therefore follow that he was taught to be a persecutor by the Scriptures of the Old Testament? As little does it follow that heathens are taught to burn their children in the fire by the voice of God in nature, because they may be *sincere* in their delusion.

"Are we left to infer that all heathens, however *sincere* some of them may be, are indiscriminately sent to hell? What! do they regularly follow reason, and are they led into delusion by the best possible use of their faculties, and then eternally punished because they had not other faculties or did not possess higher means of information? Saul of Tarsus obtained mercy because he did it ignorantly in unbelief. Why may not sincere heathens obtain mercy upon the same footing? Saul had no new Bible given him to put him into a state of probation.

"But God, it may be said, used special means to enlighten his mind, because that he saw that he was sincere. And can not the same God use special means to enlighten the heathens so far as may be necessary to their salvation whenever he sees them truly and perseveringly sincere?



If he *can* but *will* not it is because free wrath or a reprobating disposition is an essential part of his character; and if he *would* but *can not* save the heathens while there are no Bibles among them, it follows that he is dependent on the agency of our missionaries for his *ability* to save the souls of sincere people.

“Good men are greatly mistaken when they suppose infidelity will be refuted by our undervaluing the works of God. It is the same human reason that operates, whether it be used in examining the works or the written Word of God; and if reason be set aside, to what purpose is a Bible given? As well might a revelation be given to the irrational animals as to creatures whose reason necessarily leads them astray. When God communicates his truth to us, whether in nature or revelation, our belief in his testimony is a *reasonable faith*, and obedience to his precepts is *our reasonable service*.

“For what is the variety of convincing evidence brought forward by Mr. Nelson but to show us that reason is sufficient to prove that the Bible is true? Then why should we inconsistently weaken the force of reason by attempting to show its imbecility, its uncertainty, its darkness, and its leading thousands and millions into inevitable delusion? If it be thus weak, imbecile, uncertain, dark, and delusive, how can it be depended on to prove the truth of Christianity? If reason be a false guide, let us no longer appeal to its dictates for the refutation of infidelity.

“That our understanding is weak and liable to run into delusions, is as true when we use it in searching the Scriptures as when we attend to the voice of God in nature; and a due sense of this weakness and a corresponding modesty in our conclusions is essential to the right exercise of our reason, whether it be applied to the works of our Creator or to his written revelation.”

The reader will be able to discover in this last paragraph what we would claim to be a remark that needed

somewhat of modification, but in a general way the argument puts reason in about its proper office and relation to truth.

The accepted doctrine that reason has lost its authority in deciding infallible truths from the effect of sin upon it is alluded to, but not as fully defined as desirable. But the general principle for which I have contended is brought out that reason is not the *source* of truth, evidence, or instruction, but the *recipient*.

It is at this point the weakness of Bishop Foster's precedent appears, on which he proposes to conduct his argument. He reverses the order that we have just stated, and proceeds as if reason were the instructor instead of the instructed. For fear we may forget his statement of the question, I will give it again. He says:

"The subject I am to treat is, 'Life beyond the Grave.' There are three possible methods of conducting the discussion. These are,

"First: To assume every thing, and give wing to imagination and feeling.

"Second: To treat it exegetically, as purely a doctrine of revelation.

"Third: To submit it to reason, and examine it in the light of all the facts bearing upon it which lie within the circle of our intelligence."

He adds: "The grandeur and obscurity of the subject invite to the first; reverence for the Scriptures and Christian impulse indicate the second; the claims of intelligence, and the deeper wants of reason and the soul, call for the third. Aiming at the best and most permanent results, we adopt the third method."

With this precedent laid down, compared to remarks gone before, the critic will readily see that he has ruled his own case out of order.

A few more thoughts on reason, and this argument must be closed; for it has already obtained more space than at first thought was assigned it, but I hope not without profit.

## CHAPTER V.

## FURTHER THOUGHTS ON REASON.

BY this time in the range of the argument we begin to discover the sphere and ability of reason. Reason *perceives*, but does not *originate*. There is another faculty that is a near neighbor to reason—that is conscience. Reason *perceives* truth, but conscience discovers its character. Reason sees an action—conscience tells whether it is *right* or *wrong*. Both reason and conscience are creatures of education—they are not supreme, they are improvable. Conscience in conviction asserts its authority; but its authority is not supreme.

Like the authority of reason, that of conscience, to be correct, must have reference to the higher law—the law of God. It says, in its renderings, “Judge not, that ye be not judged.” “Why beholdest thou the mote in thy brother’s eye? and, behold, a beam is in thine own eye.” “With what judgment ye judge ye shall be judged.” It asserts that “those who live in glass houses should not throw stones.” It says to the brother-hater: “Why dost thou judge thy brother? and why dost thou set at naught thy brother? For we shall stand before the judgment-seat of God.” It ratifies the truth, “Vengeance is mine, *I* will repay, saith the *Lord*.”

But the Scriptures do not claim to be the creator of the faculties of reason and conscience, but recognize them just where God placed them. Hence Paul, in Romans ii, 15, represents the conscience showing the works of God’s law written in the heart of the Gentiles, who had not the revealed law, “bearing witness, and their thoughts the

meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another," and intimates (verse 16) that it will perform the same office "in that day when God shall judge the secrets of men, by Jesus Christ, according to his Gospel."

This is the truth referred to in Mr. Shinn's argument. In the same argument of the apostle we have the secret cause of reason's prostration and prostitution revealed. This is set forth in Romans i, 19-32:

"Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse: because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things. Wherefore God also gave them up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonor their own bodies between themselves: who changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshiped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed forever. Amen.

"For this cause God gave them up unto vile affections: for even their women did change the natural use into that which is against nature: and likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet. And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient; being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, mur-

der, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, spiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without understanding, covenant-breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful; who, knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them."

So I repeat that both reason and conscience must have reference to the higher law, the law of God, for their ability of perception or discernment of truth and its character. This is the criterion by which this argument alone can be carried on. Reason and conscience, of themselves, are not infallible guides. Hence that to which Paul alludes shows God's law written in the heart.

It is possible that, by sin and adverse influences or education, God's law in the heart, reason and conscience, may be *obscured*—more, may be destroyed—so that the persons, even by the approval of reason and conscience, may be led to do contrary to God's law, conscientiously thinking themselves right. Paul was eminently a man of reason and conscience, and he thought he was doing God's service in the persecution of the early Church. The Hindoo mother's reason and conscience approve the act by which she goes to the Ganges, and in blind devotion gives her child to the sacred crocodile. The devotee of the papacy just as conscientiously prays to saints, and worships the images made with hands of things in heaven and earth, though the Word of God positively says, "Thou shalt not bow down to them." Yet all these claim the approval of reason and conscience that theirs is a *reasonable service*.

But is it so? No. But this is the "*reason*" to which Bishop Foster submits the settlement of one of the most vital doctrines, and says that such a process of argumentation will meet "the deeper wants of reason and the soul." This process of argument represents "*reason*" and the "*soul*" meeting their own wants. But if the bishop's

argument were reversed and he held that some external and higher law threw light upon "reason" and the "soul," and from that source their "deeper wants" were met, then he would be on the road to a right solution of the question at issue. This, however, would be an acknowledgement of dependence upon something beyond—in fact, necessitate a revelation, by which the question would have to be settled after all. Therefore, just to cut the matter short, why not come at once to revelation, for the solution of this problem?

If it can be solved without revelation, then it must follow that revelation is not essential to its solution—more, upon familiar principles, as well as logically, it would follow, that the man would be better for the process or exercise of the act of solution of the problem by doing it without the help of revelation. But it is hardly probable that we will be permitted to apply this principle in this question.

From conclusions reached we learn that the Scriptures constantly associate the ability of reason, conscience, intelligence and the soul, with the idea of God first and primarily revealing himself to the same, and for this reason the *word*, infallible, is preferred, is preached, and conscience is awakened and conviction of truth created. Thus I conclude that we can not escape the conclusion of failure in any attempt to settle questions of such vast moment as that of the future state by any processes of deduction that may pertain to the present state.

This is reasonable, for the simple reason, if for nothing else, that the present state is not the future state, and the future state is not the present state; the laws of time are not laws of eternity, and the laws of eternity are not the laws of time; the domain of mortality is not the domain of immortality, and the domain of immortality is not the domain of mortality; earth is not heaven, and heaven is not earth; *therefore*, if we desire to know any thing of the *great beyond*, it must be brought within the

*present now*; and who can bring the *facts* of the *future state* within the compass of the knowledge of the *present* but God? and if none but God can do it, how can he do it but by *revelation*? and if by revelation, then must we go to God and his revealed truth for the settlement of the question of *beyond the grave*.

The subject thus presented to our reason and intellect touched by the life-giving energy of the Holy Ghost by which the conscience is quickened, bring both into the proper exercise of their office and power, and renders practicable the truths thus received.

Thus I have given as best I could what I claim to be the statement of the question that will commend itself to the best and most enlightened judgment, and on the principles I have indicated I propose farther to conduct the argument. That I am not alone in the views thus indicated will be seen by the utterance of one of the ablest of minds, Dr. M'Cosh, in *Princeton Review*. With his statement this chapter on the province of reason will close. He says on the development and growth of conscience, the same principle which applies to reason, the following:

“The conscience grows as all living things do. But it grows from a germ. The faculties of the mind are all, like the laws of nature and the properties of matter, of the nature of *tendencies*. Sense-perception is such a tendency. It does not act till it is called forth, and it is called forth by material objects presented to it. It is much the same with all other mental capacities. The judgment acts when objects admitting of comparison are brought under its notice. The fancy is a seed, but does not flower or bear fruit till it has experience and knowledge as its material and its nutriment. There are intellectual germs in infants and in savages, but they need to be ripened by light and heat falling on them. It is the same with the moral power; it is in all men native and necessary, but it is a norm requiring to be evolved.



“It grows as the tree grows. As the oak needs soil in which to root itself, and air of which to breathe, so the conscience is in our psychical nature, and is in contact with stimuli to make it germinate and expand. All along it is so far swayed by surroundings. Its health depends so far on climate. When reared in a bare soil it will be dwarfish. When exposed to cold and blighting it will be stunted and gnarled. In a good soil and a healthy atmosphere it will be upright and well formed. In particular it grows and spreads out with the intelligence which enables it clearly to apprehend the realities of things, to discover causes and calculate consequences. All this is in accordance with what we observe of human nature, and may be fully admitted, while we hold that the moral capacity and perception could not have been produced without a native moral norm any more than a plant could have grown without a germ. “From this account we see how the conscience is liable to be deceived and led astray. In particular, it may be influenced by the desires and wishes of the heart or will. It is, as Butler often calls it, ‘a faculty of reflection,’ and does not perceive objects directly as the senses and consciousness do. It is dependent on the representation given it of the state of the case. If that be perverted; the judgment of conscience, right enough in regard to the picture given it, may be wrong as to the fact. On the supposition that the white thing we see in the wood is a ghost we might very properly be alarmed, but we have no fear when we know it to be a sheet of linen. If that idol is a god, as the man’s ancestors told him, he does right to worship it and submit to the sacrifices it requires; but if, as the Christian knows, it is no god, he feels under no obligation to yield it reverence and obedience. If this farm is mine, as the Irish peasant believes, he is justified in resisting all attempts to drive him from it. He will see this to be wrong when convinced that the property belongs to his landlord.

“Parents made their children to pass through the fire to Moloch, because they were convinced that the act would pacify their god. A friend of mine who was under the delusion that God required him to sacrifice the object that was dearest to him, and endeavored to put his wife, as the dearest object, to death, had a correct enough moral sense, but was under the sway of a deranged understanding. Saul thought he did right to crush the rising Christian sect, because he regarded them as apostates; but he changed his conduct when he saw that they were following the true faith. The Hindoo mother casts her female child into the Ganges and the African exposes his mother to death by the fountain, because they have the idea pressed upon them that it is better they should thus die than be exposed to a life of hunger and privation. The Jesuit regards himself as justified in deceiving the enemies of the Church, because of the good thereby accomplished, and does evil that good may come.

“But with all its defects in our weak and corrupt nature, the conscience is indestructible quite as much as the understanding is. In children and in savages it has to occupy itself with insignificant matters; but it is seen working, and it is capable of being developed by an increase of intelligence. Criminals have resisted and so blunted it; but at times it will deal its blows upon them with tremendous force. Deceived and silent as to certain deeds of wickedness, it will show itself alive and awake as to others. We have heard of robbers committing murder with little or no remorse, but greatly distressed by the neglect of certain superstitious rites which they regard as binding on them. On the other hand, there are persons upright in their transactions with one another, but who do not seem humbled or distressed by the neglect of the duties which they owe to God.”

More light upon this particular subject by a reference to *Watson's Institutes*, vol. 1, pages 15-104.

## CHAPTER VI.

## DEATH; AND WHY WE DIE.

BISHOP FOSTER says ("Beyond the Grave," pages 243, 269) many things that "the facts that lie within the circle of our intelligence" constrain us to deny. It is my purpose to examine the same and convince the reader of their untenability.

*First: "Man was made for permanence of life; but in this statement we do not mean either that his animal life, as such, in its present form, was to be permanent, or that he was to remain forever in a body on earth."*

In quotations from this forward we will give no italics but what are the bishop's own. The above are his. He continues: "We do not believe either of these ideas to be true. We are free to confess that we can see nothing in the nature of man to exempt him from the common law of death, so far forth as he is animal. Further, we are constrained to believe that, left to the mere working of natural law, he would have died. He most certainly included in his created constitution tendencies to death, which, *unhindered*, would have culminated in that result. The same causes that work dissolution in other creatures were active in his nature. The same hostile forces which are universally destructive of other lives were militant against his life, guaranteed its ultimate overthrow, unless in some way prevented. The physiology of his life, as in every case, exhibits a constant lapse into death, an unintermittent tendency to the goal of extinction. As to his organic life, he *was naturally mortal*."

A few thoughts define the bishop's position:

1. "Man was made for permanence of life."

2. By this permanence he does not mean the body, but the soul only.

3. That he rejects the idea of man's exemption from death in creation.

4. Man's death is included in general death that applied to all cases, and no exception in his favor.

5. That death is necessary, pages 260-6.

I quote the bishop correctly. I make the proposition, that the bishop teaches that *man was not created for bodily permanence*.

Next: I make the proposition that he holds, that if man had not sinned he would not have died. This is correct (page 243): "And yet we accept the idea that, had he not sinned, he would not have died."

Once more: I challenge contradiction when I say that he teaches in the whole of Note B, pages 260-266, that death is a necessity.\*

6. That it was *designed*.

7. Logically concluding that it was designed, and of necessity, and yet that it would not have occurred without sin—that is, death was necessary—it would not have occurred without sin, therefore sin was necessary. This logic will admit of kaleidoscopic variety, and presents numerous colors when connected with his idea that, "left to the mere working of natural law, he would have died," and yet that sin was necessary to help natural law kill man; that is, natural law would not have resulted in death had sin not occurred.

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\* "I think the difficulty arises from the bishop failing to qualify the terms 'die' and 'death'—failing to distinguish between 'death' in the mere brute world and 'death' as the penalty of sin, and 'death' as denoting the *change* which some theologians think would have come over Adam even if he had not sinned. I think that the bishop's failure to discriminate these meanings of 'die,' etc., must explain the difficulty." (Dr. R. N. Davies, author of "Justification by Faith.")

Will any one say that I have misrepresented the plain logic of the bishop, or that I have done violence to his argument? I may not give in these statements what the bishop *meant*, but I feel very confident that I have given a fair representation of what he has *said*—for the proof of which the reader can see for himself by turning to the quotations or the book itself.

Taking it for granted that he has *said* what he *meant*, and *meant* what he *said*, I proceed to examine his logic as well as his argument.

First of all, it is good Universalism. But there can be no special fault in that *if* Universalism upon the point at issue is true. But is it *true*? That is the question. It makes no difference what it is, nor who holds it, if it is true.

I have said that the position held is good Universalism, because it is one of the vital tenets of that system of theology, and as such I examine it. It is also *Beecherism*, as expressed in a previous quotation from his discourse.

I have quoted Mr. Manford because he is an intelligent exponent of the Universalist's faith. He is also an accepted living authority among his people, and can still be communicated with. I will not burden this chapter with lengthy quotations from numerous Universalist divines, but will give this one again as concisely expressing the point at issue:

"The 'Fall of Man,' so called, in the garden of Eden, was foreseen by the Creator, and he wished it to take place. He designedly placed the temptation before Adam and Eve, and foreknew and foreordained their fall. He not only foresaw that they would eat of the forbidden fruit, but he designed and proposed that they should, for it was necessary that they should pass through the state of evil

"Before they fell they were innocent, but they were not holy, for holiness implies choice. They were in this

respect precisely like infant children. They knew not the difference between good and evil, happiness and misery. How could they know what good is without knowing something of evil? How could they know the value of happiness without knowing something of its opposite—misery? Hence it was necessary that they should have an experience of evil, that they might know the nature and value of good, and know that obedience is sweet.”

But if I should ask the bishop to state his proposition in so many words, the “cherished beliefs” in which he has drilled would not permit him to do so. But suppose he does not use these words to express his doctrine, is it not still the same? What’s the difference between medicine given in powder and dilution? Mr. Manford gives us Universalism in powder direct from his theological apothecary. Bishop Foster dilutes it, waters it, so that on the surface it appears different, but in the true inwardness of the thing it is the same—save that in the one case a little spoonful will answer the case, in the other you must swallow a tumbler of water—the latter is the larger dose, but boiled down it is the same in *quantity* and *quality*.

While I would fail to get the bishop to make the verbal statement in accord with the above sentiments, still, when we lay before him his logic, it will result in the same idea.

First Is it not a fact that the burden of his argument in Note B, and especially the latter part of it, is to prove *that death is necessary?*

Second. Is it not a fact that he states that, bodily, man was not made for permanence?

Third. Does he not admit that had man not sinned he would have been bodily permanent?

Fourth. Does this not conclude that if death was necessary, and yet would not have occurred without sin, that the means, that is, *sin*, by which it was brought about, was necessary?

Fifth. That if death was designed, that the means thereto were also designed?

Sixth. That the whole tenor of his argument in all his lectures is, that man was made for advancement, and that this could be only by the human experiences through which he has passed and is passing, experiences both of body and mind?

Seventh. That so being to promote the highest development of the *spirit nature* ("*man is a spirit*") that his logic of argument assimilates Universalism, and upon the question at issue results erroneous doctrine?

*The logic of such theology is untenable.* Further, it is a contradiction of the plain teaching of Scripture, as we will see before the argument is ended. It is, in essence, the same as Mr. Manford's plain statements. The only difference is that the bishop's is an indirect and Mr. Manford's a positive statement. Perhaps it would be a milder form of expression to say that this error is found in the bishop's argument by implication or inference, but it is there all the same.

Plainly stated, it teaches that man sinned, that the sin was beneficial, and consequently right, as it brought about what God designed from the beginning. Not only was it beneficial, but, in the language of Mr. Manford, it was, 1. "Necessary;" 2. "Foreseen;" 3. "Designed;" 4. "Foreordained;" 5. Man was made to that end. This is also the inevitable logic of the bishop's argument. It can not be otherwise and at the same time hold the premises that he does.

If the Scriptures are by violence to be interpreted in the light of such logic and statements, then is God said to "repent" that he made man, regrets his own doings, made a mistake for which he is sorry, "repenteth" him that what he had "foreseen," "designed," "foreordained," had really come to pass. Logically, according to this idea, God either makes mistakes—committed error in the crea-



tion of man as he did—or it repenteth him that he created man just as he should have been created.

This whole theory makes creation a solemn farce; for God made man upright, if the Scriptures are true, and they are. There is no credulity in taking the position at once, and assuming the truthfulness of the Scripture narratives. They state in plain language that God made man upright—pronounced him, with all else of creation, good, and very good—and God's repenting was not on the account of man's sin and fall being necessary, etc., and in the line of events that God wished to take place, but, on the other hand, because of sin—a calamity had befallen the greatest object of God's creative wisdom, and marred the work after it had left his hands. There is not a more dangerous heresy than that held by many, and logically inferential from the bishop's argument that things are about as God would have them.

His whole closing argument makes this impression upon us, that right conceptions of future life, and even a right appreciation of this life, would have been impossible if things had not occurred about as they did; that they would have known nothing of holiness without acquaintance and *experience* of unholiness ("sin, that grace may abound"—"God forbid," says Paul); nothing of purity without being impure; nothing of good without knowing and experiencing evil; nothing of happiness without knowing and experiencing misery; verily "necessary that they must have an *experience* of evil that they might know the nature and value of good, and know that obedience is sweet." No obedience or knowledge of it, or experience, without disobedience!

Taking a legitimate view of this logic, it is presumable that to have any conception of the sweetness of honey we must first eat a sour pickle. It may be replied that you would know nothing of the sweetness of honey if some time you had had no taste of sourness. But, mark you, the faculty about which we are speaking is not to be classed with the

physical senses. It refers to the moral perceptions, perceptions that take cognizance of moral actions and their character without experience; and on this ground, to say that man must experience vice before he knows what virtue is, is to assume that God made a human soul for the purpose of moral and intellectual and rational perception, but that the creature was such a fool that he could be taught nothing but by the rule of experience. It strikes me that this whole theory is chargeable with "calling evil good, and good evil; that it puts darkness for light, and light for darkness; bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter." (Isa. v, 20.)

I repeat the statement of such logic: God formed *reason* that was not competent to know what he revealed to it, a consciousness that could not discern happiness when within its possession. He primarily pointed out the evil—its results; but the intellect and reason and consciousness of God's own creation, made for the purposes of perception of things and their character, were insufficient to see that for which they were created; and that, before they could see and experience the state for which they were created they must of necessity see and experience the opposite!

They say that "experience is a dear school to fools;" but God made man, according to this logic, such a fool that he could know nothing in any other kind of a school. This wonderful *reason*, preferred to the Scriptures in this argument, for reasons the bishop states, by the closing logic of his work, must droop its wings, incompetent to perceive only what must be taught it by the experience of all opposites to good—no judgment, no sense or discernment or reason to which God could appeal as the *dictum* of man's actions. To *know* any thing about virtue, he must become a sinner; about happiness, he must become miserable; about heaven, he must have somewhat of hell; about sobriety, he must become drunk. Such is the logic of the theology that to arrive at a knowledge of any thing

judgment is left out as incompetent, and you must by the law of experience of all that is vicious arrive at a knowledge of all that is virtuous. We must commit sin to know what sin is, and thereby to better appreciate the right. Logically, the man who is not a great sinner can not appreciate great virtue. Paul says, in the face of just such theorists in his day: "What shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound?" "Yes," says the logic referred to; but Paul says, "God forbid."

Will not a man be happier for the experience of evil—sin? How often this question is asked, Is it *quantity* of happiness you contend for or *kind*? That we have been redeemed will be our joy, but that we have been sinners can not be a flattering thought. Is it promotive of a greater merit of citizenship?—is he thereby better qualified for its honors and responsibilities?—all this to the escaped criminal who has served his term out in the penitentiary, over that of the innocent man who has never been a violator of law nor caged within prison bars. No. So I say that when man fell it was not a fall *upward*, but downward, and that the purposes of redemption will never be accomplished until man is not only redeemed from sin here, but that also through the resurrection he is introduced bodily into that state where Satan can tempt no more, and "where the wicked cease from troubling and the weary are at rest."

## CHAPTER VII.

DEATH; AND WHY WE DIE.—CONTINUED.

THE peculiarity of statement of the argument of “Beyond the Grave” necessitates us to take it by parts—some time in the first part and some time in the latter, but the reader will discover that this course has given us quite a continuous chain of thought. Thus we hope somewhat of order out of confusion. Note B of the lectures is now under consideration. I have noticed the first argument there only in part, but trust the intelligence of the reader will enable him to follow it up after a careful reading. There are so many things vital to the subject pressing upon my mind that I beg to pass from the present to the next argument.

“ONE CLASS OF LIFE SUBSISTS ON THE DESTRUCTION OF ANOTHER CLASS.”

On page 260 the bishop says: “My second proposition is derived from the fact that one class of life is dependent for subsistence on the destruction of another class. This, if it be true, is proof direct that death as a necessity is corporate in the system of nature. That it is a fact appears in two ways most conclusively. . . . But what is true of the inferior forms of life is true of the higher also. A slight attention to the structure and physiology of the superior races, as they are properly styled, shows that they were created for each other, one class to subsist on the nutritious tissue of the others. . . . Thus the fashion, habits, and necessities of the structures built by life proclaim death to be normal and primitive.

It is born of creation, not of retribution. It is God's offspring direct, not a penal device. It exists in the bosom of sinless, not sinning, nature."

For the sake of convenience I prefer to place the bishop's fourth statement here, knowing that it will not confuse the argument, and also because it more properly belongs in this connection than does his third; and notice it with its kindred statement in his "second argument." I will place his "third proof" last in the order. He says: "My fourth argument is that death existed before sin, and could not, therefore, be penal. The historical argument, like the two preceding, is independent, and in itself conclusive." Then follows a geological argument in substantiation of his position.

I have grouped these propositions together that I may keep them fresher in my memory, that a more intelligent examination may be had. It will be convenient at this point to take up his "second argument."

First. What is the bishop trying to prove? Let him answer. "That death as a necessity is corporate in the system of nature."

What application does he make of this position? That man is no exception to the rule. In another place he hints at the possibility of an exception in favor of man; but that he does not believe, it is no part of his argument.

At this point may I ask permission to bring in the third arbiter? If not, may I have the right to consider the Scriptures as entitled to some authority in the settlement of this question? May not some reference be had to its authority when we concede that through them God himself speaks? Let us see. The bishop says, "One class of life is dependent for its subsistence on the destruction of another class."

This is true in the vegetable and animal life. It may be said also that "*man is dependent for subsistence on the destruction of other*" classes of matter. But by what logic

does it follow that because this is so that therefore man must of "necessity" die?

Again: His logic is, that the "destruction" of matter is for the "subsistence" of some other class. Does he apply this rule to man? If so, will he please tell what "higher order of races" eats man up when he dies? Is it a legitimate inference that he draws that because vegetable life ceases for the benefit of races, therefore man dies to serve the same purpose? Does he make a distinction, or is no distinction to be made? Analyze the proposition, and turn it over and over, and see if its conclusions are not absurd, that the argument that man's mortality "is derived from the fact that one class of life is dependent for its subsistence upon the destruction of another class;" and if this be true, is it a proof direct that death (to man as to all else) "as a necessity is corporate in the system of nature?" The bishop, to be consistent, ought to follow out the conclusions of his logic, namely: That if the death of man is to be argued from and for the same reasons that he argues all death, he should also hold that it is for the same purpose; namely, for some other "class" to "subsist" upon. He does not say that another human body or "class" of moral intelligences will "subsist" upon our bodies—that would be a species of cannibalism, as would also be such theology—but "another class." Please tell me that since "death as a necessity is corporate in the system of nature," for the express purpose of the "subsistence" of another class of life, who or what is to eat me up when I die? It seems to me that it would contribute somewhat to my satisfaction to know. He argues from the whole system of nature, aside from man, and drawing his conclusions, which, on general principles, are accepted by us all, throws man into the mass, and, lumping all together, assumes that "what is true of the inferior forms of life is true of the higher also"—man.

I accept his argument of design, but what application

can it have in this question? That some birds, beasts, fish, etc., are so constructed in their physical organism and instinct to be creatures of prey, and so "designed," and others to be preyed upon, I confess to a failure to see that it proves any thing as to man. Referring to these things, every one of them outside of the circle of human kind, he says, "Thus the fashion, habits, and necessities of the structures, built by life, proclaim death to be normal and primitive;" therefore *man*, normally, primitively, from the hand of his Creator, is not immortal. His death "is born of creation, not retribution," because, forsooth, the feathered, finny, and hairy creatures are things whose "normal and primitive" condition is death.

Again: How does any man know that "one class of life is dependent for its subsistence on the destruction of another class," save in the vegetable kingdom as food for man? I mean, how does any one know that a human body, buried at the roots of a tree, in its return to earth, will contribute one mote of life to that tree in a century? I venture to say that he does not know it, nor does any other man that such has been the case. All supposed chemical or scientific theories, and attempts at the demonstration of such an idea, have been exceedingly unsatisfactory. They have been open to grave scientific doubts. When it is settled to a certainty by *positive* science then I will accept.

But this is no place for speculation nor "groundless imagination." Bishop Kingsley formulated an argument upon this subject much more reasonable than the one we are combating. He says: "Where the decomposed body goes to the support of vegetation, and this vegetation goes to the nourishment of human beings, it may be remarked that but a small part of earth actually becomes part of vegetation at all. This is demonstrated by the growth of plants and trees, where the entire amount of earth to which their roots had access has been weighed, both before



and after their growth. In this manner plants and trees have increased many pounds in weight, while the earth to which their roots had access has diminished but a few ounces, showing that the atmosphere and water contribute very largely to the growth of vegetation." (How is the decrease of weight of earth accounted for? May it not be by atmospheric absorption rather than entering into the tree?) "Now, suppose a human being to have eaten grain that had grown upon soil enriched by decomposition of a human body: allowed that he has consumed *one hundred pounds* of such grain; no more than one part in twenty-five of this grain ever becomes actually a part of the human body; that is, four pounds. But not more than one part in twenty of the grain is converted earth, that is, one-fifth of a pound. But probably not more than one part in a *thousand*, to which the roots of grain had access, was human dust, which, by the previous calculation, would give to the second human body but one part in five thousand of a single pound; that is, the one three hundred and twelfth part of an ounce of matter which had ever been possessed by another human being; and even this small fraction of an ounce might go to the grosser parts of the system not at all necessary to the resurrection body. And where an animal has intervened, the ratio is immensely diminished." Now this, on the present point in issue, is about as good a reckoning as we can expect on the subject, which admits at all of the idea "that one class of life is dependent for its subsistence on the destruction of another."

But observation proves that we have about as much authority for saying that the elements of perpetuity are contained in the things created, and are not dependent upon this addition of "subsistence" from "the destruction of another class." On my father's farm is a forest, or "woods," as we used to call it. We used to "go to the woods," in my boyhood days. Then the timber was of rank growth. It doubtless had been so for centuries. After

the lapse of years, stock, straw, the refuse of the farm, added to the richness of the soil. Naturally, we would suppose this forest would have taken on freshness of life, and its "subsistence" would have been greatly vitalized by this immense addition of the "destruction of another class" of matter. But I discovered that the "woods" began to die. Fine, stately poplars and oaks drooped their heads, and their tops became filled with dead limbs by the death of foliage and decay of sap. Why was this? Go anywhere you will, and the uninterrupted forests are rank with life. Try to enrich them by the "destruction" of other matter, and increase their "subsistence," and they decay. Almost any farmer can bear testimony to this fact.

But perhaps there is an adjoining forest, where the earth has been stirred by the rooting of swine, where the beech, oak, poplar, etc., put on vigor, and yet no "destruction of another class" of matter has been added. Why is this? The forest itself, each individual tree, drew from the earth and air its life, and the droppings of its own foliage, a part of its own existence, at its roots, where mother earth opened her bosom to receive them and warm them into life again, all seemingly containing within itself, with the God-given aid of earth and air, *all but limitless perpetuity of being*. Any interference with this order, or attempt at extra "subsistence," was attended with evil rather than good.

Now, there are seeming exceptions to this rule, but they are rare, and the argument is on general principles. The general rule is admitted that encroachments on nature's domain of forest and plant is the prophecy of decay. "But," says one, "is not this argument at fault, in viewing the fact that plants are improved and the fruit becomes delicious by transplanting and digging of earth, etc.? This question, answered correctly, is a confirmation of my argument and a refutation of the bishop's. I answer it by asking another, Is the improvement of the plant

grounded upon the addition of "subsistence" by the "destruction of another class," or is it not rather because you have placed it under more favorable circumstances, by which its roots have better and more advantageous access to the earth from which it draws its life? The argument is not changed in transferring it from trees to plants. It applies to every growing thing in its proper sphere.

Again: The bishop's logic rules God out of consideration in this question. For instance, it is the existence and non-existence of animal and vegetable life; or, rather, the question applies as the bishop applies it "in all cases." Do I misrepresent him when I say that he holds to the position that *life* "subsists" on death? I read his "second argument" (p. 260), and see that I am correct. The reverse of the bishop's position is the correct one. "In him was *life*, and the *life* was the *light* of men," is a theory that applies in nature as well as grace. There is no such a thing as "light" without "life" first. It may be that in the mind of the bishop there is such a crowding up of life on life that there will not be room for its products; that a wise economy has decided that to get the difficulty out of the way one part shall be absorbed or eaten up by the other. Or he may have reference to the *origin* of life (it is difficult to tell); if to the origin, then, as *life* is *dependent* on *destruction* for *subsistence*, what *died* that the first thing might live? Please answer this question by the teaching of "reason," or "the facts that lie within the circle of our intelligence," and see if you can escape the logical absurdity of the eternity of matter, which would be a contradiction of the best scientific authority we have.

"O, well, of course I believe *God* created the life of all things," you say. But I must reply that if "purely a doctrine of revelation" must be set aside for "the claims of intelligence, and the deeper wants of reason and the soul," you will place "nature" at the head of your arti-

cle with a capital N, otherwise you will be obliged to accept my conclusions.

The thought that seems irresistible is, that God has placed the *life* of the plant, not in the plant itself, but in the earth.\* “And God said, Let the *earth* bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit after his kind, *whose seed is in itself, upon the earth.*” I hold that the life is not in the seed, to germinate only as it springs forth by the mysterious breathings of God upon it. By *him* all things *consist*, and my conviction is that you might just as well talk about the *destruction* of the *life* of God in order to the *subsistence* of other things, as to say that *death* is the *subsistence* of life. It is like that old Thomsonian system of medicine, “heat is life, and cold is death.” It died with advanced intelligence.

Now, that it is impossible to crowd God out of our thoughts in this argument, let us lay the case before the aforesaid arbiters. Though there be a tie in the chosen two, yet the third will bring it out all right. Nature seems not to have solved the problem for us, and it is well that there is “a golden mean” that “lies just between,” in which revelation loses nothing, but reflects its superior light upon the difficulty. We can not reason from nature’s law, and come over on the territory of revealed truth, without we have respect to what this revealed truth says upon this subject. I take the position of the *identity* of matter, and not its *unity*. What is meant by that? I simply mean (and especially so far as the human body is concerned; and I may, like the bishop, apply my theory to “all classes” of matter) that the matter that composes my body is *identified* in the mind of God as the property

\*I hold that life proper is a miracle, and rests with God, and that its presence and manifestation is attributable to the all-pervading presence of the Spirit, as in creation; but in an accommodating sense the agency of the force of spontaneity seemingly rests in the earth.

in ownership by my dual nature, and can belong to nothing else. It is my body, separate and distinct from all else, was so from the beginning, and will be so to all eternity; and although, by *analogical* reasoning only, it has been considered otherwise, that its component parts entered into other bodies, yet it is largely speculation, it is not a demonstrated fact. If it were a demonstrated fact, the principle I hold is not changed; for it is still *within* the material domain, but not so absorbed as to lose its identity.

I believe this theory is stated in the creation of all things, and that this identity of *personal materiality* of matter is a condition of things that defines the *personality* of a human *individual*, animal and vegetable creation. This identity is alluded to in the eleventh verse of the first chapter of Genesis, and by Paul when he says: "To every seed his own body."

What did David allude to if not something of this kind when he said (Psa. cxxxix, 14-16): "I am fearfully and wonderfully made; marvelous are thy works; and that my soul knoweth right well? My substance was not hid from thee when I was made in secret, and curiously wrought in the lower parts of the earth. Thine eye did see my substance, yet being imperfect; and in thy book all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned, when as yet there were none of them."<sup>†</sup>

Now, it is an admitted theory that in the formation

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\*This individuality of matter is attracting scientific attention, and while like all other scientific search it has not yet reached a perfect solution, still the facts so far brought out and those in process of solution point to the very probable correctness of the statement I have made. A recent work by R. W. Wright, and published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, advocates this theory. Rather an adverse criticism appeared in the *North-western Christian Advocate*, of Chicago, editorially, June 23, 1880. It is not a familiar branch of scientific search, but a very worthy and commendable one.

of the earth its gradations are all such as to indicate it as especially designed for the habitation of just such an intelligence as man. So the words just quoted indicate that the particles of dust were watched over, cared for, and preserved distinct, that should enter into the make-up of the human frame.

No one has a right to deny, or can successfully gainsay, that this is the mind of God upon this subject, and that it applies to all existences. But in this application it does not follow that "all classes" are created to the same end or purpose. Man was the highest ideal of existences on earth, and from the beginning God makes distinction in his favor. In contradistinction to all else of animal or vegetable he was designed to be immortal. Bishop Clark struck the key-note of this truth when he said, "Man is all immortal." He was created perfect—not absolute perfection. From this high state he was to ascend. Of the simple narrative of the circumstance of his mortality as a *penalty* it is said, "And the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil: and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever: therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of Eden, to till the ground *from whence he was taken.*" Humanly speaking, he was made of the dust of the earth, but the distinction of elements is strongly hinted at by the words that imply individuality of matter. Take the bishop's illustration by the silver dissolved in liquids. The same illustration is used by Bishop Clark in "Man all Immortal." There it is a beautiful incident of a servant rewarded for signal service by the presentation of a silver cup from his master. By accident it is dropped in a vessel of aqua fortis, and he sees the cup disappear before his eyes. He is deeply pained at his loss, but the master hearing of the same assures him that his sorrow is groundless, that the cup still exists, in a different form, but substantially the same in

material. By proper process—if I remember correctly—salt is thrown in, and the silver goes to the bottom of the liquid, which is poured off, and the silver in the hands of the smith is soon restored to the form of the identical cup that was lost.

It must be admitted that all such analogies have a limit as illustrations, but the point I would bring out here is, that though, to all appearance, the cup was gone, and no perceptible change could be seen in the liquid from the presence of silver, still with that dissolution of a solid material substance into a liquid form the silver did not become aqua fortis nor the aqua fortis silver; there remained an identity of individual elements. This was proven in the restoration which took place in the separation, which answers to the resurrection.

I claim that something of this kind applies in the case under controversy, and is capable of philosophic and scientific demonstration. It is not an unreasonable claim that I hold to such a theory. Analyze the subject fully, and the more you look into it the more you will become convinced of the correctness and reasonableness of my position. There is a sense in which we are of the earth and yet not earth. I exceedingly doubt the proposition that there is one element alone out of which all are created. That they are all created out of the dust of earth we can readily admit; but the elements are there by which we can apply to man what may be applied to all created existences, "*to every seed his own body.*" The earth was the place of deposit, and we were taken out of it; we shall return to it, we shall be resurrected from it. "Thou turnest man to *destruction*, and sayest, *Return*, ye children of men."

The bishop's "second argument" proceeds upon the analysis of the subject as applied to man, showing by "the structure and physiology of the superior races" "that they were created for each other, one class to subsist upon



the nutritious tissue of the other." He proceeds to demonstrate how "vegetable takes its life from unliving substance by an alchemy too subtle for our detection, a chemistry by whose mysterious manifestation death turns to life," and how, on the other hand, the animal differs from the vegetable in that its subsistence depends upon the death of the vegetable. "Nature is vicarious." From this he proceeds to show design in the construction of living things for the capture of prey for subsistence, all to prove that death was normal and primitive, and designed; therefore, *man* was thus to die.

It is impossible to discuss this subject with the bishop's premises, if they be true; and if they be true, all revelation must fall to the ground; the plain Scripture narrative must cease to be received as authority relating to man's sin, redemption, death, and the resurrection; the whole of the revealed account is very misleading if his argument be correct. To substantiate this remark, serious as it may seem, note the "fourth argument" of the bishop.

He says: "My fourth argument is that death existed before sin, and could not, therefore, be penal. The historical argument, like the two preceding, is independent, and in itself conclusive."

I assume to say that it is not "conclusive" at all. What is his process of proof? It is this: "Geological science discloses an extremely high antiquity for the globe on which we dwell, and that throughout all its ages of life it has been the abode of death. Man is a *parvenu*, a modern creation, the very latest. It is, indeed, but a few thousand years since he came to his home, tenanted for uncounted millions before. This is the teaching of both records, the inspired and geological. Among all the ancient memorials of life there is no trace of him, but all those outside memorials are memorials of death as much as life, showing that all along, over all the surface of the globe, life and death equally prevailed. The globe itself is a

vast catacomb, crowded to its deepest base with remains of species and orders, extinct cycles of ages before any of the present races made it their home. No one who has any information in the premises pretends any more to doubt the facts. Thus sin, which entered the world 'by one man,' is new, while death is ancient. The cause can not be subsequent to the effect. To prove the force of this overwhelming fact two idle conceits have been invented. One, that earth was the scene of an ancient rebellion of some pre-Adamite man, or possibly of the angels who kept not their first estate, and from that emanated the long line of death whose desolations extend over geological eras. This vain imagination, of course, neither admits of nor requires an answer. The other is the supposition of so wise a man as Horace Bushnell."

The bishop proceeds to give it, but it is not essential to our argument.

In looking at the above statement of the bishop's I would say that the Bible is the first to teach the immense antiquity of the earth. It bears testimony to that fact in its songs. The same also teaches the recent origin of man. Can any one imagine sublimer poetry than the thirty-eighth chapter of Job? "Where wast thou when I laid the *foundations* of the earth? declare if thou hast understanding. Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? or who hath stretched the line upon it? Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? or who laid the corner-stone thereof, when the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?"

Please read all this song. Two things it incidentally bears testimony to, that there were planets in existence before our earth existed—that is, before its foundations were laid—and that there were moral intelligences in existence then called "sons of God," who sang on the occasion of the laying the foundations at the coming together of the germinal principles of which our earth is the

outgrowth. Other allusions of the same Scriptures prove the pre-existence of life to that of man; but that life—that is, so much of it as was life on earth—was not *human life*. In this position of Scripture there is, therefore, no contradiction of geology. I think rightly understood the Scriptures grant all that the science of true geology claims, and it, in return, supplements the Scripture statements.

But at this point permit one remark: The Christian idea of death has either been misapprehended or it has been greatly misrepresented. My reason for this statement is this: In the “Imperial Bible Dictionary” we find a strong statement, that the Christian idea was that death was unknown, that immortality was the property of animal existences, and that they never died until man sinned, that with his fall, for the first time, all else went down with a mortal crash. I think, on general principles, this is not a fair representation of the Christian idea. My opinion of the case is, that death was the common heritage of all animal and vegetable creation, primarily so under the law of nature. Placing the bishop’s idea by the side of the article before me, and comparing notes with other authority at hand, I think I discover the pastures in which he has been feeding and the waters from which he has been drinking. Is there any *standard* authority (there is here and there a writer) in the school of Christian thought that holds to the view that *immortality was the property of all animal existences up to the fall of man*, and that in consequence of *his sin they became mortal*? I know the idea is held by some, but is it the accepted Christian idea? I answer emphatically, *No*.

Do I understand the bishop to represent that the Christian idea denies the presence of death as the “normal” and “primitive” condition of all things previous to sin? I so understand him. This I claim is either a misapprehension of the Christian idea or a misrepresentation of it. The bishop has set up his man of straw that he

may stand off and have the honor of knocking it down. The point I want to make in this criticism is, That death—that is, animal death—as it reigned in the universal domain of animal existences previous to the fall, was not in consequence of sin. It was *natural*. It was, of course, physical death. It was universal. I repeat that it was not in consequence of sin. I say, therefore, that death did exist previous to sin—but *the death of what?*

Mark you, at this point, there is an epoch in the argument. I hold that at man's creation he was familiar with the fact of death. Sin as yet did not exist. But for all that, God talked with man in his innocency familiarly about death. Death reigned in all else. When God created man and breathed into him the breath of life, he became a living soul, an undying being. His soul could not die in the sense in which his body died. I mean, also, that in his duality his personality was complete. This alludes to character and consciousness of perfection. In the midst of a dying world this living man is placed—immortal, soul and body. He in every particular stands out distinct from all else. He commands: "Of every tree of the garden thou mayest eat: But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou *shalt not eat; for in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.*" I hold that this statement in the first utterances of the Almighty in which he places man for the first time under law, implies the immortality of man, or they are idle and meaningless words. Man was created for bodily permanence, and placed a moral agent in the midst of creatures of non-bodily permanence; and with this non-bodily permanence around him and before him, God says that man stands out in contradistinction to it; but that in the *day thou* (man) eatest of the forbidden fruit, thou (man) hast *lost* this contradistinction of designed permanence and immortality and become mortal and dying like other animal existences.

I claim this to be the solution of this question that no

one can deny, and at the same time adhere to the Scripture narrative. Death had always reigned before and without sin, but man was dropped down in the midst of it as an exception to this rule, and "the wages of sin" in him were to place him in the common mass of death and subject him to laws of decay. The subsequent narrative confirms this statement. He did not drop dead on the spot, but became no exception to the rule of other decaying things. Therefore, by the maintenance of virtue and holiness in which he was created, he was constituted an exception to mortals by being immortal; he also, by violation of the law he was empowered to keep, became mortal. Death is therefore *to man*—not to other animal existences—the *penalty of sin*.

One serious mistake is made when it is said, by such a giant of thought as Bishop Foster, that death to man is not penal. Let me restate his position, that I may not be mistaken, nor lead others into error: "Death existed before sin, and could not, therefore, be penal. The historical argument, like the two preceding, is independent, and in itself conclusive." It is an error for him to rule out the whole of Christian thought by ignoring the fact that so far as the Bible and theology have to do with death as the penalty of sin, the whole argument must proceed with specific reference to *man*. Back of him it does not go. It simply teaches that man should be no exception to the rule if he ignored the conditions of *his* immortality. Further, his death applying to soul as well as body, he incurs the deformity—the marring of that moral and spiritual beauty in which he was created. He dies spiritually.

The bishop's argument as applied to man subjects him to the serious charge of logically denying the atonement. Can he reconcile the atonement with his position? I hold that to deny death as the penalty for sin necessitates, logically, a setting aside of the atonement, for if the penalty theory is false, then is that of the atonement false; or,

where is there a place for atonement where there is no penalty? If death is not the penalty of sin, then tell me what is?

These are serious questions, and demand serious answers. The whole system of the bishop's argument is full of absurdities. They loom up on every page, and before he caricatures as "idle conceits" those whose logic and intelligence have commanded the faith and respect of the ages, he should look well to his own foundations, and see if he is not first to drift away from the solid rock. We do not propose to take Milton or Bushnell as the rule of exegesis or proof, but to conduct the argument in the light of both revelation and reason, and by this course we may be assured of meeting the "deepest wants of reason and the soul." We do not see how reason or the soul can get along without this course, and hence we pursue it.\*

Man is an exception. God makes him such. What is the subject under consideration? Is it not the subject of *beyond the grave*? Let us rule out all inconsistency, then, by considering man as outside, and an exception to the common mass in the present world as much so as we consider him separate from it in his relations to *beyond the grave*. If we consider him in the common mass here, and discuss him in that light, when we transfer him to the future state to be consistent, put animals and man there together too. But you say that the animal can not live there; it is mind, thought, spirit, that lives there; it is reason that exists there. Well, animals have these in their measure in addition to instinct. They are not *rational* creatures, humanly speaking, because they are not human. But they *think*, they *reason*, they are creatures of *education*, and for domestic animals faculties amazingly similar to the human are seen in *degree*.

I know that this argument is open to serious objection,

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\* See author's discourse on atonement in "From Pit to Rock."

but the limit of animal reason and intelligence is that of their appointed sphere. Man's sphere is superior because his appointments are superior, and his endowment is appropriate to his appointment. The difference of their future state is a difference of appointment and divine direction.

But on what ground of *reason* or *logic* is it argued that, because death *reigned in the pre-Adamic animals*, and before man sinned, *therefore* death is not a penalty for *subsequent* rational man's sin? that is, because irrational *animals* died before rational man was created, therefore the death of the rational creature is not penal? Turn this logic any way you will, we are still unable to see the logical inference or connection between the death of the pre-Adamic creature, and that of rational man of a vastly subsequent period, placed under law appropriate to his rationalism with its accompanying penalty on condition of disobedience. If we accept the bishop's premises, that we are to make no distinction between pre-Adamic and irrational creatures under no intelligent law, and rational man placed subsequently under rational and moral government, then are we compelled to accept his conclusions. But his premises are false, therefore his conclusions are false. If rationalism, pure, is to have to do with the argument, from the time of the formation of man's body until the "living soul" was "breathed into" it, the formation of his dual nature was a *conjunctive work*.

The impression is made in the bishop's argument, as it often is elsewhere, that the "animal man" was made; and that his being was total in the abstract from the soul, as a kind of machine; and that after this organism was complete man was stood up on his feet to dry—or, if with "animal" life, moved about as such—at least saw that, first of all, the mechanism was complete, and then formally breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and that not until after this latter *ceremony* he became a living soul. It looks as if the argument proceeded largely upon this basis.



But is this correct, reasonable, or in accord with the implied teaching of Scripture?

There is evidently an analogy not figurative only, but in fact, between this creation of man and the other acts of creation. The Spirit of the Lord is represented as the creative energy. For instance: "And the earth was without form and void; and darkness was upon the face of the great deep; and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." What for? Giving it *formation* as well as life. Christian thinkers will agree that the creative energy is uniformly attributed to the Spirit of God. I believe the creation of man, and the impartation of the life principle as well as soul, are works that take place simultaneously. If any thing, his *life* has precedence over materiality. The giving of the animal and spirit life, or soul life, are not separated in the narrative. Therefore, if the life principle in man be an impartation of the Spirit of God, it must be of its own duration, whether it be of animal or man. This can not be altered, save by special edict and appointment. "By him all things *consist*." His life-giving and energizing power permeates all life.

Man's creation was a more rapid work than that of earth, of material inanimate things, but for all that by the same divine agency, the word "and" which follows the narrative of the physical creation conjunctively connects the soul's creation as simultaneously with that of the body. In experimental theology there is a question often asked like the following: How long a space of time occurs between justification and regeneration? which Mr. Wesley would style "hairsplitting" theorizing. So some have asked, How long after the body was created before the soul was breathed into it? At what stage of bodily growth or perfection does the soul enter it? and many like questions are asked. But rationally, the moment God touches the physical being with life he is breathing the living soul into it. If a living individual soul is a *creation*

it is begun to be fitted to its earth temple when God touches with life the structure, in building for it. I am inclined to the opinion that the moment that it has the primary principles of human existence in it, in accord with God's appointments for the creation of such an existence, that moment the soul is there. Each grows with the other's growth, and strengthens with each other's strength, the physical the product of physical laws, the soul the product of God's breathing consciousness. But with God there are no fractions of existence.

I come now to the bishop's *third* proposition which I intentionally left to the last, because his *second* and *fourth* more appropriately belonged side by side. He says: My third proof—"that is, of *man's preordained mortality*—is derived from the law of fecundation or propagation obtaining among living things."

At first thought I considered it too much of a *curious* thing to give his language in full, but after deliberation I have concluded otherwise. So here it is, just as it comes from his pen: "Each species of life has a specific law of propagation and fecundation; which is a part of its original enduement and investiture. These laws determine the amount and method of life contained potentially in each creation. They are the essence of creation—the first or properly creative act including all after developments of the life principle or nature. The law declares itself by the operations of nature. In this way we become cognizant of its existence. Now it is my purpose to show that these included laws of the propagation of life are inconsistent with the idea of permanence of the atomic lives or individuals which come to existence by their operation, and by this means to show that perishability of the individual lives was an inclusion of the plan of life itself, so tracing death to the original decree or purpose of God as normal. The scheme of life as to its breaths and variety, even in the measure in which it has come to our knowl-

edge is not simply wonderful, it is amazing; we can not attempt the survey of any considerable part of it, but must suffice with one or two illustrations. Prepare to be surprised at what follows. I am sure the event will astonish you more than you can imagine.

“Let us take for our first illustration the little English sparrow, suggested by hearing its vigorous chatter this snowy morning from the cover of a neighboring ivy. Within a few years it has become as familiar to the parks and groves of America and as great a favorite in our homes as it has always been amid the lawns and ivy grown vales of Europe. It is well known that it is both an exceedingly hardy and prolific species, having young with great frequency and persistency—not improbably averaging in the case of a healthy bird, not less than a score of offspring, which, indeed, is a moderate estimate. Suppose two of these beautiful creatures to have been originally created and the law of their being to have been that they should propagate a single brood of not more than four and their fecundation then cease; their offspring to be subject to the same law, the fresh brood oncoming when the parent bird attained its twelfth month, thus each year producing double the birds of the preceding. Now suppose all endowed with permanence of life, what would be the result as to the number of sparrows at the end of two hundred years, or at the two hundredth generation? It is a simple arithmetic problem which any ordinary child may work out in a few hours by starting with two and multiplying the product by two two hundred times, or doubling each year for two hundred years, or more quickly yet the result may be ascertained by reference to logarithmic tables. The experiment will show that they would reach the sum of 3,262,019,678,459,263,839,964,499,350,631,378,022,737,142,959,936,020,783,562,752, which if read after the French method of notation, would be (counting all the inferior numbers as ciphers) three octillions of decillions, a

sum so enormous as to transcend all power of conception or expression almost.

“Let us now inquire what disposition could be made of this amount of life if there were no other lives to be provided for? What relation do you suppose would the sparrows have to the square inches on the earth’s surface? I have propounded this question to many thoughtful and even scholarly men and women, and have found a few who, after a little reflection, imagined that there might be nearly a sparrow for each square inch. In fact, it shows the number of sparrows to be more than three hundred millions of decillions for each square inch. If you doubt, reduce the two hundred millions of square miles, which constitute the earth’s surface, to square inches. You will find the number to be 8,614,775,040,000,000,000, which you will find will go into the above number more than three hundred millions of decillions of times. Suppose a sparrow to be an inch in height, the earth at the end of two hundred years would be surmounted with a column of sparrows three hundred millions of decillions of inches high. There are 63,360 inches in a mile; the column would therefore be more than four thousand decillions of miles high. The sun is one hundred millions of miles from the earth; the column would therefore tower into space forty octillions of times higher than the sun, nothing but sparrows.

“Take another view. The sun is a globe, eight hundred and eighty-eight thousand miles in diameter. The solid contents of this vast body, reduced to cubic half-inches, shows the number of half-inch cubes to be, in round numbers, seven decillions. Multiply this by five hundred millions, the number of similar bodies within the reach of the greatest telescopic power, and we have thirty-five billions of decillions. This sum will go into the number of sparrows about nine hundred trillions of times. Now, allowing a sparrow to be equal to a cube of half an inch,

they would in two hundred years be equal in bulk to four hundred and thirty-nine quadrillions nine hundred trillions of universes as large as the one known to us, or it would require all the substance of the universe multiplied nine hundred trillions of times to furnish materials for sparrows' bodies. If we suppose the sparrows to have existed since Adam's creation, the figures to represent their number would make a row one thousand eight hundred units long, and the number of universes required to supply these bodies would be expressed by a row of figures one thousand seven hundred and fifty-five units long.

"Let us substitute men for sparrows. Suppose, as in the former case, each generation to double, or each human pair to have four children, and none to die; as we are now about the two hundredth generation, the figures at the present time would be the same as in the above calculation. Let us give a foot square to each man, and suppose the average height to be four feet, what would be the result as to the relation of men to the square feet on the earth's surface?

"The number of men would be in round numbers, as already stated, 3,000, or, in round numbers, three octillions of decillions. Then add 5,575,680,000,000,000 quadrillions of square feet on the earth's surface. This would go into the above more than five hundred billions of decillions of times, which would be the number of men for each square foot. As, by supposition, the average height is four feet, the column of human flesh would tower into space to the inconceivable height of two trillions of decillions of feet; which, divided by 5,280, the number of feet in a mile, would show four hundred millions of decillions of miles, or, as shown by dividing this sum by 100,000,000, the number of miles the sun is from the earth, it would be four decillions of times higher than the sun. Now, as it takes a ray of light eight



concomitant. The one order included the other; birth carried death not less certainly and necessarily than life in its embrace."

There is but one other question that approximates the bishop's illustration for "amazing" character and eccentricity, and with no more reference to the settlement of the problem in debate than his illustrations, and that is the homely query, "What becomes of the pins?" It is a familiar adage that "figures won't lie." The immense figures here given must bequeath us either an immense truth or mistake. This theory is largely based on counting the *chickens* before they are hatched, or meeting a difficulty before we get to it.

There is no authority for the interpolation of such an illustration but that of a fruitful imagination. The illustration is not authorized by any facts in science or revelation. It therefore belongs to the mythical, or domain of imaginary possibilities. His figures are more curious than useful; they are the fanciful paintings of imaginative science, a picture drawn by almost every pen that essays to treat of the subject. There is nothing especially objectionable in such a proceeding—there is nothing of very special practical benefit in it in the way of a solution of the problem under consideration, that death must make way with human life to provide place for human beings. The problem of the bishop, applied to the spirit of man, will also make a thing of immensity, and he must now begin to make way for space for immortals.

The argument ignores the possibilities of the omnipotence of God in providing space in immensity, if he so designed that *all* created animal substances should be permanent. That he did not so design we are all agreed. But the logic does not result in the "therefore" which would conclude man in the mass with no creative and designed exceptions. It is not necessary to repeat what I have said on this subject. If God had designed that *all* physical



existence should be permanent, are there any who believe that at any moment, however great the increase, its physical force would have exceeded the power of the Almighty to provide space and sustenance for the same? I put God against these figures, and they sink into littleness and insignificance. But we are agreed that death is the normal and primitive condition of things in general. This generality applied to every living thing save moral intelligences, and there I claim that God did make an exception. He made this exception in every way, and *sin* only was to run athwart the exception. *This exception applied not only to man's physical permanency, but also to the law of fecundity or increase.* From the beginning this increase was not as it is now in its application to man. The command was, "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it."

But I venture to say that while the propagation of his own species was a part, only, of this blessing, that the principal part alluded to man's high position in relation to other creatures of God and his dominion over them; hence the specification, "Have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the face of the earth."

In relation to the law of fecundity I venture the assertion that in this, as in the matter of death, man was the great exception to all else, and that he was the "god" of God's creation in his relation to that creation, and that as rulers are not to outnumber the ruled, so he in this relation to them and the laws of increase as comparatively singular, he the ruler, they the dominion of things at his feet.

I believe that no reckonings can be drawn from the present state of the laws of human fecundity, for the increase is a part of the penalty of the fall. God said to the woman, in consequence of her sin, "I will *greatly multiply* thy sorrow and thy CONCEPTION," etc. Here we are to call

in arbiter number three who insists upon the correctness of the law principle that governs in all courts of civilization, that a witness shall have a right to construe his own testimony. It shall be taken as he *means* it. But in this case the *sound* and *meaning* of the words of Scripture are the same and the only question in this trial and at this point is, Shall the Word of God be ruled out of court as an incompetent witness? If so, then we must yield the point; but, if not, then do we claim that God makes a distinction here that will take the props from the bishop's figures and bring them in tumbling confusion about his head. The Scriptures constitute the mind of God as a witness upon the question of fecundity, and it is clear that they rule out his feathery air-castle as not applying to man. Thus I claim that his calculation is not germane to the subject as applied to man. What the law of increase would have been in the case of the human race we are not told; but if the present inhabitants of the earth illustrate it, the words "*greatly multiply . . . thy conception*" imply carried backward, an *immense* minority of the human race compared to the present. Just here there are other questions crowding in, some by way of objections, others in the shape of curious inquiry, all for information, but to all I say, Weigh the matter carefully, scientifically, as well as in the light of divine truth, and they will be satisfactorily solved or so constituted that your faith can accept the Scripture statements.

In the bishop's ear I whisper the question, If the witness of revealed truth, according to the above reckoning, is not ruled out of court, will you not change your figures *as applied to man*? If the Word of God has any consideration in the matter, and the "facts" and "reason" of the case suggest the probability of it, is there any room for the statement, "*Let us substitute men for sparrows.*" You can not do it, sir. It is not lawful that you should. With the supposition that the bird story be correct, I have such

an estimate of the Divine knowledge that not one of the birds even would fall to the ground without His notice. But to man he says, "Ye are of more *value* than *many* sparrows." "The very hairs of your head are all numbered." With God it is not a question of *numbers* or *space*, as seems to be the burden of the bishop's speculations, but of character; and as if the Savior had in his mind this immensity of figures in "many sparrows" he keeps up the idea of the man as a numerical exception when he says, "Ye are of more value than *many* sparrows," than the sparrows that *outnumber* you.

I claim that there is no "groundless imagination" about my argument, that if the sayings of God in relation to man in his creation, fall, and resurrection are of material worth and are verities of truth entitled to "rational" credibility, then have we a well grounded argument and a well grounded hope. Will science presume a question of space with the Almighty? Permit further observation as to the scientific phase of the subject. The revelations of science are wonderful. They transcend, almost, our conception. Many a mind has become unsettled in the contemplation of physical science. The well-balanced mind is that which takes the ballast of moral truth along. What becomes of the birds? What becomes of the beasts? What becomes of the pre-Adamic monsters of the deep? What becomes of the fish—of the "codfish?" It is said that Mr. R. Ingersoll represents a pious father teaching his son the lesson of *design* in nature. As an object lesson in the "bird" department he sees one of the crane species alight in the edge of the river, and walk out on his stilted legs and with his long neck and bill take a fish from deep water. See there, said the father, divine wisdom, providence, and design. He proceeded to say that for this reason the bird had long legs, neck and bill, and the providence and design were very clearly seen in its favor. "But," said the son, "while I see it clearly in that case,

where is the providence and design on the part of the fish in being eaten up?" The father was unable to answer according to the skepticism that was theorizing against truth. But there is an answer. There is a design in some things that they are to be eaten.

But one objection can be urged, and that is the unkind idea of *pain* that one thing suffers in being devoured by another. But are we certain of this? Has not Providence provided a law of escape from pain in such. This law applies to all, and is a wonderful providence and mercy. Dr. Livingstone, the missionary and explorer of Africa, says that when he was struck down by a lion, and knew that his flesh was being torn by the claws and teeth of the beast, that he was unconscious of pain. In the face of death, however great the physical laceration, there came over him a feeling of numbness, rendering him unconscious to pain and yet conscious of peril. Yet such is the *amaze* that takes possession that even fear is taken away, and renders one consciously submissive to his fate. The lower animals can not speak, but may we not suppose that if they could they would bear testimony to something of this kind? So in the presence of the design of some for food there is no perceptible suffering in them so fulfilling that design. Thus we may see the inklings of providence in the fish eaten by the crane.

But what becomes of the immense numbers of the objects named? Science answers all these questions. It is supposable from the best light given that, when they have reached a certain increase, a designing mind has brought upon them in a moment, and for some great end, simultaneous destruction. Some compression has taken place that made them answer other ends, that were finally to contribute to the benefit of man. This applies to the vegetable era in which great beds of coal were the result. In the formation of rocks there are petrifications that illustrate

living existences, birds, fishes, reptiles, etc., long before the era of man. No one denies this. The immense reservoir of oil underlying the earth is held by some to be the product of compressions of things alluded to, especially the vegetable. Those who are well informed in geological knowledge will testify that rocks, marble, and great beds of chalk, are composed of what were once living creatures or substances. Under the glass the shells in these creatures that once inhabited the waters are discoverable. In the Keokuk (Iowa) region there is a stratum of rock composed of fish-bones. So here we have, away back in the ages, no one knowing how far, these remains that indicate the answer to the question, What becomes of those things? Is it not believed that if there was such a repetition there would be a like disposition?

But man is the exception to the rule. He is not found in the rocks. Prehistoric or pre-Adamic ages settles nothing as to man. We take him up within his own era, analyze him in the light of his own creation, and trace design in him as it is revealed to us. Science gives us but little information as to man's creation or future destiny. And as to fecundation and increase, revelation and human observation proves that the race is in transition, and that in the ages to come there is an implied limit to it all, as taught in the case of the woman with seven husbands, when it is said that they will be as the angels of God. To set aside Scripture we get into confusion, but they unravel the knotty problems that distract the mind, and bring a definite and satisfactory solution at hand.

Death is not, therefore, necessary to man simply to get him out of the way for the occupancy of some one else. There is a higher lesson of instruction given than that. That lesson, for time and eternity, is couched in the simple statement of Paul: "The wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord."

With this proposition before us, I assume to discuss the doctrine of

DEATH OF MAN A PENALTY FOR SIN AS TAUGHT BY THE  
SCRIPTURES.

If this book were intended to be a compilation of the opinions of others, several pages would here be given of the greatest of all theologians, Richard Watson; but the compass of the work will not admit of the space that such an argument would occupy. Taking it for granted that all Arminian ministers have his Institutes at hand, I will say that they contain on "death as a penalty for sin," which is comprehensively treated in the chapter on the *Fall of Man*, all that is really necessary to say. If time will not permit to read all of Mr. Watson's argument, the reader can begin at page 43, and take up his argument as far as page 49, Volume II; but much will be gained by taking time, and completing his whole course.

In his sermon on Genesis iii, 24, Mr. Watson, under his first division, says: "Let us, then, inquire what man is shut out of, when he is shut out of paradise. What did he lose?" He then proceeds to answer: "He lost the happiness of his *external condition*. In paradise all was happiness. There was no *pain*, no *want*, no *sorrow*, no *tear*, NO DEATH. When driven out he was driven into the wilderness of woe, to gain his bread by the sweat of his brow; to linger out a few years in disappointment, pain, and misery, and *then to die*. This is the condition of man. Little external happiness surrounds him in the present life. What he has he derives from the superabundant grace of Christ; *for every particle of it was FORFEITED BY SIN*. Man is now *doomed to toil, frequent sorrows, tears, and finally to death.*"

Not only did the results of the fall extend to the body, but also to the soul. "When man was excluded from paradise, he lost, too, the uprightness and purity of his moral nature. This loss infinitely exceeded in wretched-

ness the loss of his external condition. 'God made man upright.' This expression intimates that there was in his nature a tendency to good; that good was his element. The understanding aspired after it; the will clave to it; the affections rejoiced in it. In him all was order, and all was peace. The moment that sin affected the moral nature of man it spread through his whole character. The understanding became darkened, the will rebellious, the affections were vitiated; in a word, he became a sinner. 'The whole head was sick, and the whole heart faint.' We have shared in this loss. The nature of man is corrupt, and the corruption extends to every descendant of Adam. The fact proves this. It is proved by the experience of every man and every child. We go astray from the womb. Does any one require Scripture proof? Two passages, I think, will be sufficient. 'That,' said Jesus, in his discourse to Nicodemus, 'which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.' This expression—'that which is born of the flesh'—signifies that which is born of man is sinful. 'They that are of the flesh can not please God.' Such, then, is our infected nature, tending continually to evil. There is in us 'an evil heart of unbelief in departing from the living God.' Without an entire and radical conversion, no man can enter into the kingdom of heaven. His upright, moral nature, man lost when paradise was lost." (Sermons, Vol. II, p. 71.)

Please keep in mind the thought for future reference in this argument, that *death as a penalty for sin* affected the whole man, body and soul, in their respective spheres. Death may be called the *effect* of sin, or the *result* of sin, or, appropriately, the *penalty of sin*.

When this is said, I would guard against an unauthorized construction of this truth by the assumption of mistaken teachers, that the Christian idea is, that *all* death is the penalty of sin. I speak on general principles. The Christian idea has a right to explain, as a witness, the



meaning of its own testimony, and no-attorney or even judge can change that law. A technical wrangler may play on words, but, for all that, we are compelled to take the meaning of the witness, he being the one whose right it is to give it. Therefore, when we discuss the doctrine of death as a penalty, it must be understood as strictly relating to *man* only. Keep this in mind, and do not let any amount of analogical reasoning from birds and beasts divert the attention from the real issue. Man is an exception in creation, and not included in the rule, as the bishop would have you believe. Keep that also in mind. Do not yield your revealed premises for any sort of philosophy and false reasoning. There is a greater probability of your Bible being true than all others. There is no reason why it should not be. Do not let false assumption shake your foundations, even though it should steal the livery of heaven to serve the devil in. To confirm the exceptional creation of man, that while he is in a certain sense animal, yet not animal; that in his creation as dual man—man with a double nature, physical and moral—still he is the only creature, aside from angels, that was created under law—under moral law. He is, therefore, a moral agent in contradistinction to all other created earthly things. Other creatures may, and some evidently do, possess in degree reason and intelligence, aside from mere animal instinct, but man is the only creature with a moral faculty. To this creature, man, we now apply the argument.

First of all in importance is the fact that the *law* came to him in his double nature, body and soul. This law had its penalties and rewards. These applied to body and soul. As to rewards, the body and soul were partnership in sharing them. As to penalty for sin, body and soul were to share the consequences. As to the restoration in Christ, in the resurrection the body and soul are still to keep up the partnership in the benefits derived.

I will not say that they are equal, that the body is as

great as the soul; but I will say that their relation to each other, so far as the appropriate office of each is concerned, is to be continued throughout eternity.

The death penalty is pointed out in that law: "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." So far as man's earth-state is concerned, as a result of his sin, his exceptional character is forfeited, and his body becomes mortal, as all else. But the exceptionality is kept up, in the fact that the restoration of the resurrection relates to his *body*, in which no other body is to have part. God watches over this exceptionality, even in the dust, and puts man in time on his honor or his faith for a restoration, and in the future will bring him up to live forever in the immortal body and character that his own volition in life has elected. But this is drifting a little from the penalty idea and argument. We feel hurried to get into the argument on the resurrection of the body, hence the slight diversion.

Paul considers death as the effect of sin: "Wherefore, as by one man *sin* entered into the world, *and death by sin*; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." I should like to give the rendering of this text by Lange, Henry, Clarke, Jamison, Fausset, Brown, and many others; but the reader, important as they are, would weary of the quantity, but not of the quality, of the same. I desire to keep within the compass of thought that will not weary the flesh to such an extent as to affect the activity and vitality of thought upon the subject.

Our own Dr. Whedon is nearest within the reach of all, and excepting a slight logical inference that might be drawn from the same I give his comment on the text. He says, on the subject of "death by sin," that "geologists declare, and science seems universally to accept the declaration, that animal death existed for ages before the human race existed. Indeed, death, disintegration, dissolution, appears to belong to the very nature of material

organisms. This fact seems to be recognized in the Genesis history. Adam's first organism seems to have been naturally dissoluble, and its dissolution to have been prevented by the *tree of life*. His bodily immortality seems thus to have been properly supernatural. Just so his holiness was supernatural, being superinduced by the blessed indwelling and communion of the Divine Spirit. Sin removed the Holy Spirit; the sentence upon sin removed him from the *tree of life* (Gen. iii, 22), and so, when sin entered, then also entered *death by sin*. It was, as above said, into the *human world* that both sin and death now entered. It is said explicitly that 'death passed upon all *men*,' not upon the lower animal races. On Adam's sin, moral subversion and mortality obtained full sway over him, and so all his descendants by the *law of propagation*; the law by which, throughout the entire generative kingdoms, whether vegetable, animal, or human, like nature begets like nature, bodily, mental, and moral."

The logical inference, that might be drawn, alluded to in the remark previous to this quotation, is that if the tree by supernatural power effected the permanency of man, and this was conditional upon man's faith in its supernatural agency, and his obedience likewise to the law conditioning the same, that when he fell, cut off from the tree, his death would be equivalent to annihilation. If it was supernatural life, to possess it required faith in it for physical existence, and on ground of unbelief, man would lose his immortality—in the future state sinning man would not be known, but annihilated. There is no need of this inference; the fact of its not being included in the interpretation of Dr. Whedon is admitted.

A point further suggested is that of the soul-sleeper's logic: that when God breathed into man the breath of life he became a living soul, and that when the breath of life goes out of man (in physical death) he becomes a dead soul. To conclude thus is to do violence to Scrip-

ture interpretation, whether we apply the argument to soul or body, or to both. If the Scriptures had never said any thing about the state of human souls and bodies after death, then we would conclude that annihilation was a Scripture doctrine, and that in consequence of sin; but the fact that the Scriptures have carried us into the future domain of existence, and reveal to us there the conscious existence of material bodies with human souls, proves clearly that death, as spoken of in the Scriptures, *does not mean annihilation*.

Another error in danger of coming to the surface is that of the *sacramental character* of the tree of life. Dr. Curry alludes to the same thing in his *Repository* review of "Beyond the Grave:" "At this point it appears as if the lecturer, becoming apprised of the inevitable tendency of his argument, sought to catch at something to hold him back, or to turn his too venturous craft aside into some eddy at the side of the stream, in which to avoid that dreaded plunge which he seemed to be nearing. He is not prepared to believe—or, at any rate, not to confess—that had there been no sin the body would have died. He had shown that it was a natural necessity, the normal terminus of a journey of self-limited existence; but somehow that result must be avoided. He accordingly had recourse to the theory propounded by a certain school of theological writers, that a miraculous efficacy resided in the fruit of the tree of life, by virtue of which the normal processes of the human physique might be arrested, and so death be evaded. This supposed power of the tree of life is denominated 'sacramental:' but we do not see why, unless the Romish element of *ex opere operato* efficacy is accepted with it.

"A few years since a converted papist published a book on 'Chemical Changes in the Eucharist,' as taught by Rome; but, if the 'sacrament' of the tree of life had power to overcome the natural flux of the elements of the

human body, then it would appear to have been a decidedly effective chemical agent."

Dr. Curry further adds: "We are afraid of such methods, which seem to materialize the work of saving men's souls, and of making sure of immortality. This whole affair of the 'tree of life' is a case of attempted wisdom quite beyond the range of what is written. It is artificial and extra-scriptural, and it is entertained only because it seems to solve, conjecturally, a difficult problem, made difficult by unsupported theory, and to put an altogether unwarranted meaning into a doubtful passage of Scripture. But the whole theory is destitute of any solid foundation in reason or Scripture, and can not be safely built into any superstructure of theological or anthropological science."

This quotation is thrown in to show the divergence of opinions upon very important points, and the intelligence of the reader must enable him to decide for himself the most tenable grounds.

The plain statement seems to be that God made man unlike all else, immortal, *created* him so, and that the continuance of the same was contingent upon his obedience to law, to that holiness and rectitude of character in which he was created and with the power of choice to retain. In this creation, and under these conditions, there is not a word said about his bodily existence or any other existence as dependent upon material food, so far as immortality proper is concerned, but *if he sinned* he should die, *if he did not sin he should live*.

Primarily, normally, or whatever way you may call it, certainly in the vital conception and essential principles of his immortality all seemed dependent on virtue and not food, fidelity to God and not material substance. The tree of life is, indeed, spoken of, but virtue was the ground-work of his immortality, and vice the ground-work of his mortality. After the fall, inferentially, there is reference

made to the tree of life having power to perpetuate his life and resort to it for that purpose, but no reference to such resort previous to the fall, but simply immortal on ground of fidelity to God, and mortal *penally*, because of the cessation of that fidelity. It now becomes a question as to the use of the tree of life previous to the fall, when it is distinctly declared that man's life and permanence were specifically dependent upon virtue and fidelity and his death in consequence of the opposite.

That it did possess the elements of the perpetuity of human existence we can not deny, but whether it was sacramental in its relation to man's physical permanence I am not ready to say. We are not informed that man even resorted to it previous to the fall. The Romish idea must, in a certain sense, be admitted if it was sacramental. If it was sacramental, it certainly was not efficacious in removal of guilt, the point where *sacramental efficacy* must come in. If it did not relate to the moral and spiritual, but only to the physical, existence there is no harm in saying that it was promotive of man's permanence by eating of it, even in the condition of his fallen nature; but his exclusion seems to be for the fear that eating of it would perpetuate being in the face of suffering and corruption in consequence of sin.

Leaving the curious research to those who wish to pursue it, I return to the plain Scripture statement, that, "*The wages of sin is death.*" Following the order selected by M'Clintock & Strong, the next quotation is from Hebrews ii, 14: "Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same; that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil." It is remarked that Satan has power of death; not that he can, at pleasure, inflict death on mankind, but as he was the instrument of first bringing death into the world (John viii, 44), and as he may be the executioner of God's

wrath on impenitent sinners where God permits him. Death is but once (Heb. ix, 27, "It is appointed unto men *once* to die"), yet certain (Job xiv, 1, 2), although uncertain as to the time (Prov. xxvii, 1); universal (Gen. iii, 19); necessary in order that God's *justice* may be displayed and his mercy manifested; desirable to the righteous (Luke ii, 28-30).

If we are disposed to accept the Scripture statement of the penalty theory of death, we have one passage that no living man can gainsay. Its association renders it directly to the point, and in this connection I use it. It is 1 Cor. xv, 54-57: "So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass that saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. O *death*, where is *thy sting*? O grave where is *thy victory*? *The sting of death is sin, the strength of sin is the law.* But thanks be to God which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ." The words in italics will answer the present purpose.

It is plainly stated here that *sin* is the *sting* of *death*. What does that mean?

On the entire passage quoted one able comment says that "death has as yet a *sting* even to the believer, in that his *body* is under its power till the *resurrection*. But *then* the sting and power of death shall cease forever. '*Death is swallowed up in victory.*' Hebrew (Isa. xxv, 8). '*He* (Jehovah) *will swallow up death in victory*'—that is, forever, in Hebrew idiom (Jer. iii, 5). Christ will swallow it up so *victoriously* that it shall never regain its power (cf. Hos. vi, 2; 2 Cor. v, 4; Heb. ii, 14, 15; Rev. xx, 14, xxi, 4)."

The quotation is evidently taken from Hosea xiii, 14. And though it may have there some allusion to national restoration, Paul applies it most emphatically to the question under consideration. Hence, "The Hebrew may be



translated, 'O death where are thy plagues? where, O hades, is thy destruction?' On the quotation as applied to death as a *penalty* for sin, the LXX. says, 'Where is thy victory [*δίκη*] [lit., in a law suit], O death? where is thy sting, O hades?' 'Sting,' the cause, answers to the Hebrew, *plagues*, the *effect*. Appropriate as to the old serpent. [Gen. iii; Num. xxi, 6.] Thou who hast stung with plagues others, shalt be stung thyself. Victory answers to the Hebrew *destruction*. Cf. Isa. xxv, 7; 'destroy, . . . veil . . . over all nations,' namely, *victoriously destroy it*—and to 'in victory' [v. 54], which he triumphantly repeats. The '*where*' implies their past victorious destroying power and sting, now gone forever; obtained through Satan's triumph over man in Eden."

"*If there were no sin, there would be no death. Man's transgression of the law gives sin its lawful power.*" (J. F. B.) I shall have further use for the passage in the treatment of the resurrection. The clear statement is made by this learned authority that "*If there were no sin, there would be no death*"—confirming the idea of death as a penalty. Upon the words, "*The sting of death is sin,*" Mr. Barnes says, "*there would be no death without sin.*" The apostle here *personifies* death, as if it were a living being, and as making use of sin to inflict death, or as being the sting, or envenomed instrument, with which he inflicts the mortal agony. *It introduced it*; it makes it certain; it is the cause of the pain, distrust, agony, and horror which attend it. *Had there been no sin, men would not have died.*"

This testimony is direct. On this same passage "*The sting of death is sin,*" Dr. Whedon bears testimony as follows: "Before Adam's *sin* the destroyer slew the lower order of creation, *but had no sting for man*; man would attain the resurrection state without death or hades." (Compare verse 51.)

The old familiar witness is now called, Dr. A. Clarke, who on the same words remarks, "The apostle explains

himself particularly here; *Death could not have entered into the world if sin had not entered FIRST*; it was *sin* that not only introduced *death*, but has armed him with all his *destroying* force; the *goad* or *dagger* of *death* is *sin*; by this both body and soul are slain." I venture the remark that the uniform testimony of all Christian authority bears directly in favor of the idea that *death* is *penal* and that had man not sinned death would not have entered the human world—man had not died.

In this light we may look upon the death of Christ as penal. In fact, it is safe to remark that when the position of Bishop Foster is taken we have no further use for the sacrifice of Christ; the atonement goes for naught. But the position is so illogical that he finds revealed truth running athwart his path of argument at every point. If the position that I have taken is not correct as against that of the bishop, I then ask, What is the meaning of the apostle's language when he says of Christ, "Forasmuch, then, as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same; *that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil, and deliver them who through fear of death were all their life-time subject to bondage?*" This can only be intelligently understood in the light of the truth, for which I have been contending. Hence believers are exhorted to "look for that blessed hope and the glorious appearing of the great God and our Savior Jesus Christ" in the *resurrection*.

I deem it unnecessary to continue the argument on the penalty idea of death. The "intelligence" of the ages has so understood it. I certainly fear the bishop's position would rob the Gospel of its vital purpose if it did not blot it out altogether.

## PART SECOND.

### THE ARGUMENT SERIATIM.

*"Semper ego auditor tantum, nunquamne reponam?"*

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#### CHAPTER I.

##### EXAMINATION OF LECTURE I: "MAN A SPIRITUAL BEING."

THERE are some things left unsaid in the points that I have been taken up and discussed that may find a notice in this argument in serial, but it is not the purpose to afflict the reader with numerous repetitions. I have been hedging about the outskirts of this forest of words forcefully and beautifully spoken, and yet for all that subject to very grave doubt. The bishop's position is peculiar. His tactics in a military point of view would be indeed remarkable. He has placed his strongholds on the outposts of his book, at the beginning and ending, which, when once broken through, leave nothing within to defend. I should call it in the line of military defense a "hollow square."

But to stop at this point and not complete the criticism would subject one to the charge of retiring from the field before this "hollow." It is not the thing on the outside, but that within that we want to get at. The bishop has laid down doubtful premises and reached doubtful conclusions.

There are some things that we must not be deceived about, and these are upon the question of the soul's immortality and capacities in this and the future state; upon these there are very few, if any, points of divergent views.

I take it for granted that we are perfectly agreed that the soul is immortal. Words need not be multiplied upon that point by way of proof or effort at reconciliation.

On one point we are at issue with each other. The bishop claims that *man is a spiritual being*. No one objects to that. But we do object to the positive statement that man is *only* a spirit. "God is a spirit," or, rather, *God is spirit*. The inference is made in the argument of "*Beyond the Grave*" that man is a spirit very much in the same sense that *God is spirit*. I think this is an error. I think it can not be. I think in this like all else, that any approximation of being, essence, or character between a finite and the Infinite Being is beyond our conception. God is spirit and man is a spirit, but is not and can not be such spirit as God is. This I think will find ready acceptance.

I might complete my work with argument in favor of the spiritual existence of man and not touch the real point in issue, but it will be readily seen that my office at present is to have to do with the *resurrection of the body*.

If this book should ever take class with the literature of the doctrine of immortality, it will be that of the bodily resurrection.

The immortality of the soul is a conceded fact. The immortality of the body is in debate. It remains to be seen, in an argument that must be exclusively devoted to that department of the subject, whether there is any ground for the hope of the resurrection of the body. "If a man die shall he live again?" "For the hope of the *resurrection* I am called in question."

I once heard the statement from the lips of Mr. H. W. Beecher, in his lecture on the *Ministry of Wealth*, that in the whole of the Old Testament Scriptures the future life of immortality was never held up as an inducement to a life of virtue and godliness, but that of temporal prosperity; that they were so gross and sensual, their perceptions so dull, that it was only temporal things by which the mind

and heart were influenced. I was somewhat startled by the statement, and after weeks of thought and search I came to the conclusion that Mr. Beecher made an unwarranted statement.

When I was a boy I thought when any thing passed into print it was truth, and I used to stand in perfect amaze at the wreck that I thought came to some men simply because I saw something in print hurtful to their character; but I soon found that untruth passed into print as well as truth, and early in life I was led to discern between truth and error, no odds where it appeared. But up to this day I have not fully recovered from the feeling that when great and good men spoke that it was not possible for them to utter erroneous things; but back of it all I have discovered that each must think for himself, weigh well the thoughts of even great men and scholars, and even after comparison of the same with infallible truth let your own judgment indicate your faith, think for yourself. One conclusion, unpleasant as it may seem, I have been forced to, and that is in the "higher classes" of "advanced thinkers" who have and do stand out before the world as representative minds, there is as much pronounced ignorance about some familiar truths as you will find elsewhere.

I take it for granted that the scholarship of the ages has not been that of ignorance, and when a man steps across the path of the faith, intelligence, and reason of the ages, and asserts a position in contradiction of these ages, he may well step gently, hesitatingly, tremblingly, for he has on his hands a herculean task. Not that it is impossible that this combined faith, etc., should be mistaken and he correct, but that the probabilities are rather against him. Any man is welcome to assume the position, but amidst the thousands of crafts that lie quietly at anchor in the harbor of revealed and well-authenticated truth, if he wishes to get out to sea and lose sight of shore on a boundless ocean, it will be a difficult matter for him to do

so without bumping his keel against other vessels of more solid material, so that in getting out he will find himself bruised and peeled, and shorn of so much of his strength and beauty that he would feel himself more comfortable back in the harbor rather than on an uncertain voyage.

This question of the resurrection has been anchored so firmly in truth, and in the heart of the race, that it will be exceedingly difficult to heave anchor and get the Church militant to spread sail and pull away from it. To do this, we must get rid of that peculiar drawing felt in the heart and soul when the last clod is thrown upon the grave, and we turn away without hope of clasping that hand again. Our whole faith must undergo a revolution. Instead of immersing the dead in flowers and evergreen, tokens of bodily immortality, we should reverse the order, and throw on the coffin-lid withered leaves and old dry limbs and sticks. We should also revolutionize our idea of the import of Christ's suffering and death, taught us when we kneel at the sacrament of his supper, when, with tearful emotion and strong faith and hope, the minister says: "The *body* of our Lord Jesus Christ, which was given for *thee*, preserve *thy soul* and BODY unto *everlasting life*. . . The blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, which was shed for *thee*, preserve *thy soul* and BODY unto *everlasting life*." The bread we eat, "in remembrance that Christ died for *thee*, and feed upon him by faith with thanksgiving." And so we drink the wine, with a significance (in both of them) of faith that teaches, not a material benefit accruing to the body at the time of the sacrament, but that the preservation relates to the integrity of soul here and the resurrection of the body hereafter—all through the death of Christ and in accord with the whole tenor of Scripture teaching. All this must be cut out of our "cherished belief" and practice if the doctrine of the resurrection of the body be not true.

More, if the doctrine be not true, we may carry on this revolution to its logical outcome by destroying the

very structure of Christian faith and the Christian Church. We may begin at our own ritualistic service. First, take it out of our covenant in which each says, "I believe in the resurrection of the *body*, and everlasting life after death." Next, at the grave blot out the utterance, "We therefore commit *his body* to the ground; *earth* to *earth*, *ashes* to *ashes*, *dust* to *dust*; looking for the general resurrection in the last day, and the life of the world to come, through Jesus Christ our Lord, at whose second coming in glorious majesty to judge the world, the earth and the sea shall give up their dead, and the corruptible bodies of those who sleep in him shall be changed, and made like unto his own glorious body; according to the mighty working whereby he is able to subdue all things unto himself." All this needs to be cut out of our "cherished beliefs" if we accept the bishop's position.

Go still further. We will not only need a new translation—for that would not meet the demands of this revolution—we would need a new *revelation*, for Paul says, "If there be no resurrection of the *dead* [*dead bodies*, not living ones] then is Christ not risen; and if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have testified of God that he raised up Christ; whom he raised not up, if so be that the dead rise not. For if the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised; and if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins. Then they also which are fallen asleep [*dead*] in Christ are perished. If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable."

Are you ready for the revolution? Are you ready to subtract the truth of the resurrection of the "dead," and accept the remainder as wholly satisfactory? Paul's verdict, of all such, is, "Of all men the most miserable." This does not mean that the "satisfying portion" of the future state is exclusion of all bodily existence; but that



to earth's experience of *death* there shall be added that of future restoration; that is, if death was the last of our bodies, we would be miserable above all men, but Christ being risen, and become the first fruits of them that slept, becomes the *pledge of hope* to all who sleep (die) in him. Says Dr. Curry: "Bishop Foster meets with a direct disclaimer of any expectation of the restoration from the grave of the 'identical body' in which the man lived upon earth, and so sweeps back into the domain of fancy all the scenic imagery of the 'breaking graves,' and 'yielding seas,' and the 'standing up' of a 'very great army' at the sound of 'the archangel's trumpet.'"

Let this be as it may, are we ready to take the venture he has taken? We will bide our time, and wait with patience the coming of more light; but, in all his labored argument, not one ray of light has penetrated our mind that would in the least degree change the sentiment from that which has been couched in the "cherished beliefs."

So let us proceed with the argument. We see by the bishop's process all established beliefs must crumble, and Paul himself must go down. If we accept his propositions, they necessitate a new revelation, for the old is unreliable.

### SECTION I.

"It is believed that such is the intrinsic importance of the subject, and such its interest to our affections and our religious faith, that it deserves more attention than it has received, and the more because of the materializing tendencies of the times under the specious guise of science and philosophy." ("Beyond the Grave," page 9.)

But may we not assert the opposite as the very reason why we should adhere tenaciously to the *literal* resurrection of the body, and add; "And more so because of the *spirit-izing* tendencies of the times under the specious guise of *spiritualism*?"

Is it supposable that the difficulty is to be remedied by

going to the other extreme? There is one characteristic in all such reasoning. Persons have noticed that all theories extraordinary, that are founded on inferentialisms, are indelibly stamped with *indefiniteness*. Take Second Adventism, and such arguments as "The Great Tribulation" and "The Seventh Vial," by Cumming, and "The Seals Opened, or the Apocalypse Explained," by Dr. Pond, and many others, and you are bewildered, but not convinced. Bewilderment is not convincement; but many, thinking otherwise, have consented to be bewildered, and have gone to the asylum for the insane in consequence. The bishop's book must pass into that class of *indefinite literature on the future state*.

While in his drift in a positive way to spiritualism he has essayed to offset materialism, he has, nevertheless, held on to that logic by which he is forced to the materialization of spirits; for I understand him to teach, for all his denial of the material body's resurrection, that he still clings to the idea of touchable bodies. There is one inconsistency discernible, and that is of the denial of materialism, and then going forward and constructing a theory of materialism. He admits that the spirits will have bodies; but they are not the bodies of creation, not resurrection bodies.

This compels the second conclusion that grows out of this contradictory argument; that is, the abuse of the word *resurrection*. If the "resurrection" body is not this earth-body, but *another*, then is it not a *resurrection*, but a *substitution*. *Substitution* should therefore be substituted in the Bible for *resurrection*. Does he think by this process of argument that he will accomplish much by way of heading off "the materializing tendencies of the times under the specious guise of science and philosophy," by going from one materialism to a materialism that multiplies the difficulties of the solution of the problem in controversy?

Is the question more competent of a solution within the domain of our present and known laws? or in the unknown beyond is there a law by which we know the solution will come within "the facts that lie within the circle of our intelligence?" By this process of reasoning the argument becomes confused and indefinite.

## SECTION II.

"Awarding due honor to the Holy Scriptures, as the court of ultimate appeal and supreme authority, it gives reason fair play throughout," etc. ("Beyond the Grave," page 10.)

The reader will keep this in mind for future reference.

The remainder of the Preface is filled up with statements that need qualification, with reference to *reason*. They are such as are high-sounding, relating to the "rights of reason," the *competency* of reason, and that imply reason as sufficient of itself, as the court of ultimate appeal. No one wishes to lower the "right" of reason, nor its capacity; but there are "facts within the circle of our intelligence" we are compelled to admit, and one is, that sin has so disabled reason that it can not be infallible in its conclusions. To those who have the lectures at hand, let me inquire if there is not a confiction between the bishop's remark as to the Scriptures being the court of ultimate appeal, etc., and what follows in the Preface. He says, "It gives reason fair play throughout;" and following his logic, if human *reason* should conclude the Bible false, and its doctrines erroneous, it could assert its mandate above them all. If he accepts the qualification contained in the last paragraph of his Preface, then does he surrender his whole ground, and concede that this argument must be settled as "purely a doctrine of revelation," and only understandable by "exegetically" investigating it, or that the Bible is not a "Thus saith the Lord." One of the two—which? There can not be two "courts of *ultimate appeal*

and *supreme authority*, that of the Holy Scriptures and human intelligence and reason."

Here let us not lose sight of the true office of reason, that it is not the source, but the reception, of knowledge. Let us not lose sight of the fact that reason, like conscience, is a creature of education. The "Thus saith the Lord" may be a "Thus saith the Lord," whether the reason "know" it or not. Its being a "Thus saith the Lord" is not contingent upon the recognition of it by reason, but the recognition of it by reason may be necessary to act upon; yet, whether it be so recognized or not, it is, for all that, superior to reason as a guide of action, aside from reason's cognition.

Again: The necessity of the *spiritualization* of the future body, to get rid of "materializing tendencies," etc., is hardly permissible. I can not conceive of a greater cause of such materialism as the bishop alludes to than his own theory. In matters of controversy, I have noticed a drift in the human mind to go to extremes. A good illustration of this is seen in what might be termed the old orthodoxy and old Universalism of one hundred years ago, that as Romanism gave such a bad side to religion that positive atheism resulted, so the old severe orthodoxy, in its literal fire and brimstone theory, drove men to deny future retribution altogether; just so, I presume that to escape some dilemma the "reason" can not solve, as to a bodily resurrection, the bishop has drifted to extreme spiritualism.

That he has gone in part over to the Unitarian school in this matter, and largely to Swedenborgianism, there can be but little doubt. In taking their theory that death is not penal, he is compelled to follow their conclusions—a denial of the atonement. By his kindly reference to Dr. George Bush as his "court of ultimate appeal and supreme authority" (pages 121–123) on the question of future spirit state, I am confirmed in the opinion that he has turned himself over—for what reason I can not say—to the prin-

ciples of a man whose arguments have been answered over and over again, and by none more forcibly than the sainted Bishop Kingsley in his work on the "*Resurrection of the Dead*." I will make frequent allusion to it. I assume to say that Bishop Foster's theory is, in the main, *Bushism*, and that to maintain it is to discard the standards of orthodoxy. (But even for this he is, by Dr. Curry, crowned as a hero.) If he accepts Dr. Bush's definitions he will have to accept their application.

Some comparisons will not be out of place at this point. Before undertaking this task of writing I desired to know the status of Unitarianism on the questions involved, and corresponded with leading divines of that denomination. Here is a reply from one in Chicago under date of July 4, 1880. He says, "Many Unitarians, while receiving the Gospels with grateful reverence as honest and in the main trustworthy accounts of Christ, can not believe that miracles ever really took place, and consequently can not believe that Christ was visibly raised from the dead. Others, among them myself, do believe that he was, though whether it was a simple *bodily* revival or a spiritual manifestation of the visible life we are generally unable to settle, the New Testament accounts being themselves apparently conflicting and inconsistent on that point. But I think Unitarians all believe in immortality, that Christ and all men pass from this life to another, and are living still in what St. Paul calls "the spiritual body. In *hope*, too, we are *Universalists*, *hoping* that *all* may eventually be restored to virtue and happiness, *sure* that all will have further opportunity of growth, repentance, and change; but it is a matter on the details of which Unitarians have never liked to dogmatize." (Brooke Herford.)

Those who have read Professor Bush and compare this letter with the same, and place by the side of both the lectures of Bishop Foster, can very readily obtain a knowledge of the source of his information. It is exceedingly

unauthentic, unsatisfactory, and leads us over old battle-fields fought over in the past, and nothing new is offered. There is not an argument of the bishop's but has been answered often.

His process of reasoning is largely that of Professor Bush.

Kingsley says of Bush: "He makes his rational deductions the *criterion* of truth in regard to the *meaning* of the inspired Word," and adds that Bush, "setting out in the light of this *criterion* of truth, every passage of Scripture he meets must yield the 'sense' required by his 'criterion,' namely, *his* 'rational deductions.'" (See Kingsley, pages 102-105.)

That it is possible to arraign the bishop for his *Bushism* is proven by his second lecture, where he emphatically teaches, from page 60 to the close, that which Bush teaches on page 78 of his, that he can see no use of the doctrine of the resurrection for the reason assumed, namely, that the purposes of the soul can be answered without it. Bishop Kingsley has assumed, and that correctly, that a denial of all the fundamental doctrines follows on the process of the same reasoning.

But let us call a halt, and not reach the lectures in our remarks before they come in order of the argument.

### SECTION III.

"'Life beyond the grave!'" The subject is of "*almost impenetrable obscurity*. The grave bounds our vision. How shall we find out any thing which lies beyond? Can we ever know that there is a life beyond? . . . Does death end all? We answer unhesitatingly, No. The answer represents our *belief*, not our *knowledge*. However it may awaken surprise, *truth* demands that we should make the confession that we do not know that death does not end all. Nor does any man know that it does. If it were given to man on earth to know, that would be the

end of uncertainty, or even questioning. We do not know; therefore we are liable to have misgivings, doubts, and fears. There is not a single fact within our reach that furnishes us absolute knowledge. We have neither sense nor mental vision of man after he dies. He does not appear again within the range of our faculties. We do not find him. Where he is, or that he is not at all, is absolutely unknown to us. Our consciousness is silent on the subject. The dead do not come back to us, and we are not able to go to them. This, without doubt, is the common experience of humanity. If there are any who imagine that they know, we are not anxious to dispossess them of the pleasing delusion; it can not harm them." ("Beyond the Grave," pages 15-17.)

The reader will evidently see his own confusion in finding out the bishop's meaning. Acknowledging the Scriptures as "the court of ultimate appeal" (page 11), and yet cutting them out and "submitting it to reason, and the examination of the subject in the light of all the facts bearing upon it which lie within the circle of our intelligence," this difficulty is sure to arise. There are no facts within the scope of reason or circle of human intelligence by which the future state may be known. The "court of ultimate appeal," the Scriptures, must then settle it.

- (1.) They tell us that death does not end all.
- (2.) There is enough in them on which to base a *knowledge* of the facts.
- (3.) The *facts* of a future life are revealed.
- (4.) Reveal is to make known.
- (5.) Christ is the light of the world. Light is that which makes manifest, known.
- (6.) Christ made known, not the fact—that was known before—but the *mode* of immortality in the Gospel.
- (7.) It is a matter of *knowledge* that death does not end all. (See rich man and Lazarus, and other revealed illustrations.)



(8.) John says that it does not end all. "It doth not yet appear what we shall be, but *we know that when he shall appear we shall be like Him*, BECAUSE WE SHALL SEE HIM AS HE IS." Compare Christ's appearance in the transfiguration, the occasion when he arrested Paul, when Stephen was dying and saw him, and John's description in Rev. i, 12-16.

(9.) The fact of Christ's resurrection and ascension furnish "absolute knowledge," which the bishop denies.

(10.) The Word of God in every reference to the future state speaks both to our "sense" and "mental vision of men after death." In the frequent allusions he does "appear within the range of our faculties" of "mental vision"—but not of communication.

(11.) The idea that "consciousness" is "silent" on the subject of future existence is a greatly mistaken utterance. But of course it depends upon what is meant by "consciousness." If it means sensible *touch*, then it is correct, but if it means soul consciousness in its outgoings and longings for the redeemed, then is the statement at fault—for the facts of immortality are attested by the affections and impulses of the soul—of the whole man.

(12.) David's assertion that his child could not come to him but that he could go to it, is a clear contradiction of the utterance of the bishop, "the dead do not come back to us, and we are not able to go to them." If *beyond the grave* is our text, "the court of ultimate appeal" contradicts the statement. It takes a *bodily* resurrection to explain the meaning of David's words, for it was the *dead* body that brought the grief, and his relief supposes its resurrection. It is true that spirit communings are not Scripturally admissible. It would be absurd to suppose the return of its spirit. It was more than David's spirit going to it at his death, alluded to.

(13.) It was not "imagination" and "pleasing delusion" with Paul, nor a "*think* they know" when Paul

said "I *know* in whom I have believed," etc. "Because I live ye shall live also." Just as sure as the facts of Christ's resurrection and future state were made a matter of knowledge to his apostles and others, and through them to us, the Christian has a *knowledge of the facts of immortality* given for his encouragement. This so-called "pleasing delusion," "can not harm them" who hold it. I imagine that here is a heel turned against "the court of ultimate appeal," after one has consented to abide its decisions.

It may be that he prefers the "circle of our intelligence." But what is that? There is a disposition to weigh humanity and its destiny in the scale of "positive science." But what is *positive* science, and, admitting all its conclusions and deductions, what has it decided in the problem in controversy? Nothing. You may draw analogies between nature and revelation, but that is all. The simple fact of analogy proves nothing. Man is not an annual. He is not planted as seed which yearly produces a harvest. He is unlike any thing else. He is not vegetable. He is distinctly apart from all other creations, animal as well as vegetable. If we believe the divine record as to his *creation* we must believe it also as to his *future* destiny. We are just as much indebted to revelation for the solution of the doctrine of his future state as we are for information as to his creation as a moral agent under moral law, on which he depended for the perpetuity of his purity and permanence of being and on which we depend for a revelation of every step of his existence—his creation, fall, redemption, death and future being. There is no settlement of these questions save by information given to reason by revelation. The information is positive.

#### SECTION IV.

"Having conceded that there is no absolute knowledge in the premises *pro* or *con*, we now affirm that we find it

quite impossible for us to doubt." ("Beyond the Grave," page 17.)

This is a sad conclusion. But is he sincere? Are we not rather to conclude from the subtle wording that revelation and all else have given no definite law to settle this, and that those who "think they know" have only a "pleasing delusion," "harmless," indeed; that by so doing, he assumes that there is no law *pro* or *con*, and that where there is no law there is also no transgression, and that, therefore, to doubt is an impossibility, because there is nothing to doubt? Can any one draw other conclusions? This is unquestionably his logic—and seemingly so designed. Remarks are unnecessary.

Again, same page: "The *strength* of the *belief* is unquestionably instinctive, but this only points to its probable truth."

What does *instinct* prove? Nothing much but embryo truth—no formulation about it. Instinct is very apt to be molded by the passions and habits of life. The Indian of the West has an instinctive belief in a future state. But his instinctive revelation of its conditions is measured by his passions and ambitions of his earth state. The warrior here is the warrior there. The scalps that adorn his apparel here will be ornaments of honor there, "and so on throughout the whole bloody *régime*. Human passions and instincts perverted are attached to the gods and their blood-thirstiness goes into the future state. Give us more than instinct—give us instinct's guide, *revelation*."

Page 17, continued: "That which we now seek to find out is this: Since we have no means of absolute knowledge, what may we *rationally* believe? Are there facts which ought to determine our beliefs one way or the other? Let us not fall into the dangerous fallacy, that since knowledge is impossible, inquiry is useless. There is a truth. Either man does survive death or he does not."

(1.) He concedes that there is no ground of absolute truth. (2.) Knowledge is impossible. (3.) But it is a fallacy not to inquire—though “knowledge is impossible,” and no *absolute* truth. You might as well say to the mote that is spreading its wings for flight to the sun that reaching it is an impossibility, yet do not fall into the fallacy that flying for it is useless. There is but one inference from this curious logic, and that is, the *educational effect* of inquiry. This is the only benefit left if there is no absolute truth to attain. Dr. Patton notices an objector to prayer answers, who holds that the particular benefit of prayer is in its educational effect in producing a devotional frame of mind. The doctor proceeds to examine some passages in that light: “Seek and ye shall find, knock and it shall be opened.” A mother is in search for a lost child. She comes to you for inquiry. You reply that seeking is a good thing; you need not expect to find, but seeking is a wholesome thing in producing, educationally, thoughtfulness of the child and affection in the mother. A neighbor comes to your door, knocks; you do not get up to let him in. Knocking is a good thing; never expect the door to be opened; the particular benefit of knocking is in its educational effect in creating patience, and waiting. If any one can draw any other inference from the bishop’s statement that there is no “absolute knowledge”—that since “knowledge is impossible,” that still, inquiry is useful—than that drawn in the above, the writer would like to know what it is. (4.) Then, again, there is, on the face of these inferences, the significant question, “What may we *rationaly* believe?”

Let the intelligent reader take up the work of George Bush referred to, and I venture the remark that, with the exception of the picture painting, of which the bishop’s mind is fruitful, and one or two other items, he will find, largely, the doctrines of his lectures there. To prove that this statement is not a fancy, I will ask the bishop’s ques-

tion once more, and see how Bush answers it: "Since we have no means of absolute knowledge, what shall we rationally believe?"

Bush says (237): "So far as we are capable of forming a judgment, the evidence from *reason* preponderates in favor of an *immediate* entrance *at death* upon the resurrection state. This evidence we have seen to be confirmed by a multitude of passages, which yield this more readily and naturally than any other sense. But in the text under consideration, and perhaps a few others, the doctrine of a future simultaneous resurrection seems to be explicitly taught. Here, then, we are reduced to a dilemma. The character of the difficulty is changed. It is not so much now a conflict between reason and revelation, as an apparent conflict between one part of revelation and another." And it is the further work of the author to make *reason* the court of ultimate appeal in the settlement of the doctrine of the resurrection, and his *rational* deductions are the standards of truth.

But the point at which I aim is, that while Mr. Bush, Foster, and others discover what seems to them "apparent" contradictions in revelation, the correct statement of the case would be their incapacity to discover what that truth in Scripture is. Is the order to be reversed, that reason is the infallible standard of truth, instead of the Scriptures being the infallible standard of reason? Which is it? Bishop Foster clothes his argument in different words, but his thoughts are similar to those of George Bush. Still, after saying, as Pilate, "What is truth?" and turning away with the same philosophy in his mind that dwelt in that ruler, and controlled thought in his day, which held that "absolute truth" was "impossible," he says (18): "That there is a truth: either man does survive death or he does not." But what is the definiteness of the statement? Let the bishop answer. Page 19: "Each mind must act for itself, and as new minds are

constantly coming into the arena, the old questions must be fought over in each age. *It is a fair presumption that the debate will never cease, and nothing will ever be settled for all time.*"

He has no attainable anchor. With no guide but *reason* and its "deductions," he will lurk in the murky darkness of indefinite conclusions. All being unsatisfactory, and for the want of a *mode* of immortality, he must come to the Scriptures as "the court of ultimate appeal and supreme authority," but claiming that it gives "reason fair play throughout," this "fair play" he construes into loose "play" with the Scriptures, and, following the example of Bush, sets them aside as "contradictory" and unsatisfactory in the settlement of the doctrine of immortality. When "fair play" with reason means "foul play" with Scripture exegesis, it is time to call a halt.

#### SECTION V.

"If it were once established that man is simply the organized thing which we cognize by sense, the debate would soon close, further discussion would become a simple impertinence. It is that hallucination so strangely possessing many, almost all, minds, which makes the principal difficulty in arriving at the truth in the premises." ("Beyond the Grave," p. 23.)

Let us not be thrown off our guard by this strange language. (1.) "If it were once established that man was *simply the organized thing* which we cognize by sense." Now here the impression is made that those who oppose the bishop's theory of "*man a spirit*" only, hold that man is "simply" a "thing" of "organized" matter. I contend for the *dual* nature of man. Pages could be filled with testimony to this truth. This thought will be enlarged upon in future pages. (2.) The bishop's dilemma is as great by assuming that *man is spirit only*.

Page 23: "It is that hallucination so strangely possess-

ing many, almost all, minds, which makes the principal difficulty in arriving at the truth in the premises."

He evidently feels that the intelligence and scholarship "of many, almost all, minds," are against him. The "thing" which he treats with such lightness and insignificance is a part of *us*. No manner of reasoning can shake it off. It is not the *whole* of *us*. Man is not *wholly* "*simply* organized thing," nor is he wholly spirit. That the two elements are distinct is conceded, but that they were ever designed to be totally separate to all eternity we deny. That the body is inferior to the soul we also admit, and soul superior to it; but this does not settle the question *pro* or *con*. Certainly it does not argue the annihilation of the body. The body is not soul, nor soul body, but in their proper functions and appropriate offices and relation to each other there is position for each, and office for each in unison of the dual man in heaven as well as on earth.

The figure of the potter and clay partly represents my idea. One was marred in the potter's hand. It did not answer his original purpose. He did not *destroy* it, but gave it a humbler seat of honor. God says he *could* deal with a kingdom thus, putting them up or down, but he does not. That God could destroy by physical force his creatures no one will deny, and that for no other reason than he *could* do it; but does he do it? No; he deals with them, not as lumps of clay, but moral agents. He gives the nations their spheres, to which their merit and capacity entitle them. In a certain sense he deals so with man. Originally the body was designed for a higher sphere than it has filled. *Sin* marred it. God humiliates it. Not as a potter with inanimate clay, but the soul being in the transgression, and the body its instrument, God, for the soul's sake, inflicts the only penalty appropriate to the spheres of their respective elements; and being intimately and for eternity essentially connected for the fulfillment of the original design of their creation, having sinned,



God, as in the case of the nation he has threatened to overthrow, puts them on honor through the moral responsibility of the soul, on conditions and benefits God has provided; in the resurrection both are, through Christ, to attain unto that "glorified body" which they were evidently originally designed to be. This truth is illustrated in Scripture.

#### SECTION VI.

"We consign the quickly decaying form to the grave. We know that it soon molds to the dust. There is not a single sign that it will ever germinate or return to life. *To believe that it will, on any facts which appear, or any rational ground within our reach, is impossible.*" ("Beyond the Grave," page 23.)

Now, if the Scriptures constitute a "court of ultimate appeal," then have we "facts which appear." But to believe them, says the bishop, "is impossible." Pointing to the very "facts" in controversy, Christ says, "Yet a little while, and the world seeth me no more; but ye see me: *because I live ye shall live also.*"

The whole aim of the argument is to shake off this body. It seems to be to disprove the double nature of man, that spirit only is man (which we all admit, so far as the thinking part of man is concerned), that the body is only an accommodating agency of the soul, that its capacities decline while those of the soul increase, that the future man is a formless spirit.

But as to the decline of the body's capacities, was this so from the beginning? In David's flight of contemplation of the immensity of nature, he comes to man: "What is man, that thou art mindful of him? or the son of man, that thou visitest him? For thou hast made him a little lower than the angels, and hast crowned him with glory and honor." Then follows his reference to his earthly honors. The words imply that man was not originally designed the fading creature made for decay. When he is

taken up among angelic intelligences, it is clearly seen that while he is but *little* below them, the honors and dominion conferred was to be such as would answer the ascending nature of man in his duality of character.

I will show in my argument and deductions from revelation that the future society is to be that of sensible contact with dual creatures, loved ones that have *form* or *shape*, through which *individuality* is more perfectly conveyed, even to spiritual perceptions.

## SECTION VII.

“The life of the spirit is its power to think, and feel, and will; the life of the form is its power to digest and assimilate food, and build up tissue. The aliment of the spirit is knowledge; that of the form is vegetable and animal substance. The spirit thrills with the sense of beauty and goodness and truth; the form trembles and dilates with nervous excitement under touch and sound. The spirit is invisible and impalpable; the form is visible and tangible. The spirit grows by increase of thought; the form by increase of bulk and weight. The spirit loves or hates, rejoices or sorrows; the form sways and bends with sympathetic nervous affection. Thus we perceive a marked and absolute difference between the two in all their characteristics, phenomenal and essential. They have absolutely nothing in common. They are no further similar or identical than this, that, for the present, they dwell together, and serve each other; and the union seems an end and is for an end.

“In the end served it is discernible that the form is for the spirit as servant and instrument. The spirit uses it, and, for a time at least, needs it,” etc. (“Beyond the Grave,” pages 28, 29.)

He at this point opens up an important and indescribably interesting department of this subject. In the first part of his statement, and so much of it as precedes the

latter part of the quotation on page 29, we are agreed upon. It all applies to the earth-state of man's existence. But as the subject is that of *beyond the grave*, it must be carried into that domain. Thus, taken on territory of the future state, has the bishop satisfied us, from any thing that he has said, or analogy drawn, or "deductions of reason," that the end for which the body was created and which it serves here ceases at death? What is the proof? *But is there any intimation from Genesis to Revelation that the body's service to the soul was only an arrangement for time?*

We come now to the discussion of knotty and difficult questions. Giving *reason* "fair play," I wish to ask, What is it that reason settles, aside from "the court of ultimate appeal," the Scriptures? For several pages of the lectures, beginning at this quotation, the sum total of the argument is that, because the body is what it is to the soul here, therefore it will have no such relation to the soul there.

Mr. Bush says that all the faculties of the soul can accomplish their purposes independent of the aid of the body. Bishop Foster, seemingly taking Bush for his guide, repeats his argument. But how do they know? What is the proof? Nothing at all but the inferential conclusion that, because the body decays and dies here, there will be no body there. This inference can not be drawn from nature. It can not be drawn from reason. It can not be inferred from science. It certainly is not found in the Scriptures. From whence, then, is the derivation of such conclusions? From assumption only. The illustration in telegraphy is wanting, for in that case the material must come to the aid of the immaterial. That the immaterial, in the illustration, can exist independent of the material all concede; but when communication is needed, what then? Your telegraphy fails to cover the case. It is a nice illustration, in part; but it is not demonstration, upon the whole.

I hold that there is no definite information upon this subject save in revelation, and that must come to our aid, and we must accept its teachings and representations of this subject or we are without knowledge. It comes with the authority of truth, and we accept its facts.

To get this question before the mind, let me ask, Are immortals different from mortals in the matter of food, assimilation, and digestion? Also, are immortals possessed of *form*? Is it not a fact that man would not live a moment beyond the exit of soul from his body, and that for certain purposes of soul cognition the two must here be inseparably connected? I claim that the complete future union of soul and body carries with it the same idea. Of course, the future bodies identified in their individuality will necessarily be of that tangibility, materiality, and food assimilability which belong to that future state, and will be unlike this earth sphere.

The statements of Scripture are positive on this point, and can not be set aside as figurative, unless a part of the revealed plan is a "make believe" system of truth which would be equivalent to deception. Unless revelation is a deception, future existence is an existence of touchable bodily forms, where material hands can be grasped, and where the eyes of the soul will look through material bodies.

At this point let me beg indulgence in devoting a chapter to the discussion of an interesting question of Scripture import and fact that has not received more than a passing allusion, if that, from writers on the doctrine of immortality. The argument shall be purely Scriptural, and is suggested by this last quotation from "Beyond the Grave." It will cover the ground in the quotation, and to it I will devote considerable space, for I am presuming upon lively interest upon the part of the reader that justifies its discussion. The question stands at the head of the following chapter, and as the bishop requested his auditors to pre-

pare to be amazed at his figures, he will doubtless have somewhat of kindred amazement at the statement of my proposition. To the following chapter you are therefore referred, and the proposition at its head is competent of proof if the Scriptures constitute "the court of ultimate appeal."

## CHAPTER II.

THE EMBODIED SPIRITS IN HEAVEN REPRESENTED AS  
POSSESSING GREATER CAPABILITIES THAN  
THE DISEMBODIED.

THE Scripture representation of human intelligences beyond the grave shows the disembodied spirits as possessing less capacity than embodied spirits will possess.

This statement applies to existence *beyond the grave*. It is to be settled by the authority of Scripture. The departed human spirit in heaven is as one that has lost its *mate*—not its mate in equality, but a partner for all that. In that condition it is better off in heaven without a body, and knows more, and its capacities greater than when enshrined in a body on earth, but not so great as its powers will be in the re-embodied state. This disembodied state constitutes what is known as the *intermediate state*. When soul and body are reunited, that intelligence and capacity which will come of this reunion will be greater than that of a spirit beyond the grave without a body.

Thus I think I am understood well enough to proceed to the proof, basing the same on the “court of ultimate appeal.” All else fails us on this point, and to it we now come, believing that the deductions of revelation will be more definite than reason, and more in accord with the “deeper wants of the soul.”

## CHRIST’S RESURRECTION BODY.

The first instance in proof of the proposition heading this chapter is that of the resurrection body of our Lord.

Just here let me say that the bishop’s argument will

rule out the evidence. But in reply I will say that I will rule out his argument by which he assumes to rule out my witness and testimony. That will settle the question.

There were laws known to the resurrection body of Christ to which his previous body seemed a stranger. Unless by some outward manifestation in his favor, such as was intimated possible in the twelve legions of angels that his Father would send in answer to prayer, in his behalf, and the opportunities afforded by the crowd of people to escape harm, he seemed to be subject to the same contact, fatigue, and hunger that others were subject to, and to the violence of the people culminating in his arrest, trial, and crucifixion. There were no supernatural or unknown laws that interposed in his behalf. He was a man among men save by special miracle. He hungered, he thirsted. He was burdened in body with fatigue. He was subject to the same laws, and there seemed no more escape for him than for others. His death attests this fact. He was a tender plant—a root out of dry ground—with no form or comeliness, and no beauty that we should desire him. That there were supernatural attestations of his divinity is certain, but none for his protection against any or all of the ills to which the human flesh was heir. He slept as other men. He also toiled as other men. There were no supernatural outbreaks of the immortal state in his preresurrection character, only so far as they were manifest in proof of his sonship. The transfiguration can not be urged as an exception, for it had to do with the heavenly state and properly belongs to the sphere of the resurrection body and had to do with immortals and not mortals. Peter, James, and John were taken up into the mount as witnesses, but not as participants in it. Only Moses and Elias, in the same state, were competent to converse with a glorified bodily Redeemer. Peter's words were the indefinite jargon of a dream. Thus mortals compared to immortals.



But when Christ had risen from the dead there was an immense increase of bodily capacity or power as peculiarly characteristic of that state. The stone was expressly sealed and made secure to put beyond a doubt the impossibility of his resurrection. An immortal rolled away that stone. If the angel is not material, here is an instance of an immaterial thing coming in contact with a material with power over materiality that mortals could not possess. This body, in its resurrection state, ate bread as before. The disciples, who thought they had seen a spirit, were requested to feel of it, and were assured that a spirit—that is, a *disembodied spirit*—had not flesh and bones, as Christ was seen to have. “Flesh and blood,” such as Christ had before his death, could not inherit the kingdom of God” in heaven, but “flesh and *bones* as ye see me have” by feeling me, says Christ, can. The elements were indeed subject to him before, as we see the wind and the sea obey him, and as he walks on the water to his disciples as well before as after his resurrection by specific miraculous power; but the laws of gravitation seem in his resurrection to be no obstacle in the way of his resurrection body. Whether that body hungered or not we are not informed, but he was known to them in the breaking of bread, in the eating of fish and honey-comb at the seaside; and when the trembling ones believed him to be a spirit without body in addition to touch, he said, “Have ye here any meat?” And they gave him meat, and he ate it before them,” showing that such food as others ate was eaten by the resurrection body of our Lord Jesus Christ. That body passed through barred doors. He appeared before his disciples in such a mysterious way that they were impressed with the unnaturalness of his presence, for the barred doors would have kept others out; but to his body of “*flesh and bones*” these barriers did not offer any obstruction whatever. I presume “*rational* deductions,” according to Foster and Bush, would rule this out of court, but

remember "the Holy Scripture is the court of ultimate appeal."

Right before the eyes of his disciples and a multitude of witnesses by principles unknown to mortal law, but familiarly presented as known to immortals, he rises into heaven the bodily Savior he had been on earth, with this addition, that he had passed the sphere of mortals and entered upon his immortal state with immortal bodily powers. Whatever before may have been the powers of soul, surely those of body and soul here are not equal, but in the resurrection the body measures up to the capacity and demands of the soul, and where it commands the body is there to obey.

"But," you say, "in what sense does this prove that the soul has more power with the body than without it in the future state?" Nothing but a direct answer will suffice. So I will give it. In no instance in Scripture where the minutia of dying is related is it represented that the soul has power of its own exit. When it leaves its body it wants other hands to convey it to its rest. Thus it was in the case of Christ: "Father, into thy hands I commit my spirit." Thus showing the truthfulness of the statement that the spirits of men disembodied are nowhere in Scripture represented as possessing the powers of navigation through the air without assistance. "They go to a place prepared for them," but it is by the return of the risen Lord for them that they are *received* to himself.

This was the case with Stephen. He saw the heaven open, and Jesus standing on the right hand of God; and dying, the spirit going out of the body, he exclaimed, "Lord Jesus, *receive my spirit.*" I am confident, unless the Bible is not "the court of ultimate appeal," that the uniform testimony of its teaching is, that the powers of the soul with the resurrection body are greater than without it.

One more case is at hand. Lazarus died, and the narra-

tive is not that he of his own ability went flitting through the heavens to Abraham's bosom, but that he "was carried of the angels" there.

If we go back into the Old Testament history, David in the Psalms says, "*Thou shalt guide me with thy counsel, and afterward receive me to glory.*"

Of Enoch it is said: "He walked with God, and was not, *for God took him.*"

Elijah went up bodily, in his chariot of fire. The explanation needed in the case of these two, is, that the process of this translation is a more rapid—a miraculous accomplishment of the processes of death and resurrection—in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, in which God's power is the active agency, and nowhere attributable to any capacity in us; hence, the patriarch and prophet, by the presence and assistance of God, entered upon their state *beyond the grave*. Though Moses is represented as dying, I think he died in the same way—no man knoweth of his burial place, because his sepulcher was the bosom of God, whence the Father kissed his being away from its earthly sphere. Centuries after, with, perhaps, no other intimation than the will of God, Elijah, who went to heaven with heavenly assistance, appears again without it, to converse with Christ on earth as to his decease at Jerusalem. Moses appears in the same rôle with the prophet, showing that their future state is similar, though the narratives of their death are unlike; yet this subsequent occurrence and appearance with no attendant other than each other, proves a very similar exit. There is no doubt as to their exit being that of a glorified bodily state, the heavenly character of the same indicated by the positive statement of Christ's transfiguration, these appearances being "*in glory*"—or the glorified state.

Another proof is, that intelligent converse with immortals necessitates a transfer to their condition—to their state.

This truth of the superior capacity of spirits with res-

urrection bodies is farther confirmed. The souls of them that were slain for the Word of God, etc., who were under the altar and cried, "How long, O Lord, how long," etc. That they had entered upon a state of active interest in earthly affairs, or rather had taken it with them no one can deny; but it is said that white robes were given them and that they should rest for a season, etc., indicating that they should witness or bide the divine dispensation that would justly bring out all things well. That they are happy we will admit. That they witness the counsels of heaven in the affairs of men on earth we will concede, but that any unusual developments of power of the most superior known aside from God and angels belong to such spirits is not so stated. Their state is that of "*rest*;" their character is that of *purity*—"white robes;" their office is that of waiting.

In no place in revelation is there the glimmer of an intimation that a departed human spirit will be equal unto the angels, or perform any of their offices as ministering spirits, doing God's pleasure or bidding *until after the resurrection of the body*. *Then and not till then* does the spirit come in possession of those angelic powers by which, unknown to the earthly sphere, its bodily competency will be equal to the demands of the soul. It is at the resurrection when the spirit seeks its partner of flesh that they shall be caught up in the air and so shall be ever with the Lord. But to accomplish this first, the Lord shall descend and with him "all the holy angels," intimating that as they accompanied these spirits from earth to heaven, in like manner they will accompany them back to earth, but on the occasion of the resurrection they will not need the assistance further, for they "are equal unto the angels."

Mr. Bush says that he rejects the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, because he can not see any use for such a doctrine, affirming that all the purposes of the

future state and of retribution may be answered without it." (P. 78. Compare Kingsley p. 14.) Bishop Foster says substantially the same thing. But that is not the question. Because George Bush and the bishop think the purposes of the future state can be answered without the resurrection, this, *their* "*rational* deduction," is begging the question. The fairest putting of the question is, "What saith the Scripture? how readest thou?" what of "the court of ultimate appeal, the Holy Scriptures?" They teach that the soul enters upon a state superior to this at death; and further, superior as that state is, it does not measure up to the capacities of the soul when reunited with the resurrection body. I repeat, that the Scriptures do represent a limited and dependent capacity of the soul in its separateness from the body, and that spirits are represented as performing feats of exit hither and thither in the resurrection state unknown to the disembodied state.

I have here thrown out my vanguard, and shall beg the indulgence of taking up the argument in regular course, after stating the point of the avoidance of my argument in the bishop's lectures.

It is apparent that he does not want to go over to Unitarianism entirely, but that if he could effect a middle anchorage he would feel safe. There is a fallacy in trying to carry water on both shoulders. Still there is a sense, in arguments of radical divergence, in which the golden mean may lie just between.

Bishop Foster does not deny that the real body of Christ in which he was crucified was restored to life and appeared to his disciples and others, but he says that was not his resurrection body.

Somewhere between the blessing of his disciples and his ascension into invisibility he shed that body, and the body in which he ascended was his glorified body—the true resurrection body.

Bush denies the resurrection altogether, and deals largely with optical illusions, etc.

I shall give some of his quotations and then return to the argument *seriatim*, after which we will endeavor to show the fallacy of the bishop's position and offer arguments from "the court of ultimate appeal" to prove that spirits with touchable bodies have a greater sphere of activity and enlarged capacities than those of no bodies. Also that spirits as represented by this same "court of ultimate appeal" are not formless, intangible things. But also that no knowledge of their state and character can be learned by sensible contact with them here, but is transmitted to mortals by a revelation from God, made especially for the benefit of mortals. I would at this point continue this part of the argument, but I see a benefit that will accrue both to the reader and myself by calling a halt and returning to the criticism proper. But before closing I desire to point out, in the course of argument, how they may see that the bishop would close the door against controversy by saying that the body in which Christ ascended was not the one in which he was resurrected. If that is a correct statement, I would lay down my pen; but it is an unwarranted assumption for any man to make who believes in the clear statements of Scripture.

The door to the argument shall not be closed by this assumption. Here are some quotations from Bush:

(1.) "The resurrection of the body, if my reasoning and expositions are well founded, is *not a doctrine of revelation*. . . . The resurrection of the same *body*, in any sense whatever, encounters difficulties in our view absolutely insurmountable." (Page 40.)

"The resurrection of the body . . . an insurmountable difficulty" in the way of God! "Why should it be thought a thing *incredible* that *God* should raise the dead?" "Ye do err not knowing the *Scriptures* nor the *power of God*."

But I did not intend to make comments on these quotations, only give them.

(2.) "How the evidence adduced may strike the reader we know not. To our mind it is amply sufficient to establish the conclusion that the resurrection of the body is not a doctrine sanctioned by reason or revelation, so far as we have hitherto interrogated the testimony of each." (Page 274.)

(3.) "The resurrection body is that part of our present being to which the essential life of man pertains. We may not be able to see it, to handle it, to analyze or describe it. But we know that it exists, because we know that we ourselves exist. It constitutes the inner, essential vitalities of our present bodies; and it lives again in another state because it never dies. It is immortal in its own nature, and is called a body—a spiritual body—because the poverty of human language, or perhaps the weakness of the human mind, forbids the adoption of any more befitting term by which to express it. . . . It would seem, then, on the whole, from a collation of all the grounds on which an opinion is founded, that the judgment of *reason* would be, that a spiritual body is developed at death; *by the development we mean disengagement.*" (Page 78.)

"It is something essentially connected with vital operations, something that is exhaled with the dying breath, or, in other words, that goes from the body before it is consigned to the dust." (Page 170.)

"The true *anastasis* (or resurrection) is the development of a spiritual body at death." (Page 78.)

"The prevailing sense of *resurrection*, in the New Testament, is simply that of future state or immortality."

"The grand point we combat throughout is that which affirms that no resurrection can take place but by means of the reunion of those principles—soul and body—which constitute our being in the present life. We maintain



that neither reason nor revelation countenances the idea of such reunion. All the purposes of a future state of existence and retribution we contend may be answered without it." (Page 78.)

Bishop Foster uses almost the same words. His argument and doctrine are with slight qualification the same. This statement is sustained by comparing the following from Bush with Foster:

"The point that will probably be regarded as most exceptionable, is the making our *rational deductions* the *criterion* in regard to the meaning of the inspired Word, on a theme of so much importance as the mode of our future existence."

I assume to say that, if said "rational deductions" as to "the meaning of the inspired Word," mean that the "inspired Word" is to be interpreted in the best light of our intelligence of *its* meaning, we acquiesce in the statement, but Professor Bush does not mean that. He assumes that there are "rational deductions" with reference to the future state, independent of the Scriptures, which "rational deductions" constitute the premises of Scripture exegesis, and therefore the Bible must bend to that. What need we then of a Bible? See how well the next quotation confirms the above statement:

"If the *letter of revelation* hold forth a view of the *doctrine* which arrays itself against the clear evidence of facts" (he means what *he* has conceived to be "facts") "and the *soundest process of reasoning*, is there no demand, on the other side, for the *reconciliation of Scripture with reason and science?* *Are we to hoodwink our faculties to do homage to revelation.*"

To this outspoken thrust at revelation (which Bishop Foster substantially follows in his lectures) Bishop Kingsley has appropriately remarked:

"The very fact that revelation has been made supposes human reason ignorant of the things revealed; otherwise

there would have been no need of the revelation. That any particular doctrine of revelation can not be discovered by the light of reason, therefore, is no objection against such doctrine, but rather an argument in favor, inasmuch as if all the doctrines of the Bible might have been known without a revelation, there would have been more grounds for believing the Bible to be a mere human production, the result of man's 'rational deductions.'

"The grand error in the theory we are opposing is, that it attempts to discover the doctrines of religion independently of the only light that has revealed them, *and then requires the Bible to sanction its conclusions.* The best eye can not see without light. No more can the best reasoning powers draw correct conclusions without sufficient data. And in matters of religion it is the peculiar province of revelation to furnish the data. The optician who should shut himself up in a dark room, in order to investigate the properties of light, and then require the laws of optics to conform to his preconceived theory, his 'rational' or irrational 'deductions,' would not be more inconsistent than the theologian who professes to investigate the deep things of God, independently of the only means that has revealed them, and then require the Bible, whether it will or not, to sanction his favorite theology.

"From all this it is a most '*rational deduction*' that human reason investigate *any subject in the light of that science which properly embraces that subject.* What would be thought of a mathematician who would set himself to work to discover, by *arithmetical formula*, the laws of *chemical affinity*? or of the musician who should undertake to investigate the principles of *geometry* by *tones and semitones*? Can the law of gravitation develop the principles of moral obligation? or the rules of rhetoric explain the properties of the rainbow? The reason is plain. These sciences are not homogeneous. They differ essentially in their nature, and the principles of the one do not apply to the other.

Chemistry must be studied in the light of chemistry; geometry in the light of geometry; and so all others. . . . What a pity that men will not learn modesty from their own liability to be mistaken in matters much less mysterious than the resurrection of the dead! And if one human science can not develop the principles of another human science, how much less shall any human science develop the great truths of revealed religion. It is true that the sciences reciprocally reflect light upon each other, and revelation sheds its effulgent light upon all true science; and all science, truly so called, reflects back the golden rays of revelation. But all this is incidental, and I may add, too, *providential*; but it is not the province of one science to develop another, much less is it the province of any or all human science to discover the great principles of divinely inspired truth."

Then proceeds the argument to answer the sophisms of "progressive knowledge." Bishop Kingsley's answer is complete. Almost the same process of reasoning will exactly apply to Bishop Foster's argument.

(4.) "It seems to be a fair presumption that the same body which rose also ascended. But the evidence is certainly conclusive that it was not a material body which ascended to heaven." (Page 153.)

So says Bishop Foster, in almost as many words. The same opinion is held by Foster as that of Bush, on the ascension body, save that while Bush says it presumable that Christ's body arose, Foster holds that it did rise from the dead, but with Bush's idea that it did not ascend.

So far in the discussion, this trivial difference between Bishop Foster and Professor Bush is the only one in the whole argument.

If the reader will apply the unanswerable argument from Bishop Kingsley, on the impossibility of one human science to develop the principles of another, it will be seen

that all of the illustrations of Bishop Foster, drawn from the domain of science, are largely imaginary and out of place. They demonstrate nothing, and are swept to the winds as useless and inapplicable to the question at issue.

His supposition of the soul of one man put in the body of another man, is an absurdity. We propose to rule out all suppositions that are not supposable cases, as unworthy a place in reasonable argument. The thing contained in his illustration is a monstrosity, as well as the attempt to apply it as a "*rational* deduction" to prop up his theory. If such monstrosities of argument are admissible, we could proceed with such license and overthrow all truth, because we could suppose premises that would reach like conclusions.

That there are truths of revelation that are above the discovery of "*rational* deductions," is not only believed by us all, but at the same time there are instances where the Scriptures seem specially desirous that it should be so, that the mind and reason could see the importance of acceptance of revealed truth on the ground of the authority that dwelt inherent within it, without any reference to the ability of reason to arrive at the same truth. Strange to say, the truths to which revelation refers in application of this principle are the very ones that Mr. Bush and Bishop Foster set aside because they can not be demonstrated by rational deductions. Revelation lays claim to our faith in them without a demonstration, and Foster and Bush reject them for the simple reason, and no other, that they thus come. If God has made a mistake in the manner in which he has chosen to reveal his truth, it would have been well for him to have delayed the matter somewhat, until consultation could have been had through human "*rational* deductions."

What I claim is, that while God has revealed mysteries, and people marvel at the same as incredible things, because they were mysterious and insoluble, rather than

meet a caviling, selfish nature, God sees where the mind of man would be drawn to a higher plane of true rationalism and faith, by multiplying or intensifying the mystery, and increase its insolubility, and man, on the ground of its divine authenticity, accept it without a demonstration.

Allusion has just been made to a passage which illustrates this statement, as well as proving its correctness; that is, John v, 19-29:

“Then answered Jesus and said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do: for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise. For the Father loveth the Son, and sheweth him all things that himself doeth: and he will shew him greater works than these, that ye may marvel. For as the Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them; even so the Son quickeneth whom he will. For the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son; that all men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father. He that honoreth not the Son honoreth not the Father which hath sent him. Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that heareth my word, and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death unto life. Verily, verily, I say unto you, The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and they that hear shall live. For as the Father hath life in himself; so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself; and hath given him authority to execute judgment also, because he is the Son of man. Marvel not at this; for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation.”

The mystery of a resurrection from spiritual death is forcibly presented in the first part of this quotation.

Christ's complications with the people were great. His truths to them were mysterious. But in the face of all he rises higher in the scale of mystery, at which they already "marvel;" but he multiplies the difficulty by saying: "Marvel not at this; for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the *resurrection* of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation."

Yet Christ utters this truth in spite of the possibilities of rational deductions. It does not rest upon the condition of the ability of reason to solve it for its truthfulness. It is truth without deductions—it rests upon the authority of God. The first resurrection was the new birth, and an occurrence in time; the other, in contrast with the former spiritual resurrection, is the literal and material resurrection of our bodies.

This is one instance where Christ teaches that the truth of the resurrection of the *body* is to be accepted, though it is beyond the bounds of reason's comprehension or deductions.

Take another illustration, John vi:

"Then said they unto him, What shall we do, that we might work the works of God? Jesus answered and said unto them, This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent. They said therefore unto him, What sign shewest thou then, that we may see, and believe thee? what dost thou work? Our fathers did eat manna in the desert; as it is written, He gave them bread from heaven to eat. Then Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Moses gave you not that bread from heaven; but my Father giveth you the true bread from heaven. For the bread of God is he which cometh down from heaven, and giveth life unto the world. Then said they unto him, Lord, evermore give us this bread. And Jesus said unto them, I am the bread of life: he that

cometh to me shall never hunger; and he that believeth on me shall never thirst. But I said unto you, that ye also have seen me, and believed not. All that the Father giveth me shall come to me: and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out. For I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me. And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day. And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life; and I will raise him up at the last day.

“The Jews then murmured at him, because he said, I am the bread which came down from heaven. And they said, Is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know? how is it then that he saith, I came down from heaven? Jesus therefore answered and said unto them, Murmur not among yourselves. No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him: and I will raise him up at the last day. It is written in the prophets, And they shall be all taught of God. Every man therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me. Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he which is of God, he hath seen the Father. Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on me hath everlasting life. I am that bread of life. Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness, and are dead. This is the bread which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof, and not die. I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever: and the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world. The Jews therefore strove among themselves, saying, How can this man give us his flesh to eat? Then Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his



blood, ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day. For my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed. He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him. As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father: so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me. This is that bread which came down from heaven: not as your fathers did eat manna, and are dead: he that eateth of this bread shall live forever. These things said he in the synagogue, as he taught in Capernaum.

“Many therefore of his disciples, when they had heard this, said, This is a hard saying; who can hear it? When Jesus knew in himself that his disciples murmured at it, he said unto them, Doth this offend you? What, and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where he was before? It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing; the words that I speak unto you, *they* are spirit, and *they* are life. But there are some of you that believe not. For Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that believed not, and who should betray him. And he said, Therefore said I unto you, that no man can come unto me, except it were given unto him of my Father. From that time many of his disciples went back, and walked no more with him. Then said Jesus unto the twelve, Will ye also go away? Then Simon Peter answered him, Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life. And we believe and are sure that thou art that Christ, the son of the living God.”

Here is a case similar to the first, in the fact that a spiritual mystery precedes the material. To eat his flesh and drink his blood was a thing of high spiritual import, but he trusts to their perception to discover it, while he clothes it in mysterious language.

The Jews turned against him, and many of his disciples went away, but when he turned to them, instead of

a qualification of his language he intensifies the mystery: "Doth this offend you?" I stop not, says Christ, to explain away a mystery, but proceed to emphasize the same, that you may be constrained to accept my word for the *authority* of it, and not question it always because of the absence of demonstration. Then he proceeds from what should be an experience of spiritual consciousness, the life of Christ in the soul, to that material mystery that stands without a parallel—without a demonstration, the resurrection and ascension of the material body of the Son of God:

"When Jesus knew in himself that his disciples murmured at it [the 'hard saying,' etc.] he said unto them, Doth *this* [mystery] offend you?" He does not explain nor apologize, but adds, "What, and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where he was before?"

The spirit, for his present purpose, is the object of discourse as essential to right life, but multiplied mystery should be no obstacle to faith. The *flesh* from any standpoint you view it, profiteth nothing without the quickening life of the spirit. The increase of this spiritual quickening is represented elsewhere as securing a "better resurrection."

Thus Christ places a higher value upon this faith principle than on all else. Without it it is impossible to please God. "What! do you mean such a priest-ridden and blind faith as that?" It is not a priest-ridden and blind faith. The difference is the difference between the infinite God and finite man. It is a dull and stupid faith that is blindly led by priest and pope; but not so that faith that lays its hands in God's hand and sings: "He leadeth me." Christ complained, "Except ye see signs and wonders"—"ocular demonstrations" and "rational deductions"—ye will not believe. "He did not commit himself to them that believed on his name when they saw the miracles he performed," and the reason stated, is, "He needed not to be told of man, for he knew what was in man."

Which is the greater, the faith of demonstrations, and deductions, or that of love? The latter includes the former but the former does not include the latter, and this is the reason the Savior did not commit himself to those of the former.

To carry this doubting sort of faith and rationality into the business departments of life, see the uncomfortable attitude of the man. Not only is such displeasing to God, but is also to man. First of all, it refuses to be exercised without an analysis or demonstration. It must be examined. There is no objection to that. It is all right. In Scripture it is supposed that God has revealed a knowledge of himself in Christ, that without further questioning faith would accept "the record God has given of his Son."

But like the doubter that is being elevated into that of the hero by "progressive" and "advanced thinkers," who goes to the merchant and before he does business with him must "investigate" him and draw "deductions;" or to the banker, must "investigate" him and draw "rational deductions;" or to the lawyer, doctor, preacher, and others, *ad infinitum*—thus taking up life in "investigation"—the man goes to *God*, and before a single syllable of the *Infinite Truth* can be accepted, God must be "investigated" too. Well, this must be an uncomfortable state. "No means of absolute knowledge;" "each mind acting for itself;" "the debate will never cease;" and "nothing will be settled for all time" (p. 17-19); the beautiful (1) picture presented by "Beyond the Grave." Is there not some place that the weary child of God can pillow his head, and rest in his earth-pilgrimage even while his feet still press its pathway? Yes. In contrast with the gloomy picture, God's Word is absolute truth. It shouts out upon the air hope—hope of what? For what *hope* was Paul called in question?—the hope of God's Israel in all ages of the world—"the hope of the resurrection." From the conversion of the soul, the first witness of its acceptance with

God up to the shout over death and the grave it is interwoven throughout soul and body.

"There shall be a *resurrection* of the *dead*, both of the just and unjust."

Let others call this a "pleasing hallucination" if they will, and "harmless" to believe, but we are not of those who hold to the idea of "harmless" deception.

### SECTION VIII.

But we proceed with the chapter. On pages 30-2, we read:

"He [the soul] cares for it [the body] because he intends to use it for his own purposes, or because he must have its offices in his own higher and nobler ends. He wants to see and hear, for by seeing and hearing the world of knowledge opens to him—he can not afford to be deaf and blind; he wants to travel, to visit foreign lands, he can not afford to have it crippled and bedridden; in a word, he commands its feet to carry him from place to place for business or pleasure; he commands its hands to execute, in stone or metal or pigment, his ideals of beauty; to write and blazon his thoughts; to carry on his industries and arts; to navigate seas; to construct highways of iron, that he may traverse the continents; to build electric bridges across worlds, that he may hold converse with people of all zones and climes. He does all this for his own ends, simply using the form as the instrument by which to accomplish his manifold wishes and conveniences. . . .

"The superficial view—the sense view—is, that man is what you see, what you touch, what you handle—this shrine or organism. That is all that sense gives you. It is the view that comes first to every observer. The sense-facts come first to cognition; and to the unreflecting, remain the most powerful through life. Were this sense-view true, I should be constrained to say, there is not a particle of evidence, within the reach of man, that he is an immor-

tal being; for there are no facts which point to a return to life of a body which is destroyed. We must be able, therefore, to show that what you see is not the man, or abandon all idea of his immortality on rational ground.

“The task which I now undertake is, to show that the essential man is an invisible quantity, which never comes within the range of sense only as it comes to manifestation in some visible form of activity—the being himself always remaining invisible.”

Then follows a long and labored argument to prove what every one believes, that body is not spirit, and spirit is not the body, and that the powers . . . of the body and soul are distinct, the soul being the essential man. Then, also, follows the pen picturings, all of which are not germane to the subject in controversy. After the distinctions are drawn, that they are separate in their elements, I shall ask for more than a “*therefore*,” basing, as he does, the denial of the resurrection upon the distinctness of soul and body.

On page 30 he emphatically acknowledges that the soul is dependent upon the body here “in reaching his [soul’s] own higher and nobler ends.” By the tenor of his argument the body serves the double purpose of clog and help to the soul. (1) We are told that the *soul* could not see without physical eyes; (2) it could not hear without physical ears; (3) it could not travel without physical feet; (4) it could not write or blazon its thoughts without hands; (5) it could not “carry on its industries and arts, (6) or build ships, and navigate seas, . . . and, last of all, hold converse with people of all zones without a *body*. *He* [the soul] does all these *material* things, using the form as the instrument by which his manifold wishes and conveniences” are carried forward. But is not that body a material one? Yes. I ask that while the original design of the lectures in the bishop’s argument is to check “the materializing tendencies of the times,” if in so doing he has not gone to the

other extreme of the *spiritualizing* tendencies? By what "rational deduction," if the soul is so dependent upon the body for communication, etc., does he deny in its sphere (higher, of course, than earth) corresponding dependence in heaven? For a more complete answer to the bishop's argument than I can give at this point, the reader is referred to my argument on the capacity of spirits in the future state as greater with bodies than without.

The "sense view" of the bishop, in the main, we agree with, but at once find a radical divergence by following his conclusions. That the "sense view" is the first matter of consciousness that we have of our earth-state, we also in the main accept. Still, even this may be qualified or doubted. Christlieb makes a beautiful point on the possible conscious existence of the soul before it is aware of the presence of a body, in the case of the little babe recognizing a smile from another soul as it looks into the face of its mother. Thus weeks have passed away, when one day two little objects bounded up before its eyes, and it is surprised to find that it is the possessor of hands. Its little feet are discovered in very much the same way. After a while, out on this tour of observation, it makes the discovery of a body. Yet the cooing little one had a conscious existence before it made these discoveries.

"That man is what you see, touch, handle—the shrine of organism"—is the "sense view." Is there no "sense view" in heaven? The answer, according to this logic, will be, No; because there are no *bodies* there. Is it a fact that poetry, art, painting, and other phases of finer spheres of mental activity and work, that were emanations from the *soul*, and yet to become tangible must become within the domain of "sense," will be so ethereal that sensible vision will know none of these? I claim that that thing called *sense* is a greatly abused and mistaken thing. From all the representations of Scripture, heaven, more highly spir-

itual, will for all that, have a *sense* side to it. Then, again, I am not certain about the earth-state sense view being destroyed at death. While it is *this mortal* that shall put on immortality, and *this corruption* that shall put on incorruption, I can not see any unreasonableness in supposing that, while God *glorifies* this body of mine, it means also that all the faculties of *sense* shall not be destroyed, but that they shall be perpetuated in a refined and glorified sense that corresponds to the dignity and glorified character of the risen body.

Therefore, let us not lose our senses by degrading our *sense*, but, aiding it to a higher appreciation of the office it is to fill in the future state, as inseparably connected with the idea of its office as a medium of communication. There is *sense* of some kind, or there is no communication. It is the property of both soul and body. Their connection may be separated, so that the consciousness of the soul may be unimpaired while sense of body may be gone, and so *vice versa*, but mentally, physically, and spiritually, I believe that *sense* will be transferred to heaven along with the dual nature in the resurrection, and take its place in the paradise of God as something tangible, and be one medium of appreciable knowledge of God and his works beyond the grave.

But there are intimate connections between soul and body that do not seem to be severed by death. These connections are very mysterious.

Some of them have appeared within the circle of our "intelligence." I can not account for them, and I do not know that any one pretends to do so. But they are well-authenticated facts.

They are not specifically alluded to in the Scriptures; but they are common within the compass of human experience. Of some of these I will speak at the close of this chapter.

"Were this sense view true, I should be constrained to



say there is not a particle of evidence within the reach of man that he is an immortal being." (Bishop Foster.)

Aside from revelation, will the bishop analyze this remark, and tell us, without this *sense* view, how he can establish the idea of immortality, or its proof? Of course, it is an easy thing to say that the soul is master of the body, and that it uses the body for seeing, hearing, running steamboats, building telegraphs, etc.; but what of its immortality? Does the fact that it is in the mastery in time and in *sensible* things authorize us to say that *therefore* it is immortal? What have you given us of *rational* deduction that amounts to a demonstration on this point? What is there in all this imagery on these pages that is more than inferential? It is by purely a doctrine of revelation that we know the soul is immortal. The fact that it thinks does not prove it immortal. Thoughts come and go in the soul without its consent, just like the body breathes without its consent, or without the consent of soul either. If the proof of immortality comes from such inferential testimony, then there is just as much "reason" in the argument that the body breathes from the pent-up *life* within, without its volition, as that the soul has thought by a similar process; and that, if this proves any thing, it proves as much in one case as another in the appropriate spheres, so far as immortality is concerned.

It is objected that the soul is intelligent and the body non-intelligent. But what does that prove? Has it any thing to do with the question at issue? Is not this question a question of *life*, rather than else? All acknowledge the intelligent character of the soul over that of the body, and that the body is instrumental, through which the soul speaks and operates; but that is not the question in debate—it is a question of *life*, of *duration*, perishability or imperishability. *Life* is inherent in all existences of flesh; but the question is as to whether *man*, in the original and divine appointment, is to go out at death and cease to live.

If the indestructibility of matter is a fact of scientific demonstration, who is prepared to say that that life on which organism depends is inferior to the temple it filled with its glory? Draw your inferences.

He says: "There are no facts which point to a return to life of the body which is destroyed."

I reply, there are no facts in reason or the "circle of our intelligence" that "point" to a future life of the soul. I claim that in all the domain of natural law there is just as much to show the return of life to the body as there is that the soul will live forever.

In this matter, also, we are as dependent upon revelation for information as in the other case. There are no *facts* with reference to either, but we must go to revelation to obtain them.

There are some people who are persistent in their ability to live without the benefits of the Gospel, as obtained in the privileges of the Church; but they are always found hanging on to the outskirts of Christian congregations and within hearing of the pulpit—and yet they are doing without the aid of these! So in this Christian land of light, where truth has shaped conviction, and in her faith and enlightened reason, men are arguing that such momentous questions without revelation can be settled, when in *fact* they are as dependent upon it for their ultimate settlement, as much so as if they had never heard of the Bible. This being correct, what shall we say to the startling question that "there are no facts which point to a return to life of the body which is *destroyed*?"

"If a man die, shall he live again?" is christened by Mr. Wendling as "The Problem of the Ages."

Job says: "There is hope of a tree, if it be cut down, that it will sprout again, and that the tender branch thereof will not cease. Though the root thereof wax old in the earth, and the stock thereof die in the ground; yet through the scent of water it will bud, and bring forth

boughs like a plant. But man dieth, and wasteth away: yea, man giveth up the ghost, and where is he? As the waters fail from the sea, and the flood decayeth and drieth up; so man lieth down, and riseth not: till the heavens be no more, they shall not awake, nor be raised out of their sleep. O, that thou wouldest hide me in the grave, that thou wouldest keep me secret, until thy wrath be past, that thou wouldest appoint me a set time, and remember me! If a man die, shall he live again? all the days of my appointed time will I wait, till my change come. Thou shalt call, and I will answer thee: thou wilt have a desire to the work of thine hands. For now thou numberest my steps; dost thou not watch over my sin? My transgression is sealed up in a bag, and thou sewest up mine iniquity."

There can be but one voice in this matter. The hope of man is superior to the tree. Its life is not extinct by being cut down. Man shall die. But "all the days of my appointed time will I wait till my change come," which in fact means that he shall live again, but not in this present order of things, but in immortality. He is not blotted out: "Thou shalt call and I will answer thee: *thou wilt have a desire to the work of thine hands*," that it shall not be utterly destroyed.

Bodies have returned, and we are told that all those who sleep in the dust shall awake. Since no "deduction of reason" will satisfy, shall we settle it by "the court of ultimate appeal?"

## SECTION IX.

We now come to another very interesting phase of the subject. Pages 55-8:

"But it is said, A thing without form and other qualities of matter is inconceivable. We answer, That if by conceivable is meant picturable—drawn out before the imagination as a picture—then, certainly, the immaterial

can not be conceived; but if, by conceivable, be meant supposed to exist, then the immaterial can be conceived. Who ever saw or can picture the form or color or weight of force, of thought, of memory, of hope, of fear, of love, of conscience, or of that of which these are manifestations? The simple fact is, we know these to exist, and, as existing, we know that they proclaim a reality; but a reality of which we can not predicate any of the things we predicate of material substances. There are, then, two universes or two hemispheres of one universe, the great material realm and the more exalted spiritual realm. One is inert, powerless, unconscious, but beautiful in form and color, varied in texture and motion, massive and magnificent; the other has none of these, but is essential life, power, and consciousness.

“The self-conscious subject must be a self-centered indivisible unit. Were it the body or any part of it—say the brain—each part must be a sharer of the consciousness, and, in that case, it might be divided and subdivided, but this is impossible. The subject is a simple indivisible unit, which retains its identity permanently and unchangeably. The only things of which consciousness takes note are thought, feeling, and volition; and it notes these as states of the self-conscious subjects, and notes nothing else of him. Thus consciousness discloses simple spirit. The self perceives form in *objectives* and other qualities, as hardness, color, gravity, and such things; but these it never perceives nor is conscious of as predicables of itself or as in any proper sense belonging to the self-conscious subject.

“The self is free. It originates its own acts from within. It is conscious of the power of alternative action. This is a quality which no mere machine can possess, and which can never be predicated of matter as such. The power points to a unitary subject, and the consciousness is that the subject possessing it is one and indivisible, and identical through all its successive exercises. Each free

act is the act of the same subject, and the series has no other relation than this, that they are the self-determined acts of the same being.

“There are other phases of the argument which we omit, deeming what has now been said sufficient to establish the point in hand: *Man is a spirit.*

“The theory of common sense, thus announced in consciousness and deducible by the reason and fortified by the deepest philosophy yet attained, has also the sanction of revelation. The distinction is there clearly, frequently, and conspicuously made; *indeed, if the doctrine be not true, the Bible is thereby shown to be fundamentally false.* It appears in the exordium of Genesis, and is reiterated in the peroration of the Apocalypse, and pervades the whole volume. ‘And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.’ That the distinction is here made is plain. There is an organism of dust and an inbreathed soul. ‘Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was; and the spirit shall return to God who gave it.’ ‘And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.’ It makes nothing against this that the word soul is sometimes synonymous with breath or natural life. It is used in both senses, but its common signification is the equivalent spirit, person, self, as distinct from the body. All readers of the Holy Scriptures know that they maintain the distinction throughout with invariable consistency, and the spirit is *always* the person. It is the spirit that was created in the image of God; that was put under law; that had power to transgress; that sinned and fell; that is to give account to God; that receives revelations. It is the spirit for whom atonement is made; to whom pardon is offered, who receives forgiveness and peace; whose future is depicted in such impressive terms; for the loss of which worlds would be no compensation;

whose salvation induced the divine incarnation. The body throughout holds a subordinate rank, and is made account of simply as an appendage of the spirit. If the Bible is divine the doctrine is true; and we have seen that it stands in its own right also. The older and the newer revelation have one trend and speak with one voice. Here we rest so much of the discussion as is concerned with the question, *Is man a spirit?*"

Taking it for granted that in a subject of such vast importance the closing argument would be the statement of view positively held, I have thought it necessary to cover as much of the bishop's ground as possible.

(1.) He says, "If by conceivable is meant picturable—drawn out before the imagination as a picture—then, certainly," souls in the future state can not be "*seen*" any more than the "*form*," "*color*," "*weight*," "*of fear*," "*love*," "*force*," "*thought*," "*memory*," "*hope*," "*conscience*," etc.

And yet we can not tell whether he means this or not. Here appears again that indefiniteness previously alluded to, characteristic of his argument. I understand that when he speaks of the "*picturable*" he means a *tangible* or touchable thing on canvas. Then, again, I find myself plunged into confusion—that it is something "*drawn out before the imagination as a picture.*" But I take it for granted that he really means by "*picture*" our "*imagination*" reduced to tangible or touchable form. I think I am not mistaken. If this representation is correct, then do I understand him to teach that, "*certainly*," in the future state, *beyond the grave*, "*the immaterial*," the *soul*, the *person*, the *ego*, "*can not be conceived.*"

I further understand him to teach that the highest conceptions of the "*immaterial*" (soul) in the future state, like his arguments of "*rational deduction*," is *supposition* only. Proof: "*But if by conceivable be meant supposed to exist, then the immaterial (soul) can be conceived.*" I understand that *conceive* means capability of understand-

ing—that is, the subject comes within the compass of knowledge; and *supposal*, if Webster is authority, means “a position without proof; the imagining of something to exist; supposition . . . to represent to one’s self, or state to another, not as true or real, but as if so, and with a view to some consequence or application which the reality would involve or admit of.”

The bishop’s argument does not imply “reality” in place of supposition, as the subsequent sentences imply—not a tangible reality. But we have, what is evidently the product of a fruitful imagination, such an argument as this: The *soul*, the immaterial of man, is formless—it is not “picturable”—that is, no conceptions of it are *formable*; but if its being is reduced to a *supposition*—that is (giving his own words), “if by *conceivable* be meant *supposed* to exist, then the *immaterial* can be conceived.” I confess to an incompetency to draw any conclusion from this argument that reaches beyond a supposition. Again do I say that it sounds very much like Pilate’s, “What is *truth*?” Dr. Whedon construes the meaning to be “that all the philosophy of the age in which he lived had decided that man could know but this, that nothing could be known; that higher truth is undiscoverable; that, in fact, there is no absolute truth,” etc., the most definite conclusion of the pagan ages. Can any one draw any better conclusion of the import of the bishop’s argument? If he does not mean that the highest conception of the soul—in the future state—is a *supposition* only, and that “supposed to exist” is the law of the conception of the immaterial (soul), then I have failed to see the point of his plainly printed argument.

The next absurdity is found in the question following, the logic of which confirms the statement I have just made. He says: “Who ever saw, or can picture, the form or color or weight of force, of thought, of memory, of hope, of fear, of love, of conscience, or of that of which these are manifestations?”



"*Force*" of what? If by *force* is meant the power or effect of power, or constraint or restraint of material bodies affecting each other, then force may be weighed in the balances, and definite conclusions may be arrived at as to the "weight" of force. This is a commonplace fact in science.

But the logic of the argument is significant. It is this: No one can tell, none "can picture the *form*, *color*, or *weight* of love, thought, memory, hope, fear, or conscience;" therefore, they are not objects of form, color, or weight. So far, so good. But will it follow that these only exist—that is, *love*, *hope*, *fear*, etc., only have a *supposed* existence because the *form* can not be defined? He concedes that we know they exist, and that they proclaim a reality of which we can not predicate any of the things we predicate of material substances.

But, if he argues on the principle of *supposal*, and conceptions of the soul are had by that law, we may readily infer that, as these are emanations similar to emanations from the Divine Mind, that as their *effect* is *felt* on tangibility, that in the essential organism in its entirety as from God and its final entirety before God, there will be something of tangible, touchable organism in the future body. It is not in the nature of reason that even a "spiritual *body*" that has become the source from which emanates formless and weightless graces, is as intangible as they. The weight of these things is *nothing*, but does it follow that the *body* spirit is *nothing*, from which they spring? If so, then have we *nothing* from *nothing* and *nothing* remains; therefore the immaterial is nothing, its products are nothing. Take nothing from nothing and nothing remains. "Love," "hope," "fear," "force," and thought are to the soul what fragrance is to plant or flower; they are to the soul what rays of light are to the sun. But shall we argue that because fragrance is immaterial, that therefore the plant is the same? and likewise because we can't weigh a sunbeam, there is no substance in the sun?

That spirits are not material in the sense our bodies are material, we will admit only this far; that as God has so ordained that spirits in their earth-state can not commune with spirits in the heavenly state, and yet spirits for all that in every essential element of the spirit nature, so can not the materiality of this state touch the materiality of that state, though I believe that there is scarcely any difference in the essential elements of materiality of the two spheres. That the elements of mortality will be taken out of our bodies I will admit, but they will be as solid and weighty there as here. I believe that the essential change will be one of spheres as much as of elements. The elements of body and soul will take on the element of the sphere of immortality. The resurrection introduces us into the sphere of immortality. I believe a mistaken conception of the future state has grown out of spiritualism in which heaven and heavenly intelligences are represented less *real, tangible*, or material than vacancy into which we gaze. The highest "conception" "supposable" from this argument I am answering is, that the future state and soul are not equivalent to the tangibility of *wind*. I propose to show in this argument, before it closes, that earthly intelligences will be like heavenly ones, and that, though they are called *spirits*, they are not the intangible things of which we have heard as invisible, weightless, and colorless as the bishop's objects by which he would illustrate them. "The court of ultimate appeal," "the Holy Scriptures," shall be my guide.

It is not so much what we may "conceive" by the meaning of the word "wind" or "spirit" that we are to "suppose" the case, but in the narrative of the Scriptures the question is, In what *form* do they represent these spirits? Do the Scriptures ever represent them as immaterial and untouchable things? The disciples thought that they had seen a spirit when the resurrected Christ appeared before them, and it was indicative of their idea of a dis-

embodied spirit. But that resurrection body, which at that time was his spiritual body also, was both material and touchable.

More than this. Spirits of the other world, who have never lived on earth as their abode, but inhabitants of the heavenly state—spirit as they are—for all that, have form, and are of touchable substance. In the right place and at the right time I will prove this, but it must be in answer to the question, “What saith the Scripture” on this subject?

Until I reach that point in the argument, I must notice the present lecture a little further. One thing is certain, that if the future state is only arrived at by process of “supposition,” it is reasonable that we “suppose” it in the light of revelation.

#### SECTION X.

Page 56. “The self-conscious subject must be a self-centered, *indivisible unit*.” But how do we know it “*must*” be such?

“Were it the body, or any part of it—say the brain—each part must be the sharer of the consciousness, and, in that case, it might be divided and subdivided; but this is impossible.”

It is here argued that if soul and body are one in the future state as here, therefore they are parts of each other. Does that follow? If so, the logic, if true, must work backward as well as forward—earthward as well as heavenward. It must follow, therefore, that soul and body are parts of each other here. Hence the soul is competent of division here—divided and subdivided. But who holds to that idea? No one. Does any one hold that in their earth-sphere they are parts of each other? No. Does it, therefore, logically follow that if they live together in heaven they “*must*” become parts of each other? No. Well, then, the “supposition” is based on imagination,

and the logic becomes inadmissible. If soul and body exist together here in a vital and essential relation to each other, and yet independent of each other, and unlike in essential elements, by what parity of reasoning do we conclude that they may not and can not so exist together in heaven? Can the soul be "divided and subdivided" here any more than in the future state, because it is in the body? The inference of the bishop's argument is that it can.

Again, he says: "The subject [soul] is a simple indivisible unit, which retains its identity permanently and unchangeably." Correct. In the mind of God the "identity" of the body is "retained permanently and unchangeably." In our eyes it is lost sight of; in his the identity is kept up.

Once more he says: "The only things of which consciousness takes note are thought, feeling, and volition; and it notes these as states of the self-conscious subject, and notes nothing else of him. Thus consciousness discloses simply spirit." Correct in the main, but deficient in some particulars.

What is understood by "*feeling*?" "Thought" and "volition" are things of the spirit; but do I understand the argument to mean by "*feeling*" the emotions of the soul? If not, but *sense* contact, then does it show that spirit takes cognizance of material things. As the word appears in the argument, it certainly implies spiritual consciousness of material things.

Again: "The self is free—it originates its own acts from within. . . . It is a power which no mere machine can possess. . . . The power points to a unitary subject; and consciousness is that the subject possessing it is one and indivisible, and identical through all its exercises. Each free act is the act of the same subject, and the series has no other relation than this, that they are the self-determined acts of the same being." Therefore the bishop

would conclude that the doctrine of the resurrection is false. But link this intricate reasoning with the Bible statement of immortality, and let me ask if you do not have to divorce your imaginings from revealed truth, and create your own theory, before you determine upon accepting these conclusions?

I repeat that all that may be said of the soul and body's independency of each other we all hold in unison. The superiority of the soul is conceded. But inferences of their final separation are not to be drawn from such. The body is a "machine;" but is not the soul a machine, too? and is not the doctrine that of machine within machine, "wheel within wheel?" And yet for its original purposes the combination of distinct parts, not in unity of substance, but in unity of *relation* to each other, must be kept up for the continuance of man in his creative entirety.

What is an engine without an engineer? and what is an engineer without an engine? Can machine manifest itself without machine? Yes, says the argument; "consciousness" is the cognitive power of existence. But "consciousness" of what? Of consciousness only? Consciousness is consciousness; but if there is nothing but consciousness, and it is the soul, what then? Is there nothing of cognizable *things*? and if there are other *things* outside of consciousness to take cognizance of, are these things nothing but consciousness? "mind," "thought," "emotion?" What a curious and monotonous existence, especially since it is a "formless," "colorless" state! Rather, is it not a fact that consciousness, correctly considered, is not *soul*, but a property or faculty of it? that, while we are not to entertain the possibility of the soul's unconsciousness, still the soul is one thing and its consciousness is another, and that of the things of which the soul's consciousness takes cognizance there may be objects of which consciousness is no part of their nature? If this be so, then have we made a point against the bishop, in that heaven is of something else

than all intangible spirits, something touchable there of material nature, and spirit comes in important relation to and connection with the material, even in heaven. So when the bishop states his question, *Man is a spirit*, I propose to reply that in his entirety, NOT ONLY SPIRIT.

### SECTION XI.

“The theory of common-sense, thus announced in consciousness, and deducible by the reason and fortified by the deepest philosophy yet attained, has also the sanction of revelation. The distinction is there clearly, frequently, and conspicuously made; indeed, *if the doctrine be not true, the Bible is thereby shown to be fundamentally false.*” (“Beyond the Grave,” page 57.)

Compare with this statement, coming from the lips of our Churchly bishop, one very similar by Professor Bush: “If the *letter of revelation* holds forth a view of the doctrine [of immortality] which arrays itself against the clearest evidence of the facts [as Bush conceives them] and the *soundest process of reasoning*, is there no demand, on the other side, for the reconciliation of Scripture with reason and science? Are we to hoodwink our faculties to do homage to revelation?” Place beside Bush’s “soundest process of reasoning” Foster’s “theory,” “deducible by reason and fortified by the deepest philosophy yet attained,” and you have the kinship of argument.

Once more: Place beside Bush’s query, “Are we to hoodwink *our* faculties to do homage to revelation?” Bishop Foster’s statement that “if the doctrine be not true the Bible is thereby shown to be fundamentally false,” and the said kinship is again discovered; for I understand him to mean that if the Scriptures teach the resurrection of the *body*, and a reunion of the soul with this identical body, then his “theory,” “deducible [per *his* judgment] by the reason and fortified by the deepest philosophy yet attained,” will prove the Bible “fundamentally false.”

That is, he first assumes that there is an agreement between *his* deductions and revelation, but if there is a divergence between them the Bible is false and his deductions true; that is, according to Bush, "Are we to hoodwink our faculties to do homage to revelation?" Revelation wants no man to hoodwink his faculties, but the circumstance and manner of this statement is equivalent to a dethronement of the "cherished doctrine" that the Holy Scriptures "contain sufficiently all doctrine required of necessity for eternal salvation through Jesus Christ our Lord." This is what the bishop certified to in his episcopal vow; but if it is not correct, then had he better stand at another shrine of enthronement and ordination, witnessed in France a few years ago. The final moral effect will be the same. If the bishop would read up a little on the enthronement of reason in France and the dethronement of the Bible, he would be forcibly impressed with the similarity of the argument of French atheism and his own, "fundamentally" on the subject of "rational deductions" and "deepest philosophy." I think by drawing as largely from Holbach's "System of Nature," and from Voltaire, he could make substantially as good an argument in logical conclusions from "rational deductions" as he has by browsing from this Swedenborgian *Bush*.

## SECTION XII.

"It [the deduction just quoted] appears in the exordium of Genesis, and is reiterated in the peroration of the Apocalypse, and pervades the whole volume." (Beyond the Grave, page 57.)

His quotation from Genesis is, "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul."

I have noticed this quotation already, and would pass it now with but a thought. That is, if the possibilities



of life admitted of a dual existence in Eden as the creative work of God, and made it possible that soul and body live together, though separate and distinct in element, let it be understood, if I have guessed the bishop's reference correctly, that, when man's being, in his entirety of existence, is "reiterated in the peroration of the Apocalypse," it does not serve his theory of immateriality. But as Eden is referred to in Genesis, and the climax of human redemption referred to in the Apocalypse, the bishop will have to accept the conclusions of his own reference. That climax of redemption is spirit, but not spirit only; it is material, but not material only. But there is the material counterpart of every thing in Eden at creation, and into which it would have merged. Read it—figurative, largely; but not only figure, but inspired description of a tangible heaven. People go west from the Eastern States. They find tangible soil. I believe heaven has soil, water, fruit, streams, and that the footing of that country is more tangible than earth. Heaven exceeds all earthly tangibility as it exceeds all else that is earthly. Hence, I do not believe, with Bush, that the resurrection was simply a "visible effect," and not a verity, a visible effect that amounted to an "optical illusion." Heaven mates Eden and its possibilities in all particulars but sin. And in its inheritance, in the description here given, verse three will do away with the bishop's erroneous opinion against death as penal. "And he shewed me a pure river of water of life, clear as crystal, proceeding out of the throne of God and of the Lamb. In the midst of the street of it, and on either side of the river, was there the tree of life, which bare twelve manner of fruits, and yielded her fruit every month: and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations. And there shall be no more curse; but the throne of God and of the Lamb shall be in it; and his servants shall serve him: and they shall see his face; and his name shall be in their foreheads. And there shall be

no night there; and they need no candle, neither light of the sun; for the Lord God giveth them light: and they shall reign for ever and ever." (Rev. xxii, 1-5.) Trace, sentence by sentence, the facts in this picture, and we have in Genesis Paradise *lost*, but in Revelation RESTORED.

Page 57: "There is an organism of dust, and an inbreathed soul." United in creation—separated at death—reunited in the resurrection—so says the Bible throughout.

The next quotation of the bishop from the Scriptures, to establish his argument, is: "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was; and the spirit shall return to God who gave it."

May I recall his attention to the text? I believe he says, "The subject I am to treat is, '*Life beyond the grave.*'"

Let us treat it, then, in the light of the only knowledge we have from beyond the grave, and not assume by infinite analogies of this time-state to settle things of the future. The laws of the world beyond the grave are to settle this question, and not these this side of it. They must necessarily be revealed to us, as we can not go over there to get them. God has given them to us in his Word, and while the conditions of happiness in the future are to be acted on here, they also are given us in revelation, so that we are not in blindness.

Now to the quotation in question: "Then shall the dust return," etc. It is found in Ecclesiastes xii, 7.

Adhering closely to the text, "Beyond the grave," let me say that this passage does not take us there. It speaks of the disposition of the dual nature at death. Unless the bishop takes the position that this is the terminus of all, he must concede that the Scriptures teach a future consideration of soul and body. The quotation is out of order. It applies in that sublime description of man's decay, on which he bases his warning to youth, the conclusion of which is to "fear God and keep his commandments, for,"

after death and *beyond the grave*, "God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good or evil."

### SECTION XIII.

The next Scripture proof of the bishop is as much out of order. It is: "And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." (Page 57.)

The very same application of this text occurs as in the former. It establishes nothing *beyond the grave* for the bishop's argument, but can be used in favor of the usual interpretation. I will dismiss this quotation with the simple statement with which about all the standard commentators agree. That is, this passage has reference to the duty of supreme fidelity to God as over man. Man may kill the body, but can not touch the soul. But if God is not feared supremely, he is able not only to kill the body, but after that he has killed it, *beyond the grave*, in the day of judgment, after the resurrection of the body, is able to cast them both, reunited, into hell.

The bishop can not evade the argument by maintaining the idea of distinction throughout, for, admit the distinction of soul and body for time and eternity, they are intimately connected for all that, though this connection does not mean sameness. The intimacy is so close that the divine renderings are based on it. Distinctness proves nothing *pro* or *con* in the argument, and the bishop can only be inferential in his conclusions, and that by his own self-chosen premises, but neither these nor his conclusions are authoritative.

### SECTION XIV.

"The body, throughout, holds a subordinate rank, and is made account of as an appendage of the spirit. If the Bible is divine, the doctrine is true," etc. ("Beyond the Grave," page 58.)

We weary of such statements as this that appear on almost every page of the book. After they do appear they prove nothing to the point. His "*therefores*" that may be looked for in close connection are illegitimate and illogical.

In man's creation as a unit he received a dual nature, and the soul was perfection of structure, which was not said until *body* and *soul* were united. The unmaking of this structure is death, resurrection is the remaking, or reconstruction of the unit man of dual parts. So that when the bishop accepts the quotations from Scripture that he last made as indicating the finality of man, he accepts a position, according to his construction of them, not susceptible of proof, and arrays himself against the intelligence of the ages in the application he makes of them.

Mr. Landis says in his excellent work on the immortality of the soul that the question of immateriality is not important.

"In treating upon the subject of immortality, not a few of the defenders of the current views have perplexed both the question and themselves by claiming, as essential to the proper reception of the doctrine, that the soul should be conceded to be *immaterial* in the undefinable and so-called *philosophical* sense of that term. But we really know nothing of the essential elements of matter, and, of course, the term *immaterial* can convey no determinate idea. It is nowhere used in the Bible, nor has the cautious and profound Butler ever once employed it through his whole *argument*. The *idea* philosophically associated with the term is of modern origin (for the ancient philosophers seemed to have no conception of it), and was originated as an offset to the debasing material philosophy of Hobbes, Toland, and others. It is in no way required, however, in an investigation of the subject before us; *corruptibility* and *incorruptibility* convey ideas which are not beyond our reach.

But the same can not be said of *materiality* and *immateriality* in their professedly philosophical sense.

If, however, in compliance with modern usage, the terms must be employed in this discussion (for most of the authors to whom I reply are perpetually using them), I wish it understood that they are herein employed, not in a philosophical, but in a theological sense. By *material*, as applied to the soul, I mean *corruptible*; by *immaterial*, in the same application, I mean that the soul is a spiritual, incorruptible substance, of a nature similar to that of angels; or as Dr. Abercrombie defines the term it may not be objectionable: '*All that we mean or CAN mean by being IMMATERIAL is, that the phenomena of mind are entirely distinct from any thing we know of the properties of matter.*'"

Can the bishop say more? and is any more to be derived from the question of "distinction" between body and soul? Nothing more, not even a glimmer of what he claims to be reflected upon the future state.

Landis continues: "But along with this explanation it ought to be repeated, that the doctrine of the soul's immortality *neither depends on nor can be deduced* from that of its immateriality in the metaphysical sense of that term. And hence it is of no actual importance in religion."

Landis closes his statement of the unimportance of the question of *materiality* and *immateriality* by saying:

"The Bible nowhere attempts to define the soul's essential nature and quality. The *body* or flesh is therein contrasted to the *soul* or spirit, and a different origin attributed to each. It likewise distinguishes between them as different substances, attributes different properties and operations to each, and assigns to each a different *destiny* at death. For the things thus announced include all that is needful for us to know at present in order to realize the importance of living for eternity."

I promised that at the close of this chapter I would give the reader some curious illustrations that pass the

bounds of possible solution, except as we may surmise, showing the probability that after a dissolution of body in whole or in part there may be an intimacy of connection between them that argues in an incomprehensible manner the possible inseparableness of the two, even by death. I do not contend for the theory, nor can I explain it. I simply give it for what it is worth. The illustrations are not products of superstition nor imagination. They are authenticated.

Not many years ago I knew a man with an empty sleeve. The arm was gone close up to the body. One day he caught the empty sleeve that hung dangling at his side and scratched it vehemently. Struck with the strange performance I asked him why he did it. He replied that his arm itched. But I said, You have no arm. He replied that it made no difference, it itched all the same, and was just as real as if his arm was on his body. I asked him to explain how that was. His answer was that it could not be done, at least he could not himself explain it.

Here come in some of the problems of sensibility. We can understand how derangements of one part of the body will create pain in another far away region, but it is explained on the ground of absolute and direct connection between the parts. But will some physiologist explain the law by which a sensibility of pain as real as life can be felt in parts where no parts are? This could be in a measure accounted for if the individual was itching in some other part—say his shoulder—and the one to which the absent arm belonged, then we could see on the partially defined laws of sympathetic sensibility how the sensation of itching could be thrown off so as to have appeared to be where no arm was. But this was not the case. More, if the shoulder had itched, which it did, to have relieved it would have also relieved the arm had the sensation come from that direction.

I also knew a man who had his arm violently torn

from his body by a threshing machine. In his paroxysms of pain he complained altogether of his hand; there was not the sign of a hand, but he insisted if they would take hold of his hand and rub it they would relieve him. To the day of his death he complained of the painful attitude of his hand, that it was twisted and tangled in an unmerciful manner.

A third instance was a man near Macon, Illinois, by the name of Bradly. I give the narrative substantially as his friends, who were witnesses to the fact, gave it to me.

His hand was torn by the tumbling shaft of his thresher and necessitated amputation. Several days after this was performed some friends were in Decatur, and an acquaintance was inquiring after Mr. Bradly's welfare, when the friend replied that he was doing well save that he complained of cramping in the hand. If he could get rid of the sensations of cramp he would be comparatively painless. The acquaintance replied that the hand was not buried properly, that it was cramped, and that when they returned home, if they would disinter the member and straighten the fingers and place it back properly the desired relief would be experienced. Somewhat curious to see if such a thing was possible they did so, and unknown to Mr. Bradly in the performance, when simultaneously he experienced a release from the pain of a cramped hand.

A fourth instance was that of a soldier with amputated leg. It lay on a table in an adjoining room, and, thrown there, he, not knowing of its whereabouts, experienced a corresponding pain from the violence. Every time they would move it he would suffer the effects.

A fifth case is of a similar kind, where the limb was buried in a reverse position to that of the body. His sensation was that of his limb lying by some uncontrollable circumstance on his body, with the foot in his face, and he found himself endeavoring to remove it.

From the press we have the following account:

"A curious circumstance is mentioned in a Canadian



paper of a boy named Kingston, who recently lost his arm by a threshing machine at Adelaide. After the limb had been amputated and buried the boy complained that the hand was cramped, causing him extreme pain, and that if it was not disinterred he could not recover. The limb was accordingly disinterred, and the hand found to be firmly shut together. During the operation of opening the hand the patient evinced great agony, and afterward declared that he felt relieved from the sensation of cramp."

The account proceeded to say that "the case was a strange one, but we believe it is not without precedent in medical annals."

If some one curious to know of such things would make inquiry, facts of a similar nature might be discovered.

I do not presume to say that such experiences occur in every case of amputation. If they did they would be numerous. And I am not prepared to say but that they do so happen. My observation is not extensive enough to speak with authority in such cases. But certainly here are some facts that are worthy the notice of those who are professionals in human anatomy and physiology. There is the invisible tie; and what is it that thus seemingly links the living principle with the dead, or rather the dead with the living, so that even when decaying flesh, a severed limb, receives roughness of treatment it makes known its complaint to the living—to the soul?

Is there a principle of life unknown or as yet undiscovered that mysteriously turns to the living spirit for protection? If this which seems as yet but a surmise should be true, there may still be hid away a law of which mortals have had but here and there a ray. But this is all too indefinite. These pages are not designed to deal in uncertainties, but in positive truth, authenticated by a positive revelation. Man is "fearfully and wonderfully made." His form erect is indicative of his uprightness of soul in which he was created. He was to serve a high

purpose in creation, but the clay was marred in the potter's hand, but being a moral agent and not a lump of clay, and dealt with as a moral agent, God's purposes of redemption through Jesus Christ our Lord will secure to man in his entirety what was first in the purposes of his creation.

## CHAPTER III.

## EXAMINATION OF LECTURE II OF "BEYOND THE GRAVE."

I N beginning the present chapter in the order of the argument in answer to Chapter II of his lectures, I must confess a degree of embarrassment by the indefiniteness of the precedence of proofs as presented in the lecture. For instance, when he holds that we can "rely" on revelation "for positive proof, *when proved to be such*" (that is, when *it is proved to be revelation*), and intimates that on that condition "it is a good witness, and faith in it becomes reasonable, and non-faith irrational." I feel myself at a loss just here to construe his language. If he means by these statements that every believer, before he accepts the Scriptures as a whole as the Word of God, must put them through the crucible of skepticism, which is the implication, then has he placed quite an undertaking in the hands of each individual. The inference is, that every thing must be demonstrated before believed. Do I state his position correctly? Let us see: "But revelation, on it we rely, for positive proof, *when proved to be such*," etc.

A sinner stricken with conviction and crying for immediate relief, or one verging on the grave and longing for hope, finds himself in straitened circumstances, if this schooling must be gone through.

Some of us feel that, while there is a restless dissatisfaction with things of revelation, still we can accept the Word of God because we *feel* it to be true. Do not make evil capital out of *feeling*. By it I mean that as soon as we read the Word of God there comes over us, with no

other demonstration than that of the Spirit, the *consciousness* of its truthfulness. This *consciousness* I call *feeling*, and it is also *knowledge*. But I have inferred from the bishop's argument that some other process determines this.

For instance, on page 12, he says :

“When a doctrine stands on the authority of revelation—a ‘Thus saith the Lord’—it must . . . not contradict *our knowledge*. . . . *We still maintain the highest rationality when we demand, as a condition of our faith, the sufficient proof that it is the God of truth who announces the doctrine.* Let this proof be furnished, and, by a law of the highest reason, we are compelled to believe—the strongest faith becomes the purest rationality. No greater proof can exist than a ‘Thus saith the Lord’—not even our direct cognition ; but we must first *know* that it is a ‘Thus saith the Lord.’ And we intuitively know that between a ‘Thus saith the Lord’ and our immediate cognition there never will or can be contradiction.”

There is such subtlety of statement here that the gate is both opened and closed against reply.

First, what do we understand by “*our knowledge*?” I take it for granted that “*our knowledge*” means what comes within the compass of a scientific and philosophic demonstration, by which rational deductions from things within the compass of human experiments in time are demonstrated. This is “*our knowledge*.” Bishop Foster's whole argument on *man a spirit* attempts to prove that yonder state is not demonstrable by earthly rules and laws, that no conceptions of it can be had now ; we must wait the exit. So I claim that as the resurrection is also represented as under other laws than “ours,” neither can it be demonstrated by any principle, scientific or otherwise, that comes within the compass of “*our knowledge*.”

How incautious are the words of Bush, and yet how similar those of Foster : “If the *letter* of revelation holds forth a view of the *doctrine* which arrays itself against the

clearest evidence of the *facts* [that is, of “*our*” facts], and the soundest process of [“*our*”] reasoning, is there no demand, on the other side, for the reconciliation of Scriptures with [“*our* knowledge”] reason and science? Are we to hoodwink our faculties [“*our* knowledge”] to do homage to revelation?” That is, before we accept revelation it must be critically “*proved* to be such.”

When the bishop assented to the statement that “in the name of the Holy Scriptures we do understand those canonical books of the Old and New Testament of *whose authority was never any doubt in the Church*” (see Articles of Religion, § v, ¶ 7), and in the covenant vow of his episcopal office he answered, “I am persuaded” “that the Holy Scriptures contain sufficiently all doctrine required of necessity for salvation through faith in Jesus Christ,” and “determined, by God’s grace,” “out of the same Holy Scriptures, to so instruct the people;” I say, since all this has occurred, should I say that these same Holy Scriptures teach, to the satisfaction of the intelligent judgment of all, that there is to be a resurrection of the *dead bodies*, would he hold in view of his position that if such a doctrine was in the Scriptures, that they are proven “fundamentally false” by facts within his knowledge, and that they were not the Word of God? Will he assent to the statement in answer to the second question contained in the baptismal covenant, that he “steadfastly believes” in “the resurrection of the *body*?” These references are to the *body* that *dies*.

I have uniformly alluded to the bishop’s argument as a mixture of Unitarianism and Universalism. But it is predominatingly Swedenborgian—it is all three in a curious compound. The line of argument, as will be seen by comparison, is more largely that of George Bush. No one can fail to see the twin-like likeness. Compare the two. For a variety not essential, there is an occasional divergence, but essentially the arguments are the

same. I have noticed that the only perceptible difference, so far as I have alluded to the two, is that Bush denies the resurrection of the body *in toto*—and where it is referred to as a body it is for *effect*, and not real—the purpose of which was to make the disciples believe that there was a resurrection when there was not. Bishop Foster does not *deny* that the body of Christ rose and that of believers will; he admits the possibility of the bodily resurrection of Christ, but that, in common with Bush's opinion of Elijah's ascension body, it was dropped when he went up.

One thing is perceptible. The bishop admits the possibility of resurrection of the body, but he does not affirm it. His absence of affirmation, considering the circumstances of it, is equivalent to Bush's denial of it; for he ought to be able, standing where he does as the son of the Church and its doctrines, to say to-day, as he did in the covenant in which he was given to God, "I *steadfastly* believe in the resurrection of the *body*."

Again, his logic has led him into Universalism, Unitarianism, and kindred errors. Dr. Curry so understands his position on the general resurrection and the general judgment. But this he may deny. His denial will not meet the case—he can not explain his position away. A man may deny going to New York; but if he is on a lightning express, headed that way, with lightning speed, and between it and the city not a station, stop, or switch, his destiny will certainly be New York. He may deny it when even in the heart of the city. On the doctrines in controversy the bishop is on that track—more, he is in the heart of the errors I have named. I challenge him or any man to deny the penalty theory of death, and escape the conclusions I have named. Escape is logically impossible, whatever may be asserted to the contrary.

It is certain that Professor Bush, whose authority is largely followed in the vital argument of "Beyond the

Grave," is an uncertain leader. After he left the quiet bay of orthodoxy he had no settled convictions of truth. (See M'Clintock & Strong.) His "*Anastasis, or Doctrine of the Resurrection*," by which he essays to deny from the deductions of reason the existence of a future material body, is seemingly the error into which our beloved bishop has fallen. I am quite sure that Bush is his accepted authority on the spirit state. From this time forward on all vital and essential doctrines there was no settled condition of mind.

Are we to believe that like Mr. Bush there is unsettledness of convictions of truth invading the head and heart of the author of "*Beyond the Grave?*" When, on page 19, we are told that "it is a fair presumption that the debate will never cease, and nothing will be settled for all time," may we not fear that this unsettled state is intruding into the domain of otherwise settled convictions? Is there no anchorage? If so, let us try to find it—a rock on which to build, from which no beating blasts of wind or rain can move us. This inconstancy of thought—this being blown about by every wind of doctrine—is one of the evils attendant upon a departure from revealed truth and its simple teaching. We are exhorted to be able to give, to every one that asketh, a reason of the hope within us, and Paul was called in question for the hope of the resurrection; and yet if "nothing is settled," and will not be "for all time," then can no reason be given for our hope. There can therefore be no "sure word of prophecy" or hope for us. This idea that every doctrine must come within the compass of "our reason's" comprehension, and that revelation must be "proved to be such" before accepted, linked with the idea that nothing can be settled for all time, is too indefinite and uncertain for those who are satisfied with nothing short of a positive basis for a positive faith.

We have heard somewhere of the statement that the



Church of God and revelation were bound under obligation to give to unbelievers and skeptics the convincing testimony of revealed truth, and that such men had a right to demand the same. To honest inquirers after truth this may apply; but it is a fact, which some men evade, that men are unbelievers in spite of testimony, and no amount of evidence would convert them. The wicked world is not an honest inquirer.

Even Bishop Foster has failed to recognize the fact that the obstinacy of unbelief is such to-day, as eighteen hundred years ago, that renders the words of Christ still true, "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead."

The unbelief of the age is not of the head, but of the heart. "The fool hath said in his *heart*, There is no God."

#### SECTION I.

"But it is said, that if there is no proof that I cease to exist, at least it is certain that I become impotent; that, as when alive, I could only act through the body; now that it is dead, I can not act at all. This is an unwarranted assumption." ("Beyond the Grave," page 60.)

We desire to proceed in this argument with reference to its relation to the generally received faith. The statement made on page 60, quoted above, may apply to the soul-sleeper's opinion of the subject, but certainly is inapplicable to the generally received orthodox idea. There need be no space taken, therefore, in answering it, for the bishop's argument with reference to the fact of soul consciousness after death is correct.

Page 60 continued. "In fact, for all that is known, I may be able to act with greater freedom and power. Death may introduce me to new conditions of more noble and exalted forms of activity." "*May* introduce us." Why not say *will*. For a reply to this remark the reader will refer to the thoughts in a previous argument on the

proposition that in the future state spirits possess greater possibilities with than without bodies.

Reference is also requested to the argument, "Equal unto the angels."

I would further say at this point of the argument that all agree that death introduces us to a sphere, so far as spirit is concerned, where we will "be able to act with greater freedom and power," and that death also "introduces us to new conditions, of more noble and exalted forms of activity." This is true of the future state as over that of the earth state. But this statement does not cover the ground in question, that is, of *beyond* the grave. All concede the superior condition and ability of the spirit after its exit from the body over that in the body, but the question at issue is evaded if we stop here. The question relates to *beyond* the grave—the grave with which the soul has nothing to do. What of the *body beyond the grave*! When the body is in the grave it is not *beyond* it. Exalted and noble as the "freedom and power" of the soul may be in its disembodied state, "noble and exalted" as may be the "forms of activity" to which death may introduce me in my new condition, as above and superior to my earthly state; yet what of that "new condition," etc., compared to the representations of the powers, and activities of that soul when soul and body are reunited in the resurrection? It is *beyond the grave* we must carry the question, and compare the state of the spirit in the intermediate state with that state when the intermediate state is no more.

## SECTION II.

"The body may be to the spirit what the musical instrument is to the musician—probably is. What is the musical instrument to the musician? It is the instrument from which he evolves to external observation of what is in him. You destroy the instrument, and you make it

impossible for the musician to evolve the music to external ears like yours; but do you touch the musician himself, or destroy the music in him, when you destroy the instrument on which he plays? Do you destroy the player? Certainly not. How do you know that the case here is not one exactly like that?" ("Beyond the Grave," page 60.)

But what is it that hears? We are told that it is the "*external ear*." What is the "*external ear*?" It is *flesh*. But all through the bishop's argument we are told that it is *unconscious* matter incapable of thought, memory, appreciation, love, etc. If music is a thing like a thought, that can not be weighed by pennyweights or pounds, is simply a thing for "*external ears*," and external ears a "*machine*" in common with bodily organism, then, to carry out the logic of the argument, there is such a thing as machine consciousness. I rather think that through the medium of external ears the melodious sounds are carried to the *soul*—and that it is the combination of the two that makes the music cognizable. It is not to be argued by this that soul-existence and consciousness are dependent on physical organism and existence. A person may be so deaf that music can not be heard, but they have a soul for all that, and music exists for all that, also; but until the medium of transmitting the music to that soul is in proper place and operation it can have no appreciable idea of music. It will not answer to say that among the finest musicians there are those who are deaf, for to them music is only a mechanical thing without sound.

It may be said that this logic will lead into the doctrine of the soul's silence in the interval of death and the resurrection. I am free to admit that if God had not revealed to the contrary we could not escape the logic. Bishop Foster, with the aid of all science and reason or philosophy, can throw no light upon this subject; none of us know any thing about it save what is revealed. The Scriptures tell us that the soul experiences greater power and activity in

the intermediate state than in its earth state, and they also tell us that while this is the case, still, in some measure, that power and activity is abridged by the absence of a glorified resurrection body, and that when said body is secured the power and activity of the being *beyond the grave* will far exceed that of the spirit in the intermediate state. All this is brought out in the chapters mentioned.

"Do you destroy the player?" asks the bishop. No. But the music is not the player and the player is not the music. Comparing this thought with his argument against what he calls "*the sense view*," we find an inconsistency. For instance, we are told (so I infer) that thought, etc., are of the same elements as that of soul, and that if we want to have any appreciable idea of the constituent parts of the soul we must be able to analyze a thought—its substance. Now, a thought is not soul and soul is not thought. The soul is that which thinks; the thought is that which is emanated or evolved by the energies of the soul. I hold that the bishop's illustration of music is weak and falls short. If the instrument is the illustration, then would it teach annihilation. Is the music proper in the instrument or in the man? If in the instrument, then to destroy the music you destroy the instrument, and to destroy the instrument you destroy the music, unless it can be demonstrated that music exists in the abstract—that we can not conceive. In an argument like this it is unfair to bring in a "middle-man" illustration, such as hand-organ theories, etc., to help out what should in all fairness be demonstrated in the man himself. Therefore, we conclude that primarily the man himself is the musical instrument, and that music is of the man and in the man, and he is the instrument that both plays and is played upon, and through the reciprocity of his dual nature receives back the appreciative notes, and, contrary to the bishop's logic, to destroy the instrument you do destroy to external ears the possibility of conscious delight. Beyond the grave the superior possi-

bilities of the soul in the intermediate state are God-given, and for the emergency are not self-possessed, but of special endowment at God's hand. No other conclusion can be deduced from reason, science, or philosophy. We know nothing upon this subject aside from what is revealed. We can deny revelation, but our denial will not make void its truth.

### SECTION III.

“The argument in support of the immortality of the soul, founded on the mutations of animal life, has been thus forcibly illustrated by Lord Brougham in his *Discourse on Natural Theology*: ‘The strongest of all arguments, both for the separate existence of mind and for its surviving the body, remains, and it is drawn from the strictest induction of facts. The body is constantly undergoing change in all its parts. Probably no person of the age of twenty has one single particle in any part of his body which he had at ten, and still less does any portion of the body he was born with continue to exist in or with him. All that he before had has entered into new combinations, forming parts of other men or animals or of vegetable or mineral substances, exactly as the body he now has will afterward be resolved into new combinations after his death. Yet the mind continues one and the same thing without change or shadow of turning. If the strongest argument to show that the mind perishes with the body—nay, the only argument—be, as it indubitably is, derived from the phenomena of death, the fact to which we have been referring affords an answer to this. For the argument is, that we know of no instance in which the mind has ever been known to exist after the body. Now, here is exactly the same instance desiderated, it being manifest that the same process which takes place on the body more suddenly, at death, is taking place more gradually, but as effectually in the result, during the whole of life, and that death itself does not more completely resolve the body into its ele-

ments and form it into new combinations than living fifteen or twenty years destroys by like resolution and combination, the self-same body.

“‘And yet, after all these years have elapsed, and the former body has been dissipated and formed into new combinations, the mind remains the same as before, exercising the same memory and consciousness, and so preserving the same personal identity, as if the body had suffered no change at all. Here, then, we have that proof so much desired—the existence of the soul after the dissolution of the bodily frame with which it was connected.’” (“Beyond the Grave,” page 67.)

Here is not a new process of reasoning, and still it may be termed peculiar. This quotation was originally the argument of Lord Brougham to establish the immortality of the soul. In “Beyond the Grave” (69, 70–71) we have the argument serving to prove, or the effort to prove, the non-permanence of bodily existence. In Appendix, note A, there is a scientific admission of the permanence of matter, but in the heart of the argument we controvert there is a laborious argument to prove to the contrary.

The argument at this point, as I understand the bishop to present it, is, that as Lord Brougham proves the immortality of the soul from his deductions therefore the non-permanence of the body must follow. But we are not to accept these premises that we should be forced to such conclusions. The common faith is, if we accept it as in any wise correct, that the body of man was created for permanence. The law of its permanence was interfered with by sin, and death resulted. Whether we accept the Scripture narrative or not, one thing is certain, the facts of human life correspond to that narrative. This becomes presumptive proof that what that narrative teaches with reference to the future state will be as accurately true as in the past. That narrative is, that the *body* will be changed, become a “glorified *body*,” and that the non-per-

manent nature of the body, made so by sin, will put on permanence. "*This corruptible will put on incorruption; this mortal shall put on immortality.*" "Then" *beyond the grave* "will be brought to pass that saying which is written, Death is swallowed up in victory," etc. I say that this is no "poetry," as reflections upon the same seem to indicate by some writers. The language is not figurative. The apostle comes right to the point of a material resurrection, and this can not be denied without wresting the Scriptures.

The argument that the body which we had seven years ago is not the body we have now, and consequently chosen to prove the non-permanence of the body, is familiar, and, in the question of the resurrection of our identical body, serves no purpose whatever. But familiar as it is as an argument, is it true? Upon this particular point scientists are not agreed. At best it is only supposition with possibilities pointing in that direction, but it is one of those fine-spun theories—so fine that it has never capacitated a demonstration.

Can any one testify from personal experience, or observation, or scientific demonstration, that it is so in the absolute sense? Admitting it as an absolute truth, you are forced to admit of a possible scientific demonstration. One thing we are agreed upon, that, in our earth-state, the taking on of new material is the measuring up of the same to meet the growing wants of both physical and soul life. This is a peculiarity of man in his earth-state, and why may it not be a peculiarity of the resurrection body? If the body increases in strength here, why not there, and by the increase peculiar to its resurrection state measure up to the demands of the soul?

It is said that the analogy does not hold good, for, passing a certain period, the body begins to retire its energy and strength, and decays. But it is not intended that the analogy should apply throughout, but that in the



resurrection state this decay and retirement of its energies are not known, and that its energies, which throughout Scripture are represented as God-given, and its capacities will measure up and be sufficient for every demand of the soul, whose servant it has been in time, and whose servant it will be throughout eternity—yet, for all that, companions.

Mark you, the fact, *in a time sense*, that the soul is permanent, and the body not so, proves nothing. What are the facts in the case of both *beyond the grave*? that is the question. In answering this question light is thrown upon it by the Scripture doctrine of the resurrection of the *body*, not of soul, for in no sense is the soul said to die as the body. This is what revelation on this subject is for. Evidently the bishop accepts the teaching of Lord Brougham on the impermanence of the *body*—that not one particle of the body of fourteen years ago remains in it to-day. On page 157 he says: “It is a question which has been mooted whether resurrection is predicated of the *body* or of the *person*.” The side of this question on which he is identified is seen in the language which immediately follows: “Ordinarily it [the resurrection] is understood of the body, *but it is a noticeable fact that the body is not once directly mentioned in the Scriptures as the subject.*”

(What does the reader think of the next sentence, “though there are passages which *unmistakably* point to the *body*.”) I will pass this for the present to give it a more extended examination in future pages.

The point of application I desire now to make is, the *effect of the bishop's argument in the administration of moral government*, especially so far as its principles are applicable in the rendering of the judiciary in civil courts. Punishment is predicated of the *body* as the instrument of the soul. This I believe to be the teaching of Mr. Watson and most of the intelligent divines who have written on this subject. This can not be otherwise, where men are palpably beyond regard for moral restraints. “Moral suasion”

will do for men who are still within the compass of moral reason, but the criminality of the day has stepped beyond the bounds of that, and arbitrary restraint and punishment are necessities for overt criminals. If the bishop is altogether correct, and the resurrection is predicated of the *person* and not the *body*, then, in all candor, the renderings of justice should come in the same line of reasoning. For instance, the *body* should not be held responsible in a civil court for the wrongs of the soul, for it is only the servant of the soul, and is compelled to do the soul's bidding. The body can not think, it can not premeditate crime of any kind—the soul impels it onward in these. Take a person of intelligence, reason, and possessed of volition, and compel him to acts of crime, and he commits the same under circumstances over which he has no control, and any court in civilization will acquit such a person; but here is a *body* that can not think, premeditate, or assume any more responsibility than a rock or other inanimate matter—at best not more than animals; and yet it is bruised, mangled, and peeled for the sins of the soul. This is either right or wrong. If it is the “*person*” and the “*body*” is not the “*person*,” but an “*instrument*,” a “*hand-organ* that grinds out accurately” the deeds of the “*person*,” why then manacle the “*organ*” and beat it, when it is by the soul inspired to acts discordant to peace, prosperity, or life? It is a poor rule that will not work both ways. In the moral government, what is right in time will be right in eternity, and what will be right in eternity is right in time. Moral law and its renderings are like the God who gave such, unchangeable. Just here it is seen how, in some sense, there is a partnership recognized between soul and body. They are contributors to each other's pleasure or pain so far as it is possible for flesh to rise to the appreciation or experience of such. It is also recognized that this condition of things continues through life. Revelation says it is taken up in the resur-

rection and continued in eternity. I can not explain how it is that in crime the body is *particeps criminis*; but one thing is certain, that it is so held by civil courts. It may be said that in the "sense sphere" this is the nearest the truth that we can approximate in the rendering of moral and civil justice. But I deny it. We are profoundly ignorant of the very first principles of justice if the statement is correct.

Here is a man whose crime is such, and whose persistency in the same such, that nothing short of penitentiary for life, at hard toil, can meet the demands of justice. The turpitude of his act or acts justifies the infliction. Perhaps that *body* in which the crime was perpetrated, and which was the soul's instrument, must suffer the lash. It may be it is confined at hard physical labor. In seven years' time the infliction continues with the same severity that it did the first day of punishment, though we are told that there is not a particle of the physical man in that body that was there on the occasion of the crime. What shall we do in this case? Simply this: We are to rule out of our reasoning all such absurdity as that contained in the bishop's theory at this point. It does n't apply to the question in debate.

The "common-sense" reply to Mr. Bush, whose theory the bishop's largely resembles, on this same point, by the sainted Kingsley, is applicable. A part of it has already been given, so much as refers to the passing of the human into the composition of other bodies.

I have occasionally intimated similarities between Foster and Bush. Compare, for the satisfaction of all, the proofs cited. Here is one. Bush, page 152, says, "It is nowhere expressly affirmed in Scripture that the identical material *body* of Christ arose." Foster, page 158, says, "Ordinarily it [the resurrection of the *body*] is understood of the body; but it is a noticeable fact that the *body* is not once directly mentioned in the Scriptures as the subject."

But to the point. And here I give more of Kingsley's statement of the case than I at first expected to, but it is so appropriate to the point that I will be indulged. He says:

"The arguments from 'reason,' against the resurrection of the body, may be summed up under four heads:

"(1.) That the body is in a constant state of change, from birth to death; so that, when it is said the body shall be raised, it can not be known *what body* is meant, as the individual, if he be an aged person, has had several entire bodies during life-time; and if any one of these bodies should be raised, it would not be the body inhabited by the soul, except for a small period of human life.

"(2.) That the body becomes totally decomposed after death, mingling with other elements, forming various and numberless new combinations. That parts of it pass away into impalpable gases; and these again uniting with other substances, and these substances again suffering decomposition, and so on, till the identity of the body is utterly destroyed; so that the identical body never can be raised.

"(3.) That the resurrection of the identical body implies the resurrection of every identical particle of matter of which the body is composed, neither more nor less; but,

"(4.) That this is impossible in the nature of the case, as one body at death becomes parts of other bodies at their death; and, consequently, that two or more souls would claim the same body, or parts of it, in the resurrection.

"Now, I undertake to say that *not one* of these four propositions, taken as a whole, can be made out. To begin, then, with the first. There is no doubt but that *some* parts of the human body are in a state of flux, or change; but it is not so evident that *all* the parts are; *no man on earth knows it, or can know it*. But whether the whole body does thus change or not is perfectly immaterial to the argument, so far as the resurrection is concerned; for the Scripture doctrine is, that it is the body that *dies* that is raised again, whether that body 'sleeps in the grave,' or

'in the dust of the earth' elsewhere, or 'in the sea.' So that, if we have had a *hundred* bodies during life-time, the case is not altered. The last part of this proposition is sufficiently answered by Mr. Watson: 'Rewards and punishments have their relation to the body, not so much as it is the *subject*, but the *instrument*, of rewards and punishments.' As it is the soul only which is the responsible agent, so 'it is the soul only which perceives pain or pleasure, which suffers or enjoys, and is, therefore, the only rewardable subject.' Were we to admit such corporeal mutations as are assumed in the objection, they effect not the case of our accountability. The personal identity or sameness of a rational being, as says Mr. Locke, consists in self-consciousness. 'By this every one is to himself what he calls *self*, without considering whether that self be continued in the same or diverse substances. It was by the same *self* which reflects upon an action done many years ago that the action was performed.' But the objection contradicts the common-sense of all mankind."

Then is added the same argument with which I preceded this quotation:

"Suppose the criminal who has been sentenced to the penitentiary for fourteen years should demand his release at the end of seven, on the grounds that it was another body which was sent there seven years before; that they were other hands upon which the chains had been fixed; and, as proof of this should gravely enumerate the times he had pared his nails, and shaved his beard, since he was sent there; who would think his reason sufficient to release him, unless for the purpose of sending him from prison to a lunatic asylum?

"The second proposition assumes that by reason of the total decomposition and dispersion, and new compositions and decompositions, taking place with a dead body, that it is not possible that the same identical body can ever be raised again. But why not? Can not the chemist take a

piece of gold coin into his laboratory, file it to powder, dissolve it with acids, alloy it with other materials, grind it again to powder, throw it into the fire, and mingle it with soot, ashes, and charcoal, and yet bring out the same fine gold? And can not he mold it again in the same die, and be perfectly sure that it is the very same gold? And is the God of all power and wisdom, whose vast laboratory is the *universe*, less skillful than the creatures he has made? And can not he, who is intimately present to every particle of matter, who knows every particle by *name*, and whose power has brought every particle into *being*, collect together again the scattered fragments of the human frame, although mingled with the elements and driven to the four winds of heaven? May we not reply to those making this objection to the resurrection of the body, 'Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the POWER OF GOD?'

"The third proposition—namely, that which affirms that there can be no resurrection of the identical body without the resurrection of every particle of gross matter composing the body—*has no relevancy to the argument*, except by connecting it with the fourth proposition; for unless it can be proved that the very same matter, at least a portion of it, which was possessed by one human body at death was also possessed by another human body at death, no argument can be drawn from this position unfavorable to the doctrine. It may be observed in this place, however, *that those who adopt the commonly received opinion do not contend that just the same amount of gross matter, neither more nor less, which was deposited in the grave, is essential to the resurrection.* But they do believe that that which constitutes the essential identity or sameness of the body shall be raised again; not, indeed, in gross matter, but refined, purified, and made glorious. Our bodies, during life-time, may vary considerably, so far as the amount of gross matter contained in them is concerned, and that,

too, in a very short space of time; but who supposes that the *essential identity of the body is destroyed by this?*

“The proposition contains a fallacy, by putting more into the definition of the word *identity* than the opposite doctrine allows; and then drawing unfavorable conclusions from such definition. This is contrary to all rules of honorable controversy. But it is contended by Professor Bush, that the very nature of identity absolutely requires all that is put into the definition. But this is not the question. It is enough that his *opponents* do not so *understand* it. *The question is not whether the believers in the doctrine of a resurrection have used a particular word in a greater or less extension of meaning than that which rigidly belongs to it, but whether the idea they would convey by it, as explained by themselves, is correct. The dispute is not about the meaning of a word, but the reality of a thing.* If our author had considered this, he might have saved himself the labor he has bestowed on the subject of identity.

“Having encountered nothing formidable in the first three arguments, let us now examine the fourth. This asserts that in consequence of one body after death becoming parts of other bodies at their death, it is impossible, in the nature of the case that the same bodies that die should be united again with the same souls with which they lived; as where human bodies have been decomposed, and their substance gone to support vegetation, and this vegetation nourished other animals, and these animals again gone to the nourishment of man; or, where the human body has gone to the support of grain, and this grain gone to the support of other human beings; or, more directly, where one human being has consumed the flesh of another, as in cannibalism. We have stated the case in all its strength, and are now prepared to look it full in the face.

“In regard to the first part of this proposition, namely, where the decomposed body goes to the support of vegetation, and this vegetation goes to the nourishment of



human beings, it may be remarked, that but a small part of earth actually becomes part of vegetation at all."

Continuing, he says:

"But a small part of the vegetation concerned in the growth of grain is actually grain itself; and how easy for God, who is not inattentive to any thing he has made, and who has adapted means to ends, with infinite skill, throughout every part of nature, to have so ordered, in his providence, that this small part of human dust that actually becomes a part of vegetation should lodge in the roots and stalk, and leaves, without ever becoming grain at all! I say, can not HE DO IT? And is there *any contradiction of terms here?* And remember the question here is, whether the doctrine implies any thing that is palpably absurd. If it be said that nothing short of divine interposition can bring out these results, we grant it. But nothing short of a divine interposition can effect the resurrection of the body. The same power that can do the one can do the other. Then 'why should it be thought incredible,' with any who believe in a God of infinite power and wisdom, 'that God should raise the dead?'

"But let us take the case of cannibalism itself. Now no considerable portion of the sustenance of any human being has been human flesh. But a small fraction of the entire food, even of those who occasionally indulge in this dreadful practice, has been of this kind. And but a small fraction, even of this small fraction, ever becomes a part of the human body, allowing, for the present, that the flesh of one human being may become part of another human being. And even this small fraction may go to the grosser parts of the system, not at all necessary to the resurrection body. So that there is nothing absurd, even here, in the commonly received doctrine of the resurrection. But I have a more weighty argument to offer against this position.

"We have already seen that the resurrection of the body,

belonging to the nature of miracles, must be studied in the *light* of miracles. The question, then, is simply this: If the God of infinite power and wisdom set himself to the accomplishment of this work, can he perform it? We unhesitatingly answer, *Yes*, and without any contradiction in terms either. To say that the thing is absurd, if we admit that God has set himself to accomplish it, is, as we have already seen, an impeachment of his wisdom. But it may be said, 'This is the very thing we deny, namely, that God *has* set himself to the accomplishment of this work,' But let it be remembered that it is admitted on all sides that this is the obvious meaning of the Scriptures; and a meaning which all would receive, but for those 'rational deductions' which we are now examining, and which allege that the thing is absurd and self-contradictory. I say, then, we have a right to repeat the inquiry, 'If the God of infinite power set himself to accomplish this work, can not he perform it? And to answer, as above, he may so order, in his providence, that no human being at death shall possess a single particle of another human being at death, even allowing cannibalism to be ever so much practiced. . . .

"But we will now admit, for the sake of the argument, what is claimed in the third proposition, that the resurrection of the identical body requires the resurrection of all the gross materials of which the body is composed: not, indeed, in gross materials; and *then* show that the doctrine implies nothing contradictory or absurd. For then, examining the subject in the light of miracles, we have only to consider the Supreme Being as undertaking the task of raising every human body *entire*, as it respects the amount of matter *possessed by it at death*. And is it not infinitely easy for him so to order, in his power and wisdom, that no part of one human body after death shall ever become a part of another human body, under any circumstances? Is it not as easy that a law should be stamped upon the

matter composing the human body, by which it can not become amalgamated with another human body, as that a similar law should exist in regard to *oil and water*, or *iron and clay*? And can not he who could cause *five loaves* and *two small fishes* to nourish *five thousand men*, besides *women and children*, also cause the other food that has been eaten to be entirely sufficient for the nourishment of the human body, no matter how much the practice to which we have alluded has prevailed? And would he not *do it* before his ultimate purpose in this respect should be thwarted? Are the divine resources so *feeble* and scanty; are the ultimate designs of eternal Jehovah so circumscribed, that a mere pigmy can throw them into confusion? 'Well, but this can not be done without a miracle.' Well, what then? The whole subject of the resurrection belongs to miracles. Why will men, professing to believe the Bible, identify themselves with rationalists and infidels, in their abhorrence of any thing miraculous? Who shall stand up to 'limit the Holy One of Israel?' We have seen, then, that this last and most plausible objection interposes no serious obstacle in the way of the sublime and *Scriptural* doctrine of the resurrection of the body. The opposing theory is built upon doubtful deductions drawn from doubtful hypotheses.

"I have bestowed the more attentions because they contain the whole strength of the argument against the resurrection of the body. It is admitted that the plain letter of inspiration teaches the resurrection of the body. 'But this doctrine,' it is said, 'encounters insuperable difficulties.' So, then, if these 'insuperable difficulties' have been fairly removed, the argument is yielded at once; inasmuch as these 'difficulties' are all that have prevented the Scriptural doctrine from being received.

"All that is claimed in this humble effort thus far is that the doctrine has thus far been rescued from the bewilderment of a vain philosophy, and placed where we

may contemplate it in the brighter and purer light of divine inspiration. Indeed, I suppose that an appeal directly to the *Scriptures*, without this tedious examination of our author's (Bush's) 'rational deductions' would have been all-sufficient with most who have listened to these remarks; but it is not so with all. And to many it will afford a higher degree of *satisfaction*, if not a higher degree of evidence, to know that these philosophical objections are themselves *unphilosophical*.

"The light of the sun may be obscured by fogs and mists and clouds; so may the light of revelation by the bewildering speculations of a pseudo-philosophy. You are well aware, my brethren, of the effect upon the youthful mind of an array of the high-sounding titles, 'reason,' 'science,' and 'philosophy,' when attempt to array them is made, as in the present case, against the *Scriptures*. To rescue one youthful spirit who might be just upon the outer current of the maelstrom, whose constant influence, 'drawing inward and downward,' is to swallow up and engulf him in ruin, were an undertaking worthy of an angel. I hope an anxiety of this sort may atone for what might otherwise be somewhat tedious. If one of the feeblest of God's children should find his faith strengthened, or if any lingering skepticism should be dispelled from the mind of any, then shall I have not 'labored in vain.'

"Finally, my dear brethren, is there not an elevated satisfaction, a holy enjoyment, when, after following error into its lurking places, descending its dark and winding labyrinths, and traversing its damp and cloudy and miry vale by the aid of the compass, we find ourselves in the clear sunshine and see that our foundation is the rock?"

As I close these interesting and tender sentiments of our sainted bishop, who was first to lay his hands upon my head in holy orders, I feel that his voice comes wafting from the vale of Syria, where his body lies buried, and whose grave is fanned by the breezes from Lebanon, fra-

grant with the cedars that embalmed the days of holy memory, saying, "Them that sleep in Jesus will God bring with him." That voice that could speak loud enough for the sainted Kingsley to hear, and in obedience to its call to go like a messenger of God to encircle the world with the message of life can and will speak loud enough for him to hear, "Kingsley, come forth," and he will come with glorified body and song, and join in the company redeemed from among men in the song, "Unto Him that loved us and gave himself for us," etc.

It is with breathless silence that I draw the contrast between the bishop who, though dead, yet speaketh with his strong utterances of faith in the simple teaching of Scripture as he pillowed his head upon them, and our living one, who assumes to teach by implication that, indeed, if the Scriptures do not teach his theory of the resurrection then are they "fundamentally false." The conclusion of this trend of thought is that the resurrection must be accepted as a miracle wrought of God. But this can not be done if it is settled by the rule of "facts that lie within the circle of *our* intelligence," as Bishop Foster demands in his precedents laid down, for if this doctrine were to be so determined then would the argument exclude its miraculous character and be equivalent to a positive denial of the same.

I am pained to state that the Unitarian and Swedenborgian mixture and character of the argument leads him to deny miracles, and the reader can inform himself as to the fact that the authority chosen by him (Bush) follows in much the same line of reasoning. Where shall this end? Let us ponder well the path before walking in it. It is not the first man who has thus bewildered his thoughts by "vain philosophy" and "science falsely so called." The logic of history is against the whole procedure.

Another serious fact lies upon the surface of the whole argument, and that is, that this whole question can be

settled by principles of rationalism so-called. This is the most irrational feature of the whole argument. Take this irrationalism out of it and the argument would not have been considered worth the paper on which it is printed, either for quantity or quality. It is because so much is made of this so-called rationalism, and "reason" and "sound philosophy" are so conspicuously paraded, throughout to the music of high-sounding phrases, that I can not refrain from giving more space to consideration of the same.

The character of the argument is of his own selection. He prefers rationalism to the Bible, and, by implication, that the plain teachings of the Scriptures are irrational. The Scriptures constitute "the court of ultimate appeal," but are "fundamentally false" if they are not in accord with "rational deduction." Some would "treat it (the future state) exegetically, as purely a doctrine of revelation," but he prefers "to submit it to the reason and examine it in the light of all the facts bearing upon it which lie within the circle of our intelligence," independent of the Scriptures, for "*reverence* and *Christian impulse*" are the only grounds of accepting it "exegetically and as purely a doctrine of revelation." But "the claims of *intelligence* and the *deeper wants* of reason (!) and the soul (!) call for" us to "submit it to the reason, and examine it in the light of the facts bearing upon it, which lie within the circle of *our* intelligence." Therefore, "aiming at the *best* and most permanent results, we have adopted the third method"—the rationalistic method. (Page 13.)

What are we to infer by this statement of premises? Simply this, *that the problem of the immortality of the soul and resurrection of the body after death*, all of which belong to laws of another sphere and not comprehensible in this, is to be settled by "reason," which is to "examine" the problem of the *future* state "in the light of all the facts bearing upon it which lie within the circle of *our* intelligence" in the *present* state. I assume to say that for the

very reason assigned the problem will not be thus solved. It can not be. You may as well say that one of the senses should assume the prerogative and power of the settlement of problems within the domain of the other senses.

There is great significance in the question, "Can a man by *searching* find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection?" It means that the Infinite is not grasped by the finite, and yet skepticism demands that all knowledge of God, and all experience of faith should be brought within the compass of a scientific demonstration, the conclusion of which would be characterized with mathematical precision and comprehension. What would be left of God? or of his attributes? And where would be faith? Both, to all intents and purposes, would be annihilated. It is because God is above and beyond me that I can ever aspire toward him and adore. Can I aspire to a being beneath me? within the compass of my comprehension? Could I put him beneath me by thus grasping and taking in his infinitude, it would prove me more than infinite, or destroy his infinity and compass him with a finite mind. If I could compress him within *my* comprehension, or tower superior to his height, so as to look over his head, then is he beneath me, and nothing beneath me is worthy of my worship. I may admire it, in a certain sense adore it, but can not pay it divine honors—worship. If I did I would be an idolater. What I worship must be greater than myself. God, to be worshiped, must be incomprehensible—beyond demonstration. With such a God, the *wisdom* of man is *foolishness*.

*He must be a miracle working God.* No being in heaven and earth is entitled to worship who can not work miracles. Not as prophets and apostles worked them with delegated power, but who has the innate power within and of himself to do so. The Being who does this is entitled to divine honors—that being is *God*. Among the miracles of his



working is that stupendous miracle of *all, the resurrection of the body to everlasting life after death.*

In no place is it represented that it occurs in accord with the known laws of nature, "reason, or sound philosophy." It is a *miracle, and nothing but a miracle.*

"Why should it be thought a thing *incredible* with you, *that God should raise the dead?*" (Acts xxvi, 8.) God does it. "Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, *nor the power of God.*" (Matt. xxii, 29.) It is the *power of God* that accomplishes it.

Again: "For our conversation is in heaven; from whence also we look for the Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ; who shall change our vile *body*, that it may be fashioned like unto *his glorious body*, ACCORDING TO THE WORKING WHEREBY HE IS ABLE TO SUBDUE ALL THINGS UNTO HIMSELF." (Phil. iii, 21.)

These passages account for the resurrection purely on the ground of *God* putting forth *his power* to accomplish it, and no other. And this thought applies throughout revelation. In fact, there is no other thought of it but this.

The same thing is alluded to by Paul in Ephesians i, 19, 20: "And what is the *exceeding greatness of his power* to us-ward who believe, according to the *working of his mighty power*, which he wrought in Christ, *when he raised him from the dead,*" etc.

As the Spirit of Jehovah brooded over the waters, and is, Scripturally, the creative energy of living substance, and yet was unseen and incomprehensible in bringing order out of chaos, so is it represented as performing like office in the resurrection. Paul says, "If the Spirit of Him [God] that raised up Jesus from the *dead* dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead *shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you.*" Here we have the *energy* of the resurrection.

*I hold that all life is a miracle.* Chemically, the component parts of an acorn can be put together with the germ

in its place, and the glass of greatest microscopic power may not discern the distinction from the natural. But that acorn will not grow—plant it, and it will rot. Why? It requires the *miracle of life* to be wrought upon it by the direct breathing of the Almighty. “By him all things consist.” It is as impossible to get away from this thought by “rational deductions” as it is to get away from the doctrine of a resurrected *body* by “the mighty working of his *power* whereby he is able to subdue all things unto himself.”

If the Spirit of God brought out of confusion the beautiful order of earth and universe about us, who will doubt the reasonableness of the truth that that Spirit which is in every place, making its life-giving energy felt on every thing, will also breathe upon these dry bones, and in consequence they shall live?

When the army of Missouri marched from Forsyth, Ark., to Cape Girardeau, Mo., it halted one evening where two rivers met. It was a mountainous country. In the forks of those rivers there was a high mountain overlooking all the country round about. Said Colonel Buckner to Rev. H. Ashmore, chaplain of the Twenty-fifth Illinois Infantry: “I am going up on that mountain to see a sunset from the mountain top. Come and go along.” He did so. Weary and footsore they reached the summit. There were high mountains all around them, but they lay like mole-hills at their feet. They were rapt in wonder at the grandeur of the scene, and silence sat upon their lips. At last Colonel Buckner, a godly man, broke the silence by asking: “Do you know what I was thinking about?” “I can not tell your thoughts,” replied the chaplain. “Well,” said he, “I have been looking from this height off over those other mountain tops, and tried to compute their weight. But it has exceeded my comprehension. I have thought what power it took to place them there. And yet I am filled with the truth that our great God

has been able with his own hands to pick them up and set them down like little hills, that skip like lambs at his feet. And yonder is that great sun going down in such splendor. God put it there, and commissioned it to hold these mountains in their place, and keep these stars that will soon look upon us in their sphere. While I have been thus thinking I have been filled with the blessed thought that that great and omnipotent God is *my Father*, to whom I have committed my soul and body. I have never had such confidence—such real *trust* as at this moment. If he can do those other things, then he can do for me what I need. ‘I *know* whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is *able to keep* that which I have committed unto him against that day.’” And then, on that mountain top, he broke forth with song:

“Praise God from whom all blessings flow,” etc;

and said, at its close, “Let us pray.” Such a prayer was scarcely ever heard as that one that went up to God from that mountain top from the heart of that Christian soldier. When he closed the sun was down. But was that all? Was such a scene to be blotted out? No. There was a rising of a more glorious sun after the stillness of night.

So in the resurrection. It is man’s faith that leads him to Pisgah’s top. His soul even here is filled with ecstasy. He sings and prays:

“We feel the resurrection near,  
Our life in Christ concealed;  
And with his glorious presence here  
Our earthen vessels filled.”

Footsore and weary, he reaches the summit where he looks into both worlds. But to him death is the setting of a golden sun after a glorious day; and while he contemplates the scene he begins, even in the flesh, to know the power of Christ’s resurrection, and sings again. The sun sets and he retraces his steps—to the grave—to the dust

from whence he came—the spirit kissed away to God—but with the confident belief that the same mighty breathing that gathered the indestructible atoms together, and made the living man, will breathe again, and the soul itself, energized by the same power, will catch the delightful thought and come again to its companion, glorified, and with a full, realizing sense of why it has been thus separated; and now, thus united, will come forth with the shout: “O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory? The sting of death is sin, the strength of sin is the law; but thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.”

We noticed the setting of a glorious sun, but its rising is superlatively grander. ’T was with such a vision before him that Paul said, “I have hope toward God.”

Again: If this doctrine is not true the whole Christian system of truth tumbles to ruin.

Paul (Rom. iv, 25) says, “He [Christ] was delivered for our offenses, *and was raised again for our justification.*” Now, I understand this to teach that by his sacrifice on the cross he put away sin. That is, he was offered for our sins, or on the account of the same, to make pardon possible. But this was impossible without the resurrection; “*and was raised again for our justification.*” Had his resurrection not taken place, there is no evidence that could be given that he had accomplished the purposes of the atonement. Not only by his death, but by his “ever living to make intercession for us,” since his death, by the office of Advocate, do we hope for pardon and salvation. *If Christ’s body, in which he died and was buried, was not the ascended body, then do I hold that, sacrificially, the world is without a Redeemer. It also follows that the whole scheme of pardon goes for naught.* Unless we admit that the Savior who died on yonder cross and that one ascending to heaven are of the same *bodily* identity, then must we blot out of our Bible that “cherished doctrine, “*He [the crucified one]*

ever liveth to make intercession for us." Thus we put away the precious plan of salvation by becoming *rationalists*. The truth is, the resurrection is a miracle, as is also salvation from sin; and the position of the bishop destroys the whole scheme of redemption, as taught in the Scriptures.

I repeat, the error of Bishop Foster, with skeptical rationalism in common (and his position places him on their territory), is in demanding that truth shall come within the compass of a scientific demonstration, and if not arrived at by the prescribed rules of so-called "positive science" it is not to be accepted.

Here is where science must ever scoff at many fundamental truths that are beyond the possibility of a demonstration by their rule, and they are truths, for all that.

For instance, take the doctrine of regeneration. It is certain that it does not come within the compass of scientific demonstration; and are we to deny, therefore, the reality of experimental religion? I hold that skepticism demands an unreasonable thing when it thus presents its claims, and I will prove my position true.

Proof: Does not science demonstrate every thing within the law or domain of the thing to be demonstrated? Who will answer no? No one. The statement is correct.

There is a material domain, and there is a spiritual domain. Regeneration comes within the spiritual domain. If a man has a soul and soul consciousness, and be a moral creature under moral law, as he is, he must acknowledge this. Very well. What logic, "reason," or "intelligence" is there in a scientist taking out of the realm of spirit a problem that can only be solved within the realm of spirit, and demand a solution of a spiritual problem—the regeneration of the soul—as you would solve a problem in chemistry, geology, or any thing else in any branch of physical science?

You would call me unreasonable if I would assume that *hearing* is to determine the *taste* of my dinner, or tell

you that *colors* are only known by the sense of *touch*, and not by *sight*. Why? For the simple and common-sense reason that one sense is not to arrogate to itself the office and law of another sense.

To enlarge this thought. We have five senses—seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling. Suppose a personification of these. Mr. Seeing, in perfect delight, and with a “cherished faith” in what he beholds, exclaims, “What a beautiful landscape!” and proceeds to express his admiration of its beauty. Mr. Seeing has a “cherished faith” in landscapes.

But just at this point Mr. Hearing steps in and disputes the beauty of the landscape, and says, “I propose to settle this question of beauty by ‘submitting to the reason’ [of Mr. Hearing], and examine it in the light of [hearing] all the facts bearing upon it which lie within the the circle of *our* [Mr. Hearing’s] intelligence.”

He begins. He *hears* sounds—the birds, breezes, herds, and people; but what of the *landscape*? can he hear that? can he hear its beauty? So he proceeds to reason from the facts that lie within the circle of *his* intelligence, and many things he can tell you; but about the landscape proper he has very indefinite and unsatisfactory conclusions. The *fact* of a landscape he does not exactly deny; but his conclusions are strange, as compared to those of Mr. Seeing.

Now all these neighbors come together. Each one proposes to discuss the question of landscape “in the light of the facts that come within the circle of his own intelligence.”

So Mr. Smelling starts out with, “Nonsense,” etc., just as Mr. Hearing did, and he is determined to reach the character of the landscape “in the light of the facts that lie within the circle of his intelligence”—smelling.

You can imagine the accuracy of his conclusions. That he may deduce some facts relating to fragrance, etc., we all admit; but what of the landscape—the thing in con-

troversy—can Mr. Smelling smell out any conclusions of a very definite and satisfactory character? Not much.

At this point Mr. Tasting steps in. He says there are “facts that lie within the circle of his intelligence,” and that he prefers his own rationalistic method of settling the debate. As in the other cases, so he knows something that does indeed come “within the circle of his intelligence”—that is, Mr. Tasting tastes the fruit that grows on the landscape, and that is something “within the circle of his intelligence” concerning the landscape (“*if proved to be such,*” p. 70)—but what of the landscape proper? His conclusions are round-about, but like the others, he does not touch the landscape.

Just here Mr. Feeling comes into the debate. He has a “sense view” that brings out “facts” also, “that lie within the circle of *his* intelligence.” That there is a landscape he will not deny, for he can feel it. But come to the point sprung by Mr. Seeing, the landscape and its *beauty*. Well, says Mr. Feeling, there is no such a thing, for that statement contradicts *my* “intelligence,” and any thing that contradicts *my* intelligence, though asserted by Mr. Seeing, I hold to be “fundamentally *false*.” I can not *feel* the *beauty* of the landscape, and that there is such a thing is contrary to *my* “rational deductions,” and “am I to hoodwink my reason to accept the statement of Mr. Seeing?” Further, “Why should my ‘intelligence’ be abridged by the limit of” Mr. Seeing?

What an array of testimony against Mr. Seeing? They all seem to concede something of “facts” concerning the landscape, “facts” that lie “within the circle of the intelligence” of each, but each pleads his “reason” for not accepting Mr. Seeing’s statement.

What will Mr. Seeing do? He is alone—none like him—all against his “cherished beliefs.” How will he defend himself and his theory of seeing and the beauty of the landscape? Certainly not by the theory of the others.



What they know they know, but each is forced to admit there are some things that their "reason and the facts that lie within the circle of their intelligence" do not know and can not find out, with reference to the question at issue, and which they never can know only by accepting the simple statement of Mr. Seeing and taking his word for it without the possibility of a demonstration by any law or rule known to them.

This illustrates my point. Mr. Seeing can say to each of these "*sensible*" gentleman, "If you want to rise to a knowledge and appreciation of the beauty of the landscape *come within the domain of seeing*, and examine it in the light of facts that come within the circle of *my* intelligence," and then the demonstration and proof will be complete and final. Each sense is foolish for being skeptical of the other, and for demanding the solution of problems within the domain of that sense where the problem does not belong. The other four senses must accept the revelation of Mr. Seeing as final. I say, how scientifically nonsensical is the demand of the Bush-Foster skepticism that a problem that belongs to another sphere of existence known only to other laws than those with which we are acquainted, and which, in the very nature of the case can not be solved by or in the light of any facts lying within the circle of our intelligence, should insist that before a problem, the solution of which is a thing of the future state, can be accepted, it must come within the compass of human rational comprehension, and if not, it is therefore "fundamentally false."

On page 17 Bishop Foster remarks: "Having conceded there is no absolute knowledge in the premises, *pro* and *con*, we now affirm that we find it quite impossible for us to doubt" logically where his confused judgment tells him as Pilate's told him that there is no absolute truth, there is nothing to doubt—and being nothing to doubt there is no condemnation for unbelief. "He that believeth not shall be

condemned," needs a little remodeling, for why should a man be damned for not believing what never had an absolute existence—truth? "We now affirm," says the bishop, "that we find it quite impossible to doubt." Why? Logically because he believes there is no absolute truth to doubt. He would make out a case of logical irresponsibility, that is, "Where there is no law there is no transgression"—where there is no absolute knowledge there can be no sin of doubt. He says, on the same page, that "we have no means of absolute knowledge." And again, "let the debate go on;" truth will never be arrived at, but it will not hurt us but rather be beneficial to seek all the same. "Hope deferred maketh the heart sick,"—and so does this kind of reasoning. Why is it that the bishop can not arrive at absolute truth concerning the resurrection? Simply because he has placed himself in the ludicrous relation of Messrs. Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, and Feeling to Mr. Seeing, and for the very same reason that they had no absolute truth as to the beauty of the landscape, so he has no adequate knowledge of the doctrine of immortality. Messrs. H., S., T. and F. might have pursued their search after "absolute knowledge" with reference to the beauty of the landscape on the line of "reason, and the facts that lie within the circle of *their* intelligence" till the day of eternity; but while they would deduce somethings belonging to the landscape, they would, without accepting the statement of Mr. Seeing remain in ignorance of its essential character. The state that the bishop in his book is trying to define is as indefinable from his stand-point as the character of one sense is from that of another—inmeasurably more so. It takes an eye-witness to give us the truth of things unseeable in this earth state; and with reference to the future state we walk by faith and not by sight.

For the revelations of immortality we accept the written statement of those who were "*eye-witnesses to his maj-*

esty." The question at point now is, Will we accept the testimony of sight?

"Beloved, now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear [not possible in our earth state] what we shall be; but we know that when He shall appear we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is."

We are not ignorant of that state. John saw it on the Mount of Transfiguration—he saw it at ascension, and he saw the glorified Son of God amidst the golden candlesticks—illustrations to mortal eyes of that glorified state that awaits resurrection saints. "*We shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is.*"

#### SECTION IV.

I return to pages 69–70:

"(1.) If I could dislodge the soul it is very possible that all kinds of activity could go on without the body."

But all *degrees* of activity can not go on without it. See argument on "Equal unto the Angels." More than this, the dependence of the soul upon the body, for its activities, is conceded by the bishop in a previous argument.

"(2.) But since I can not dislodge it, *it is impossible for me to prove directly that the soul can go on without the body.*"

This is a virtual surrendering of the whole argument. Where, then, are we to obtain knowledge concerning the same?

"(3.) How can I prove that a soul can do any thing out of the body when I only know it in the body?"

Here is the whole mistake of the argument from reason. It is the attempted solution of a problem belonging to other laws than known here by laws that lie within the circle of our intelligence. The thing is an absurdity. The absurdity is logically confessed.

"(4.) I have shown, also, that there is reasonable ground for the belief that its activity may be continued,

and possibly improved, when dislodged. This is as far as the argument from reason can go."

Where, in the argument, is shown the probable ground of the soul's continuance or improvement when dislodged? What can we *reason* about, or from, on this subject but what we *know*, and what do we know but what is *revealed*?

"(5.) But revelation—and on it we rely for positive proof, when proved to be such—is a good witness, and faith in its testimony becomes reasonable, and non-faith irrational. Its testimony on the point is clear."

Just here is a little difficulty in understanding the argument. It is obscured by the remark, "Revelation furnishes positive proof *when proved to be such*." Here is confusion. If I quote a passage from revelation he will meet me with the remark, "How do you know that to be revelation? Can you '*prove it to be such*'?"

I can see but one way out of the dilemma, and that is this: The bishop says that "revelation" can be "relied" on when "proven to be such," and that its "testimony" is "clear" on the "point" in controversy. So I jump at the conclusion that when the bishop selects a passage from revelation to prove his "point" "clear" that I have a text that for revelation is "proven to be such," in his mind, or else he would not use it. Very well, here it is. He says:

"(6.) But that which we know now on the point by reason, as we have shown, is that the soul, while *in* the body, is able to carry on a kind of activity which the body does not directly meditate. All self-consciousness, all reflection, all meditation, all worship, all conception of right and wrong, of truth and beauty, of the spiritual world, is without the mediation of the body directly."

This much of the argument I rule out as foreign to the particular point in controversy.

But he adds: "I infer that if I were delivered from the body" (he means *this* body), "and placed in *that* body

not made with hands eternal and in the heavens—called by revelation a spiritual body—I should be gainer in respect to these things. The facts all seem to show that, and beyond all these I have no power to go.”

My reply is this: The bishop flying to this passage (1 Cor. xv, 44), I presume that now, with his own assuming, we have one text “proven to be” revelation. Further, that he admits that beyond these he has no power to go. It is some consolation now, though declined in his premises, to get on the grounds of “purely” Scriptural “exegesis.” After he has concluded to accept the situation we will examine his position in the light of the passage he has chosen, and those he may yet choose. His statements here are somewhat confusing. For instance, in reference to this passage or in connection with it, he says: “I infer that if I were delivered from *the body* and placed in *that* body not made with hands,” etc. He here clearly states *that this present body* and *that* body are not kindred, that is, “*that*” body is no part of *this*. They are two distinct existences.

Does the text bear him out in this conclusion? Let us see. As I understand his argument, it is that in the resurrection state “*this*” is not “*that*” and “*that*” is not “*this*” body. Therefore, there is no resurrection body, for either is not the other. “But,” says one, “he will give the soul *another* body suited to its capacities.” Still that would not be a *resurrection*, but a *substitution*. Professor Bush says that the resurrection alludes to the soul, that it rises again because it never dies. But that is contradictory to the Scriptures, for they teach that it is that which *dies* which rises again, and the soul, not dying as the body does, can not have applied to it the idea of the resurrection. More, if it is not the body which dies, then it is nothing that rises, and hence the word resurrection is a superfluous term in Scripture or theology. There is no place for it. There is no use for it. This is the conclusion at which we arrive, irresistibly if the *body* that *died* is not the predicate of the

resurrection. The bishop says that the resurrection nowhere in the Scriptures is predicated of the *body*, but of the *person*. But the whole trend of his argument also is that the *person* never *dies*, is indestructible, and that this is one characteristic of its nature as distinguished from the body. Never dying, it therefore can not have applied to it the term *resurrection*. The *ascension* of the spirit at death has been snatched at as the meaning. But that will never do, for the simple reason that it is not the thing *ascended* that is referred to as raised again, but that which "sleeps in the dust of the earth"—the *dead*. It is that which *goes down* that is to *come up*.

Paul is very specific about this, and we can not mistake:

"So also is the resurrection of the *dead*. *It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption: it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory: it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power: it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body.* And so it is written, The first man Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam was made a quickening spirit. Howbeit, that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and afterward that which is spiritual. The first man is of the earth, earthy: the second man is the Lord from heaven. As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy: and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the *earthy*, we shall also bear the image of the *heavenly*. Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood can not inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth *corruption* inherit *incorruption*. Behold, I shew you a mystery; We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed. In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the *dead* shall be raised *incorruptible*, and we shall be changed. For *this* corruptible must put on *incorruption*, and *this* mortal must put on *immortality*. So when *this* corruptible shall have put on

*incorruption*, and *this* mortal shall have put on *immortality*, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory? The sting of death is sin; and the strength of sin is the law. But thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory, through our Lord Jesus Christ." (1 Cor. xv, 42-57.)

It is not necessary to waste many words on this "*spiritual body*." It is the annunciation of a truism that it is a *body*. It is not *spirit* in the sense that the Spirit is spirit. Unless the bishop should otherwise explain, the inference will naturally be drawn from his argument that in essential substance or element of composition, there is no difference between a *thought* and the *thinker*, the *soul*. I do not attempt to prove the substance of the soul, but I do claim that in essential elements there is a vital distinction between the thought and thinker. They are neither material, and both are spirit substance, but the soul is substance in a superior sense to that of thought. I can not explain it. Soul is more than spiritual protoplasm—it is form—though, imperceptible to mortal eyes—but form for all that. The probability is, that all ideas of form will conform to that of resurrection bodies.

But when Paul says, "It is sown a natural body, it is raised a *spiritual* body," the meaning is plain, unless we desire a confusion of words. He is here speaking of the *body* that *dies*—the natural body, in contrast with the supernatural body it will become in the resurrection. He does not mean by "*spiritual* body" that it will be spirit in the sense that the soul is spirit, but that in point of *immortality*, in contrast with its previous mortality, it shall take upon it the "powers" of a "resurrection" that will render it in permanence and possibilities equivalent to the demands and possibilities of the soul. Not that it will think and perform offices of the soul, but that it will be the soul's companion in eternity, in the divine appoint-



ment, and without which the soul's capacity will be abridged. How or why this is so I am not prepared to say, only that the Scriptures, the "court of ultimate appeal"—"revelation on which we rely for positive proof"—"is clear on this point." "What saith the Scripture?"—and its answer is mine.

Thus Paul keeps before the mind the same *body*, but two distinct *states*. He says it is the same "natural body" that is made spiritual—that is, it is transformed into an undecaying state. Hence "flesh and blood" can not inherit the kingdom of God—the future state; that is, elements of decay in these bodies if carried into the future state can not live eternally there, any more than here, were it possible to get them there; and in the resurrection translation, transformation, or "regeneration," as Christ calls it on one occasion, our bodies are delivered of these elements, but remain, our bodies still—eternally. Christ's resurrection body possessed flesh and bone in contradistinction to that of spirit, and that flesh and bone ascended to heaven, and dwells there to-day, just as tangible and material as when touched by his disciples.

It is *this corruption* that will put on incorruption—*this mortal* that must put on immortality; so when this occurs the complete effects of death upon our mortal bodies and immortal spirit will have been overthrown, and we shall stand entire at last. As to the capabilities of the resurrection body the Scriptures teach a fact of great power. We transfer the whole subject from the domain of human science, reason, and speculation to the power of God. It is the Omnipotent that accomplishes it. Christ and his apostles predicated the possibility of the resurrection upon the power of God. Christ in his controversy with the Sadducees accused them of ignorance of the *power of God*. Paul said, "Why should it be thought a thing incredible that *God* should raise the *dead*?"

The Scriptures speak of "the *power* of his resurrection."

And Paul says, "It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power." So that with reference to any question of possibility there is but one answer, *With God it is possible*. The reader is referred to a further comment upon this verse (44) to *Barnes's Notes*.

With testimony preponderating in favor of the facts annunciated there remains but one question, and that to be answered very definitely. It will be remembered that the bishop's argument at this point is upon the advantage of the soul without the body over that with a body. Is the teaching of Paul in 1 Cor. 15 corroborative of this position? When the victory of all victories is won and the last enemy is overthrown and the grand shout contained in the 55-57 verses is heard, in the light of the apostle's lesson in the chapter, is this victory a victory of bodiless souls, or re-embodied spirits?

There is but one answer to this question. The Scriptures must be wrested to give another.

#### SECTION V.

On page 75 it is said: "God is the only source of being, and since whatever exists exists solely because he holds it in being, it will continue to exist until he destroys or withdraws the being which he imparted. Non-existence of a created thing can only be reached through his agency. No created being has any more power to abrogate its existence than it had to cause it; and no created being has power to abolish any other created being. There is no more possibility for a finite and dependent existence to vacate its own being, or any other being, than there is to establish it. This, then, follows—that no reason can be shown why a thing existing should be suffered to reach no existence, unless some instance of annihilation can be alleged. But there is no such instance. It is conceded that neither scientific discovery nor experience has been able to adduce a single case."

The permanence of material existences is here argued. It is a scientific fact. On page 77 he proceeds to show that while he has argued the indestructibility of matter, yet God has *annihilated* the animal man, "automatic life" is gone. It is difficult for us, even impossible, to see the reasonableness of the proposition, even from a scientific or rationalistic stand-point, without a purpose. What is that purpose? The bishop assigns none. The best and fullest meaning I can conceive from the words of Moses (Psalm xc, 3): "Thou turnest man to destruction; and sayest, Return, ye children of men," is, that the wreck and ruin that came to man in consequence of sin, shall be cleared away by the resurrection of the body. At death he is *destroyed*—that is, the building is torn down, and it is built up again in the *resurrection*. We can not conceive why matter should be indestructible if not for a purpose. If I guess correctly, the highest purpose of our indestructibility, according to the bishop, is that something else may eat us up. We live to be eaten. I venture he has not suggested a higher motive of our material indestructibility. And yet, on page 78, by his contrast of soul and body, he logically deduces a destruction of our material existence, which is a contradiction; and on page 81, proceeds to challenge broadly, comprehensively, that the race bring him proof that a single atom of matter that God has created, or a single atom of spirit from the beginning of creation until now, has ever perished.

If this is not putting body and spirit upon footing of equal permanence, I do not know what stronger language could be used to make it unmistakable. What for? For nothing but to be eaten, absorbed, taken up like water by a sponge, to contribute to other existences, and not to glorify God in the form of its creation.

Why talk so much about living on and on when we know we never die? Much is said in the argument of "life after death." If the "person" is the spirit only, and

it never dies, why talk of "after death"—there is no such thing as death to the *man*. But this will not suffice. Of course, the soul is immortal, but the whole doctrine of the resurrection is predicated of the *future permanence of bodily organism*.

#### SECTION VI.

Page 95, quoting Bidwell, he says: "Paul states a universal truth when he describes a natural man as 'being all his life-time subject to bondage through fear of death.' This thought of death is always with man. Every once in a while it will rise up in our path, and stare us in the face, and it makes cowards of the strongest of us. And this death is not simply a negative argument. Man everywhere possesses an innate love of life."

If there is any proof in this it is in favor of the resurrection. Why this "fear of death?" and to what does it relate? If it relates to the body, how is that fear taken away? By the resurrection. This fear relates to something else than simply to dying in the abstract. Does the poor uncomely worm have an innate fear of breaking its shell and becoming a winged inhabitant of the air? Hardly. If it was a creature of reason and anticipation, we could imagine delight at the thought. So why this fear of death? Is it at the thought of eternal life, of the society of pure spirits, of becoming an inhabitant of the deathless sphere of heaven? Certainly not. Read the context. The main difficulty growing out of the quotations of Scripture made by the bishop is, that they are applied in his argument to one thing, when they relate to something else. This quotation is to be used against his argument, rather than for it. Here it is a little more complete: "Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same; that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil; and deliver them, who through fear of death were all their life-time subject to bondage." (Heb. ii, 14,

15.) In this passage death is feared for something beyond it. Again, there were those who had no idea of immortality. Death was feared by them. But here is a direct allusion to the fact that Satan produced death, and that through causing man to sin, he has caused him to die, and in so far has the power of *death*. Our best authorities and ablest divines agree that any construction of this text falls short of its meaning if we do not understand it to teach that Jesus Christ reached beyond all the consequences of sin upon both the body and soul. He made it possible to pardon the sinner and remove condemnation. He also made it possible to rise from the dead. The resurrection of the *body* is here, with the other, held up as the antidote to the fear of death. A clear reference is made to the penal idea of death. By the death and resurrection of Christ he goes beyond the work of Satan, and makes possible the restoration of man to purity and bodily immortality. This is the only solution of this problem. Any other leaves the world in darkness and in the shadow of death. This is the meaning of the words: "That through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil; and deliver them who through fear of death were all their life-time subject to bondage."

But does this teach the *bodily* resurrection of Christ? Is it possible that Christ has won such a victory as this? Bishop Foster and Professor Bush both deny that Christ ascended to heaven in the body in which he died, and which was buried and possibly rose from the grave, but did not ascend. Let us see what the Scriptures, constituting "the court of ultimate appeal," say. John (Rev. i, 10-20) had a revelation of the glorified Son of God. What a sublime manifestation! Read it:

"I was in the Spirit on the Lord's day, and heard behind me a great voice, as of a trumpet, Saying, I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last: and, What thou seest, write in a book, and send it unto the seven Churches

which are in Asia; unto Ephesus, and unto Smyrna, and unto Pergamos, and unto Thyatira, and unto Sardis, and unto Philadelphia, and unto Laodicea. And I turned to see the voice that spake with me. And being turned, I saw seven golden candlesticks; and in the midst of the seven candlesticks one like unto the Son of man, clothed with a garment down to the foot, and girt about the paps with a golden girdle. His head and his hairs were white like wool, as white as snow; and his eyes were as a flame of fire; and his feet like unto fine brass, as if they burned in a furnace; and his voice as the sound of many waters. And he had in his right hand seven stars: and out of his mouth went a sharp two-edged sword: and his countenance was as the sun shineth in his strength. And when I saw him, I fell at his feet as dead. And he laid his right hand upon me, saying unto me, Fear not; I am the first and the last: I am he that liveth, and was dead; and behold, I am alive for evermore, Amen; and have the keys of hell and of death. Write the things which thou hast seen, and the things which are, and the things which shall be hereafter; the mystery of the seven stars which thou sawest in my right hand, and the seven golden candlesticks. The seven stars are the angels of the seven Churches: and the seven candlesticks which thou sawest are the seven Churches."

But who is it? "*I am he that liveth and was dead; and behold, I am alive for evermore, Amen; and have the keys of hell and of death.*"

This scene is located in heaven; but it is revealed to John on Patmos. If it was not the very Christ that lived on earth, died on Calvary, was buried in the grave, and raised from the grave by the mighty power of God, then are these words without meaning. Compare Foster with this passage. He tells us that somewhere between the mount and invisibility Christ shed his earthly body, and did not take it to heaven with him. But Christ, speaking

from his glorified *state* and *place*, says, "*I am he that liveth and was DEAD*"—the same. And, further, he says that he who was *dead* is *alive*, and not only alive, but the *dead* that is made *alive* is *alive forever more*; then says the *Amen*, SO LET IT BE. Then he adds, as if his resurrection mission was not fully announced, I "have the keys of hell and of death."

It is intimated—positively stated by Bishop Foster—that Christ's resurrection is not the pledge of ours. If the idea of a *pledge* is not contained in these words quoted above, and one of a very definite type, then do I fail to see the full force of their meaning. It is a message of bodily immortality, as well as that of the conditions of divine favor, that he gives to the Churches.

Here, again, comes the idea of *power*. Science, reason, "sound philosophy," "facts within the circle of our intelligence," may not be able to solve the problem of the resurrection, are not able, but the *power of God* is. "Believe that I am in the Father and the Father in me, or else believe me for the very *works*' sake." His works proved him able to raise the dead by his voice. We rule out the objection that these were raised to die again, and in that such resurrections are unlike those at the last day; for the same Christ says, in addition to *spiritual* resurrections—as some claim, the only resurrection—"Marvel not at this; for the hour is coming that they who are in their *graves* shall hear his voice, and come forth." That hour is not "now," as in the previous case. He does not say it "now is," but that it is in the future, and that it is the *dead* that shall be raised, some to everlasting life, and others to the resurrection of damnation. The *how* of this occurrence, baffles all solution but that of the *power of God*.

An engine is upon the track. Suppose particles of steam were intelligent creatures, and one of them would intimate that the engine would stop its speed and pull up at a desired station. Others would cry, "Impossible!



Do n't you see, it is contrary to nature to stop this speed and weight without a calamity, a real wreck and ruin?" The other would reply, "Why should it be thought a thing incredible that the maker of an engine should stop a railroad train?" He reasons thus: The creator is greater than the thing created, and rises above the creature, and subjects it to his control.

And so, when Joshua "*spake to the Lord*" (not to himself), and said, "Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon, and thou, moon, in the valley of Ajalon," suppose a little speck called a man says, in scientific horror, "O, never—cause a wreck, a smash-up—'an irresistible force comes in contact with an immovable body,' and we will never know the result."

Well, if a man rises above his work, and yet preserves order, can not he who made all things, all worlds, and holds the law that controls them in his own fist, stop a world, if need be? Why should it be thought a thing incredible that God should dash a world to atoms, and yet preserve the order of his universe? What will science teach us upon this subject? If any thing, it will confirm this truth.

So, then, if God made man immortal—designed his immortality—and sin interfered with the divine plan, is God so limited in majesty and might that he can not rise above the wreck and undo the work of Satan? Why, then, incredible that God should raise man from the dead, since death would leave him, so far, under the heel of the enemy? God created man once, can not he restore his own creation?

Thank God, we see this power dwelling in Christ. "*All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth.*" He flashes athwart our sorrow, and gives us joy and hope; across our night, and gives us day, eternal day. When soul and body are parting, especially is he our hope. "*My flesh also shall rest in hope.*" "*I shall be satisfied,*

when *I awake*, with thy likeness" of immortality; for "if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in the likeness of his resurrection."

This wonderful transformation is claimed to conflict with science in the rapidity with which it will take place. "Behold I show you a mystery; we shall not all sleep; but we shall be changed; in a *moment*, in the twinkling of an eye," etc. I do n't know about the confiction with science. It seems to me that some *men*, and not science, act as if, when the Bible says white, they'll say black; when it says sweet, they'll say sour; when it says light, they say dark; when it says life, they say death; when it says quick, they say slow. The first skeptics that essayed to antagonize truth with their theory have spoken of some of the upheavals of the mountains as taking long periods of time—thousands upon thousands of years; but it is now generally conceded that in most cases it occurred "in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye." There are geodes which, when broken open, are filled with beautiful crystallizations. It is thought by some that centuries were necessary for the formation of these beautiful crystals. You have seen by sciopticon light the crystallization of liquids as thrown on canvas. You watched it. You could not see it. But it was going on. But in a moment, quick as a flash, and it was done. So these rocks of crystallization. Are all of God's wonders confined to the rocks? May we not expect that the grandest creature of his hand is to be the object of his greatest wonder-working power, when he shall change these vile bodies, and in the twinkling of an eye they shall take on the crystallization of immortality? I reaffirm, "I believe in the resurrection of the body."

## SECTION VII.

"The divine character requires man's existence in the future in order to its own vindication. This, we think,

is so on two grounds, to wit, the grounds both of goodness and justice." ("Beyond the Grave," page 97.)

If death of the body is in consequence of the sin of the soul, the body being its instrument, and "the grounds both of goodness and justice" require "man's existence in the future in order to a vindication of the divine character," then, when Christ's personal and bodily sacrifice was provided, how can that vindication take place, in the fullest sense, without the resurrection of the body to immortality? They were both together in the transgression—man in his dual nature—though the soul was the responsible agent; and, this being admitted, how can the soul come up to the measure of responsibility to receive as great trusts as in its first creation, without it has as great given to it—for instance, the body. Or is the soul's integrity in the future state based on what we might term, not a material, but the moral annihilation of the body; that is, so far as the body is concerned, it is to the soul, to all intents and purposes, annihilated, if they are not to live together. This question would not be sprung, had it not been for the proposition "that the divine character requires man's existence in the future in order to its own vindication. This we are told is on two grounds—namely, of goodness and justice." I hold that if death is in consequence of sin, that it is a penalty for sin—and the bishop, as an Arminian Methodist, can not escape the point—and if the body is not to be raised, but that the soul enters upon its eternal state without it, and never to be reunited with it, then is there a very grave sense in which the soul, throughout its highest ecstasy of heavenly delight, will have to know that its penalty for sin is an eternal penalty, because of the death of the body for sin and its eternal absence on the account of the same. If we reason this principle on the grounds of "goodness and justice," and apply it as the bishop has done, we can come to no other conclusion.

And again, the soul can never vindicate itself, because

a full vindication is certainly dependent on a full restoration, and this we are told by the bishop will not take place. The reader can enlarge this thought with safety.

I do not fully teach the same probation as before the fall, and yet who will deny free moral responsibility in heaven? The temptation to sin will not be there, because there is no sin there. It is taken out of our hearts while here, and, finding none when we arrive there, there will be no other prompting from within or without but to that of holiness and praise.

In italics, he says, on same page: "*There can be no doubt that a being who has power and wisdom to originate such a creature as man, has the requisite power and wisdom to perpetuate and greatly aggrandize his existence. Not to do it, is to becloud and call in question his benevolence for what he has already done.*"

Yes; but while this is admitted we will admit one thing—that is, that the principles of "goodness and justice" are not changed by their transfer to heaven. They are of heaven, and handed down to earth for administration, and we know them; and, while the "divine character" is to be "vindicated" in the future state, it will not be in accord with a principle that will humiliate the soul throughout eternity. I believe the logic of the bishop will enforce upon the soul that humiliation—that is, that throughout eternity the body is absent because of the sin of the soul.

On page 106 the argument is devoted here to the thought that the soul's development exceeds that of the body. The usual logical inference is drawn that because of that fact the body has no permanence in the future, and for the same reasons the soul is proven immortal. In the light of revealed truth we all recognize that all this kind of reasoning proves nothing. Then asks:

"Have there not already developed in your soul wants which time and sense can not satisfy? Do you not, in the

supremest moments, hear voices in your soul calling you up? Are you not conscious of longings for something better than earth can give? Has there not come to you the feeling of an undefinable attraction toward unseen realities. Do you not sometimes see the far-off signals waving you on? Do you not feel a strange uneasiness often, and stirring within you, as if you would fly away to a beautiful realm somewhere, where life could take on nobler forms, and, we do not doubt, those you have loved dwell? I know you do. Are not these prophetic—the stirring of a life in the germ? I must think they are.”

This reminds me very much of the precedents upon which the bishop *refuses* to argue the question: “First, To *assume* every thing and give wing to *imagination* and *feeling*.” If this is not now his basis of thought, what, then, does the reference to “feeling” and “seeing far-off signals,” “strange uneasiness,” etc., mean, if he has not left the “rational” and gone into the “emotional” argument?

But he adds: “Are not these prophetic—the stirring of a life in the *germ*?” *Germ* of what? “A *life* in the germ,” says the bishop. I find some confusion of thought at this point. My dictionary tells me what *germ* means. I can not see the analogy between the true meaning and the bishop’s thought. I mean to say that, *generally*, there is allusion to *form*. To reason from *nature*, this is the case of necessity. Must I understand that the *form* of my soul will be changed, and that its present promptings are in that direction? I venture to say that the thought did not enter the bishop’s mind, and that the allusion is rather to the perfection of the soul’s *character* and *state* or *capacity* of enjoyment. This will be admitted. If so, then this “emotional” argument will be ruled out as having nothing to do with the doctrine of the *body’s* future permanence. Whatever may be the “germ” of a “life” beyond, there is one unmistakable utterance from Scripture—a passage that is from revelation, without stopping to “prove that it

be such"—that is, "God giveth it a *body* as it hath pleased him, and to every seed *his* body," not *a* body, but to every seed "*his*" *body*. (1 Cor. xv, 38.) I venture the assertion that these outgoings of the soul alluded to relate as much to one life as the other, and that they are so experienced in the common heart of humanity. Whatever that "germ" is in the future it is to have a *body*. "God giveth it a *body*."

We are told that from 35th verse of 1 Cor. xv to the close of the chapter, Paul "answers the Gnostic opponent who denies the possibility of the resurrection, *based on the vileness of corporeal matter*. He shows (35-41) that there are varieties of body, contrasts the mode of our present body (42-50) and furnishes an apocalyptic picture, affirming by revelation a glorious resurrection of the same body." (Whedon.)

On the words, "But some *man* will say, How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come? *Thou* fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die: And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat or of some other *grain*: But God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body," he continues to say: "Both questions deny the possibility of the resurrection (of our present body, note Acts viii, 9) by asking the *HOW* and the *WHAT kind*. They fully believe that it is no *HOW* and no *kind*; for matter is immutably corrupt and they have no conception that body can be made, even by divine power, any otherwise than corrupt—*just because it is matter*."

"*Thou fool*. The italic *thou* is furnished by the translators. Similar was Solomon's *fool*, who said in his heart, There is no God. *Thou*. Yet here, as in Rom. ix, the apostle has a conceptual opponent face to face. This *thou* would be more emphatic in Paul's Greek than in our English, for the Greek can omit the pronoun, and inserts

it only for the keen point. As Dr. Poor (in Lange) pertinently says, 'It is the pointed finger aiming at the objector present to the author's mind—*thou*.' And fool belongs to this *thou*, just because his own planting a *seed* refutes him. When *you yourself* put a seed in the ground, *you* know what follows. *Quickened*—made alive in the future plant.

"Paul here, be it noted, is not dealing in the secrecies of science, but with the bare facts presented to *the eye* of the seed planter. The three patent ocular facts are, a burial, a death, and a reappearance. The seed goes into the ground, dies, and is 'resurrected' in a plant above ground. To Paul's conception the plant is the same seed reappearing; the same matter in a new form. Yet this sameness is not what he is now illustrating; *he is now only showing the Gnostic that, as matter is not necessarily inglorious, so the materiality of our present body is no reason for objecting to its future remodeling in glory.* Paul's view is, that the same materiality rises re-organized, and endowed with new properties. It is *idem et alter*; the same in substance, but different in phenomena; just as the same carbon may be first a charcoal and then a diamond.

"EXCEPT IT DIE.—Is it strange to you that corruption, decay, and death should be the antecedent of immortal life? Lo! the seed you plant can not live until it DIE. Death is the necessary condition to future life.

"*Not . . . body that shall be.* The planter does not sow it a plant and then have it come up a plant. But a seed is sown and a plant is grown. Just so you bury a *putrid corpse*, and it comes forth an *angel-like BODY*. But to the apostle's legitimate conception the new plant is but a transfiguration of the old seed, and the new body is but a molecular rearrangement of the old corpse. *The old corpse is the primitive material* out of which the new body is made; just as in the CHANGE of verse 52, the old is the material for the new.



“BARE GRAIN.—Naked kernel, not a living stalk, with fresh branches, foliage, and flower; as it is in its upspringing.

“But God giveth it. And it was just because the Gnostical objector had a semi-pagan ignorance of God (note on verse 34) that he could not realize that God can reorganize old matter in new glory.

“PLEASED HIM.—For the laws of the resurrection, like the laws of nature, are a mode of the divine volition. The new body is produced by God’s power and just as he wills. *To every (kind of) seed his own body.* And so God may modify the resurrection body so as to destroy the objector’s supposition that the same body means a corrupt body.

“39–41. As the necessary corruptness of all matter, and therefore the necessary corruptness of all bodies, here or hereafter, is the ground assumption of the Gnostical objector against the possibility of the resurrection, Paul now enlarges on the varieties of body, and the various glories which material bodies are made by God to assume. These are all to illustrate the difference between the dying body and the resurrection body.”

This latter thought suggests another as against the bishop’s theory, and that is the indiscriminate mixture of all bodies into one common and essential mass, which is the bishop’s idea, when revelation contends for individual distinction. In the discussion of the future state or beyond the grave, he rules out the *body* as “common and unclean,” and as having no fellowship with hope. But by a more careful study of the Word of God he hath showed us that in this respect we should not call it common or unclean. This contempt of the body is both scientifically and Scripturally wrong. The body is also alluded to as a subject of salvation in connection with the soul—“*he is the Savior of the body.*”

Paul says: “Now the body is not for fornication, but for

the Lord; and the Lord for the body. And God hath both raised up the Lord, and will also raise up us by his own power. Know ye not that your bodies are the members of Christ? shall I then take the members of Christ, and make them the members of a harlot? God forbid. What! know ye not that he which is joined to a harlot is one body? for two, saith he, shall be one flesh. But he that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit. Flee fornication. Every sin that a man doeth is without the body; but he that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body. What! know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own? For ye are bought with a price: therefore, glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, which are God's." (1 Cor. vi, 13-20.)

The language of the apostle is very clear. Its meaning is summed up in a very few words: Primarily and essentially the body is for the Lord. It is designed to be as pure as the soul. God *raised up our Lord's body*, and will *also* raise us up by his power. Our *bodies* are inseparably connected with Christ, and so designed from the beginning. They can only be separated by sin: "Shall I then take the members of Christ and make them the members of an harlot?"

Our union with Christ is by the spirit of holiness—of separateness from sin—joined by the hatred of sin and love of righteousness. "He that is joined to the Lord is one spirit." The *body* can be sinned against as can the soul. (See verse 18.) The closing words are final: "What! know ye not that your *body* is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own?"

Here Paul asserts the estimate of God upon the body (perhaps not so great as that of the soul, for the temple is not greater than he that dwells within), but jointly with the soul. "Ye," soul and *body*, "are not your own, for ye

are bought with a price." Here it is clearly and forcibly stated that God has redeemed the *body* along with the soul. The full redemption of the body is realized in its resurrection from the dead. This is promised in verse 14. Paul also alludes to this very fact in Romans viii, 17-21. He passes from the doctrine of regeneration and witness of the Spirit of God with ours to our heirship, to the inward longing after immortality and eternal life beyond the grave in consequence of the same. How complete the argument, and undeniable the truth of it in the words of his own utterance: "And if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint heirs with Christ; *if so be that we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified together.* For I reckon that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us. For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the same in hope; *because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God.* For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now. And not only they, but ourselves also, which have the first fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, *waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body.* For we are saved by hope; but hope that is seen is not hope: for what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for? But if we hope for that we see not, then do we with patience wait for it."

Paul says, in 1 Corinthians vi, 20, that to this end we "are *bought* with a price," and that in view of that particular fact of the bodily glorification in the resurrection state, of the same he concludes the irresistible "*therefore*" of human duty here: "*therefore* glorify God in your *body*, and in your spirit which are his."

Bishop Foster says that there is not a passage in the

Bible that predicates the resurrection of the *body*, but, on the contrary, of the *person*. I meet this with a positive contradiction, and say that there is not a passage in the Bible but predicates the resurrection of the *body* and of the *body only*, and not of the *person*, for the *person never dies*, and the resurrection is predicated of that which *dies*.

The Scriptures I have selected are direct in their proofs that relate to bodily resurrection and glorification. They are simply irresistible. Sin affects the body. We are exhorted to keep it out of the body that it may admit of a glorified state before God. I do not mean by this that the body will not be raised if it is a sinful body, thus basing immortality upon the life of faith in the soul, but I do pretend to say that while the wicked will be raised immortal, no one will be raised in a "*glorified body*" but he who loves and honors God in his body and soul on earth. It is the *glorification* of the body that is dependent upon virtue, and not upon the fact of its resurrection; this latter will be general. "There will be a resurrection both of the just and unjust," but there will only be a *glorification* of the *just*—of believers.

If the Scriptures constitute "the court of ultimate appeal," I think I have made my point. I do not propose to debase the *body*. You may talk about the "sense view," and all this and that, but "sense" is not a "corrupt" thing. There is a high and holy "sense view" of heaven—a veritable, tangible heaven. I say this for the soul as well as for the body. I think, therefore, with all respect for the bishop's attempt at deep philosophical reasoning, he would have kept more within the bounds of reason than he has if the Scriptures throughout had been indeed "the court of ultimate appeal." He says he submits the subject "to the reason, and examines it in the light of all the facts bearing upon it which lie within the circle of our intelligence," and, "aiming at the *best* and *most permanent* results," he has adopted this method, as

called for by "the claims of intelligence, and the deeper wants of reason and the soul."

But how indefinite his conclusions! How unsatisfactory his argument—if argument it may be called! Better call it imagination—better place his whole argument under the first precedent which he rejects, as belonging appropriately there, when he says there are three possible methods of conducting the discussion: "First, to assume every thing, and give wing to imagination and feeling." If this has not been the method he has pursued, instead of the one pretended, then have I misjudged the character of his argument. And then, when the Scriptures are appealed to, I assume that he has either made selections that did not apply to *beyond the grave*, if interpreted in the light of the context, or which alluded to the intermediate state, which doctrine he notably evades, or wrests the texts chosen so that they are made to give a meaning that they will not bear if properly interpreted. No one regrets more than myself the necessity of making this statement; but consideration for the truth, above that of all else, constrains me, and the reader is requested to examine the Scriptures quoted to find the correctness of my position.

It seems that indefiniteness has been the sum total of the long and labored lectures, and that confusion has been more desirable than conviction. The reader of Darwin's "Genesis of Species" will remember how almost every chapter closed with a sort of admission of the absence of a satisfactory scientific demonstration of his theory, hinting only at the probability of its truth, or a sort of "hope so" that it is truth. This is very unsatisfactory, but, indeed, is a very common state of things among some scientists. For instance, Mr. Huxley himself is represented as saying, in his New York lectures, in 1876, the following: "I insist on the *defects* of the geological record the more because those who have not attended to the matter are apt to say to us, 'It is all very well; but when you

get into difficulty with your theory of evolution you appeal to the incompleteness and imperfection of the geological record,' and I want to make it perfectly clear to you that *that imperfection is a vast fact which must be taken into account in all our speculations.*"

And we are also told in the "Origin of Species," by Mr. Darwin, that "the geological volume is a history of the world, imperfectly kept, and written in a changing dialect. Of this history we possess the last volume; of this volume here and there a short chapter has been preserved, and of each page only here and there a line."

I confess my inability to apply any other language that would be more fitting or expressive to the whole volume containing the bishop's argument on *beyond the grave*. I am not prepared to accept such statements of indefiniteness and uncertainty as applied to the Bible doctrine of man's immortality. I am not stopping here to "prove revelation to be such," for we have accepted it as such, and our argument must proceed upon that basis.

There is one point of arraignment of this logic to which allusion has already been made; that is, the frequent statement of the *immortality of the soul*, as if it were called in question by Christian believers. There is no controversy on this point. Again, the impression is made by the same frequent reference to the soul's immortality that by it we are to infer the non-permanence of the body beyond the grave. This would have us believe that as the soul is immortal the body is not to be raised. This is begging the whole question. The Christian idea, in the aggregate, proceeds upon the admission of the body's non-permanence *here*, and that the *resurrection* is based upon this idea, and that without this idea there would be no meaning in the word nor use for it if when the body dies that is the last of it.

Others may come to contrary conclusions, but with my

utmost thought I have been unable to reach any other than that which I have stated.

This closes the examination of Lecture II, and I now proceed to the consideration of the thoughts presented in Lecture III. I trust that we shall be able to pursue it in the fear of God and love of the truth, with the prayer that good may result.



## CHAPTER IV.

EXAMINATION OF LECTURE III OF "BEYOND THE GRAVE."  
THE SCRIPTURAL ARGUMENT.

IN the beginning of our examination of Lecture III of "Beyond the Grave," it is a pleasing annunciation that we range in more pleasant pastures than heretofore, in that the argument is to have more of the definiteness of revelation.

Here it is admitted that the Word of God is *testimony* on the subject in controversy; that it is "*the voice of God declaring, Man does live after death.*" It is further admitted (page 109) that "the argument assumes that the Bible is God's testimony. If this postulate be not true, of course the argument fails. Assuming it to be true, the argument further posits, by implication, the adequacy of the witness. This will not be called in question. If it is certain that we do not know, it is no less certain that the Infinite does know, the truth in the premises. His testimony is not an inference or hearsay, but a personal knowledge."

I have given this quotation as containing the condition of debate that the parties in the controversy are willing to subscribe to as governing them in the discussion, and I desire to place my signature to the same as accepting the same as governing principles in the discussion which follows.

In the preceding criticism the argument has also been largely Scriptural, for the simple reason that when the path I have been compelled to follow, professedly rational and philosophical, by the force of the inner impulse of the reasoner, trespassed on the domain of Scripture, it became necessary to follow it there; and it is easily seen how,

perhaps, our opponent stepped over the bounds of his original design, and fed on other grounds. How far this will be the case in the present chapter remains to be seen.

But we both agree to the above conditions, that shall govern the discussion in this chapter.

Scarcely have we lent our subscription to the conditions which teach the "*certainty*" of the "testimony" given, than on page 111 we are informed: (1) "It is fit that the acknowledgment should be made that after all the aid we shall get from revelation, the subject now broached will be found still shrouded in deep obscurity"—that it is the "*fact*" of immortality only that he "*established*," but "he has not cleared it of mystery." No attempt is made to give exact information touching either class of holy or unholy dead. Already the indefiniteness of the Scriptures begins to steal over us. (2) "It is *certain*, even, that *most* that is said is *imagery*." Appropriate, then, is the remark, but sad the conclusion: (3) "It is safe to presume that *this state of facts has both perplexed the faith and saddened the affections of most devout believers*." No wonder, if the statement be true; but is it true? But hear, hear! (4) "We are constrained to record that on all these points [of heaven and those who dwell there] the information is the most general imaginable." What a court of "ultimate appeal!" Shall we turn away? Shall we walk no more with the Master? "Will ye also go away?" saith the Master. "To whom can we go? *Thou* hast the words of *eternal life*." Are they only "general" and indefinite? or are they specific?

#### SECTION I.

"I have searched the sayings of the Master himself, word by word, with the assiduity of unappeasable desire, . . . but nothing that I have been able to find lifts the mystery. 'It doth not yet appear *what* we shall be.' As yet, 'we know in part.'" ("Beyond the Grave," pp. 112-13.)

This latter expression gives us the key by which we unlock the "mystery" and "obscurity" that seem in full possession of the mind. Here we step on the second precedent mentioned in first lecture, that if the Scriptures as stated in the Preface, constitute "the court of ultimate appeal," and we come to them for light, we must treat the subject "exegetically, as purely a doctrine of revelation." This I understand the bishop now essays to do, though I understand that he designed the *third* method of treatment laid down on page 13 to apply throughout, which would exclude the exegetical method.

## SECTION II.

Page 113. The argument supposes an insoluble and unrevealed mystery, and to prove it quotes 1 John iii, 2: "It doth not yet appear *what* we shall be," but, "As yet, 'we know in *part*.'" This interpretation of the text quoted creates the idea of "mystery" where no such mystery is designed. A proper interpretation relieves of the difficulty. This is one of the plain passages of Scripture, the meaning of which lies upon its surface. It is simply this: Now we are the sons of God, but in the consciousness of our heirship we do not enter upon our glorified state. Great as the present experience is, it is greater for what it is to introduce us to in the future; therefore, the *visible* resurrection and glorified state does not *appear* to the natural vision "yet;" but we know that when he shall appear we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." Of that *appearance* or likeness we "*know*" now, but do not *see* it now. The question is as to what we *know*—that is, John says "it doth not yet *appear*," but he does not say we do *not know* what we shall be. I claim that the *information* as to the state beyond the grave is sufficient and satisfactory, and that the only thing that stirs our hearts with restlessness is the fact that in connection with being born of God—sons of God—it, the future state, doth not "*appear*,"

but it is made *known* to our "intelligence." It is in reference to the *seeable* state that we have the words "we know that when he shall *appear* we shall be like him for we shall *see* him as he is." Illustrations of *what* "he is" have been given, and on these a *knowledge* of that appearance is given us. But we will not be permitted as the chosen few have been to *see* him, until "he doth appear" to us as he did to the three in the transfiguration, to Stephen when dying, to John on Patmos Isle, and to Saul of Tarsus. Here in these instances the *appearance* of the heavenly state was vouchsafed to a few, but they, in "flesh and blood"—in the decayable state and earthly infirmity could not have lived in it—could not have inherited it; its "weight of glory" could not have been "endured." The evangelists describe the transfiguration as an appearance "*in glory*."

The bishop follows the quotation with, "There must be some good reason why so much *obscurity* remains around a point which it was one of the chief points of revelation to set before us, and knowledge respecting which is so supremely important."

It was one of the "chief points of revelation" to set before us a "knowledge" of the future state, but it was not the object of revelation to make it visible. I hold that the "obscurity" is that of *sight* and not of *knowledge* concerning the future state, and that the text just quoted, and by so many chosen to mystify the subject, bears me out in my statement.

### SECTION III.

"Now it is a fact that, for the present, God has given us no sense by which to *perceive* the spirit world." ("Beyond the Grave," p. 114.)

This is a curious statement. Commonly speaking, God has given us five senses, and there is not a single atom of foundation in science, philosophy, revelation, or

any thing else in earth or heaven, that we know of, that indicates that we will ever get rid of these, or that they will be reinforced by a sense that is still unknown. It is speculation—the veriest play of imagination to claim that there will be another sense. We might just as well say that revelation should appeal to creatures without reason, with the positive requirement of acceptance on moral ground, when there were no moral perceptions, as to hold up heaven before the mind as one of the inducements or incitements to faithful virtue and endeavor when we are told that it is a “*fact, that for the present, God has given us no sense by which to PERCEIVE the spirit world.*” This is simply an absurdity in the sight of revealed truth. It is no escape from the dilemma to say, as the bishop does immediately after, “Designing us, during the present stage of existence, to have to do with physical realities chiefly, he has not supplied us with an outfit of faculty to bring us into the sensible fellowship of spiritual realities.” This is evading the question. It is not a question of *present* “sensible fellowship of realities,” but, Has God given us any sense by which to *perceive* the spirit world? Are the *realities* of the spirit world matters of *knowledge* to us here—not that they *appear*, but that they are matters of intellectual and spiritual perception? This I understand the bishop partially admits, but the logic of his precedent and its consequent is, that we both do and we do not know. He further tells us that “the blind man stands in the midst of beauty without perceiving it—as *undiscerning as if it were not*, even when it surrounds and touches him on every side; and the deaf man stands dumb and insensible as a stone in the very focus of the storm of ravishing sounds incapable of knowing the strains which thrill others”—so, “*for aught we know*, the transcendent glories of the spiritual universe insphere us, and *we KNOW it not.*” That there is much that is beyond our comprehension all will admit, but even that is a matter of revelation.

We *know* of it. The whole drift of his argument is that this present state is probationary, preparatory to the spirit state. If so, then it is absolutely necessary and logically to be supposed that the things for which we are being prepared must be matters of revelation—*known* to us—and of intellectual perception also. That they do not “yet appear” to the ocular sense is a fact, but that they are still objects of perception of knowledge is also a fact. They can not be presentable to the mind as objects of its aspiration if this be not true. We will know the spirit world by the senses we have now. If not, then we will know it by a sense or senses we have not. This latter implies the cessation of our present sense system by which only we have our individual consciousness. To say that in the future we arrive at a knowledge of the spirit world by senses that are not now in our possession, is almost equivalent to annihilation of our individuality and the creation of another. This we can not entertain.

#### SECTION IV.

With reference to *beyond the grave*, it is said, “He permits us to draw our own elysium, only conditioning us, that it shall be pure and holy, . . . and then gives us the assurance that it shall so transcend all our ideas that our surprise will be ecstatic.” (“Beyond the Grave,” page 117.)

First, with reference to that state *we* “draw our *own* elysium”—nothing known but what is inferential—“our own” ideas of its enjoyment. The proof given of this statement is one of the texts of Scripture so often misappropriated. To the subject in controversy, it may be used accommodatively, but not as *proof*. It may be used as some passages referring to earthly judgments are applied in a figurative sense to the general judgment, but do not establish it. The passage is: “Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man,

the things which God hath prepared for them that love him."

I challenge the bishop's application of this passage. If there was any allusion in it, directly or indirectly, to the "spirit world" "beyond the grave," I would yield the point; but such is not the case; therefore, it is ruled out of this argument. All Scripture texts must be interpreted, if interpreted correctly, in connection with the subject under consideration in which the text appears. Thus we interpret this. *It applies to the present state and experience of the wisdom and life of the Gospel in the heart.* Read the context:

"Howbeit we speak wisdom among them that are perfect: yet not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world, that come to nought: But we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom, which God ordained before the world unto our glory; which none of the princes of this world knew: for had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory. But as it is written, Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him. *But God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit: for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God.* For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God. Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God; that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God. Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth; comparing spiritual things with spiritual. But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. But he that is spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is



judged of no man. For who hath known the mind of the Lord, that he may instruct him? But we have the mind of Christ."

Mark you how inapplicable the text to the bishop's argument. He selects it to prove that the realities of the spirit world are not a matter of revelation; but Paul says that the "things" that this passage alludes to, and which the eye hath not seen, nor the ear heard, neither entered into the heart of man, "*God hath REVEALED unto us by his Spirit.*" Whose eye and ear hath not seen and heard? What man's heart hath not conceived the things which God hath prepared for them that love him? The "natural man," says Paul. The "*things* prepared for them that love God" are here said in the same connection to be "revealed" to them, so that they are matters of *present* knowledge and experience. It is this reckless use of Scripture that befogs so many precious doctrines. Always quote the text where it belongs, and much difficulty will be avoided.

I will say that, as the spiritual blessings alluded to are revealed and become facts of conscious experience, just as clearly has God revealed the facts of the spirit world, not to the sense of sight, but the intellectual perception—it is a matter of *knowledge* for the present, and not *sight*—but when there it will be a fact of both knowledge and sight. For the present, with reference to that state, "we walk by *faith* (based on the ocular demonstrations furnished by Paul, preceding the words) and not by sight," but by a faith equivalent to absolute knowledge. Take up the next quotation of Scripture by the bishop:

"For our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory."

What relation has this to the passage previously quoted? None at all in the subject matter under consideration. In fact, as this whole lecture is a continuation of the subject that man is purely or only a spirit, and the argument

must carry us *beyond the grave* to demonstrate it, and as we know nothing of *beyond the grave* but what is revealed, we need but read the context without comment to prove the mistaken position taken by the bishop. Here it is. It is Paul's comfort in distress:

“Therefore, seeing we have this ministry, as we have received mercy, we faint not; but have renounced the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor handling the word of God deceitfully; but, by manifestation of the truth, commending ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God. But if our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost: in whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them. For we preach not ourselves, but Christ Jesus the Lord; and ourselves your servants for Jesus' sake. For God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, *to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.* But we have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellency of the power may be of God, and not of us. We are troubled on every side, yet not distressed; we are perplexed, but not in despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; cast down, but not destroyed; always bearing about in the *body the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in our body.* For we which live are always delivered unto death for Jesus' sake, *that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in our mortal flesh.* So then death worketh in us, but life in you. We having the same spirit of faith, according as it is written, I believed, and therefore have I spoken; we also believe, and therefore speak; *knowing that he which raised up the Lord Jesus shall raise up us also by Jesus, and shall present us with you.* For all things are for your sakes, that the abundant grace might through the thanksgiving of many redound to the glory of God. For which cause

we faint not; but though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day. For our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory; while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal." (2 Cor. iv, 1-18.)

But one conclusion can be arrived at by this lesson, and that is, that Paul was in the face of death, and that such a visitation would not be annihilation, but an introduction to a painless sphere of freedom from persecution. This absence from his brethren will introduce him to "presence with the Lord." He continues this thought in the chapter following:

"For we know that, if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven: if so be that being clothed we shall not be found naked. For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened; not for that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life. Now he that hath wrought us for the selfsame thing is God, who also hath given unto us the earnest of the Spirit. Therefore we are always confident, knowing that, whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord; (for we walk by faith, not by sight:) we are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord. Wherefore we labor, that, whether present or absent, we may be accepted of him. For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad."

But what does this prove in the discussion of the subject, *beyond the grave*? Nothing yet to the bishop's point.

We have Paul in the face of death. For the *present moment* he looks not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen—not at the temporal, but the eternal. They concern him most *in the dying moment*. Dying, he enters the intermediate state, present with the Lord, with glory revealed in him not experienced on earth. But is that all? No. After all this there is to come a realization of his words, if they are words of meaning: “*Knowing that he which raised up the Lord Jesus, shall raise up US also*”—“us”—not that my dying and going to the presence of the Lord is resurrection, but shall “raise up *us* also by Jesus, and shall present *us* with you.” Thus “our mortal bodies” shall be “quicken<sup>d</sup>”—*made alive*—for so the word determines, and with this steadfast hope before us, “*for this cause we faint not.*” Paul says, “I believe” this, and “therefore have I spoken.”

#### SECTION V.

“Are all immortal? Is consciousness uninterrupted? Do all go to the same place and condition? Does the body show in the immortal life? What kind of employment do they have in immortal life? Do we recognize each other in immortal life? These points exhaust the subject. We will take them up in their order.” (“Beyond the Grave,” page 117.)

Some interesting thoughts are suggested in the elucidation of these subjects, but I will say at this point that, as a sermon must necessarily occupy more time and space than the text it will not be possible to follow the order here laid down. I will refer to the same in a general way, endeavoring, however, to come to something better and more satisfactory than indefinite generalizations. The result of the discussion will develop my acceptance of the generally received Christian idea of the questions propounded; that is, (1.) All are immortal. (2.) Consciousness is not interrupted. (3.) All do not go to the same *place*, nor to the

same *state*. (4.) The body does show in the immortal life. (5.) The employment will be that of praise and worship, and aside from these will be such as is suited to the capacities and tastes, all of which will be of a holy type. There will be variety in heaven as on earth. (6.) We will recognize each other in immortal life. Taking for granted the reader's familiarity with the words denoting "soul" and "spirit" to show the distinction between the living immortal object and mere animal life we will conclude a readiness to proceed with the argument.

## SECTION VI.

On pages 120-23 we discover that Rev. George Bush is "the court of ultimate appeal" in proving the true definition of soul, and that we are also referred to this Swedenborgian authority's work on the soul as the only court of appeal. The bishop's argument is largely molded by that court, and he follows largely the same philosophical reasoning. Hence, when we turn to Bush, as advised, we hear him dilating largely about the "poverty of human language," that it was impossible to present a distinct revelation of facts to the human perception—hard to understand where the weakness mostly lies, with God or man or both. Following the same reasoning the bishop dilates largely on the same poverty. He says: "Such is the poverty of language among the Hebrews, and, indeed, among all nations anciently, and such its poverty yet, even among the most learned and highly cultivated people of the globe, that in *most important* matters words have to be carried over into figurative and symbolical uses." Yet we are taught that the acme of perfection is attained at the present, when we approach the perfection of this language of so much "poverty," so-called.

On pages 123-4, Zech. xii, 6; Gen. ii, 7; Num. xvi, 22; Job iv, 18, 19; 2 Cor. xii, 2-4; Eccl. xii, 7; Isa. xxxi, 3; 1 Cor. ii, 11; Rom. viii, 16; 2 Cor. iv, 16;

1 Cor. vi, 20; Job xiv, 22; Job xxxii, 8, are chosen to prove that there is "a fixed and radical distinction between the soul and body." Who denies it, for time or eternity?

A second class of passages are made to serve in the argument, and present death as a catastrophe: Job xiv, 10-12; Psa. cxv, 17; Eccl. ix, 4-6; Eccl. iii, 18-20; Isa. xxxviii, 17, 18; Psa. xxxvii, 9, 10; Psa. vi, 4, 5. I have made allusion to the wrong appropriation of Scripture. In the numerous references made at this point, we have a most astounding illustration of the same practice. Certainly if moderators were before us in this discussion, the bishop would be called to order, and his memory refreshed as to the subject of debate. Up to this point the reader has almost wearied with the constant statement of "man a spirit," "body and soul *distinct*;" "spirit is person, the essential man;" body materiality, soul immateriality, etc; but what of it all? We were promised something from "*beyond* the grave;" not this side of it, nor at it, but *beyond* it. The argument so far keeps us on the time side, or hovering at the grave, but has yet failed to take us beyond, save as it does it inferentially. We want more than an inferential idea. We want positive proof. This has been essayed in the passages chosen. Let us see how well they do it, or, rather, how well they do not do it. There is not time or space to take up each one, but we will examine the most important, assuring the reader that the others corroborate our interpretation.

One thing I had hoped, and that is, that, where the bishop's "rational deductions" ruled out the "cherished doctrine" of the resurrection of the *body*, when he came to "the court of ultimate appeal," the Holy Scriptures, I would find him on the side of Bible teaching; but I am mistaken. The Bible throughout must be forced to serve his idea of bodiless, formless souls in eternity, or it is "fundamentally false."

Will the passages of his own selection serve his pur-

pose? Let us see. Take the first. If the point he contends for is the simple proposition that the *soul* is not the *body*, and the *body* is not the *soul*, they will serve his purpose. But with reference to *beyond the grave*, the subject of discussion, how do they apply? They do not settle anything save to establish our faith in the "cherished doctrine" of the resurrection of the *body* and everlasting life *after death*.

(1.) The first passage reads: "The burden of the Word of the Lord for Israel, saith the Lord, which stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundation of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him." Now here is a reference to the *formation* of man, and not man's restoration *beyond the grave*. That the point he desires to make is "*distinction* between the *body* and *spirit*" is obvious, still this is contending for a truism. Unless it can be established by the same texts that they deny the resurrection of the body and its future permanence beyond the grave, it is simply a waste of space and time to intrude them in the discussion, for it is on *beyond the grave* that we seek light. The other quotations are just as foreign to the point as the one given.

(2.) "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul." There is nothing in this of *beyond the grave*.

(3.) "And they fell upon their faces, and said, O God, the God of the spirits of all flesh, shall one man sin, and wilt thou be wroth with all the congregation?" We find nothing in this that conflicts with future immortality.

(4.) "Behold, he put no trust in his servants; and his angels he charged with folly: how much less in them that dwell in houses of clay, whose foundation is in the dust, which are crushed before the moth?" Still we are not carried, in the argument, *beyond the grave*.

(5.) "I knew a man in Christ above fourteen years



ago, whether in the body I can not tell, or whether out of the body I can not tell; God knoweth: such a one caught up to the third heaven. And I knew such a man, whether in the body, or out of the body, I can not tell: God knoweth: How that he was caught up into paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter." What this passage is designed to prove I am at a loss to know. Aside from the general admission of the distinctness of body and soul, it proves nothing on that point. The "man in Christ" was evidently Paul himself. There is no settled opinion as to whether he was in or out of the body. God only knew. The presumptive evidence is, that it was a trance, in which the man in his body forms but indefinite ideas of the things beheld. So Paul's "I can not tell" sounds much like Peter's "wist not what he said" on the Mount of Transfiguration. It compares well with the ignorance of Paul as to duty on the occasion of his arrest on the way to Damascus. If it proves any thing it proves this, that to mortals still in the flesh there has been vouchsafed a manifestation of the heavenly state, but that in their earth-sphere it was utterly impossible for them to analyze it, to define it. The *fact* of its glory they knew, but beyond that they did not pretend to go. Paul goes no further in this connection than to state the *facts*. As to a separation of soul and body on that occasion Paul did not know; he only said, "God knoweth." That is as definite as a mortal can be without divine aid. God has given us the aid. We will use it.

(6.) "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it." But this is the finale of man's earthly career. For proof, see the sublimely beautiful but solemn proof in the whole chapter preceding the verse. (Eccl. xii.) It is to man's dying that reference is made, and not *beyond the grave*.

(7.) "Now the Egyptians are men, and not God; and their horses flesh, and not spirit. When the Lord shall

stretch out his hand, both he that helpeth shall fall, and he that is holpen shall fall down, and they all shall fail together." Just as foreign to the subject.

(8.) "For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God." Foreign to the discussion.

(9.) "The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God." Also foreign to the subject.

(10.) "For which cause we faint not; but though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." This, too, may prove, and does, the separateness of body and soul; but we long for Scriptures that will throw light upon the subject of *beyond the grave*. The reader can determine for himself whether the logic is satisfactorily definite to conclude that because soul and body are distinct that that distinction argues their eternal separation.

Without wearying the patience of any one by lengthy arguments, I will make the statement that the use of second class passages chosen to prove death a calamity is to be swept into the same waste of thought, and disposed of accordingly. Let us pay a passing moment of attention to the use made of the passage, "Therefore we are always confident, knowing that while we are at home in the body we are absent from the Lord (for we walk by faith and not by sight)," etc. This is selected to prove the separate possible and conscious existence of the soul after death. This we admit. But it will not serve the bishop's purpose of an exclusive spiritual existence in the future state. The best disposition that any one can make of it is that at death the soul goes to God; but it goes with the firm expectation or expressed hope of reunion of soul and body in verses 13, 14: "I believed, and therefore have I spoken; we also believe, and therefore speak; *knowing* that he which raised up the Lord Jesus shall raise up us also by Jesus, and

shall present us with you." The bishop claims for the use he makes of the quotation that "a more beautiful statement of the doctrine of the spirit's survivance of the body, and its advanced bliss and consciousness, could scarcely be put in language;" but again and again we protest that it falls short. The passage, of course, gets the body into the grave (the soul never goes there, and in that sense is always beyond it); but what of the *body* beyond the grave? There is a "beyond the grave" for the body—what of that? Thus on page 144 we are compelled to acknowledge that the passages quoted have no reference to that state of the dual man *positively beyond* the grave.

## SECTION VII.

"Is it probable that the spirits of men are wholly made of organism during their existence in the intermediate state? There is not a word of information on the subject." ("Beyond the Grave," page 144.)

Is there any information as to the *form* or organism of the spirit here? There is none needed. It is presumable that, if the Scriptures throw any light upon the subject, it is in favor of both form and organism. This subject will be treated in another chapter, in connection with the resurrection body.

On page 145 we are asked, "Where do spirits dwell in the interval?" and answered, "It is *unknown*." He continues: "Whether their *ad interim* location or their eternal dwelling-place is about us, or in some other region, we have no means of absolutely determining. Many imagine that the case is plainly set forth in revelation. We are quite sure they are mistaken."

If the statement refers to an impossibility to locate heaven as you would the sun, then do I concede such impossibility. But if the Scripture statements are to be taken for truth, they tell us plainly of the *place*, and *where* it is *located*, not in relation to the sun and other planets, but in

relation to God. But God is everywhere, it may be said, and consequently everywhere is heaven. No. The risen, glorified body of Christ has ascended to a "*place*," and a *body* supposes place. Where Christ is, in his bodily presence, is heaven. (See "Heaven viewed under a Local Aspect"—*Mercersburg Review*, April, 1871; Lancaster, Pennsylvania.)

But the mode of our immortality is mystified by the peculiar turn of the argument taken by the bishop on page 147. He says: "In the change we lose our earthly bodies, and *all* conditions of the life we lived in them, which we have outgrown, the ends of which have been served. *We are born into new conditions, with a physical body, of some kind, which as imperceptibly develops while we live as the body of the child unconsciously grew in the womb.*"

I confess that to me this is a new revelation. I aver that it is not a new translation, but a veritably new revelation. It is understood that the argument is now a Scriptural one. If the point had been made that we have physical bodies in the resurrection state, but not the bodies that died, but new bodies, and the text says, "Clothed upon with our house which is from heaven," I could see how it were plausible for the assumption to be made, by thus applying this passage, though its true reference is to the same body that dies only under other conditions and phenomena. But here we have the plain statement of two material bodies (logically occupied by the one soul), born out of one (at death) into the other, "*which as imperceptibly develops while we live as the body of a child unconsciously grew in the womb.*"

The language is very indistinct. It may be that it is not meant that this physical body, extraordinary and imperceptible, was a companion in growth with the physical body which dies, but that at death we drop the earthly physical, "*and all conditions of life,*" in it, and are ushered into *another* physical body. We are told that in the

future state "we have a physical body of some kind," but that, in particular, it is *not* the body which *dies*. This is my difficulty—if I determine the argument by Scripture I fail to find the Scripture for it. In examination of young ministers on Bible doctrines, for orders, we ask a question, and his answer must be accompanied with Scripture text for proof. I ask it here, to corroborate the bishop's statement. It is not forthcoming; and while he attempts a Scriptural argument it is with the *text* left out. This position has already been hinted at. First, we are told that our bodies which *die* will not rise. But next we are told that we will have "physical bodies of some kind." Now, I aver that this will change the language of Scripture from that of *resurrection* to that of *substitution*; for if bodies which *die* are not represented in Scripture as the very bodies that are raised again, then have I read in vain. I positively affirm that the Scriptures in the original tongue, Hebrew and Greek, read that way—that the *body* which *dies* is the *body* which is raised from the dead. There is but one door of escape from this position, and our enemies assume to make it such; that is, "the *poverty* of language" is such originally and now, that it seemed, and now seems, impossible to read otherwise.

Again, if it is not the same body it is another body; and if another body, it is, in addition to its character as a substitute, a new *created* body, if gotten up for the occasion. But that position would destroy the almost omnipresent New Testament term, *resurrection*, and would read *creation* instead of *resurrection*. The more a man drifts from the common-sense interpretation of the Scriptures the more he multiplies difficulties.

The Scripture definition of *death* as applied to the body is plain. It is the going out of the soul from the body. The Scripture definition of the *resurrection* is just as plain. It is the returning of that soul into its original companion, the body. The prophet was called to raise the dead child

to life. He prayed, "O Lord, my God, I pray thee, let *this* child's *soul* come into *him* again. And the soul of the child returned into him again, and he revived." The child *was dead*. The going out of the soul from the body constituted that death. The return of that soul into the body constituted its resurrection. Cases could be multiplied illustrative of this thought. The same applies in the New Testament instances. Take the case of Lazarus. It applies there, "I know *he*, the *dead body* of my brother, shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day." The conversation of Christ with the two sisters of Lazarus was of the most deceptive character if it did not teach the resurrection of the body—"at the last day." It was the brother that *died* bodily, that to them rendered life extinct, and nothing short of a restoration of the *body* from the *dead* would meet the demands of their sorrow. This demand was met then and there. But there stands that reference to a future resurrection of that same body—they believed in it—the Jews believed in it; and it is a strong presumptive argument which amounts to a positive proof of the doctrine that Christ encouraged their faith in it; and if they were deceived by the "cherished faith" of the Jews into the belief of a false doctrine, the blessed Son of God left them in full possession of the deception, his whole tenor of teaching on that subject confirming that deception rather than removing it. This is the simple definition of death and the resurrection from the Scripture stand-point.

Another question arrises: Where is the soul on its immergeance from the body—where does it go?

Christ said: "Father, into *thy hands* I commit my spirit." Was his prayer answered? We believe it was. Then the question is answered. So the thief's spirit was in the same *place*. But where is paradise? Paradise is heaven—the hands of the Father, if Christ went there. Paradise alludes to *state* rather than *place*. The *place* was

God's hands, the *state* was paradise. Thus Stephen saw *heaven* open, and saw the Son of man standing on the right hand of God in the open heaven—he saw into the heavenly state and place—and said, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." Without multiplication of Scripture texts these will suffice.

But are they conscious? Yes. The case of the rich man and Lazarus proves them conscious. The souls of them that were slain for the Word of God and before the altar prove them conscious. The "redeemed from among men," as they raise their songs with the multitudes of heavenly hosts "*before the throne*," prove the future consciousness of soul after death. We have every reason for consciousness of soul after it leaves the body, from the words: "I heard a voice *from heaven* saying unto me, Write, From henceforth blessed are the dead who die in the Lord; even so, saith the Spirit, for they rest from their labors."

But as the province of this argument has to do with the future immortality of the *body*, I prefer not to be diverted from this specific point, and leave the specific subject of the soul's immortality and future consciousness and superior activity to other pens, as an accepted truth. My purpose is to see if the darkness of the grave is so impenetrable to Omnipotence that no ray of immortality can reach the sleeping dust, but that it must ever remain the unsightly mass and wreck that sin and Satan made it. Is it not to be snatched from the destroyer? or is its ruin complete? I believe Christ has outflanked this enemy—the Captain of our salvation has reached beyond the lines of our foe, and with the voice of a trump and the shout of the angel commissioned with omnipotence the foe is to be put to flight, and we come forth with the shout, "O grave, where is thy victory; O death, where is thy sting," etc. To the contemplation of this theme let us return, and follow it up as the line of argument may indicate in this review.



## SECTION VIII.

"The third point, Do we possess bodies in the immortal life? if so, what kind of bodies? This is a question about which a vast obscurity gathers, and yet which many seem to imagine is set forth with unusual fullness and plainness in the holy Revelation. The intimation even of possible difference of view or dissent is accounted heresy. There is unbecoming impatience and even intolerance of discussion. Nothing could be more unwise or more unfortunate for the interests of truth." ("Beyond the Grave," page 150.)

The last sentences sound very much as if some one anticipated martyrdom. Though conversant with the discussion on immortality, I have not yet heard of any one in the past burned at the stake as a heretic simply because he denied that we had bodies in the spirit world. I do not know of the charge of heresy against any one of that school. There are two sides to this question of "heresy" and "intolerance" that we have not time to discuss.

In this country people have attached such a value to doctrines (as they should) as to consider them of such vital importance to themselves as individuals that organic union has been based upon them, calling themselves Churches. Communities of beliefs have thus arisen. The variety is beneficial. Christian charity does not consist in all believing the same thing, nor that we should belong to the same organic union, nor that we should tolerate dissension or discord of doctrine within that union. The union is supposed to belong to those who do see alike, and those to the contrary belong to some other union that believes as they do. Then charity comes in to make possible the crossing of the chasm with the spirit of tolerance and love.

Certain liberalistically disposed gentlemen of the clerical cloth (with liberalism left out), essaying to teach a

better way, cut right and left with immense vehemence, with no regard for the scholarship of the ages, and proposing a general earthquake of revolution and reform, seem disposed to run away with the whole Church and its "cherished beliefs." But when they are striking their heaviest blow and commanding the ecclesiastical sun or moon to stand still while they overthrow its Jericho of error, lo! just when they look for the miracle, both sun and moon move steadily on, and the Jericho proves to be a Mount Zion, the "Hill of the Lord," forth from which goes the word to bless the nations. But in the midst of their bellying and pawing of dust, and vehement gorings and buttings and frothing, a ring is put in their nose, a hook in their jaw simply to lead them out where their harm will be less, then it becomes fashionable for the mad bulls of Bashan to sit back on their haunches and in a subdued and guttural tone give out the pitiful wail, "Unbecoming impatience . . . and intolerance of discussion." With me it is a question whether it is charity or softness and needless indulgence that the Church should be indifferent to such error. Certainly there is more tolerance in the Church, more charity, more forbearance, more of every thing that is good and consistent, than in those men who, if honest and really thinking they can serve truth, can serve it elsewhere just as well and better than remaining in a fold whose very faith and existence they antagonize, and whose only benefit they seek is the green pastures, position, honor, and emolument afforded them. They would eat the pasture and burn the stubble with unquenchable fire. Look to these men for intolerance and not to the Church. Or they are the restless babes that repose their head upon the mother's bosom, and draw from that breast their life-nourishment, and afterward spit it in her face and strike the breast that fed them. You may call this intolerance if you will, but I hold, and the position is every-

where ocularly demonstrated, that the most consummate illiberalism, intolerant, uncharitable, unscientific, unreasonable, and most exclusive spirit of this age is sailing under a pretentious banner on which is inscribed in pretentious coloring, *Liberalism*.

"It is neither profitable nor Christian to refuse candid discussion," says the bishop. So say we. So says the Church. That it is otherwise is a false implication. Truth can be discussed better with an enemy of truth outside of the fold than within. "The gates of hell shall not prevail against" truth. It is a fact that no weapon formed against the Church has prospered, and every tongue that has risen in judgment against truth has been condemned. But this success was against the foe without. There is no protection against a foe within.

"Vain is the guard, the seal,  
If treason opes the gate."

Christ withstood lawyers, doctors, Sadducees, Scribes, Pharisees, priests, and rulers, but when a disciple turned against him he had to die. Judas may have thought that the constant victories of Christ previous to this trial assured his triumph now, and he would presume upon it and make a little money. Even had this been possible, the sequel, as well as reason, shows that no man should put in jeopardy the truth. I say that truth can be served best by refusing to tolerate treason within and by an honest open field fight with honorable weapons with the enemy without. If I combat Unitarianism, Swedenborgianism, or Universalism, I want to do it with such, but I confess an inner distrust of any man who will be in heart the embodiment of these, and yet step forth before the world in the robes of orthodoxy. It is very fashionable for liberalists, falsely so called, to cry all sorts of things when they have failed to win the world of mankind to their way of thinking.

I assert that this whole procedure is not so much a question of Christian tolerance as it is of Christian consistency. Tolerance is a curious term.

“*Vice* is a monster of such frightful mien,  
That, to be *hated* needs but to be seen.  
But seen too oft, familiar with its face,  
We first endure, then pity, then embrace.”

The same may be said of error, and this we are asked to do in a foolish use of the word tolerance. I understand that Christianity teaches consistency of truth, and not tolerance of error. I believe in religious and ecclesiastical consistency. Any kind or degree of tolerance can not justify inconsistency. Put a faithful orthodox preacher in a so-called “liberalistic” pulpit, and he will soon demonstrate that “tolerance” is only a farce in certain quarters. But to return to the argument.

“*Do we possess bodies in the immortal life? and, if so, what kind of bodies?*”

The argument is Scriptural. By this we understand that the Scriptures constitute “the court of ultimate appeal,” and their decision is final. So be it.

“In the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels.” (Matt. xxii, 30.)

Luke says (xx, 36): “Neither can *they die* any more; for they are equal unto the angels; and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection.”

At this point it may be suggested that in unison with the future angelic *body* specific reference is made to the body that *died*, and that a part of the complete heirship to heaven is stated to be the fact of its *resurrection*. But I can not enlarge upon this thought. I suggest it, the reader may follow up its suggestions. Compare it carefully with the subject under consideration and in controversy between Christ and the Sadducees, and the argument is conclusive.

The best answer that Christ could give is contained in

this narrative; and it is clearly to be seen by the preponderance of testimony, that with reference to the resurrection of the *body*, on which side our bishop is found, Christ or Sadducee. But have we bodies? Yes; if we are to be equal unto the angels. But have angels bodies? Yes, most assuredly, if the Scriptures constitute "the court of ultimate appeal" on this subject. Perhaps it would be well to ask, preliminary to this, *Who the angels are?* Professor H. Louis Baugher tells us that "they are not emanations from God—the *ÆONS* of the Persian philosophy—but *created* beings, the highest in rank known to us. Both reason and revelation refer us back to only one uncreated, self-existent being—God. To him, in the person of Christ, is ascribed the creation of every thing else. 'For by him were all things created, that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones or dominions or principalities or powers.' (Col. i, 16.) Of course, this includes the angels, for they belong to the 'invisible' 'things that are in heaven,' and the terms 'thrones, dominions,' etc., can refer to nothing else than the different order of angels.

"The angels are not a *race*, descended one from another, like man. (Luke xx, 36.) So far as we know, each one is an immediate creation of God. The priority of their creation is affirmed by Jehovah in an address to Job (xxxviii, 7), in which he calls them 'morning stars' and 'sons of God,' and represents them as singing together for joy at the laying of the foundations of the earth.

"Angels are *spiritual* beings—that is, NOT SENSUAL; and here the question arises, *Have they bodies?* 'Tis certain that they have appeared to men in *bodily* shape, and in *human* form. They are represented as having hands and feet and a countenance; as standing, sitting, coming, and going in an ordinary way, as eating, drinking, singing, etc. The angels that appeared to Abraham and Lot are thus spoken of (Gen. xviii, 19): 'Lo, *three men* stood

by him [that is, Abraham]; and when he saw them he *ran to meet them*, . . . and said, Let a little water be fetched, and *wash your feet and rest yourselves under the tree*. . . . And *they did eat* of the repast provided for them. 'And the *men* rose up and looked toward Sodom, and Abraham *went with them*, to bring them on the way.' So Lot, when he saw the angels, *as men*, coming to Sodom, 'rose up to meet them,' and tendered them the hospitalities of his house, which, when they refused, 'he pressed upon them greatly,' till they complied, and went into his house and *ate of the feast* which Lot prepared. When Lot went out to reason with the Sodomites, who had gathered about his door to offer violence to the strangers, it is said of the angels, 'And the *men* put forth *their hand* and pulled Lot into the house to them;' and, afterwards, when he lingered in the city devoted to destruction, 'the *men* laid hold *upon his hand*, and upon the hand of his wife, and upon the hand of his two daughters,' and brought them forth.

"So Gideon (Judges vi, 11) saw an angel of the Lord *sitting under an oak with a staff in his hand*, and having altogether the appearance of a man, so that Gideon at first thought him to be no more than a prophet.

"Another very interesting account of the appearance of an angel to Manoah's wife (Samson's mother) is contained in Judges xiii. From it we gather that, though the countenance of the man was so striking as to make her think of 'an angel of God,' yet neither she nor her husband had any suspicion that this was really such a being until he had departed. They, however, were anxious to show him hospitality; they made ready a feast for his refreshment, asked his name, spoke of him as merely a man, '*a man of God*,' and treated him as such. Let it be observed, too, that when the angel appeared a second time, in answer to Manoah's prayer to let him come again, his wife *recognized him as the same person* that had appeared to her

before; thus teaching us that the angel had features of countenance which remained the same. So astonished was Manoah, when he found that this, whom he took for a fellow-mortal, was a real *angel*, that he was alarmed lest he should die.

"Daniel (viii, 15, *et seq.*), speaking of Gabriel, and knowing that he was an angel, describes him as 'the appearance of a man,' calls him '*the man* Gabriel,' and speaks of his *touching* him. Of a second appearance of the same messenger he says, 'The *man* Gabriel, whom I had seen in the vision at the beginning, . . . touched me,' etc.; from which again we infer that Daniel *recognized* in the angel *the same features* as at first.

"The angels at the tomb of the risen Savior are described as *young men* in white or shining *garments* (Mark xvi, 5; Luke xxiv, 4); and so of those that appeared at Christ's ascension (Acts i, 10).

"By these Scripture statements we are assured that angels *have bodies*, and that these were like human bodies. Yet still the question remains unanswered whether they are, *by nature, embodied* spirits. For it may be, on the occasions referred to, their form and appearance were *assumed* only for the time being. Still we ask, *Have angels bodies?*"

Bush and Foster can get away with the answer very easily. They can say that they have not; they are only *appearances*, and not bodies. But our authority adds:

"Our conclusion will be aided by considering what is said of the resurrection body of believers, and of Christ's glorified body. (See 1 Cor. xv.) 'There is a *natural* body,' we are told, 'and there is a *spiritual* body; howbeit, that is not *first* which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and *afterward* that which is spiritual.'

"The body that is laid in the grave is natural and corruptible; that which is *raised* from it is *spiritual* and *incorruptible*. They who are alive at the coming of Christ



shall not *die*, nor can we believe they will lose or part with their bodies, but, as the apostle expresses it, 'we shall be *changed*;' alike in the case of the living and the dead, 'this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality.' Now, all that is corruptible and mortal in man is his *body*. This body, then, plainly must undergo a wonderful change, yet remain a *body* still. Christ, answering the Sadducean objectors to the resurrection, says (Luke xx, 35): 'They which shall be accounted worthy to obtain *that* world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage; neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels; and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection.' Now, the point in dispute here was concerning the *body*; and when Christ says of the resurrected saints that they shall be equal unto—or, as it perhaps is better translated, 'like unto' the angels—the manifest interpretation is that they shall be like them in *body*; hence we must infer that the angels have bodies, to which the raised bodies of believers may be likened. In this connection it is interesting to notice that Christ gives to 'the children of the resurrection' the very same name that Jehovah, in the beginning, gave to the angels, namely: 'SONS OF GOD.'

"Here, then, our question is answered. Yet we may gain some further light from our knowledge of the Savior's glorified body. We know that he arose with the same body that was crucified (John xx, 20, 27), and with that body he ascended, and is now seated at the right hand of God. The properties of Christ's risen body were superior to those possessed by him before death. Thus, walls and barred doors were no hinderance to its motion; the Savior's rising body experienced *no* hinderance from the stone walls of the sepulcher; *he* had no need to have the stone rolled away from the door of the sepulcher, nor, afterwards, was he impeded by the closed doors of the room where the disciples were assembled; suddenly he appeared in their

midst, and as quickly 'vanishes out of their sight.' (Luke xxiv, 31; John xx, 19, 26.) Whilst the disciples were standing around him, all at once he rose, unrestrained by the power of gravitation, and ascended till he was out of sight. (Acts i, 9-11.) May we not conclude that such are some of the powers belonging to risen and glorified bodies, and have we not here some clew as to the nature of angelic bodies? From Gideon and Manoah the angels ascended in a similar way, in their very sight; and to Peter, shut up in prison walls, the angel of the Lord came in unhindered by obstacles made for the very purpose of debarring ordinary bodies. (Acts xii.) When Christ shall appear, 'we shall be *like him*;' he will 'change our vile *body* that it may be *fashioned like unto his glorious body*.' (Phil. iii, 21; 1 John iii, 2.) Speaking of Adam and Christ as our prototypes, the apostle says: 'As we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly.' These things taken in connection with the Savior's statement, that after the resurrection the saints shall be *as* or *like unto* the angels, are instructive lessons, both to our own future condition and as to the present state of the angels. From all which preceding statements we conclude that angels are the highest order of created beings, pure spirits, yet possessed of glorious *bodies*, which, however their properties may differ from and surpass any bodies with which we have acquaintance, are nevertheless truly and properly called *bodies*."

When we are asked, "Do they possess bodies in immortal life, and if so, what kind of bodies?" I think the question answered satisfactorily. The Scriptures above quoted throughout this excellent authority prove this. The only way to rid one's self from the above conclusion is to *Bush* the theory with the assumption that they were only appearances for the occasion and adapted to our sense. This is indicated in the theory we are debating. Applied to Christ's appearance to his disciples beyond the grave, Professor

Bush assumes that this was all there was of it—an *appearance* without reality.

Mr. Bush says: "The phenomena indicating a material body to the senses of the disciples must have been *assumed*. In other words, they *were mere appearances*," "a miraculous adaptation of the visible phenomena to the outward senses of the disciples." He further tells us, in substance, that Christ designed that his disciples should believe his *body* rose from the *dead*, and they must make the people believe the same thing; but that it did not, but only put on an appearance of it. When the soldiers were hired to say that they (the disciples) came while they (the soldiers) slept and stole that body away, was that a greater falsehood than this in which Professor Bush would make the Master impose on his disciples, and through them upon the people? Does the success of the Gospel depend upon its author playing the rôle of a hypocrite, and his disciples ignorant imposers of a falsehood on the people? The climax of this whole theory is reached when we are told by the same man that the purposes of the Gospel to be obtained justify this fraud—"the end sanctifies the means!" Away with this farce, and shame on the man who would incorporate the theological swindle in his Gospel.

#### SECTION IX.

"Nothing is more certain than that Jesus taught, as one of the cardinal truths, the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. . . . But that wherein the resurrection of the dead consists has never been formulated by any authority on earth, and perhaps never will be, and is not of the substance of faith. It is among the questions about which good men may disagree. Some will attain to more, some will hold less, intelligent views. Some will be enslaved by the letter of a text, other some will be more anxious to grasp the spirit of revelation." ("Beyond the Grave," page 151.)

"Enslaved by the *letter* of a text." What does that mean? Does it mean that the "letter of a text" of revelation, and "the spirit of revelation" which others grasp, are not one—a unit on this subject? If by this expression is meant a preference to give a literal rendering to a figurative text, then we understand it, and we would accept the "*spirit* of revelation" instead. But do not *Bush* the argument, and say that "the *letter* of a text" of "revelation" says one thing on the resurrection, and at the same time means another. Besides, the *spirit* of a thing so called, may be simply a reflection of the man's own wish in the matter, and the *wish* may be father to both *spirit* and *letter* of the interpretation. Is there not a greater probability and possibility, too, that there is greater safety in being "*enslaved* by the letter of a text," than to let imagination have such play, and every man's secret wish be construed into the spirit of revelation? I fear this admission on page 151: "I have some *favorite conjectures*, in which *I find great satisfaction*, which, if I did not know they were *mere dreams*, I would like to state." "Favorite conjectures" that "are mere dreams," known to be such, and yet of "great satisfaction."

Page 151 continued: "Before we proceed to state and examine theories of the resurrection, it may be wise to correct some misleading conceptions. Chief among these is the groundless imagination that man was designed to be immortal as he is; that but for sin he would have remained forever in the body with which he was at first invested a deathless earthly man."\*

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\* "*A deathless earthly man.*" This sentence needs division. As it is, it is a misrepresentation. I believe that it is not held by Christian divines generally that man would continue a "deathless earthly man," but that he was destined to pass into higher states of glorification though he had not died. This may be called his glorification in contradistinction to his first earthly condition. But it is generally held that he was deathless, and without dying, would have passed into his glorification. But this

In the present argument it is agreed upon, that the Scriptures shall be the court of appeal. For the present we are within the domain of revealed truth. To the bishop we say, Give us a text of revelation, a real genuine proof-text. But we are told that we are not to be "*enslaved* by the letter of a text." Then give us "*the spirit* of revelation." But I am afraid it can not be "*proved* to be such." How will you prove it? By the "*letter*." But the "*letter*" is not to enslave us, and, more, it is here found to be absent. It is now certain that we are requested to accept in substance the Swedenborgian idea of immortality with slight modifications. I shall insist on our agreement that the Scriptures constitute the court of appeal. Therefore I demand, Give us a proof-text. You'll not be a tithe the "*slave*" you are if you will come into the freedom of revelation.

#### SECTION X.

"It is easy to see how this imagination" (of the penal idea of death), "would become misleading in any attempt to conceive or formulate the doctrine of the resurrection." ("*Beyond the Grave*," page 152.)

There would have been no need of a formulation of the doctrine had man not sinned—no need of the doctrine just as we have it now.

But with the bishop's spirit idea it is impossible now to formulate the doctrine. It is because of sin and death and the resurrection of the *body* that we have an inspired formulation of it. I am a willing "*slave*" to the "*text*"

would not have involved the destruction of man as he is, but the carrying of the whole man with dual nature into the higher state. This process was intercepted by sin. The resurrection being the final overthrow of the total effects of sin which produced mortality, will introduce man to that glorified state designed from the beginning as his inheritance. At least this is the strong inferential doctrine of the Scriptures. It relates to the entire man—soul and body.

of Scripture on this subject, not because I do not think for myself, but because it commends itself to my judgment, sense, reason. My "imagination" is reduced to a *fact*—the "text" enslaves me.

## SECTION XI.

"It may be possibly true, that *natural* death to man is somehow the result of sin. But if true, it is certainly an exceptional case." ("Beyond the Grave," page 152.)

Here is another instance of the indefinite character of the argument, that renders it difficult to understand. To this I alluded in the former part of the argument. But it is patent that the bishop does not accept the doctrine of death as a penalty. He simply says that it "may be"—but *if* so "it is an exceptional case," and then proceeds with the argument as if man was *not* an "exceptional case." On page 153 he adds: "Death, then, among early races, is natural, corporate in the original plan of creation." If "races" were not used here, but some term recognizing the "exceptional" character of man, then would it appear better, more in the order of original design and not confounding the moral creature, man, with the irrational animal kingdom. It is a subtle term that indicates the writer's sentiment of the non-exceptionality of man.

As if one step too far had been taken he calls a halt—but does not recede—and says: (page 153) "We do not assert that this ['death corporate in the original plan of creation'] is true of man." Well, what does he assert? Hear it, and see if the whole assumption is not self-contradictory: "We do assert this, that he was not originally intended to remain in a body like that given him in creation."\* Compare the remark (152), "It may be possibly

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\*This remark has been answered. There is a sense in which I accept the statement, and that sense has been explained on a previous page. But I do not accept the bishop's sense

true, that natural death to man is somehow the result of sin," with the statement just made, and it will eventuate the conclusion: If death (somehow) was possibly in consequence of sin, and that it was not originally *intended* that man should remain in his natural body, the transgression was ("somehow") designed. Or if not designed, then if death was in consequence of it, it follows that man's mortality was not designed. If the mortality was designed, how can any one escape the conclusion that the means (sin) leading thereto was not also designed? This logic makes God the author of sin.

Page 153 continued. Difficulty multiplies. "Had he not sinned, and so become subject to death, he would, nevertheless, in some method, have been delivered from his earthly body. Then, we are not to reason from his earthly body to the resurrection body. If, under the *original plan*, he would in time have put on a new body, unlike the present in its wants, and uses, and substances, so, we infer, will it be in the resurrection." There is no intimation of "deliverance *from*" his earthly, sinless body, but glorification *in* it. "*Deliverance*" *from* it is not intimated in the whole New Testament Scriptures, but from the *bondage of its corruption*. This deliverance from the *bondage of corruption* positively teaches incorruptibility in the resurrection. No one can say that the Bible teaches that we will be delivered from our *body*.

Will the bishop give us the shadow of a proof from philosophy, reason, science, revelation, or any thing in heaven or on earth or under the earth that his "*original plan*" has any existence anywhere outside of a fruitful that he conveys. He says that "we do assert this, that man was not originally intended to remain in a body *like* that given him at creation." So we say; but the bishop's idea is, that the body man is to have is a new body—a substitution, while we believe that it is the same body in which man *dies*, under other and more glorious conditions. Let us not be confused at this point.



imagination? an imagination I take the liberty, in return for like compliments, to call "groundless." As we have agreed that we are now on Scripture ground, I request a proof text. What do we conclude? Simply this, that an imaginary theory is laboriously set up, a multitude of props are placed around and beneath it, and these props are festooned with beautiful verbal ribbons of various hues—numerous in coloring as those at a national anniversary; and after this scaffolding, ribboning, and lacing, he stands out on a little eminence before a curious multitude, more curious to see his show and thus address them, "If, under the *original plan* [some one may cry out, 'What plan?' 'Whose?' 'When?' 'Where?' 'How?' and he with baton in hand and vehement mien nods, 'To this plan'—alluding to his self-constituted structure] he would in time have put on a new body, unlike the present in its wants, and uses, and substances, so, we may infer, will it be in the resurrection?"

We shall not walk into the apartments of such logic. There is nothing there. It is only a man standing on the outside of something, trying to make people believe there is something within worth seeing. It is a sham show. Beware of pickpockets. If there was any reality in such a thing as the bishop's "*original plan*," what a pity that it is like Darwin's "*original plan*," that the "*missing link*" is gone. It so confuses our conclusions.

He adds, "It may be important that the subject of *identity* should be elucidated." Just what we need exactly. If now, we could "*identify*" the "*particles*" of the "*original plan*," it would be a matter of vast importance, compared to any thing in "*revelation*," for the "*original plan*" must go far back of it. We ask for the missing link.

Bishop Kingsley's views were the opposite of those of Bishop Foster. He says: "That although the body is now mortal, it was not originally so, *but has become so by*

transgression. *The body, which has become mortal in consequence of sin, shall be raised again to life and made immortal, through the atonement of Christ.*" The position of Bishop Foster is one of assumption only, without the mote of a proof, and still he asks us to reason our conclusions from this proofless stand-point.

## SECTION XII.

"Identity can not be predicated of the human body, as to its substance, any two moments of time." ("Beyond the Grave," page 154.)

This is based upon the usual theory that the body is not the same body to-day that it was seven years ago, but the point is ruled out of the argument, on Scriptural ground, that it specifically stated that it is *the body that dies*, and not the one of seven years ago. I think the argument is fully met on a previous page, and the reader will do well to refresh the memory by reference to it. The usual argument is presented that in the immortal world a man will not need a stomach, and that will be taken away; as he is not going to perform physical labor, he will not want ligaments, bones, muscle, etc., will not need blood, and the blood-vessels will be absent—all will be eliminated. "There is nothing in the divine teaching contrary to this view; and much, by fair inference, in its support." So says the bishop. Well, since reference is made to the "divine teaching," give us a text, inferentially or otherwise, in support. It is not forthcoming. If it is our *body* that will rise—a literal resurrection—its life may be possibly by miraculous support in the future state. The spiritualization extends to the whole body, the glorification will extend to the entire man, and I think no surgical operation will be performed, by which stomach, heart, liver, bowels, etc., will be removed, but that the immortal life and glorification will extend to every drop of blood, nerve, fiber, etc., of man's being. There is to be no subtraction but

of its elements of mortality. There will be no hunger; but it is not stated that it will be thus with man because he has no stomach, but rather because the supply of food appropriate to immortals will ever be abundant. There will be no more pain nor sickness, not because there are no *bodies*, but because of the absence of the causes.

Let it be remembered that the eternal health, freedom from pain and sickness, sorrow and crying, in heaven, are not attributed to the difference in the bodily organism, but in every instance to the character and state of the heavenly country. For instance, there will be no more death, but it is because

“Sin, the source of mortal woe,  
Can never enter there.”

The bishop says: “There is abundant reason to suppose, that while all these grosser functions will cease,” etc. But where are the *reasons*, and *what* are they? That the “grosser” elements of our “functions” which require the “grosser” element or the grocer’s goods to feed, all concede “will cease,” but that the “functions” proper will disappear, there is not a single word of proof, but stark assumption and “groundless imagination.”

But it is not a resurrection into the old order of things, as page 157 would force us to believe if a bodily resurrection, but into a new and glorified state.

On page 154 the position is taken that the resurrection is predicated of the *person*, and not of the body. This we have answered.

On page 176 he holds as one of the propositions which the New Testament is responsible for, the following: “Resurrection is a predicate of those *who*, rather than that *which*, dies; all the dead shall be raised into life again.”

This is a curious statement. Its consistency with the facts in the case is impossible. “*Who*” dies. But “*who*” according to the argument, does not die. The “*person*” is the predicate of the resurrection—so says the bishop; but

the “*person*” never *dies*. “Physical bodies, of some kind, they will have” in the resurrection, says the bishop; but the bodies he alludes to *never died*. I assume, once for all, that the resurrection is predicated of the thing that *dies*; it is predicated of nothing else, of no other body, and no amount of wrestling of the Scriptures can make it appear that there is any other body than that of the present body and present spirit combined in one companionship, and that the material partner is the one that is taken down, and the only one of which we have any knowledge, that will become a glorified body with its soul inhabitant at the resurrection.

### SECTION XIII.

“There is abundant reason to suppose that, while these grosser functions will cease, a new order of ends will arise, such as freedom of the universe, ability to travel with great velocity among remote worlds, to live in perpetual activity without rest or sleep, freedom from accidents or injury, from destructive forces of outer elements, and matters of this kind. *It must be obvious that all this implies a marvelous change in the structure and tissues of the organism.*” (“Beyond the Grave,” page 156.)

How do we know that it implies any such a thing? The “*grosser functions*” are often alluded to. I hold that all that will be dropped at the resurrection will be the “*grossness*,” but not the “*functions*.” The preponderance of testimony is in favor of this position. But the bishop says that “the freedom of the universe,” with “ability to travel with great velocity among remote worlds,” etc., is founded upon the idea that we will not have a material body. We have already presented the fact that angelic existences have *bodies*, similar in appearance to ours. All that is said of those bodies will at this point be remembered. They receive nourishment, and were touchable bodies—immortals touched by mortals.

As the subject of activity, movement from place to place, is in question, the same text says that "the children of the resurrection" shall be "equal unto the angels." If angels have bodies, as the Scriptures verily teach, and we have bodies like theirs, we will have also their possibilities. These bodies were no obstruction to their movements.

"With reference to the *movement* of the angels," says Professor Baugher, "from place to place, . . . the progress of spiritual, heavenly bodies is most probably not impeded by obstructions that hinder the free motion of earthly bodies. The use of the term, "to fly," in connection with them, does not necessarily imply that they have *wings*. That notion was first advanced by an Egyptian priest. The Scriptural representations which make them to have wings, sometimes two, and sometimes more, seem to be for the most part *symbolical*, and intended to teach the celerity of their movements.

"Christ ascended through the air without any apparent aid but *his own will*; and it is said of the raised saints at Christ's coming, that they shall, along with those who shall then be living on the earth, 'be caught up in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air.' (1 Thess. iv, 17.)

"The angel that appeared to Manoah '*ascended*' before his eyes, 'in the flame of the altar.' With such facility may these beings come and go between heaven and earth, and from one world to another in the universe. That they move with the utmost speed we infer from Daniel ix, 20-23, where we read: 'And while I was speaking and praying and confessing my sin and the sin of my people Israel, . . . yea, while I was speaking in prayer, even *the man Gabriel*, whom I had seen in the vision at the beginning, *being caused to fly swiftly*, touched me about the time of the evening oblation, . . . and said, O Daniel, I am now come forth to give thee skill and understanding. *At the beginning of thy supplications* the commandment came forth, and I am come to show thee,' etc. While the light

from yonder North Star is thirty *years* in coming to this earth, an angel from the very presence of God, who is '*far above all heavens*,' starts from that sublime abode at the *beginning of a man's prayer* and reaches him *before he has finished*; thus angels outstrip the light in the celerity of their movements."

But these angels alluded to had bodies. Their hands were touched by human earthly hands. But these are the same angels that bodily outstrip the light in the rapidity of movement from place to place.

"We shall be equal unto" *them* in our resurrection *body*. As angels are "ministering spirits sent to minister unto them who shall be the heirs of salvation," this celerity of movement must of necessity be equal to that of thought. God *thinks* of every creature his Son has redeemed, and if messengers are sent to them they do the bidding of God's thought. A chapter at this point on the *ministry of angels* would be appropriate, but space will not permit. We may simply state that it is chiefly connected with the redemptive scheme. But this argument would be incomplete if the subject concerning angels, in Christ's reference to them, did not throw some light upon our future state. Our remarks will principally benefit believers, for it must be remembered that unbelief and "liberalistic" skepticism have spread the sable curtain of doubt or denial over every utterance of positive Scripture truth, and therefore it is not probable that a single sentence of Christian belief can be uttered on this subject but what will be caricatured as a chimera of the brain. Therefore I address myself to the simple faith that accepts the Scriptures as a whole as the Word of God, and especially at this point, that with reference to angels. It is not within the province of the believer to say: "I will not accept them since Christ the sum total of Scripture and his apostles and followers accepted them;" that is, Bush-like, to say that "their knowledge is not to be the limit of ours."

To reject the Scriptures is to reject Christ. We are not foolish, therefore, when we say that one specific faith of the Christian is, that he accepts the Scriptures because they reveal the truth most needed by mortals, about which nothing could be definitely known from any other source, especially that which pertains to our future and immortal state, and the condition by which we attain unto that state.

At this point we break this chapter, and call the attention of the reader to one which legitimately follows on the fact of the angelic state, and the light it throws upon ours beyond the grave.



## CHAPTER V.

EXAMINATION OF LECTURE III OF "BEYOND THE GRAVE,"  
CONTINUED.

FIRST. It is in the resurrection state that we are told of mortals: "Neither can they die any more; for *they are equal unto the angels.*" Angels have never been subject to death as mortals. The penalty of transgression with them was not as with man—man died—but angels that kept not their first estate were cast down into darkness, etc., but they did not become mortal.

The statement, "*Equal unto the angels,*" throws light upon the possibilities of our *bodies* in the future state. (a.) It assumes that there is another state for our *bodies*. (b.) That that state is not to be measured or considered by laws that govern in the present state. (c.) Therefore, beyond analysis by known laws or processes. (d.) It can not be said to conflict with existing laws, for the constant revelation or unfolding of principles in nature heretofore unknown, renders it possible and probable that there are still unknown laws by which these powers of the angelic state are explainable, but for the present it is enough to know that *it is by the power of God.* The rest remains "to be revealed in the last time."

The position assumed by the bishop and others of the superior capacity of a human soul in the future state without the *body*, over that of supposed embodied spirits in the same sphere, is unauthorized by Scripture. At the moment of death, angels are represented as aiding in bearing away the departed spirit to God, as in the case of Lazarus, and Christ, and Stephen, and dying saints have committed their

spirit into hands of others at dying; but when the resurrection takes place, at that moment, soul and body united, we take on the possibilities of angels. Then, endowed by the "power of his resurrection," of "an endless life," like Christ, independent of angel escort we can ascend and descend, and our movements thus will be a part of the capacities which belong to the immortal state. Thus the striking resemblance between our being "caught up with the Lord in the air," to his being caught up in ascension; and "so shall we ever be with the Lord," implies, yea, positively teaches, companionship with him in an immortal resurrection *body*.

But does this imply that our bodies shall be of the same *material* composition as that of angelic bodies? Not necessarily. The body of an angel is a body that never contained the elements of physical death. Our future bodies will not possess that element either. The passage only says that we shall be *equal* unto the angels. The point is the fact of a body and its possibilities. Angels have bodies, so will we have bodies—bodies touched, handled, felt. I care not whether they are the same element or not. If we were asked the texture of that body, we would answer, "like unto Christ's glorious body." All bodies in the heavenly state are glorified bodies.

The error of some is, that the "spiritual body" of which Paul speaks is an intangible thing; that is, it is an aerial something, of cloud-like substance—to be touched is to vanish it away—a thin, gauzy tissue of glorified nothingness, that excludes all possibility of reality, and therefore the best idea you can form of our future spirit state is that of *ideal thinness*. I accept no such a theory, for the Bible idea of our future state is that of tangibility—a glorified materiality and spirituality combined.

Paul settles this when he says, "We shall be like his glorified *body*." Christ's glorified body was one of flesh and bone, and when his disciples thought they had seen a

*spirit*, he says, "Handle me and see, for a spirit (without *body*) hath not flesh and bone as ye see me have."

I know the objection will arise that the body they "felt" was not glorified until it ascended, but I hold that its glorification was, in that respect, a thing of *place* more than change of elements, that it did enter upon immortality on its exit from the grave.

One peculiarity of the resurrection body will be, that the possibilities of it will be brought up and made equal to that of the soul's requirement. This it does not possess in its earthly state. The body in the present state is the impediment to every ambition. You aspire for wealth, and the mind devises the plans and conditions by which it may be secured, but just as the prize would be attainable the wings of the mind are clipped, and droop at the thought that a body stands right between it and success. It fatigues, sickens, is the subject of infirmity, and for practical purposes it is only on a par with the machine in your field, subject in its sphere to wear and rust and decay. It is in your way, it bothers you at every crook and turn of life, and refuses to share the pressure of the mind's ambition; and, whereas the mind is ready for heat or cold, wet or dry, beyond a certain point, the body begs to be excused from an attempt at measuring up to the capacity of the mind. Hence, physical wreck from mental pressure. Rev. J. M. Reid, our missionary secretary, was at my home, nearly two hundred miles away from Chicago, and, on taking the train for that city, which was then his home, heard that the city was on fire. I wrote him, but it was a long time before I heard from him. But at last my message reached him, and he replied, "I never knew before the meaning of the words, 'O that I had wings like a dove, that I might fly away!'" *Thought* bounded away, and was in Chicago quick as an electric flash; but how tardy the train, and what a clog all material things! But suppose an accident to this body. Will we say, Throw

it away; it does n't amount to much; it is always in the way? Just as little account as we have made of the body, still it is of such vast value, and the life which attaches to it, that to save it we would sever every limb from its trunk. We bandage its wounds, repair its broken bones, minister to its sickness, absolutely impoverish ourselves, home and every thing going to perpetuate its healthful permanence. This is significant. The protest of the essential nature with which God has endowed us is against our body dying. This, too, is significant. Well, in the future and angelic state God proposes that these bodies shall be so glorified that they shall measure up to the powers and activities of the soul.

"Is not all this speculation?" No; unless God speculates about such things. Never take a position in theology unless there can be found a precept or example, one or both, to establish your position. In this we are at home. The example of Christ is before us. Once for all, this example is sufficient, with the assurance, by John, that "*we shall be like him;*" and by Paul, "*Who shall change our vile body that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body,*" etc. Reference has already been made to the activities of the resurrection body of Christ, and need not be repeated. We repeat that the only solution of this is the *power of God*: "according to the working whereby he is able even to subdue all things unto himself." We shall be caught up in the air and shall ever be with the Lord. Mark you, this wonderful achievement is inseparably connected with the resurrection state.

If we are to be equal unto the angels, if the capacities and activities of the resurrection *body* are to be on a par with the mind, we know no such a thing as space in our glorified state. In its movements mind knows no such a thing now. Space is a thing only known from present bodily conditions. I know that there is such a thing as distance, but my mind does not know it as the body

neither the body as the mind. Mention a planet and mentally I am there. Mention heaven, and the mind bounds over space, and I am there; but bodily I am not; but in eternity our bodily movements are to measure up to every demand of the soul's capacity, and on this principle planets may be but cobble-stones for the feet of immortals.

We gather this thought from the fact of our equality with angels. Proof has already been given of their movements. Luke i, 19, confirms this: "I am Gabriel that stand in the presence of God and am sent to speak unto thee and to show thee these glad tidings." Here is a messenger whose flight is as quick as thought and whose messages are messages of mercy and assurance. We shall "*be equal unto the angels.*"

But, query, Why is it that we are always discussing angelic creatures, as if they were airy, cloudy, gauzy, spirit-things untouchable? We are always speaking of them as if they were angels *because they are spirit* and not touchable creatures. This whole position is Scripturally untenable. They are *angels* because they are *messengers*. We are not to argue the angelic nature from material or immaterial considerations, for, strange to say, in the face of all our considerations, they are never spoken of as intangible or immaterial spirits, but as *messengers*; that is why they are angels, and as to *substance* they are everywhere spoken of as being touched the same as human hands are touched.

Gabriel is the messenger who shall sound the trump that shall change the living and the dead in the twinkling of an eye, in response to whose call we shall be caught up in the air and so be forever with the Lord. If this mystery is all attributed to the power of God, which none can deny, where, then, is there room for doubt? These possibilities solve all problems as to the gathering of the hosts of earth before God in the resurrection. This rapid gathering, quick as thought, of departed ones, is one of the peculiar-

ities of the resurrection body. It is sweet to contemplate that, could mortal ears hear the sound of immortals, or mortal eyes catch one glimpse of beatific spirits, when we stand by the dying one waiting the exit of soul, our ears might hear the swoop of angels' wings, our eyes might see these watchers, and behold the gentle lifting of a struggling spirit in their hands to bear it away to the bosom of God. What a shout of the soul in its struggle to break the tie that binds it. It is the struggle of love's binding.

Vital spark of heavenly flame,  
Quit, O quit this mortal frame.  
Trembling, hoping, ling'ring, flying,  
O the pain, the bliss of dying!  
Cease, fond nature, cease thy strife,  
And let me languish into life.

Hark! they whisper: angels say—  
Sister spirit, come away!  
What is this absorbs me quite,—  
Steals my senses, shuts my sight,—  
Drowns my spirit, draws my breath?  
Tell me, my soul, can this be death?

The world recedes: it disappears;  
Heaven opens on my eyes; my ears  
With sounds seraphic ring.  
Lend, lend your wings! I mount! I fly  
O grave, where is thy victory?  
O death, where is thy sting!

What a scene of grandeur. But where is it? 'Tis here. It is a transaction *this side the grave*. But *beyond the grave*, grand as this departure of spirit is, there is another and grander scene of power awaiting us. When this *corruption* puts on incorruption, when this *mortal* puts on immortality, and the shout of victory over death and the grave is heard, then, though angels will be there to witness the wonderful manifestation of resurrection power, they will not be needed, as they were, when the spirit was

about to pass over the strange highway from earth to heaven on the occasion of the body's death.

God will give us the possibilities of eternity, and rising as the peers of angels, they entering into our joys and we into theirs, and all into God's, will fly away into the domain of immortality. At first angels bore the spirit away from its earthly tenement; now the spirit returns with the same angelic company, but bears its own earthly companion to the sphere of a glorified state, freed from all corruption, decay, and death. Who does not feel that this is the plain teaching of revelation, our present "court of ultimate appeal?" To be able to realize bodily all that we have alluded to as belonging to the capabilities of the resurrection body, Bishop Foster says: "It must be obvious that all this implies a marvelous change in the structure and *tissues* of the *organism*." The plain statement of Scripture on this subject is without obscurity, and does not fully accord with his position.

He further says: "If it were a resurrection to a state similar to this, a return to the old condition of things," etc., by implication charging that "the generally received" idea would result such a theory. But this we deny. No one holds to the thought of a return to the old order.

#### SECTION XIV.

"It is a question which has been mooted whether the resurrection is predicated of the *body* or of the *person*. Ordinarily it is understood of the body; *but it is a noticeable fact that the body is not once directly mentioned in the Scriptures as the subject.*" ("Beyond the Grave," pages 157, 158.)

This is a statement that carries upon the face of it the boldness of an assertion with all the conscious facts against it, the Scriptures positively saying one thing and a man presumptuously saying another. But, he adds, "Candor requires that we should state this," that "there are pas-



sages which *unmistakably point to the body*; as, 'Who will change our vile bodies and fashion them like unto his glorious body.'" Here we have the novelty of one positively denying and admitting a fact at the same time.

Again: "In every case it is the resurrection of the dead—the *person who is dead*. Or, more properly still, the resurrection of the person who passed out of the body of flesh and blood, and who is, therefore, separated from this life, *and is hence said to be dead*."

Will the men who make our dictionaries please start a reform in the meaning of words? Will the bishop tell us where, in any language, it is found that on the soul going out of the body, it (the soul) is "said" to be dead? He here tells us that it is the person (soul) that leaves the body, goes out of it, that is said to be dead. This is, indeed, a new revelation. No, not exactly new. We know that it has always been the teaching of the New Church faith, but never before that any orthodox divine had consented to launch his barque in such shallow sea of reasoning. Here he runs athwart the Scriptures which he is professing to regard as authority. I use against him his own language: "Ordinarily it is understood of the person who passes out of the body of flesh and blood, . . . and hence is said to be dead,' but it is a noticeable fact that such is not once directly or indirectly mentioned in the Scriptures as the subject." Nowhere do the Scriptures refer to the person which goes out of the body at death as the subject of the resurrection, but always of the *body* that goes down into the grave. No manner of reasoning can change this fact. The bishop here wheels round and backs his cart squarely upon the ground of that theory that teaches that at death the resurrection takes place, and that it is predicated of the soul on leaving the body at death.

He adds: "*This fact* is made much of by the scholars of the New Church faith"—so that the bishop accepts as a "*fact*" the Swedenborgian doctrine of the resurrection.

The position of the bishop is a specialty with the school referred to, and it is from such pasture he has seemingly been feeding.

#### SECTION XV.

"The body is in no sense the partaker of moral deserts, and can in no sense participate in the recompense." ("Beyond the Grave," page 160.)

Thus he argues against its resurrection. I have noticed this in a previous argument, and have shown that we all admit that the body is only instrumental and the soul responsible. But I have also shown that the goodness of God and his justice to the *soul* in his final renderings must necessitate the resurrection of the body and reinvestment of similar responsibilities, or logically leave the soul, on the penal theory, conscious of the absence of the body as a penalty. The penalty of sin can not be said to be entirely removed without a resurrection of the body. Let the student and reader enlarge this thought, remembering that its satisfactory solution relates first and last to the *soul's* vindication before God and not the body as a creature of "ethical" qualities. It is on the high grounds of goodness and justice to the *soul* that we in reply to this point predicate, according to Scripture, the resurrection of the body. Let me say that the reference to the settlement of this question on *affectional* and *kinship* relation of body and soul is not claimed as a basis of the discussion, nor as proof. The theory does not enter as an essential feature of the orthodox idea. So when the bishop says: "Let us cease to be the sport of dreams and slave of prejudices," he can save such censures for other systems of theology.

#### SECTION XVI.

Page 160. The bishop proceeds to controvert three leading propositions, which he admits "can not so easily be disposed of," as the one on the "kinship" idea, and adds: "And yet there will be obvious reasons why they

should be scrutinized, and interpreted with accommodation." We take them in his own order:

"First. The term resurrection—*standing again*—it is insisted, signifies the standing again of the body."

He says: "It is expressly said that 'flesh and blood shall not inherit the kingdom of God.'"

Without burdening the reader with additional remark to those already given, I here append the statement of Bishop Kingsley, which is a good reply.

"Here the apostle shows that 'flesh and blood can not inherit the kingdom of God;' that is, in its frail, corruptible, perishing state; because '*corruption* can not inherit *incorruption*,' and, hence, the need of a change. But the question might arise, 'If flesh and blood can not inherit the kingdom of God, what shall become of those who are still living when Christ shall come to raise the dead, and bring all men to judgment?' And here he reveals the 'mystery.' 'We shall not all sleep,' that is, we shall not all die, 'but we shall be changed in a moment.' The change that will pass upon bodies of the living will leave them precisely like the bodies of the dead after the resurrection; 'for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed;' that is, those who should be living when this event should transpire: because this *corruptible* must put on incorruption, whether it be a *living* body or a *dead* body, 'and this *mortal* must put on immortality,' whether *living* or *dead*, when this event transpires; because *frail, dying*, corruptible flesh and blood, as such, can not inherit the kingdom of God. It must therefore be changed and made 'incorruptible' and immortal. Look at the peculiar phraseology of verses 52-54: 'This *mortal*'—mortal what? *Mortal* body shall put on *immortality*. What else but the body is mortal? And it is the body which the apostle discourses about, as the whole connection proves. 'This corruptible,—corruptible what? '*corruptible* body' shall put on

*incorruption.* What else but the body is corruptible? Can it be affirmed of that indescribable something which rises at the moment of death, according to the new theory—that *something* which the poverty of human language will not admit of being expressed in words—that this *mortal* shall put on immortality; that this dead *something* shall be raised incorruptible? Most certainly not; for that *something* ‘is immortal in its *own nature*, and *lives* in a future state because it never dies;’ while the body, the only thing which is corruptible and mortal, ‘can not be raised in *any sense whatever*,’ but remains eternally under the dominion of death? What, then, becomes of the triumphant exclamation of the apostle, at the end of this passage: “Then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory? The sting of death is sin; and the strength of sin is the law. But thanks *be* to God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.’”

The second passage quoted by the bishop to dispose of the proposition that “the term resurrection signifies the standing again of the body,” is:

“But some man will say, How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come? Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die; and that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain; it may chance of wheat or of some other grain: but God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body.” (1 Cor. xv, 35–38.)

It is thought by his argument that he has disposed of our body in the resurrection by the authority of this passage—that it is not raised, but another body. Then has he put away the thought of the resurrection altogether; for, as I have said, it is either this body or it is not—and if it is not, then is there no resurrection, but a substitution. The illustration of the apostle does not deny the resurrec-

tion of this body. I now make a proposition or two that those to whom Paul addresses himself can understand:

First: When Paul says, "Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not *quicken*ed [made alive] except it *die*," what is it that is "*quicken*ed?" *That which thou sowest*, most assuredly.

Secondly: When he says, "And *that which* thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be," Paul does not intend a contradiction; for he has just said that that which is "*quicken*ed" is that which "*died*," therefore, we are to reason that the words, "and that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be," alludes not to the idea of a substitution of another body altogether, but the contrasted character and state of the same body in its future glorified condition with that of its earthly and corruptible state. It is the same body, under different conditions. If not, then is there a positive contradiction in the apostle's language, and this we can not entertain. That our position is true, is confirmed by the apostle, with the same subject under consideration: "This *corruption* must put on incorruption; this *mortal* must put on immortality." Mark you, the product of the seed is of the *kind* sown, save that in the case of the resurrection of the human body the analogy falls short, in the fact that, unlike all else, man is the exceptional case, he is raised to die no more.

The future state and glory of the same body, as contrasted with its present condition, is the doctrine taught by the apostle. When it is called a "*spiritual body*," in contrast with its state as a "*natural body*," he alludes to no destruction of its identity, but rather to its transformation to that of the substance or character of angelic or heavenly bodies. Who will say that the "*spirit*," as applied to the character of the body does not allude as much to duration as to component elements? It is a touchable body. "Equal unto the angels," hence such a body as angels are represented to have. In this regard it is not *like* it was in

corruption, but takes on it angelic elements and powers. Whatever the apostle may otherwise allude to, he does not lose sight of the *body*. The German speaks of it as a *soulish* body, not in allusion to elements, but duration.

The next passage chosen to disprove the standing again of the body in the resurrection is in 2 Cor. v, 1: "For we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens."

In a previous argument the bishop uses this text to prove the distinctness of soul and body as separate existences. But the reader will mark that in this connection he uses it for quite a different purpose; that is, to prove that the resurrection of the dead is not a standing again of the body. The subtlety of the argument is seen in the fact that the bishop would apply it to *beyond the grave*. It will not at all answer this purpose. I insist on its interpretation in connection with the circumstances originating it and subject with which connected. Paul says (iv, 8): "We are troubled on every side, yet not distressed; we are perplexed, but not in despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; cast down, but not destroyed; always bearing about in the *body* the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in our *body*," etc. (See also 11-18.) The point is this, that in the prosecution of the work of his ministry he is constantly subject to contact with those who "can kill the body, but have nothing more that they can do;" but he fearlessly proceeds, knowing that if he should fall a martyr to the cause of truth it will introduce his indestructible soul into the home beyond the reach of earthly pain; this blissful abode will clothe upon him as a house from heaven. Now, this is a blessed hope. But just at this point the bishop cuts short the subject. He stops, as if Paul had made a final disposition of human destiny; but he has stopped at the half-way point. The bishop in these words puts the whole of

the ultimate destiny of Paul *beyond the grave*; but Paul has n't gone that far. The bishop fails to tell us that Paul is at this point looking death in the face. He fails to tell us that Paul is simply taking in the prospect of the soul and its disposition on the occasion of his death by martyrdom. He fails to tell us that Paul is only speaking of the intermediate state—his disposition in the interval of death and the resurrection. His argument would deceive us, in the fact that it alludes to the text quoted, *as if the resurrection had taken place, when it had not* (like those of old who said, "The resurrection is past already"), and in this essential feature the whole argument of the bishop is misleading. Go back, as the bishop should have done, and see how Paul prefaces all this with words that do in reality take us *beyond the grave*—beyond all that is comprehended in the text chosen by the bishop, and we hear Paul saying (iv, 13, 14): "I believed, and therefore have I spoken: knowing that he who raised up the Lord Jesus shall raise up us also by Jesus, and shall present us with you." All that follows supposes this grand consummation. I therefore rule the application the bishop makes of the text as out of order, and proving nothing to the point.

## SECTION XVII.

"The word resurrection is strained when it is insisted that it is equivalent to the statement that the exact body is to be restored." ("Beyond the Grave," page 162.)

Here the deception comes in on the words "*restored*" and "*exact body*." This would imply a restoration to its previous condition, which we do not accept, but deny. What we contend for is, not that the exact body shall be *restored* to its exact previous conditions, etc., but that the "*exact body* shall be changed, and made like unto Christ's glorious body."

Again, he says: "It may even be doubted whether it is an assertion concerning any part of the body."



If it is the *body*, it is the *body* not *restored*, but carried forward in the process of resurrection to a higher and more glorious state. There is no reason why, if one particle of the body that dies is glorified, any other particle should be exempt in this glorification. The glorification of the resurrection state is the process of throwing off the grossness of matter which applies to every particle of the body that dies, and taking on immortality which just as completely applies.

The bishop concedes the whole ground, and finds it convenient to do so to cover up the confusion of words into which he has fallen when he says: "*Its utmost meaning is, that the man who is cut down by death shall live and flourish; he shall not remain prostrate, but shall stand again; death shall not be victor over him. The word need have no other meaning than this, unless it is forced by its connections.*" I would take this concession of the whole argument as a final yielding of the point if it were not for the argument which follows, that shows that while he is driven to the wall, and concessions are made from the very force of the inner convictions of truth, that still he is biased by adverse influences over which there seems to be no control, and forced aside into uncertain and doubtful paths. It is curious to note how, and guess the reasons why, after the pronounced admission contained in the last quotation made, that at the next stroke of the pen a statement like the following occurs:

Page 162 continued. Controverting the second proposition. The proposition is: "*The fact that Christ was raised in the exact body which was laid down. It is assumed that this is the pattern of our resurrection.*"

The bishop says: "*The second assumption that the resurrection of Christ is the pattern of our resurrection is wholly without foundation, and is certainly not true. It differs in its ends, in its circumstances, its manner, and, in fact, in all its characteristics, and is in no sense a pattern.*"

Let me refresh the memory as to the conditions of this discussion. In the beginning of this chapter and argument it is agreed to take for proof the testimony of revelation. "This proof," says the bishop, "differs from all the preceding in that it is not an induction, but a testimony; it is not the voice of imperfect human reason, saying it may be true, or probably is true, that man survives death; but it is *the voice of God* declaring, Man does live after death. The former was incapable of carrying us further than a probability, the latter lands us in certainty." Agreed. Then it is further agreed that we are the "slave of the letter"—the word—and that the further progress of the argument in this chapter is "to treat it exegetically as purely a doctrine of revelation." Agreed. Now the battle is on the interpretation of the text, and the bishop concedes that "candor requires that we should state that there are passages which unmistakably point to the "resurrection of the body."

In the proposition now to be discussed there are two facts. First, "The fact that Christ was raised in the exact body which was laid down."

The argument on this point must of necessity bear such similarity to that of any intelligent interpretation of the proof texts that, once for all, we concede the difficulty of offering any thing purely original or unlike what has gone before. The fact of the sameness of the body of Christ, after resurrection, is asserted in his own prophecy (Matt. xx, 17-19): "And Jesus going up to Jerusalem took the twelve disciples apart in the way, and said unto them, Behold we go up to Jerusalem; and the Son of man shall be betrayed unto the chief priests and unto the scribes, and they shall condemn *him* to *death*, and shall deliver him to the Gentiles to mock, and to scourge, and to crucify him: and the third day he shall rise again."

A second reference to this same event is recorded by John ii, 18-22: "Then answered the Jews, and said unto

him, What sign shewest thou unto us, seeing that thou doest these things. Jesus answered and said unto them, *Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up.* Then said the Jews, Forty and six years was this temple in building, and wilt thou rear it up in three days? *But he spake of the temple of his body.* When, therefore, he was risen from the dead, his disciples remembered that he had said this unto them; and they believed the Scripture, and the word which Jesus had said."

We have the fulfillment of this in Luke xxiv, 1-8:

"Now upon the first day of the week, very early in the morning, they came unto the sepulchre, bringing the spices which they had prepared, and certain others with them. And they found the stone rolled away from the sepulchre. And they entered in, and found not the body of the Lord Jesus. And it came to pass, as they were much perplexed thereabout, behold, two men stood by them in shining garments; and as they were afraid, and bowed down their faces to the earth, they said unto them, Why seek ye the living among the dead? He is not here, but is risen; remember how he spake unto you when he was yet in Galilee, saying, The Son of man must be delivered into the hands of sinful men, and be crucified, and the third day rise again. And they remembered his words."

I do not understand that the bishop denies that Christ's body that was crucified and buried also rose from the grave. It seems, however, not to be positively admitted. He holds that the resurrection body proper, of Christ, was "assumed at the ascension" (page 163) somewhere between visibility and invisibility. So the resurrection body of Jesus was "assumed" at some point between the visible and the invisible on his way up. This sounds very much as if his "gross" body went with him part of the way and just at the line of crossing there was a miraculous disappearance. Strange that men strive so hard to make the

most wonderful miracle of all on the wrong side. They are disposed to deny the possible miracle of the resurrection, and yet assert one miracle to get rid of another.

We are now entering a very important field of controversy. We have been affirming our faith in the testimony of revelation, and now we have revelation upon the subject of the resurrection reduced to the testimony of Christ. The Scriptures testify of Christ. We are now after "*the truth as it is in Jesus Christ*." Of the Scriptures Christ says, "They are they that testify of me." Now for the testimony of Christ on the subject before us. (See note D, Appendix.)

The bishop says: "It is not probable that he (Christ) even put on his glorified body when he rose from the dead, any more than it is that the son of the widow of Nain or Lazarus did when he restored them to life. They were each in their order sublime miracles, which demonstrated the power of Christ over death; but neither of them was the putting on of immortality, and had none of the marks of resurrection, as it is to be of the saints."

This position is radically wrong. If Christ's body that came out of the grave, which we understand the bishop to admit was the veritable body that was buried (was no more the true resurrection body than that of Lazarus or the son of the widow of Nain), then must he hold that it was subject to death as before. We believe, in common with others, that the son of the widow of Nain and Lazarus died again, and that they suffered decay. But do we hold, or can we with any degree of consistency hold, that Christ's body was subject any more to death? Certainly not. You may search the Scriptures in vain for testimony in proof of the bishop's position, but plenty to the contrary. (1 Peter iii, 18): "For Christ also hath *once suffered for sins*, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit." Here is the sinless Christ who has died, and in

consequence of that he, as heir of all things, having all to pay with, paid the penalty and rose from the dead; and the bishop can not, with all his ingenuity of reasoning, in the light of this text, invent or imagine the possibility of Christ dying again. God himself, in accord with the principles of the divine government, justice, and goodness, could not touch the life of Christ—I mean that of the body that came out of the grave. It was because of this we have the triumphant shout, “I am he that *liveth* and *was dead*, but behold *I am alive forever more*, AMEN; and have the keys of death and of hell.”

He was thus “*once offered*.” Paul, in Romans v, 9, says: “*Knowing that Christ, being raised from the dead, DIETH NO MORE; DEATH HATH NO MORE DOMINION OVER HIM.*”

This absolutely takes Christ out of the class of resurrections mentioned in the bishop’s argument, in which he specifies the son of the widow of Nain and Lazarus. Death had dominion over them, but after Christ’s resurrection it had none over him. Therefore, the getting rid of that body in which he rose between earth and heaven, which would of course be a death equivalent, proves to be logically and Scripturally without foundation. In this connection we find an argument that this whole subject, so far as it applies to the death and resurrection of Christ, *presents it as our pattern*.

The verse preceding the one quoted says: “Now if we be dead with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him.” The whole context confirms this position. In it Paul is arguing our freedom from sin here, and from death hereafter, and, as an inspired argument that is equivalent to teaching Christ’s resurrection as our pattern, says: “What shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound? God forbid. How shall we, that are dead to sin, live any longer therein? Know ye not, that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized into his death? Therefore we are buried with

him by baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life. For if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in the likeness of his resurrection: knowing this, that our old man is crucified with him, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin. For he that is dead is freed from sin. Now if we be dead with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him; knowing that Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more; death hath no more dominion over him. For in that he died, he died unto sin once; but in that he liveth, he liveth unto God. Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord. Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof. Neither yield ye your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin; but yield yourselves unto God, as those that are alive from the dead, and your members as instruments of righteousness unto God. For sin shall not have dominion over you: for ye are not under the law, but under grace."

Another proof that Christ's resurrection body was unlike that of the son of the widow of Nain and Lazarus is incidentally contained in the passage, "He ever liveth to make intercession for us." The whole subject proves, yea, positively teaches, that it is the same Christ that *died* who is now in his glorified state our intercessor. I hold, further, that any other view will rob Christ of his office and character of intercessor. The position of the bishop is clearly seen to be untenable.

Making his remark general—that is, including Christ's resurrection with that of those whom he raised from the dead as only one of the same kind, all to mortality—the bishop says "they are not patterns, but proofs." Proofs of what? If Christ's is nothing more than theirs, then are

they neither patterns or proofs. But let us not be decoyed from the point. I insist on the word "*they*" being dropped, and *Christ* being inserted instead. When he is presented singly, then I assume that he is both a pattern and proof of our resurrection. No one else is. Getting the argument upon this, the right basis of reasoning, we may be able to reach a right conclusion. "They," that is, all the other resurrections, teach us but little with the resurrection of Christ left out. "*HE is our life.*" That the resurrection of Jesus Christ, as the bishop remarks, "differs in its *ends*, in its *circumstances*, its manner, and, in fact, in all its characteristics," we will admit, and the ground of our admission, or rather the reason of that admission, is the simple fact that none of us possess the prerogatives of Christ's office and work, and so far as the subject relates to these we differ from him. There is but one Christ. But in the *fact* of a resurrection he is in the completest sense our pattern.

This is proven in 2 Timothy i, 10: "But is now made manifest by the appearing of our Savior Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light in the Gospel." God had vouchsafed saving grace to sinners; those to whom this text is addressed realized that the testimony of it was the resurrection of Christ from the dead. This text can not be construed to mean that the people knew nothing of immortality and eternal life in the Old Testament Scriptures, for that would be absurd; but that no ocular manifestation of it had been given, in which was demonstrated to man the resurrection to immortality of the body that went down into the grave. I hold that the common sense teaching of this passage is, that the *mode* of immortality and eternal life was manifest in the bodily resurrection of Jesus Christ. Again does this take Christ out of the class of the resurrection of others that he had by divine power effected before his crucifixion.



It is proven to be a pattern by such Scriptures as the following: "If we have been planted in the likeness of his death, we shall also be in the likeness of his resurrection." "If we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly," etc. Many other passages are at hand, but they will also suggest themselves to the reader's mind.

*The resurrection of Jesus Christ—of his body—is proof also of ours.*

This fact is alluded to by Paul. "If in this life only, we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable." Take the whole proof that clusters around this passage.

"Now if Christ be preached that he rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen: And if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have testified of God that he raised up Christ: whom he raised not up, if so be that the dead rise not. For if the dead rise not, then is not Christ raised: and if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain: ye are yet in your sins. Then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished. If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable. But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first fruits of them that slept. For since by man *came* death, by man *came* also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive. But every man in his own order: Christ the firstfruits; afterward they that are Christ's at his coming. Then *cometh* the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power. For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet."

We have in the Scriptures not only in Christ a proof of our resurrection, but a *pledge* also.

John xiv, 19: "Because I live ye shall live also."

1 Cor. xv, 20: "But now is Christ risen and become the firstfruits of them that slept."

Acts xxvi, 23: "That Christ should suffer, and that he should be the *first* that should rise from the dead, and should shew light unto the people, and to the Gentiles."

Col. i, 18: "And he is head of the body, the Church; who is the beginning, the firstborn from the *dead*; that in all things he might have the *pre-eminence*."

Rev. i, 5: "And from Jesus Christ who is the faithful Witness, and the *First begotten of the dead*," etc.

The pledge is contained in the expression "firstfruits," etc. The significance of this allusion is certainly well known to the bishop. The first fruits were gathered and brought in and waved before the Lord, and the gathering of the whole harvest was conditioned upon this. Christ is called the "*firstfruits* of them that *slept*," "the first that should rise from the *dead*," "the firstborn from the *dead*," and the "first begotten from the *dead*." Mark you, that this resurrection from the dead is conceded, by the bishop in his argument to relate to Christ's *body*. Christ is not the first to have risen from the dead, in the sense in which Lazarus and others were raised, for both in the Old and New Testament Scriptures resurrections were numerous. He must, therefore, have been the "first" in a sense in which the others were not. Again: it is expressly taught in the Scriptures that his resurrection was not like the others—for instance, like the son of the widow of Nain and Lazarus—hence the words, "that in all things he might have the *pre-eminence*."

Once more: It can not be said that it was attributed to the special manifestation of divine power in his behalf, for this is not intimated, and more, it is expressly stated that the same power that operated in his case will

operate in ours—has operated in all cases of resurrections of the body—the *power of God*. It can not be said that Elijah's and Enoch's translation were like his, for they did not die. There is but one conclusion that can be possibly arrived at, and that is, that he was "first" of all others who actually *died* who, after the order of the resurrection of the *body*, rose to an immortal state. If this position is not correct, then do I fail to see the significance of the phrase "firstfruits" as applied to the *body* of Christ which was raised from the dead. Desiring to give more attention to this thought further on in the argument, it is dismissed for the present. We now call attention to a matter of speculation.

#### SECTION XVIII.

On page 163 it is said: "If we could reach a knowledge of Christ's glorified body—the *body which he assumed at the ascension*, and which he took into heaven, and in which he now appears—we should then have a pattern." Here it is expressly said that Christ "assumed" a body at "ascension," and that is the body, and not the one which came from the grave, which he took into heaven with him. It is also assumed that this is the glorified body. In a previous argument he told us that this glorified body grew in us as unconscious as a child in the womb. What is meant by a "glorified body?" This is a key, simple as it may seem, to prove that "glorious" applies to a body that is native of earth. His "glorious body" is his earthly body "glorified." I will not let go that thought. It is, and the whole tenor of truth without an exception bears me out in the remark, that our glorified bodies are no other than our bodies glorified.

He adds: "But of that glorified body we know nothing." Of course we do not, for the simple reason that the so-called "assumed" body of which mention is made is not a creature of revelation, but of man's own manufacture from a fruitful imagination—a conjecture. But what

saith the Scriptures? Let us see. I think a very definite proof can be established that the same *body* of Christ that is glorified in heaven to-day is the same with that which came up from the grave. Mark you, it is the same with reference to its immortality. It moved about for forty days among men, a body and just as truly one over which "death had no more power" than over it in heaven. That it appeared so much like other living but mortal bodies is no argument against its immortality, for that may be attributed to the sphere in which it moved; but as it ascended the visibility of its glorification enshrined it; but in that enshrinement of glorification it was no more immortal than when it rose from the dead. The ascension had to do with the visibility of glorification, but nowhere in Scripture is it intimated that Christ there "shuffled off his mortal coil" and took on immortality. He became immortal when he broke the prison of the grave and vanquished death; but he could only be seen by mortal eyes in "glorified" appearance, when the cloud of glory was let down from the glorified world and in the sight of mortal eyes received him into it. That it was the same body that rose I propose to prove by referring this whole matter to "the court of ultimate appeal."

Paul (1 Cor. xv, 1-8) says: "Moreover, brethren, I declare unto you the Gospel which I preached unto you, which also ye have received, and wherein ye stand: By which also ye are saved, if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you, unless ye have believed in vain. For I delivered unto you first of all, that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures; and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day according to the Scriptures: And that he was seen of Cephas, then of the twelve: After that, he was seen of above five hundred brethren at once; of whom the greater part remain unto this present, but some are fallen asleep. After that he was seen of James;

then of all the apostles. And last of all he was seen of me also, as of one born out of due time."

The truth announced by Paul is expressly said to be a matter of revelation to him. See verses 3, 4.

It is expressly said to be a doctrine of the Scriptures, (1) that Christ died, (2) that he was buried, (3) that he rose the third day. (4) It is said that *this* Christ was after his resurrection seen in the flesh by Cephas. Luke xxiv, 34: "The Lord is risen indeed, and hath appeared unto Simon"—the heart-burning report of the two disciples that journeyed to Emmaus to the eleven. With the hands of his resurrected body he broke bread, and gave it to the two to eat. He ate with them.

The next appearance mentioned of the bodily presence of the resurrected Redeemer was to the twelve. Luke xxiv, 36-43: "And as they thus spake, Jesus himself stood in the midst of them, and saith unto them, Peace be unto you. But they were terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they had seen a *spirit*. And he said unto them, Why are ye troubled? and why do thoughts arise in your hearts? Behold my *hands* and my *feet*, that it is *I myself*: *handle me*, and *see*; for a *spirit* hath not *flesh* and *bones*, as ye see me have. And when he had thus spoken, he shewed them his *hands* and his *feet*. And while they yet believed not for joy, and wondered, he said unto them, Have ye here any meat? And they gave him a piece of a broiled fish, and of an honey-comb. And he took it, and did eat before them."

Again (verse 6): "After that [after the twelve had seen, touched, and handled him] he was seen of above five hundred brethren at once." This seems to have been a prearranged meeting. Before his death (Matt. xxvi, 32) he said, "But after I am risen again I will go before you into Galilee." In Matt. xxviii, 7, 10, 16, allusion is made to the same. The angel said to the women (verse 7), "Go quickly, and tell his disciples that he is risen from

the dead, and, behold, he goeth before you into Galilee; there shall ye see him: lo, I have told you." But as these women turned to go, "Behold, Jesus met them, saying, All hail. And they came and held him by the feet, and worshiped him. Then said Jesus unto them, Be not afraid: go tell my brethren that they go into Galilee, and there shall they see me." (Verse 16): "Then the eleven disciples went away into Galilee, into a mountain where Jesus had appointed them. And when they *saw him*," etc. It seems, therefore, by common consent, proper to locate this appearance in Galilee, where Christ had made more disciples than elsewhere. We are also told, "After that he was seen of James." James saw him in his bodily presence, as did the other apostles. This James, we are told, was the Lord's brother. The identity was complete.

But again: He was seen "of all the apostles." While the above reference to the five hundred includes the chosen disciples of Christ, the eleven, here is a reference to "all of the apostles," which evidently includes more than the eleven. But the point I desire to make is on their testimony—they *had seen the Lord*. It is thought that mention is not made of every one who had seen him, but that the most important witnesses are mentioned.

Paul now says, "And last of all he was seen of me also, as of one born out of due time."

Where was Christ seen by the Apostle Paul? Let us definitely locate the spot. Mark you, Paul does not assume to have seen a greater Christ than the others had seen.

Mark you, again, that Paul says that himself, the least of the apostles, and one not meet to be called an apostle, is admitted to the equal privilege with the others, and no greater, of seeing the veritable Lord whom they had seen. Where was it, and when, that he was privileged to see him—the crucified, dead, but now risen Lord?

We can locate the whole occurrence on the occasion of Paul's journey from Jerusalem to Damascus, with authority in his hands to afflict the disciples of Christ there. The account reads:

“And Saul, yet breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord, went unto the high-priest, and desired of him letters to Damascus to the synagogues, that if he found any of this way, whether they were men or women, he might bring them bound unto Jerusalem. And as he journeyed, he came near Damascus: and suddenly there shined round about him a light from heaven: and he fell to the earth, and heard a voice saying unto him, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? And he said, Who art thou, Lord? And the Lord said, I am Jesus whom thou persecutest. It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks. And he trembling, and astonished, said, Lord, what wilt thou have me to do? And the Lord said unto him, Arise, and go into the city, and it shall be told thee what thou must do. And the men which journeyed with him stood speechless, hearing a voice, but seeing no man. And Saul arose from the earth; and when his eyes were opened, he saw no man: but they led him by the hand, and brought him into Damascus. And he was three days without sight, and neither did eat nor drink.” (Acts ix, 1-9.)

Mark you, a third time, that there is no intimation, anywhere in all these references, of Christ getting rid of the body on the occasion of his ascension, and taking on another. I hold that in all essential features Paul makes no distinction between the bodily Christ that he witnessed and that witnessed by the others. *Paul sees Christ after he had ASCENDED up on high*, after he had entered the glorified state; but I insist that Paul speaks of that glorified body as veritably the same that was seen by James, by the five hundred, by the twelve, by Cephas, by the women—some of whom took him by the *feet*; others by the



*hands* and *handled* him; others, as Thomas, putting their *hands* into his *side* and their *fingers* into the nail-prints in his hands. Paul says, "That is the Lord that I have been privileged to see." Paul's point is that of equal privilege with other apostles in seeing the very same Lord that they had *seen*, *touched*, and *handled*; but he does not intimate the most distant shadow of a thought that he had been admitted to a superior privilege of witnessing a superior body of our Lord than that of the others. It will not do to say that they all saw him in his glorification in the cloud at the ascension, for allusion is not made at all to that occasion, but to the occasions of the bodily presence of the Lord when that body could be touched. The apostle says, *That is the Lord I have seen.*

Fourthly: As it is the resurrection of the *body* that is in controversy, Paul refers to the same occasions, when they were told to touch and handle Christ's *body*, and now, making a strong point on the resurrection body of Christ, tells us that that Christ—that bodily Christ in glory, coming in the flash of brightness above the noonday sun, and arresting him on the way to Damascus—was the veritable bodily Christ that was touched and handled by his disciples, and who ate before them. I hold that this argument is unanswerable.

The bishop says, "Of that glorified body we know nothing, except that it is not the fashion of his earthly body." If by this is meant that its sustenance is not that of the coarser elements upon which it fed in time, there is no controversy.

He says, again: "When he assumed it, and how, we know just as little as we do of the kind and manner of the transforming change which will pass upon his living saints at his second coming." But I answer: We know just the same; and if we are to accept revelation as authority, simply as a matter of knowledge, we know as much of the property of the future state as we do of this. The life

property of material existences is as great a mystery as that of our future existence, and yet it is a thing with which we come in daily and hourly contact.

Again, he tells us: "To assume to be informed is to be wise above what is written."\*

We must, therefore, conclude that there are facts that relate to our eternal interest, that would be well for us to know, that God proposes to keep us in total blindness to. But when we present *wisdom* that "is written," and its testimony is direct and positive, are we subject to the charge of assuming to be informed, with authentic information left out? Not at all. Such information as is essential to a knowledge of the future state has been revealed. Revelation is positive in its testimony on the subject in controversy, and the "assumed" body alluded to by the bishop is all assumption in theory, and nothing else.

*Page 163 continued.* "The fact, then, that he returned to life in the body that was crucified and buried, and the fact that others were restored in their natural bodies can not be taken as proof positive that we are so to be raised."

Here is a confusion of argument. Just above we have the statement, "They are not patterns, but proofs," and now we are told that these "can not be taken as proof positive."

But there is a more subtle feature of his argument; that is, the manner in which the bishop classifies Christ's resurrection with that of others, *and no more than others*; that is, Christ was not raised to any more than was the son of the widow of Nain or Lazarus. This is the great mistake of his argument, at this point for the position, in

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\*Then why has the bishop essayed to give us information upon a subject about which he concedes there is none? If there is nothing "written" by which to be "informed"—and by this we are told that revelation is silent, so far as "information" is concerned—why tax the intellect or reason about the matter at all?

the light of the plain teaching of Scripture is absolutely at fault. This has already been shown, and to that proof the reader is referred.

But we will admit that "the fact that *others* were restored in their natural bodies can not be taken as proof positive that we will be raised" to immortality in our bodies. This, I say, we will admit. But no one claims it. But we do claim that the fact that CHRIST died, was buried, and was raised from the *dead*, is *proof positive that we will also be raised from the dead immortal as he*. Note this: If Jesus Christ in the resurrection from the grave is no exception, but is forced upon an equality with the son of the widow of Nain and Lazarus and others who were raised to *natural life only*, then does the whole theory of the resurrection as taught and believed by Christendom go to the wall. But the position is preposterous. It is an assumption without the most distant glimmer of authority or proof from the Word of God.

Again, on page 163: "It is possible that they who appeared at the time of the crucifixion were in the resurrection state; and that Moses and Elias were in the resurrection state, wearing their bodies; *but other cases* were no more than resuscitations to natural life, and no more illustrate the doctrine of the immortal life than would the resuscitation of a neighbor of ours by a miracle were he to remain among us for a term of years buying and selling," etc. . . . "Neither the word resurrection, then, nor the fact of our Lord's resurrection, explains or illustrates the resurrection state. *And they are never supposed so to do in the Holy Scriptures.*" "They do exactly this and no more; they show the power of Christ over death, and confirm his doctrine of the immortal resurrection life, and all his doctrines as well." (164): How is this resurrection of Christ to prove his power over death if, like others, it was but a *resuscitation* to natural life only to die again? I imagine the point of "power of death" on such grounds

is not well taken. Again: How can the resurrection of Christ, or rather his "resuscitation," to only "natural life" demonstrate or "illustrate" or "confirm" "his doctrine of the immortal resurrection life," when we are vehemently told that there are no similarities at all between them? How does it prove, that is, how does his bodily resurrection to a "natural" state only prove, the doctrine of a supernatural "immortal resurrection life?" Or how does a thing by the very force of its mortality prove immortality? Is it not a fact that, if Christ's resurrection *body* proves the doctrine of immortal resurrection life, it must itself, of necessity, be as immortal as the "immortal resurrection life" it is to prove? If not, then it proves nothing. The bishop can not escape the dilemma into which he has drawn himself, only by the loop-hole through which his Gamaliel, at whose feet he has been sitting, escapes, and that is, that the resurrection of Christ's body was a kind of make-believe; that it was intended that the disciples should believe it and preach it as a kind of make-shift, and, as the bishop here intimates, for the establishing another theory beyond it; that is, the proof of "the doctrine of the immortal resurrection life" "assumed" at "ascension." We weary with such theoretical bungling. It has n't the shadow of existence in Scripture. And then again, there is the absurd position that the resurrection of Christ's body with that of others, and only on a par with them, had a *doctrinal* bias to it rather than practical and experimental; it was to "confirm his *doctrine* of immortal resurrection life." The bishop assumes here that Christ *taught* a "doctrine" of "resurrection life," which was to the effect that the body of Christ, which ascended, was not the body that came out of the grave. Please tell us where we find him teaching it? And, also, that Christ's *material* body was raised from the grave to teach the resurrection of an *immaterial* body. When and where is there a record of this? While there is a sense in which this may be true,

still, primarily, the purpose of Christ's resurrection was to assure all those who *sleep* in him that they, in "like manner," should be raised to that bodily state in which it would be as true of them as he, that "over" them "death" would have no more "power." In contradiction of the bishop's assumption that "there is not a syllable to the contrary [of his theory] in the Gospel narrative," I hold that, correctly interpreted, there is "not a syllable in the Gospel narrative" that confirms his position. The bishop's argument loses its force and becomes contradictory of the Gospel narrative when he takes the position that the "other cases" of resurrections—that is, other than Moses and Elias—"were no more than resuscitations or resurrections to a natural life, and no more illustrate the doctrine of immortal life than would the resuscitation of a neighbor of ours," etc. Christ is classed with these "resuscitations" in the argument. He was only "resuscitated." That is equivalent to saying that he was not actually dead. This word is taken from the Latin, *re*, again, *suscitare*, to raise, and means, per Webster, to revivify, to revive, especially to recover from apparent death, as to resuscitate a drowned person, and to resuscitate withered plants. Then do we break the force and meaning of resurrection, and make it to teach, not a standing again of the body after death, but a simple resuscitation of the person, not from actual death, but from what appears, so far as our discernment goes, to be death. We will not accept the definition as even applied to any resurrection in the Gospel narrative, and especially that of Christ's. The resurrections referred to in the Gospel were from actual death. The case of Lazarus, after four days' burial with decomposition setting in; was more than a resuscitation. The simple fact that it was only to natural life does not alter the case. We admit that these were to natural life, but we are not establishing our resurrection to immortal life by theirs, but by Christ's bodily resurrection to a bodily existence over which "death hath no

more power," and that it is to that state of bodily existence where death is powerless, that our resurrection is likened.

I insist that the bishop shall not confound the death and resurrection of Christ in its significance with that of others preceding. It has a lesson of immortality for us that is not to be found in any other case. Thus viewed, the reader will readily see how foreign to the point in controversy is the argument we are combating. This plank taken out of his platform, all the rest must fall to pieces. It is the keystone to a false arch that has nothing of the strength of revealed truth to sustain it, and it must therefore fall.

### SECTION XIX.

The reader will be no less surprised to read the following statement concerning Christ:

"The whole account is the simple narrative of a man who was condemned to die, who was publicly executed, was dead and buried, and who, on the third day, appeared to his friends, and mingled with them for about forty days. *The manner of his life among them being no more mysterious than it had been before he died, and, in fact, creating the idea that he was to be permanent with them in the establishment of an earthly kingdom.*" ("Beyond the Grave," page 164-5.)

There are some similars and dissimilars between this and the future state. Christ, like the statement concerning Gabriel in Daniel, possessed, after the resurrection, "altogether the appearance of a man," and, like the angelic characters referred to, did actually eat and sleep, and talk like human beings. Scripturally, there is nothing strange about this, aside from the simple fact that inhabitants of the other sphere are amazingly like those in this, save they are immortal, with all the advantages attending immortality. They take on the characteristics of the other world when in it. They take them on here in special manifestations, but they are not endurable in this state only by those upon whom rests the powers of immortality.

It is a mistake, however, that "the manner of his life was no more mysterious than it had been before he died." If it is a question of *quantity* of mysteries, then we may say that there were as *many* mysteries before as after his death. But if it is a question of *kind* of mysteries, then do I hold that the bishop's statement is incorrect. His life and character was more mysterious after his resurrection than before. And the distinction was just such as applies to immortals. Before there were miraculous manifestations in his behalf. But the mysteries we see in him, after rising from the grave, dwell in him as a part of that state, as characteristics of it. In proof of this, see his mysterious appearance and disappearances. Compare these to those of the angelic appearances alluded to, and we at once see that in the resurrection *body* of Christ's dwelt the "powers of an endless life." The disciples bar the doors to keep out intruders. The locks are evidently securely fastened against the ingress of mortals. But Christ enters at once and stands before them. They tremble with fear, because they think they are looking into the face of a *spirit*, just such a spirit as Foster and Bush would have us be; but in the midst of their fright he bids them examine him. "Handle me and see, for a *spirit* hath not *flesh* and *bone* as ye see me have." They touched him. They handled him. They discovered that the resurrection body was one of flesh and bone, and yet that "flesh and bone" body was the veritable body that passed mysteriously in through that barred door. Did any such occurrence as this take place previous to his death? I search in vain to find the narrative if such was the case. In that which was the peculiar characteristic of a resurrection body to immortality, Christ did possess after he was raised, and it was in no sense a feature of his existence before. The "manner of his *life* among them" was far "more mysterious after" than "before his death." This manifestation of its powers was similar to that of the immortal—the angel that with-



out obstruction by the barred doors of the prison, went in and brought deliverance to Peter. I only hint at these possibilities of the resurrection body; the reader receives suggestions enough to enable him to follow up the thought which will grow upon him with great satisfaction.

Here is a curious statement: "That such was the influence of Christ's life, etc., upon the disciples; in fact, creating the idea that he was to be permanent with them in the establishment of an earthly kingdom."

Does not every intelligent student of the Scriptures recognize the error of this statement? Is it not a fact that "the idea that he (Christ) was to be permanent with them in the establishment of an earthly kingdom" was the fruit of their own carnality of thought, and that it was a molding of Jewish aspiration, and hope of their ideal Messiah, in spite of the uniform and distinct teachings of Christ to the contrary? When the statement is made that *Christ* "*created the idea of the establishment of an earthly kingdom*" in the mind of his disciples, it is made in the face of plain Scriptural statements to the contrary. It is a thought too preposterous and absurd to be entertained for a moment.

Page 163 continued: "On one occasion, in fact, he in effect declares that he had not entered the resurrection state—he had not yet put off the earthly and put on the heavenly. He still stood in the flesh, and lived a natural life among them."

We are now entering a very interesting department of this subject. Here is a point I have anticipated from the beginning of the argument. I trust the truth manifest in the argument about to take place may be indelibly impressed upon both memory and heart. It will serve a good purpose for all time to come.

First of all: When and where after Christ left the grave, did he "declare" "that he had not entered his resurrection state?" When and where, after he left the

grave, did he "declare" "that he had not *yet put off* the earthly and put on the heavenly?"

Mark you, we are told that there is a declaration to the above effect. Of course, we look for the declaration in Scripture, for, in the present chapter, it is agreed that it is the "court of ultimate appeal."

Again I ask: When and where do we have the declaration at any time after Christ's exit from the grave, that "he had not yet entered the resurrection state—he had not yet put off the earthly and put on the heavenly?" Just at this point it would have been very convenient—indeed, a great accommodation—if the bishop had quoted the words of the declaration referred to. But he has not. As it is right at the point of vitality in the argument, a proof text would have aided both very materially. But the absence from his argument of the *text* that contains the so-called declaration, leaves us to conjecture his authority. We do not like conjectures in argument, but when forced upon us, as in this case, we are to do the best we can with them.

The key to the declaration referred to, I think I find in his argument which follows: "His glorified humanity was assumed at or after the scene on Olivet, and no historian has given any account of it." But this confuses the argument. We are told that we have a "declaration" of a thing which, after all, no historian has given us any account of.

But the bishop means something, whether he has succeeded in telling what that is or not, and it is at his meaning we must arrive. He alludes to two distinct occurrences: First, in one he tells us of a declaration to the effect that on Christ's resurrection from the grave "he had not entered his resurrection state—he had not put off the earthly and put on the heavenly;" and, secondly, the occasion when he did do it: "His glorified humanity was assumed at or after the scene on Olivet"—of the results of

which "no historian has given any account." The bishop has essayed to do it. If I conjecture correctly these two occasions were about forty days apart. Let us look at the first one, and, if in the reader's mind it is properly disposed of, it will not be difficult to clear away the mist that hangs about the other.

For a key to the solution sought I will conjecture that when the bishop says, "On one occasion, in fact, he (Christ) in effect declares that he had not entered the resurrection state—he had not yet put off the earthly and put on the heavenly," he refers to John xx, 17: "Touch me not: for I am not yet ascended to my Father; but go to my brethren, and say unto them, I ascend unto my Father and your Father, and to my God and your God."

If this is not the "occasion" and the "declaration" referred to to prove that Christ taught that the body that came out of the grave "had not entered the resurrection state—had not yet put off the earthly and put on the heavenly," then do I fail to conjecture the time and place of the said declaration. That we may be able to proceed, I will assume that the quotation from John xx, 17, suggests the declaration, with both the time and place of it. If my conjecture is correct, I propose that my argument shall be an impeachment of the bishop's interpretation of the passage. The passage appears correctly translated. I look to it in vain for the declaration alluded to. It does not say, "Touch me not, for I have not yet taken on my resurrection body and state"—or words to that effect, but "I have not *ascended*." Another difficulty arises in the way of the bishop's argument, and that is, that the *ascension* alluded to is the taking on of "the resurrection state" and *body*. Christ does not await the scenes of Olivet for that assumption, for in the very text that the bishop has chosen to prove his point it is referred to as occurring in the *present tense*, "But go to my brethren, and say unto

them, *I ascend* unto my Father," etc. As the fact of his non-ascension was alleged as a ground for the refusal of the *touch*, after the tidings of ascension with that of his resurrection, had been broken to his disciples, then no one was debarred from touching him—proving that the ascension he referred to was not shaking off the *body* in which he rose from the grave, but was a reference to some other event of great significance. The argument must now, of necessity, be "exegetically" considered. It will be decided by what may appear to be the most reasonable interpretation of the text.

If Christ's "ascension" is the "assumption" of his resurrection body as the bishop implies, it takes place at once, and still remains as such among the disciples for forty days. So much importance is attached to the declaration of this text that it can not be passed without more extensive notice. I give it more space for the reason that the bishop has by implication led us to conjecture that it teaches according to his interpretation, the declaration—or is rather the declaration that at Christ's ascension forty days after his resurrection from the grave he would then and there "enter the resurrection state," then and there "put off his earthly and put on the heavenly."

I have several times declared the wrong use of Scripture in the bishop's argument, and I am under necessity of saying the same thing at this point. This passage is of such vast importance, and its mystery seemingly so deep, that I will venture quite a lengthy interpretation of it by one whose scholarship and penetrating insight into the subject appears upon the surface of his interpretation, first explaining that my mind is not clear upon the subject of several ascensions, though I can see the consistency of the same, as well as the possibility, in connection with a body possessing characteristic powers of immortality.

I refer to the able treatise of Rev. G. N. Peters, A. M., in the *Evangelical Quarterly Review*, on "The Ascensions of

Christ." It is a rare occurrence to be permitted to feed upon such rich food as he presents in his article; and in this connection it is with the pronounced conviction that the reader will thank me for inserting it here that I gladly present his thoughts. I will give it in full, though the first is hardly germane. He begins by saying:

"Dr. Neander, in his 'History of the Church,' Vol. I, p. 295, gives us the following in a foot-note: 'Considering the close connection in which the resurrection of Christ and his ascension to heaven stood with each other in the Christian consciousness—since his resurrection was regarded as but a transition point to his entire exaltation above the region of the earth in this new, glorified form of existence—I can not lay so great stress on the manner in which the writer of this letter expresses himself with regard to Sunday: ἐν ᾗ καὶ ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἀνέστη ἐκ νεκρῶν καὶ φανερωθεὶς ἀνέβη εἰς τοὺς οὐρανοὺς.' Nor can I think myself authorized to infer from it either that, according to the author's opinion, Christ's ascension also occurred on Sunday, or that he conceived the fact to have been that Christ rose to heaven immediately after his first appearance to Mary as the risen Savior.' This note is appended, by way of explanation, to the following sentence in the text: 'In the catholic epistle ascribed to Barnabas, at the close of the fifteenth chapter, Sunday is designated as the day of jubilee in remembrance of Christ's resurrection and ascension to heaven.' With a due appreciation of the vast historical acquirements and eminent ability of Neander, we must confess that we can not receive his interpretation in the note as a consistent exposition either of the language of Barnabas or of his own text. In the latter he admits, what every critic must do, that the grammatical structure of the language in the epistle of Barnabas does, on its surface or in its literal meaning, teach that Sunday is the day both of Christ's resurrection and ascension. In the former, he endeavors to explain this away by linking the

idea of the ascension with that of the resurrection; the ascension being either an outgrowth or blending with the resurrection, or, as he expresses it, the 'resurrection was regarded as but a transition point to his entire exaltation.' Leaving the question whether Barnabas possessed the learning to originate such a philosophical conception, we are willing, for weighty reasons, to abide by the literal rendering of the words used by Barnabas.\* The explicit language of Barnabas, in giving the reason why he and others observed the eighth (that is, the first) day of the week, is as follows: 'Therefore do we celebrate the eighth day with joy, because on that day Jesus both rose again from the dead and, having appeared, ascended into heaven.' Some in rendering the passage into English make it more significant by saying, 'And having appeared, also ascended into heaven.' For the reader's information the ancient Latin translation is thus given: '*Propter quod agimus diem octavum in letationem, in quo et Jesus resurrexit a mortuis, et apparuit et ascendit in cælos.*' Undoubtedly Barnabas declares that both a resurrection and an ascension of Jesus occurred on Sunday, and assigns this as a reason why Sunday is observed by them. That such is the meaning, is apparent from the numerous criticisms given by his commentators. Let me select two instances to illustrate. Menardus, in commenting on this passage, without the least hesitation, pronounces Barnabas guilty of proclaiming a false view. He says: '*Hic videtur dicere Christum ascendisse in cælum die Dominica, imo eodem die quo resurrexit, quod falsum est.*' Hefele, in his edition of the Apostolic Fathers, pointedly asks: '*Nonne Barnabas Dominum die*

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\* "The reader must not misapprehend the writer's position. Barnabas is not adduced to prove the correctness of any doctrine. The truth depends for its support on Scripture, to which I shall shortly refer; human testimony is only valuable, in such a case, by showing that the Christian consciousness of others has also received and appreciated it.

*Dominica ad cœlos ascendisse contendit?* Without detaining myself on a point that must be already evident to every one who considers the passage, let me now direct attention to arguments derived from undisputed authority, which, more than all others combined, will confirm us in the opinion broached by Barnabas; namely, such as are afforded to us by a comparison of Scripture.

“I. There must have been more than one ascension, because we have two places, totally different from each other, specified from which Jesus ascended to heaven. In the final ascension, which took place on the fortieth day (hence on the fifth day of the week, or on Thursday) after the resurrection, Luke informs us that Christ ascended (Acts i, 12) ‘from the mount called Olivet, which is from Jerusalem a Sabbath-day’s journey.’ And yet in his Gospel, this same writer tells us that Christ ‘was parted from them and carried up into heaven,’ after he had ‘led them out as far as to Bethany.’ (Luke xxiv, 50, 51.) These places are distinct from each other; for the one, Bethany, is fifteen (John xi, 18) furlongs distant from Jerusalem, and the other, Mount Olivet, is only five furlongs (so says Josephus) distant. The decided evidence of Luke is, that in the one instance Jesus only journeyed ‘a Sabbath-day’s journey,’ whilst in the other he went a little over twice the distance. If the journey in its exact length were not given, we might be prepared to receive the ingenious glosses and conjectures employed by some commentators to rid themselves of a difficulty. We might admit that that whole region was called Bethany, that it was called Olivet, that Bethany, being situated on a slope of the mount, may be included in the name; but all such theories are purposely met by the description, the minute detail, of the distance passed over, evidently to guard us against the very mistake into which so many, even of the great and learned, have fallen. We can not agree that these ascensions are the same; for the simple fact confronts us that



it is irrelevant and contradictory that Luke, had he intended to make them identical, should, in a matter of the gravest importance, present the same event so diverse from each other in the two narrations. If we carefully examine his two accounts of the ascension, the one in the Gospel and the other in the Acts, we find not only a difference existing in name of place, the distance passed over, but also in the words spoken, the things that were performed, and in the circumstances surrounding them, thus confirming the idea that he describes two different ascensions. The ascension mentioned in Acts i occurred on Thursday, the fortieth day after; this is so distinctly announced by reference to the context that no one disputes it. If we let the context of the Gospel account explain the ascension at Bethany, we find that it falls on Sunday. It is admitted by able critics that from verse first to verse fiftieth of chapter twenty-fourth down to the statement of the ascension itself, there is no break in the narrative. The chapter begins with, 'Now upon the first day of the week,' specifies his resurrection, his appearance 'that same day' to the two disciples going to Emmaus, the return of those disciples 'the same hour' to Jerusalem, the reappearance of Christ the same day to the eleven, and then in immediate connection and direct reference to the same day (for no change of time is intimated) it is added, 'And he led them out as far as to Bethany,' etc. If the account of the ascension were only recorded in Luke's Gospel, then, judging simply from the context, and the continuous, uninterrupted narrative of the events of the first day of the week, no one could form any other conclusion than that the ascension took place on the same first day of the week, or Sunday. Should we find such a connected relation of events, limited by its specifications of time, in any other author aside from the Scriptures, we should at once adopt the interpretation just suggested. We see no reason why the verses portraying this ascension should be wrested from

the preceding context, and be applied to another ascension described in Acts. To do this is a violation of the narrative itself, is virtually an impeachment of the veracity of the evangelist, making him contradictory in his testimony respecting the place, distance, etc., and is only increasing, unnecessarily, the difficulties of interpretation. Letting the two accounts, written by the same man, written under the guidance of the Spirit, speak for themselves, we conclude from what has already been adduced that the ascension from Bethany occurred on Sunday, on the same first day of the week, thus remarkably corresponding with the opening sentences of Acts, in which Luke assures us that he closed his former treatise, the Gospel, with 'the day in which he was taken up,' and yet afterward proceeds to give us another account of an ascension.

"II. We now invite attention to what some commentators assert is the most difficult passage connected with this part of Christ's history; namely, to John xx, 17: 'Jesus saith unto her, Touch me not; for I have not yet ascended to my Father.' This Scripture is only made difficult and dark when the literal sense is discarded, and the word properly rendered *touch* is changed into something else that the original will not bear, and the perfect and present tenses of the word translated *ascend* is unwarrantably transformed into the future tense. Christ addressed these words to Mary, to whom he first manifested himself after his resurrection. The main, the great difficulty in the passage to those who hold to one ascension is this: Why does Jesus forbid Mary to touch him, and assign as a reason for not allowing this personal contact, 'For I have not yet ascended to my Father,' when he afterward, before the ascension of Acts i, permitted the women and the disciples to thus touch him? They can not rid themselves of the simple implication that follows; namely, that if he had ascended, she might then touch him without rebuke. Now it is evident that so long as the notion of a single ascension at the

close of the forty days is prevalent, just so long will it be impossible for any one to give a solution to this difficulty, allowing our version as well as the original its due literal meaning. With such, the only way that they can meet the embarrassment is either to append, or change, the words as stated, or else to state that this belongs to the secret, unrevealed things of God, about which we ought not be overcurious. On the other hand, let us accept the language of Barnabas, confirmed by the Scriptures, and we find this very passage, so troublesome to others, easily comprehended. Without resorting to a substituted meaning, or the least change of any part of it, we are enabled to understand how the literal, plain meaning, attached to the verse is fulfilled, and by a comparison with other Scripture may even entertain a correct idea why it should be fulfilled in this manner. The reader will notice that Christ appeared to Mary on Sunday, and that on the very same day the prohibition, not to touch him, was withdrawn, for on the same Sunday (Luke xxiv, 39; John xx, 25) he told his disciples 'handle me and see,' etc. Before his final ascension he was touched by many women and disciples. It is apparent, therefore, that the reason which, in the first place, led Christ to forbid Mary to touch him, was the same day removed; it existed no longer. But how removed? The answer is irresistible and consistent, and consists in this: Between the time Mary saw him, and his manifestation to the two disciples, he had ascended to the Father; yea, even between the time he addressed Mary, and the time one of the companies of women (Matt. xxviii, 9) 'came and held him by the feet and worshiped him.'\* This accords with what immediately follows: 'Go to my brethren, and say to them, I ascend to my Father,

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\* For a chronological arrangement of the events connected with the resurrection, and for a harmonious reconciliation of apparent difficulties, I respectfully refer the reader to Judge Jones's Notes on Scripture.

and your Father, to my God, and your God.' Let the reader be so indulgent as to pause here and reflect, why Christ should, at this juncture, send a notice or message of his ascension to the Father, when, if he was only to ascend at the end of forty days, he could have, if so conditioned, communicated it in person. Let him also consider that Christ uses a present, emphatic tense, suitable to a contemplated present ascension. Surely this language has a deeper significancy than that usually assigned to it, for it denotes that that speedy departure to the Father, of which he had previously spoken, was then, at that very time, to be accomplished, and therefore he sends his disciples word by Mary, that he was just then about to execute the promise previously given.

"This view is strengthened, when we come to consider why Jesus should thus ascend on the first day of the week. Whilst we cheerfully and reverently admit that reasons beyond our knowledge may exist why this should be so, yet we also feel that what the Scriptures may reveal, either directly or indirectly on this point, is worthy of being pondered and appropriated, especially if it may serve to honor and exalt the Savior in our hearts. Jesus himself gives us a clue to the mystery, when toward the close of this same Sunday, after his message, ascension and return from the Father, he appears to his disciples and says: 'These are the words which I spake unto you, while I was yet with you, *that all things must be fulfilled, which were written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning me.*' Let us turn then to these Scriptures, and see whether they contain any thing that should make it, to say the least, suitable for Christ to ascend on that particular Sunday before any one should touch him. (1.) In reference to the fact that previous to his ascension no one should touch him, we refer to what is stated of the Jewish high-priest before he was allowed to enter into the Holy of Holies. The priest was

bound under a penalty of death to a due preparation, whilst all others were excluded from the tabernacle. He was to enter alone, and all others were not permitted to be with him, lest his peculiar, distinctive office should be impaired, yea, lest even the slightest touch of those, in whose behalf he was thus officiating, should convey a ceremonial or actual pollution. If in ordinary circumstances, in the conveyance of the sanctuary and its appurtenances, the sons of Kohath were not permitted to 'touch any holy thing lest they die,' much more would this be observed in the person of the high-priest after his special cleansing, when he officiated once a year in the most holy of all the Jewish appointments. All will agree, from the application made by the apostle Paul in Hebrews, that this high-priest is, in thus acting, a type of Christ. Moreover, from Hebrews ix, 11-12, etc., all will admit that the earthly holy of holies is a type of the upper sanctuary. These two facts being admitted, the rest is plain. If the type is fulfilled as carefully as the type of the paschal lamb, then it follows that just as the Jewish high-priest was not accessible to the touch of those for whom he acted, so our high-priest, before entering the upper sanctuary, could not allow Mary or any other person to touch him. The blood had been shed, but the priest must also, ceremoniously pure, in order to fulfill all that was written, enter the holiest place of all—the special abiding place of the Father. The narratives of the evangelists, when correctly apprehended, teach this beautiful, astounding fulfillment. Thus, again we perceive why this Sunday, the first day of the week, is selected for the ascension, in order to avoid the touch of others after the sacrifice is offered, previous to his entering, priest-like, the holy of holies. (2.) But a weightier reason for the latter—namely, to thus select Sunday—is found in the temple service of this first day of the week. This period, so far as that service is concerned, is significant of Christ, for it was no mere coincidence that Jesus was slain

during the feast of the passover, that various typical adumbrations were realized in the antitype, that the very time appointed for the paschal lamb to be slain was also the time in which he died, and that on the third day he should arise from the grave to meet the typical requirements of what was foreshadowed in the temple. Every reader is acquainted with the divine ordinance, instituted by God in connection with the passover; namely, that a prescribed oblation followed the sacrifice. The Jews were prohibited from gathering in the harvest until they had offered to God the sheaf, or first fruits, of the harvest, otherwise the harvest was not properly sanctified. The sheaf thus brought before the passover "was laid up before the Lord until *the morrow after the Sabbath*," when it was brought out and waved before the Lord, and it is briefly but emphatically stated "to be accepted for you." Some writers inform us that these first fruits gave notice that the general harvest would also be gathered, forming thus a pledge of God's continued good will, etc. This is true, only that we find more contained in it than the idea of a pledge. This sheaf is a type of Christ, who is represented to us under this figurative action as '*the first fruits*.' He is thus called, in view of this resemblance, by the apostle Paul, 'the first fruits' and 'the first fruits of them that slept.' (1 Cor. xv, 20-23, etc.) In the argument of the apostle, he confines himself simply to the doctrine of the resurrection, and infers as 'the first fruits' were gathered from the dead, so also shall the harvest from the dead be gathered at his coming. The doctrine of the ascension is not touched, only by way of implication, and it would not carry out the full typical significancy of the sheaf were it only confined to the act of resurrection. This sheaf was gathered, according to the divine ordinance, and kept, until the Sabbath was past, and on the morrow after the Sabbath—the first day of the week, or Sunday—was it brought forth and waved, as an oblation or offering before

the Lord, and the Lord *then accepted it*. It is not recognized by the Almighty as accepted, unless the condition imposed by the ordinance is fully carried out; namely, it must be presented or waved *before him*. We see in the *paschal lamb* how Christ is both the victim and the priest, necessarily so, and here again he is the sheaf and the priest. Now to verify the type and make it valid, he must in his priestly character present this sheaf before the Lord. How will he do this, and where will he do it? Certainly not as the Jewish priest did here on earth, and not in an earthly temple which is a type of better things. To meet the conditions of the type, it is requisite that the sheaf should be brought into the upper sanctuary, where the Lord, the Father, acknowledges its acceptance, and through this very acceptance gives us the assurance that Paul exhibits, when writing concerning the resurrection of the just. Yea, more than this, by the acceptance of this sheaf, God pledges himself that that harvest of the righteous ones to which the first fruits belong shall be holy, thus establishing the promises relating to the future glorification of that harvest, seeing that by virtue of the presentation of this sheaf, the special blessing of God is secured upon the harvest. But when shall this sheaf be thus presented before God? The answer is direct: As Christ died at the very time the paschal lamb was slain, so should he present himself before God on the same day that the first fruits of the harvest are offered before the Lord. This was done on Sunday by the earthly officiating priest, and so we say this was also done on the same day, in a higher, nobler sense, by 'the high-priest of our profession,' by his ascension to the Father, as he directed Mary to tell his disciples.

"Thus having contributed, by an appeal to Scripture, some material on the subject that may be conducive to meditation upon, and thoughtful consideration of, the ascension, we will now conclude with a few additional thoughts or reflections, several of which may more clearly



elucidate our views and prevent a misapprehension of our position.

“(a.) From what has been said, the reader is prepared for the announcement that there were, at least, several ascensions. We have already shown that we are compelled to discriminate between the ascension from Bethany and the one from Mt. Olivet. The places are different, the distance, etc., is diverse, the one from the other. But we are equally obliged to distinguish between the ascension from Bethany and the one referred to by Dr. Neander in his note on Barnabas’s epistle, namely, ‘That Christ rose to heaven immediately after his first appearance to Mary as the risen Savior.’ We have seen how, as the antitype, he ascends on Sunday; next, as the same antitype, we recognize in his prohibition to Mary not to touch him contrasted with the type, the high-priest, how he ascends before any one, for whom he enters the holiest place, shall touch him. From Luke we learn that, on the same day toward evening, he invited his disciples to touch him, and we also find that on the same day several women touched his person without his forbidding them. Therefore we are driven to both the conclusions deducible, as Dr. Neander intimates, from the language of Barnabas, that Christ both ascended on Sunday and immediately after his appearance to Mary. In no other way can we consistently, without altering a word or tense of the narrative, reconcile the statements made concerning it or the events connected therewith. Admit several ascensions, and the difficulties are at once removed; for we find no discrepancy existing in the important testimony of the same inspired writer, either as to time or place, or distance, and we also will then consider the address to Mary and the message forwarded to the disciples through her, indicative of a high purpose in fulfilling all that is written concerning him. The fact is, that in comparing the gospels, we are forcibly reminded that Christ frequently ap-

peared and disappeared. Is there any passage that forbids the idea that, during the periods of his disappearance, he had departed or ascended to heaven? We know of none, but, on the contrary, by analogy, considering his appearance whilst in heaven with the Father, visibly to patriarchs and holy men as the Angel Jehovah, his appearance to Paul after his final ascension described in Acts i, we are far from believing that his ascensions are even to be confined to these three. The first one being invisible is not directly mentioned; the second from Bethany being seen by a few chosen followers, is stated; the third, being witnessed by a larger number or being designed for a particular purpose, is described to us; the others, being also unseen, are for that reason not mentioned.\*

“(b.) The design of these ascensions is another matter, that will serve to confirm this view. Leaving out of consideration those intermediate ones, whatever their number may be, intended or brought about to confirm the doctrine of a valid resurrection, to impart instruction and to convince the intended witnesses of his acceptance and power with the Father, we shall confine ourselves to the two, which stand forth pre-eminently as a confirmation of the truth. (1.) The ascension immediately after our Lord’s interview with Mary first deserves our notice. This was not witnessed, and necessarily so, in order to fulfill the type. The Jewish high-priest was not visible to the people, when entering the inner temple, seeing that the latter were separated from him. Previous to his entering in, he may have been seen, just as Christ was seen by Mary previous to his priestly act. Christ in all things, to sanc-

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“\*Some, to weaken this argument, tell us that Christ, daily conversed with the disciples; but even if this were granted, [which we do not] it would be no valid reason for rejecting our view, seeing that Christ can ascend to heaven and return the same day. To give it force, the objector must show that such power is denied to our Lord.

tify the harvest, yea, to make the atonement valid, according to its typical prefigurement, fulfills the conditions of the ordinance, and, acting in the capacity of high-priest, goes alone, without being touched and the prying eye of curiosity or the look of amazement fastened on him, into the most holy place, the upper sanctuary. If we recognize the type as verified in the antitype, *then* must we ascribe that peculiar and transcendent efficacy, usually attributed to the last visible ascension, to this private ascension. To comprehend this subject rightly, we must keep in view that, in the priestly character assumed by Christ, he joins, with the presentation of the sheaf and his previous sacrifice, that great and solemn act which was, some time after the passover and the waving of the sheaf, performed by the high-priest in the great day of atonement, namely, to enter into the *sanctum sanctorum*, the most holy place, with the evidences that a sacrifice had been offered in the outer court, or door of the tabernacle; and by thus proceeding, the divine assurance was given that the sacrifice for the sins of the whole people was accepted. This act of entering into the most holy place is originally confined, not to the feast of passover, but to another feast; nevertheless, seeing that the sacrifice is made, and that the sheaf is to be presented, this official function, this most solemn part of the priest's work, thus necessarily becomes united with the paschal and first fruit proceedings. Still it is to be regarded as a specific priestly work of Christ, and included, as it is, in this first ascension, embraces two points, the first in importance, the presentation in the upper sanctuary of the evidences of the sacrifice made by him; the second, of scarcely less magnitude, the presentation of the sheaf or first fruits to insure the sanctification of the harvest, both being virtually united, because the latter is dependent on the former, just as the sacrifice precedes the waving of the sheaf. Viewed thus, this first private ascension, far from being designed as a testimony

for men respecting either the atonement, or its results, is intended to carry out fully that which was typically represented as intimately connected with the priestly office of Christ, and hence has a more particular reference to the Father. It is the solemn act, by which the priest, separated from men, and the God who commissioned him, meet the former to present the tokens commanded, the latter to vindicate by the reception of this priest into the most holy place, that what that priest has done is amply sufficient to protect the heavenly from all impurity in granting the forgiveness of sins to all in the nation who confess their sins and exercise faith in the priestly sacrifice and offering. Much might here be said, how this crowning act foreshadows the moral purity of God's government, and evinces both the justice and mercy of the Father; but sufficient has been said to lead any one who wishes it into a consecutive train of thought on this point. We leave this part, then, by remarking, that what many commentators and theologians generally say respecting the relation of the last visible ascension to the atonement must be understood as referring to this first, private, unwitnessed ascension. If the high-priest under the Levitical economy is a type of Christ, as all admit, we ask, must he not *especially be such* when engaged but once a year in the most important of all his functions? If so, will not the antitype fulfill his typical character in this identical respect? We say, unhesitatingly, reverently, thankfully, Yes, he will. Then we add: It is not sufficient to confine ourselves to saying, that by this ascension he gained the confirmation of his mediatorial position; he became the prevailing intercessor, he obtained all power as God-man to carry out the divine purposes, etc. All this is true, and more blessed truths can be added to the number; and yet, keeping the type in view, the plain, simple fact impressingly fastens its convincing witness upon our minds, that this first ascension was indispensably necessary to se-

cure the validity, the recognition, the full, complete, acceptance of the sacrifice by the Father. So the apostle argues, Heb. ix, 14-24, etc., and therefore it follows that Christ, on this first day of the week, yet untouched, ceremoniously clean, appointed to present the sheaf, was engaged in one of the most astonishing of his priestly offices.

“(2.) The last ascension from Mt. Olivet is also given for a special purpose. We have already seen how it is to be distinguished from that of Bethany, owing to place and distance and time. Events then occurring would likewise aid us in discriminating between the two, but it may suffice to refer to one only. This was a visible ascension, designed to enable his disciples to testify to one of the great truths, to which all others sustain a mutual relation, underlying Christianity. As it was to be the final one, and lest they should apprehend that he would continue to appear unto them, at intervals as before, angels are specially commissioned to explain the fact, that at his future return he would only come in the same, visible bodily striking manner in which he left them. Before this his appearance was sudden, unexpected in their midst, without their being able to see his descent. This corroborates the meaning attached by some critics to the phrase, Luke xxiv, 51, in the account of the ascension from Bethany, “*διέστη ἀπ’ αὐτῶν*,” he withdrew a little space from them,” and then, after this removal, ascending to heaven. For it is supposed that, nothing being directly said that the disciples saw Christ ascending, it was unseen by them. As to the latter we can not, on account of the brevity of the language, and the peculiar language used being susceptible of several renderings, vouch for its correctness, and indeed it is not necessary. This much we can, however, say, that the other ascension from Bethany being somewhat doubtful as to its visibility, we can apply, with appropriateness, the intended design of a visible ascension to the last which is

undoubted, certainly established. To avoid undue length, it is sufficient to declare that many of the reasons given by commentators and theologians for it are to be received, whilst those specified as belonging in a peculiar sense to the first ascension are all indirectly thus confirmed. Almost any writer on the subject presents them, such as to enable the disciples to give a distinct testimony respecting him, to show that he had finished his work relating to that period on earth, and that it was requisite for its continuation and completion that he should ascend; that his priesthood should be continually manifested in the upper sanctuary; that his intercession and advocacy with the Father were constantly required in behalf of his own brethren; that the Spirit under this intercessory interposition might be given to all and in an especial manner to his witnesses and their contemporaries; that it indicated a complete, perfect Savior, in all respects adapted to redemption, etc. We may, perhaps, find an additional reason if we keep in view the typical temple service. Christ appeared at various times during the forty days, in order to prepare his disciples for coming events by instructing them on several topics, but why was this done only forty days? Why not one hundred days? If we turn to Moses we ascertain that precisely fifty days after, on the fiftieth day the second Feast is held, namely, the Feast of Pentecost, or the Feast of Weeks, or Feast of the Harvest, or the Feast of the Day of First Fruits. We have seen how the sheaf is taken from the barley harvest, the harvest nearest to the slaying of the paschal lamb, from which the type to be exhibited so soon after the sacrifice is therefore taken; here we see another feast representing the first fruits also, but in a different form. Instead of a sheaf, the exact counterpart of the harvest in its bodily form, these first fruits are of the wheat harvest, that wheat that is finally to be gathered, is typically presented to us in a new form; namely, in *two* loaves of bread, made and baked

with *leaven*. (Lev. xxiii, 17.) These the Jews are to 'bring out of your (their) habitations," as "the first fruits unto the Lord," with certain offerings (Numbers xxviii, 22) indicative that they are accepted through an atonement. These first fruits are, accordingly, described to us under a new aspect, under a leavened form, ready for use, prepared for the table. The forbidding the use of leavened bread, in connection with other observances, is evidently intended to protect and secure this typically leavened bread of the first fruits. What does it design to typify? Christ, as the first fruits, under the idea of bread that is perfected, adapted to our use, by the partaking of which we obtain life, and through which the wheat harvest is sanctified. Let us here tread cautiously but firmly, looking alone to the inspired Word for information. Jesus, as John teaches, was always the Bread before he came, and whilst he was tabernacling on the earth; and yet after he suffered and gave his life as a ransom, this Bread is declared to be thus perfected; previous to his own death, it is the *unleavened* Bread; after his death it is the *leavened* Bread. As the apostle Paul says (1 Cor. x, 17, 18): 'We are all partakers of that one Bread,' but with this difference, that the Jews, under the Levitical economy, eat of it, whilst still unleavened; that is, before it passes through the entire process (if it may, to carry on the figure, be thus called) required by the law of God, yet in a form foreshadowing what was demanded by the holiness and justice of God. On the other hand, we, who believe under the present arrangement, eat of it in its leavened state; that is, after it has passed through all the requirements demanded for its perfection, seeing that 'it became him for whom are all things, and by whom are all things in bringing many sons (the harvest) unto glory, to make the Captain of their salvation (the first fruits) perfect through sufferings.' (Heb. ii, 10.) Who does not, in this connection, think of this passage: 'Though he were a Son, yet learned he



obedience by the things which he suffered, and being made perfect, he became the author of eternal salvation unto all that obey him.' (Heb. v, 8, 9.) (Query: Do the *two* loaves indicate the God-manship of the Christ—the relation that the divine sustains to the incarnate, and from hence the relation that the divine sustains to the human in the future harvest, or ought we not to press the type thus far? It may be immaterial, and it may possess a deep meaning.) This will be more clearly appreciated if we ponder the wonderfully expressive words of Jesus recorded John vi, 51–53, etc. After telling his disciples that he was the Bread, he adds: 'The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world.' 'Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day,' etc. 'So he that eateth me, even he shall live by me: this is that bread which came down from heaven,' etc. Now observe closely what follows: These words gave great offense, and even the disciples 'murmured at it,' and said, 'This is a hard saying; who can hear it?' What does our Lord do to allay this feeling? He directs attention very briefly to two things; namely, to the ascension, 'What and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where he was before?' and to the Spirit, 'It is the Spirit that quickeneth,' etc. Why these two references, if they do not in some way stand related to this Bread. They do, for as to this ascension the allusion, proved by the after history of these same murmuring disciples, is: Wait until you see my ascension to heaven, and then you will no longer murmur, but gladly acknowledge that I am the true Bread that comes down from heaven; and as to the Spirit, this has respect to the fact that it is through the power of the Spirit that this Bread is made efficacious and the harvest is secured. The glimpses of sublimity, of earthly beauty that shine forth in this par-

allel between the type and the antitype, warn us not to press it too far, not to be too eager to penetrate into those mysterious temple services, lest we, in our ignorance, should inadvertently mar any portion of those interesting revelations. This, however, we must add to unite the threads of our reasoning; this last visible ascension is specially designed, not merely to give faith in that Bread, but to meet the type of the perfected Bread. That type was exhibited on the day of Pentecost; therefore, his ascension precedes that time in order to unite with the day of its exhibition a second truth; namely, that it is expedient for the Holy Ghost to accompany this Bread, so that it may impart life. It is the office of the Spirit to testify concerning this Bread, to aid us in partaking of it, to manifest in the gathered harvest its life-giving power, and hence, to fulfill the promise of this Spirit—the *very day* is selected in which this Bread is typified in its perfected state. Consequently, as a prerequisite, the ascension precedes that day to show us that we do not eat earthly but heavenly Bread, and that the Spirit may, in connection with the type itself, be sent in such an extraordinary, powerful manner, united with visible effects as to prove, beyond doubt, the life-giving efficacy of the Bread itself. From all this we conclude that as the first, the private ascension more particularly related to the atonement and its pre-ordained (in the type) acceptance by the Father, so this last ascension was specially designed to show the true perfected Bread, and through the special manifestation of the Spirit, forwarded by this ascension to teach us that this Bread, the first fruits, was as such recognized by the Father, and will result in his blessing the harvest.

“(c.) This view, if thus entertained, not only reconciles the Scriptures, as already intimated, not only finds its ground in the typical temple service as shown, but also enables us to find many beautiful indirect testimonies in its favor. Thus, to illustrate my meaning: It is generally,

if not universally, admitted that by the ascension Christ entered into his glory. Many passages of Scripture teach this, and Barrow and others, in their exposition of the Creed, bring them together and deduce the doctrine from them. Now, if the view taught in this article is correct, then it follows that Jesus entered into his glory when he made his first private ascension, and that which is usually ascribed to his final ascension must be attributed to his first one. From the design of the first ascension, if carried out as we have taught, it follows that he was then already recognized as the constituted Mediator, effectual in his calling, in glory, exalted above all creatures. Have we, then, any thing that directly or indirectly proclaims that on the first day of the week he entered into his glory? If we follow the example of the translators of our version, in translating both verbs in the aorist form, in the same sentence, as they have done in one of them, by giving it the force of the perfect infinitive (and critics say that this may be done with equal propriety—*Jones's Notes on Scripture*, p. 491), then we have it intimated in the following. After our Lord's interview with Mary, he ascended to heaven and performed his high-priestly function, and then returned the same day, appearing to the two disciples on the road to Emmaus. After conversing with these disciples, and finding them faithless, he said, 'O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken, ought not Christ to have suffered [*παθεῖν*] these things, and to enter [*καὶ εἰσελθεῖν*, to have entered] into his glory.' If the translators, under the notion, apparently, of one ascension at the end of forty days, could take the liberty of giving the one verb the idea of an action already accomplished, why not allow us the same liberty in regard to the second verb? All that we contend for is, that both the verbs should be treated alike. If this is accorded, then it affords us an additional confirmation of the correctness of our position; for, taking into consideration 'these things'

that were the subject of conversation between *esus* and the disciples, the translators could not do otherwise than give the rendering of the first verb as we find it in our version. The second, intimately connected in the same sentence, follows the lead of the first one, inasmuch as it comes in the same form. Other illustrations, derived from the intimations of Christ, in his interview with the eleven, that he was not a proper inhabitant of the earth, from the disappearance of Christ, from the statement in Acts i, 1, 2, might be given, but we deem this one sufficient for the purpose.

“(d.) The place where Christ ascended to has been stated—into heaven. The purposes for which he ascended required that he, as high-priest, should enter into the more special presence and residence of the Father. Many Scriptures point out this truth; and we are equally assured that he continues in heaven with the Father. This is all that we know; for it has not been revealed where this heaven is located, and how far Jesus ascended before he entered the upper sanctuary. It would be unprofitable to offer mere conjecture, seeing that, from the nature of the case, it is impossible, with our present powers and limited knowledge, to form an opinion susceptible of proof.

“But, somehow, intuitively perhaps, we form the idea that it is a great distance from us. This may have such an influence on some as to cause them to reject this first ascension, in view of the exceeding shortness of the time allotted to it and his return. Perhaps it did not occupy a space of time any longer than that in which the typical high-priest officiated. This to them appears incredible—a work of insuperable difficulty. Surely those who properly comprehend the attributes of the Savior, who contemplate the divine nature of the Lord, can not urge this as an objection, for they know that his power, his ability to transport himself, is in some mysterious manner connected with his will. He has only to will what he purposes, and

it is done. We need only direct attention to what many writers, commentators, and theologians, have told us respecting the person of Christ, the risen body of Christ pervaded by omnipotence, the power and celerity of angels, as specified by Daniel, and a perusal of any of them will be amply sufficient to show that to such a being as the God-man the whole universe is accessible, according to the pleasure of his will, so that the speed of all created things—of angels, sound, light, electricity—is as naught in comparison with the velocity merely dependent on the divine will. It is beyond our comprehension, and must be received, just as many other facts are, by faith. The thought must occur to the reflecting, if this first ascension thus took place after the interview with Mary, then we have an additional proof of the power of our High-priest. He who could thus speedily ascend to the Father and return to meet and encourage others, is indeed a mighty Savior, none other but a God-man.”

It will be readily seen that this Scripture interpreted by Scripture throws light upon this subject that conflicts with the bishop’s application of the text, and therefore renders it, for all purposes that he would make of it in this argument, practically useless.

On the same page the statement surprises us “that no historian has given us any account of the future glorified resurrection *body*.” But he proceeds to tell us of Stephen seeing it when heaven opened, “and saw the glory of God, and Jesus standing on the right hand of God,” etc.; but that he does not describe it. Paul gives an account of seeing him as one born out of due time, but he does not give a description sufficiently satisfactory to mortal minds and hearts. He refers to the appearance of the light, and by implication would have us believe that Christ’s personal appearance corresponded to the same. John, on Patmos Isle, saw him and describes him, as he stood among the scenes of the Apocalypse, and we

are reminded by it of the transfiguration appearance of Christ. Then the bishop adds:

“We shall be changed, not like unto the body of the post-resurrection history, while he yet tarried among us, but like unto the body he received amid the splendor of the Olivet scene, when the earthly was exchanged for the heavenly.”

“Received.” All this argument about him “receiving” another body at ascension, we have proven to be vain. The ascension up into heaven of a body glorified is, throughout the entire Gospel narrative, ratified by the epistles, and is predicated of the body that was crucified, buried, and raised from the dead. This, we think, has been clearly proven in the previous argument.

But in passing let me suggest that the reader will read *Lange* on 1 Cor. xv, and especially the German rendering: “It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body.” This is the body—the soul-body—or body made alive by the soul, that appeared to Stephen, Paul, and John as well as in the transfiguration.

One point is at hand before dismissing this part of the bishop’s argument, and that is on that of *identity*. Whatever may be the glorified appearance of the resurrection body of Christ, though we are told that we know nothing about it, and that “no historian has given us any account of it,” yet at every appearance to mortals, as in the transfiguration, to Stephen, to Saul, or to John in revelation, still the identity was readily made. There is a partial exception in the case of Saul, who asked, “Who art thou, Lord?” which grew out of the ignorance incident to his *relation* to Christ rather than from any thing else, he having never seen him.

## SECTION XX.

On page 165 much is made of our ignorance of the *appearance* of the immortal body. He says that Stephen “does not undertake to describe it, but we may venture



to say that the son of Mary was greatly changed in the fashion and substance of his bodily presence."

Stephen only speaks of seeing him, but do we understand that there is no attempt at description by others? What, then, is meant by the descriptive language in Rev. i, and also in the narrative of the transfiguration?

I am quite certain that revelation which we may accept as the "historian" of immortals, is not silent on this phase of the subject, the *appearance* of the immortal state. We certainly have descriptions of Christ's glorified body in the instances alluded to. In the transfiguration he appeared "in glory." I presume the apostle intends to teach that as there are stars of differing magnitude, that so it will be in the resurrection state—differing in glory, but with substantially the same general appearance. Thus we are told of our glorified state, that "We shall be like him." Of course, John, as the bishop says, does not attempt a description of him, in connection with these words; but it is illogical to assume that therefore there is no description at all given of him in the Scriptures, for this same John does describe him in the first chapter of Revelation, and he is also described in the transfiguration. Daniel also beheld him as the Ancient of days, while of Stephen it is only said that he saw him; but inferring from the place where he represents Christ to be standing, we also infer a reference to the same appearance alluded to elsewhere.

Again. When we are told that we shall be "like unto the angels," or "equal unto angels," as we have it in our translation (either rendering will do), it is legitimate to suppose that we shall also be like them in appearance. While Stephen stood before the council immortality was already dawning upon him, so much so that it is said that his face shined "as if it had been the face of an angel." We shall be "equal" to them or *like them*, also, in appearance.

"Reasoning from analogy," says Professor H. Louis Baugher, "we would suppose angels would as far surpass



man in noble mien and glory as man surpasses the rest of terrestrial creation; and as the attendants of a king share his state and set it forth, so the train of the Great King should have and appear with a glorious dignity, becoming him on whom they wait; that, as the moon and the stars reflect the light of the sun around which they revolve, so these 'morning stars,' that circle around the great spotless Sun that has lighted all, should gleam with his dazzling majesty; that these 'sons of God' should bear, in some degree, the glorious lineaments of their great Father. The face of Moses, when he came down from communion with God on the mount, so shone that the children of Israel could not look upon it: what, then, shall we infer of the faces of those who see God in his undimmed majesty? There are many reasons why, in their visits to earth, the glory of angels should be veiled from human eyes; yet there have been some manifestations which we may regard as faint outlines of the reality, patterns of things in the heavens. Matthew (xxviii, 3) says of the angel that rolled away the stone from the door of the sepulcher, 'His countenance was like lightning, and his raiment white as snow.' When the angel of the Lord appeared to the shepherds (Luke ii, 9) there shone round about them the glory of the Lord. When the angel appeared to Peter in prison (Acts xii, 7) 'a light shined' therein; and what light was it but the heavenly radiance of the messenger? Of Stephen on trial, the sacred penman (Acts vi, 15) says, 'And all that sat in the council, looking steadfastly on him, saw his face as it had been the face of an angel.'

"Compare the account of the transfiguration, when Christ's face did shine as the sun, and his raiment was white as the light (Matt. vii, 2), and of that exceeding brightness that struck Paul and his company, when the Lord Jesus appeared to him on the road to Damascus (Acts ix); and see the description in the Apocalypse

(i, 13, *et seq.*), of 'one like unto the Son of man,' that appeared to John: and from these representations get an intimation of the glorious appearance of angels; for, 'As is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly.'

"Time makes an impression on man's features; not only an impression of development, but also of decay; his beauty fades, his eye grows dim, his brow wrinkles, he gets *old*, he *feels old*. Has eternity any similar effect on the angels? Do *they* become *old*? They certainly receive impressions and *increase* in knowledge (1 Peter i, 12, *et alt.*), there is development; but why should there be age among creatures that have never sinned, and that have no sentence of death written in their members? What is age, but death coming on apace? What is it that fades the beautiful form, dims the radiant eye, wrinkles the placid brow, and changes strength to weakness? what is it but sin that makes us *old*? It is the tardy execution of the sentence, 'Thou shalt surely die.'

"It is not time that flies;  
 'Tis we, 'tis we are flying:  
 It is not life that dies:  
 'Tis we, 'tis we are dying.  
 Time and eternity are one;  
 Time is eternity begun;  
 Life changes, yet without decay;  
 'Tis we alone who pass away.'"

There is no fading among the blessed spirits that never lost their title to immortality. Theirs is immortal youth, eternal brightness, unfailing vigor. The angels who appeared at the sepulcher—though at least four thousand years old—were still "*young men*."

In the resurrection state we shall be the "children of God, being the children of the resurrection;" and as we are known by the same appellation in the resurrection state that the angels were known by—"sons of God"—when they sang together, for joy at the laying the founda-

tions of the earth, so may we carry out this figure and fact, and apply it to the *appearance* of the *body* in the immortal state.

We are not, therefore, in that total ignorance of the appearance of our future glorified state, held by some.

### SECTION XXI.

Page 166-7. The bishop proceeds, so he says, to "examine particular passages, more particularly describing the resurrection life; possibly they may shed some light on our path. There are, so far as I know, three views on the subject:

"First. That which teaches a resurrection at some remote future, of the precise body laid in the grave.

"Second. A resurrection of a body from some indestructible germ in a remote future.

"Third. A resurrection or emergence at the time of death of a spiritual body."

These are the leading propositions concerning the doctrine of the resurrection. Let us now see what position our author holds. The burden of his conclusion is, that while he has no conclusion in particular of his own, still he does conclude to determine the doctrine as held by all standard authority as indefinite and unsatisfactory—this much and no more. He says:

"I have tried, with great honesty and prayerful and patient study, to compare these several theories, and elect between them, and I am in candor compelled to admit that I can not reach a conclusion. I do not believe that any has the data for an undoubted determination. The substance or truth lies within the circle of the three, but precisely what it is seems to me indeterminable."

It seems that some men labor to confuse rather than to clear away error. The bishop, though in position, honor, and learning, still announces himself a seeker. Thus are we all. But are we to reverse the promises and

say, "Seek and ye shall *not* find," etc? I do not lay claim, nor can any other, to the solution of all mystery; but I do claim that the facts about which he manifests seeming confusion, are plainly set forth in revelation. In the light of reason and revelation, examine the three propositions named. He says:

"That the *first* theory is *false*, so far as it teaches a literal resurrection of the precise substance of the body that dies, I can not doubt, though there are passages that seem to teach it."

This style of argument is of the same character with that on page 158, which says: "Ordinarily it (the resurrection) is understood of the body, but it is a noticeable fact that the body is not once mentioned in the Scriptures as the subject;" then proceeds to say, "Though there are passages which unmistakably point to the body;" then quotes one illustrating the fact; that is, "Who shall change these vile bodies and fashion them like unto his glorious body."

The reader will recognize the embarrassment in dealing with a controversialist who in one breath denies the truth, and the next admits it; and then proceeds to deny again, and then again admits the truth. This is peculiarly a characteristic of our author's procedure, as if his assertions were too strong for proof, and that his adventures are too far, and that steps backward were necessary to his own safety. But this position renders him inconsistent throughout.

He specifies the precise passages which, in one breath, he says "unmistakably point to the *body* as the *subject*" of the resurrection—so admitted; and yet proceeds by the mere dint of assumption to deny the fact of Scripture predicating the resurrection of the *body*. Another illustration is found on page 157. As to these passages he says:

"Such are the following: Isa. xxvi, 19: 'Thy *dead men* shall live, together with my *dead body* shall they arise.

Awake and sing, ye that dwell in the dust: for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast out her dead.' Dan. xii, 2: 'And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt.' John v, 28, 29: 'Marvel not at this; for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation.' Also xi, 23: 'Jesus saith unto her, Thy brother shall rise again. Martha saith unto him, I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day.' Acts iv, 2: 'Being grieved that they taught the people, and preached through Jesus the resurrection from the dead.' Also xxiv, 15: 'And have hope toward God, which they themselves also allow, that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and the unjust.' 1 Cor. xv, 42: 'So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption.' 1. Thes. iv, 16: 'For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God; and the dead in Christ shall rise first.'"

He adds: "If I can understand language, these passages do certainly teach a general resurrection at the end of the world, and in connection with a final and general judgment." He further admits that "the attempt to explain them so as to mean a resurrection and judgment which is now progressing, or so as to refer them to any local and temporal events, or to any facts in the current of providential history, is not satisfactory. It must be that our Lord designed to teach some special and grand event, in which all nations and all men shall simultaneously participate."

Thus far so good. But the misleading character of the bishop's statement is seen in the sentences immediately following. In the quotation made there is not a period

where I placed one, but so far as the quotation is made it establishes the admission of a general resurrection of the literal bodies that died. I so understand the admission. The general judgment following is also admitted. But the error into which we are invited is contained in what follows, which is claimed to be the purpose of the *raising* or resuscitation of the literal body from the grave, that it might afterward be *resurrected* into a spiritual body. Going back a little, mark the statement: "It must be that our Lord designed to teach some special and grand event, in which all nations and all men shall simultaneously participate, and *from which they shall date a new departure, and which is in some way connected with their emergence from death—the resurrection of the dead.*"

We have here (1) the statement made that the raising of dead bodies from the grave is not the resurrection, but that (2) it is preparatory to it; and (3) by implication it is taught that the state to which they are raised from the dead is that of mortality; (4) that the ascension in *a* body assumed is the resurrection. I rule out *a* body and contend for *the* body. (5.) It is assumed that the raising of the body from the grave is not an emergence from death, but that which follows is.

But after the above admissions the subject is further confused by the following statement, which I understand applies to the bodies raised from the grave and before their final ascension:

*"That all the dead do then appear in bodies I find it impossible to doubt, but that they are substantially the bodies in which they once lived on the earth, I can not for one moment believe."*

As I look at the girations of this curious reasoning with the hope that I might catch the swift-winged thought and put it under the glass of reason and logic, as well as that of revealed truth, I find the argument greatly confused by his procedure. Another discovery I make, and

that is, that his explanations of the passages (especially John v, 28, 29) are of the same character with that of Professor Bush. But the apparent inconsistency of both Bush and Foster, admitting in one breath that this passage refers "unmistakably" to the reurrection of *the body*, and then supplementing the statement with another positively denying, shows the illogical character and inconsistency of their rules of interpretation. The bishop says, "But that they are substantially the bodies which they once lived in on earth I can not for one moment believe." Then there is no resurrection; for the fact itself is predicated of the *body*, and if it is not the body that rises, why talk of any thing else rising from the *dead* when nothing else has died? If it is *a* body "*assumed*" instead of the one that died, then I repeat that it is not a resurrection, but a substitution. He adds: "Here I rest. To my mind the Master has spoken, and I dare not doubt."

But does he not assert his doubt in the face of conceded utterances of Scripture, and then asserting his doubt accompanies it with a positive denial contained in the last quotation made? Another fact is apparent, and that is that while there may be confusion to the individual mind in the Scriptures, still even that becomes "confusion worse confounded;" the positive and "unmistakable" utterances of the Scriptures are exchanged for those of another. That there are difficulties in the Scriptures appear to our mind, but perhaps, after all, we locate them wrongly; the difficulty is more likely to be in the individual mind rather than in revelation. Modesty would indicate that the probabilities are in that direction.

It is seen, and that clearly, that the bias of the bishop's argument is greatly against the first theory mentioned, which, in the main, is the generally accepted theory.

Now for the others. The second theory is, "That which teaches a resurrection of *a* body from some indestructible germ in a remote future." Of this we have no



information. It is conceded in Note A, of Appendix, that matter is permanent, scientifically so considered, and that the same fact is positively asserted in the body of the argument, and as the Scriptures predicate the resurrection on the body that *dies*, it is not so difficult to conceive of a resurrection of the same body from its own scientifically admitted indestructible matter, as it is to hold to the inconsistent and self-contradictory idea that the resurrection from the *dead* is predicated of a body that never died.

The third theory is, "A resurrection or emergence at the time of death of a spiritual body."

But this is also inconsistent, for that would be an emergence and not a resurrection. And, besides, both the "poverty of language" as well as the "poverty" of perception, are such that we fail to see how death is life and life is death; how going down into the grave is at the same time an emergence from it. But as the resurrection is *never* predicated of the spirit, so this theory must fail to convince us of its truthfulness.

## SECTION XXII.

"I have not named the difficulties encompassing the doctrine of a literal resurrection of the body laid in the grave, or divested of the spirit in death. They are many and great, but such as infinite power and wisdom could overcome. . . . I am compelled to reject the theory on entirely other grounds. *It taxes faith for a bootless object. It supposes infinite trouble for no adequate end.*" ("Beyond the Grave," page 170.)

"Infinite trouble for no adequate end!" If the Scriptures teach the resurrection, who will question the "end" of it? There is no "*infinite trouble*" about any thing that relates to an act of omnipotence, even that of the miracle of the resurrection. Here "I am compelled to reject the theory on entirely *other grounds*."

I have been counting on the conclusion of the argument

from Scripture, but here is an intimation, in a very vehement way, that, barring the Scriptures on this subject, he is compelled on "other grounds" to set the doctrine of the resurrection of the body aside.

Again: "There is no reason why the particular particles that happened to be in a body a thousand years ago should be extricated from other particles to make a resurrection body of."

This statement is deceptive. It is the body that *dies* that is to be resurrected, and not the particular particles that it may have thrown off and that became particles of other bodies. And though that body which dies may also pass into others, yet there is no "infinite trouble" about that to the Infinite One. I say, too, "Here I rest." The Master has spoken, and I dare not doubt." "Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, neither the *power of God*." "Infinite trouble!" GOD is sufficient for it. He is able. "Why should it be a thought a thing incredible with you," bishop, "that GOD should raise the *dead*?"

Then proceeds an argument (172-74) to show by the illustration of the "seed," to which much space has already been given. He quotes: "But God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body," then adds the following quotation: "All flesh is not the same flesh; but there is one kind of flesh of men, another flesh of beasts, another of fishes, and another of birds. There are also celestial bodies, and bodies terrestrial; but the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial is another. There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for one star differeth from another star in glory. So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption."

The use the bishop makes of this passage is inferred from the following: "As if he would say, God will not find it difficult to *devise* a suitable *body*. Having fur-

nished such proof of his ability, his skill will not fail him now. And then he proceeds to state in what particulars, having said before it would not be the same body that was cast, it would be diverse from it."

I positively deny the statement. Is it a fact that the apostle intimates "as if he would say, God will not find it difficult to devise *a* suitable body?" No, sir. Neither does he say *a* body in the outcome; but while in fact he does give it "*a* body, as it *hath* pleased him," it also says, "to every seed *his own body*." But what of "*hath*?"

Mark you, Paul is talking of what is before him—that is, "seed." He says, God "*hath*" already given it a body, now sow it; and God, in the resurrection of the old body from the dead into the new life, giveth to every seed, not *a* body in the sense of unlikeness to the previous seed, but *a* body in the sense of every seed already having *his own body*. The illustration falls short if it does not teach a bodily resemblance to the previous body in every particular, save the *dying* is left out of the new body, as the illustration would fall short if the resurrection body was to die again as the seed. The body is raised to immortality, the seed is not. But God *hath* given the seed a body that, though dying and rising over and over again, is never to lose its identity—"to every seed *HIS OWN body*," always. Let it be remembered that the apostle's illustration is the "*SEED*;" not the stalk, but the "*seed*" in maturity, as it is ripe and ready to be garnered, as bodies are ripe for the garner of glory at the resurrection. So when this seed, through dying, produces its "*own body*," so in the resurrection, as the body is planted in the death, Paul tells us that in the resurrection this seed of mortality, sown a natural, weak, and corruptible body, shall have "*his own body*," save, unlike the seed in its previous condition, it is now immortal. So the reference to *flesh* of men, beasts, fishes, and birds. Here the subject is the "*flesh*," and the "*flesh of men*" is held up in contrasted estimate, in the

mind of God, with that of all other flesh: and when the apostle adds, "So also is the resurrection of the dead"—of the "*flesh of men*" from the grave—it is so far above in the mind of God that in the concerns of the grave and resurrection special mention is made of it in contrast with all other flesh.

Once for all, let me say that this fact makes void and worthless the statement quoted at every breath of the denier of the resurrection, that "*flesh and blood*" can not enter the "kingdom of God." The "kingdom of God" referred to is the resurrection and glorified state in the future world; but the question is, *What flesh and blood* can not inherit the kingdom of God? I defy successful controversy of the point I now make. It is this: The "*flesh and blood*" on this side the grave can not inherit that "kingdom of God" *beyond the grave*. And why? Because of the reason stated by the apostle. But in the resurrection state, when flesh and blood are brought out of the grave, is it anywhere stated that resurrection flesh and blood or bone can not inherit the kingdom of God? No. Now, we have the "seed," representing the *body*; "*flesh of men*," representing the body; and are told that in the resurrection every seed shall have his *own* body, which emphatically teaches the resurrection of the *identical* body. "Flesh and blood," this side the resurrection, can not inherit the kingdom of God *beyond* the resurrection; but the "seed" and the "*flesh of men*" illustrations do teach us that *flesh, beyond* the resurrection, and in its resurrection state, can inherit the "kingdom of God" that is beyond the resurrection.

Paul says of the dead "seed" and of dead "flesh" what he designs shall be applied to dead bodies—human bodies—that go into the grave, that they shall spring to life again, every seed—"and to every seed *his own body*."

"So also is the resurrection of the *dead*. It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption: it is sown in dis-

honor, *it* is raised in glory: *it* is sown in weakness, *it* is raised in power: *it* is sown a natural body, *it* is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body. And so it is written, The first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit. [That is, a spirit that quickens something. What is it that he quickens? Rom. viii, 11: "But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you."] Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and afterward that which is spiritual. The first man is of the earth, earthy: the second man is the Lord from heaven. As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy: and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly. Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood [such as this side the grave can not inherit the state beyond] can not inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption. [But,] behold, I shew you a mystery; *we* [flesh and blood] shall not all sleep, but *we* [flesh and blood] shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. For this corruptible [flesh and blood] must put on incorruption, and this [flesh and blood] mortal must put on immortality. So when this corruptible [flesh and blood] shall have put on incorruption, and this [flesh and blood] mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory? The sting of death is sin; and the strength of sin is the law. But thanks be to God, which giveth us [flesh and blood] the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore, my

beloved brethren, be ye steadfast, unmovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, forasmuch as ye know that your labor is not in vain in the Lord."

The intimate relationship (not identity of substance) existing between soul and body renders it impossible, when speaking of them, to use any other terms than we find Paul using, expressing duality.

I think that the reader will readily see that this whole passage is not only in part, but altogether against the "strange doctrine" advocated. Can a man be Scriptural with the Scriptures left out? Some think it worth while to try.

Page 175: "The only sense in which we can predicate identity of body is the permanence and continuity of the animating principle."

This may or may not be. If he means by this that the animating principle must be kept *within* the particles of the body, I doubt the proposition from a purely scientific stand-point. Will the bishop pretend to say that the "animating principle" of any thing is contained exclusively within itself? That thing which the bishop calls "animating principle" is of considerable immensity, and is, if allusion is made to creation, called *God*.\* The "animating principle" that brings into life is *God*, and the "animating" act is a miracle. So I will admit that "the only sense in which we can predicate identity of body is the permanence and continuity of the animating principle." God is everywhere present to animate with life.

But what absurdity this position of the bishop's will lead to, even from a scientific stand-point! He says, "The

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\* But I said that this proposition of the bishop's admits of a purely scientific denial. Who will deny that, on purely reasonable, scientific, and natural grounds, the identity of the body is as much dependent on "animating principles" without as upon those within him? You can not take one color from the rainbow, and the others remain, but you can conceive of the permanence of the "animating principle," though it has passed from visible presence in man.

only sense in which we can predicate the identity of the body is the permanence and continuity of the animating principle." What, scientifically, is the "animating principle?" It is *life*. What is *life*? and how produced? If the bishop's logic is correct, *life* is the product of material influences—that is, the "animating principle" lies in the body. If he holds this view, then do we find him on the territory of "spontaneous generation," which is materialism. Thus, his endeavor to save himself from materialism, plunges him into the grossest phase of it. In his lecture on "Germ Life," Professor Tyndall said: "There is not a shadow of evidence in favor of spontaneous generation. When I seek for experimental evidence of the transformation of non-living into the living, I am led inexorably to the conclusion that no such evidence exists, and that in the lowest as in the highest of organized creatures, the method of nature is that life shall be the issue of antecedent life."

From any stand-point you may look at it *life* is a miracle, and the antecedent life that precedes all life is the life-breathings of the Almighty. We are not to accept the theory to which the bishop would force us, that of "spontaneous generation" applied to the resurrection, but that it will be by the same Almighty Power by which life is inbreathed into all living creatures. God can hardly be said to be a "principle," but the accidental wording of the bishop forced the term; but he is the great Animator of life, and that which "animates" lies in him alone and is of him. Therefore, the "animating principle" is a Personality, and he is Deity, and his act is a miracle. The "animating principle" is always present with him, and is everywhere present, and the idea of its absence with the Animator is an absurdity. So this difficulty is easily set aside. The proposition is absurd. Again we can apply the text: "Ye do err, not knowing the *Scriptures, nor the power of God.*"



## SECTION XXIII.

Concluding his argument, to which I have just replied, the bishop says:

"The propositions which the New Testament is responsible for may be summated as follows.

"First. Resurrection is a predicate of those *who*, rather than that *which*, dies; all the dead shall be raised into life again."\* ("Beyond the Grave," page 176.)

The second, third, and fourth propositions are accepted in the general faith only so far as they apply to the resurrection of that *which* dies; but predicating them upon this first proposition would render them logically false. The order of the resurrection named we accept.

But this first proposition is a straining of the meaning of words, for, as we have seen, the burden of the whole argument in the lectures is to prove that "*who*" never dies, but "*which*" does, and that it is the "*bodies*" of them that sleep in Jesus that God will bring with him. It is clearly seen, that the proposition which the bishop says the New Testament is responsible for is a summation of his own views, and not of the New Testament.

## SECTION XXIV.

Pages 177-82: There is more space devoted to the continued consideration of the subject contained on these pages, than we think is necessary, the ground having been covered, and in the repetition nothing new in the shape

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\*The other propositions are:

"(2.) The resurrection will be at the end of the world, or what is called the last day, and in connection with Christ's coming to judgment.

"(3.) The resurrection of the saints will take place first, and will be unto everlasting life; and that of the ungodly following, will be unto everlasting damnation

"(4.) In the resurrection there will be a definite contrast of the bodies raised to the bodies retired by death."

of argument is presented, save in a new face that is put upon some passages of Scripture by strange verbal adjustments to gain an advantageous application of texts chosen, to the argument brought forth. There is no new ground to cover, no new argument to meet. This the reader will see; but a curious handling of words and sentences, as if the face of the printed Scriptures was a checker-board, and the words and sentences only characters in the hand of skillful players, seeking who is to be the greatest expert in their adjustment in winning the game. But by watching the argument which has forced us into our defense, truth will not suffer.

To begin: First. It will be remembered that the bishop's resurrection *body* is not the body that is raised out of the grave, but another that is "assumed" at the ascension. And here let me remark that I have represented the bishop as denying the doctrine of the general resurrection. In the summation of the four propositions named, he asserts the doctrine of the general resurrection, followed by the general judgment, as true. But my charge is based on logical grounds. If his idea of a spiritual body is correct, it rises at death. There is no intimation of two spirit bodies, or that there will be two. There are just two bodies, physical and soul. The resurrection is predicated of the former. The position being taken of an exclusively spiritual body, eventuates the conclusion that all the resurrection there can be will be at death.

He says of his ideal resurrection body:

"There are some general descriptions which point to the subject on which the change is wrought, and to the change which is wrought. 'Who will change our *vile body*?' This language locates the change in the body. The adjective points to its order and use. It is not descriptive of an ethical quality; but rather of the low order and ends of its organization. 'And fashion it like unto his glorious body.' This marks the change wrought.

Here the adjective implies nothing of ethical quality in the subject, but simply increased perfection of fashion and uses. The subject is our body. Our body will be changed from the present vile one to one fashioned after the glorious body of Christ. The new one for which the old one is changed need carry up no substance of the old, even as our present body carries up nothing from our body that was twenty years ago. That the body is the subject of the change appears in that entire discussion carried on in 1 Cor. xv."

Any one will see the confusion of the argument by such a use of words. The last statement assures us that the *body* is the subject as proven by 1 Cor. xv. But positive as this statement is, we are told that the body at the resurrection is no more the body that was buried than our body is the body of twenty years ago. This annihilates the old body and renders a resurrection impossible. It is not therefore a resurrection but a substitution. According to this argument the *body* we now have is admitted to be the subject of the resurrection, and yet we are told it is not the body that was put in the grave. How can it be predicated upon *it*, then? He explains: "The new one for which the old one is changed need carry up no substance of the old, even as our present body carries up nothing from our body that was twenty years ago." We conclude, therefore, that there is no resurrection according to this theory but rather an *exchange* or trading of the "old body" for a "new" one which is in no sense a part of the "old." The illustration of the bishop assures me that I have not misrepresented his argument. Accordingly, if his position be true, every passage in which "resurrection" appears should read instead "substitution." But the game upon this checkerboard of thought with the opposition would be difficult, for in every instance the resurrection *body* is a predicate of the body that *died*, and not of a substituted one.

The resurrection by common consent being predicated of the *body*, the bishop resorts to a subterfuge to avoid the conclusions of arguments against him. He says: "There are some general descriptions which point to the subject on which the change is wrought, and to the change wrought."

To this it may be replied: "If the resurrection is a predicate of those *who*, rather than that *which* dies," as he asserts, why does he, in violation of the argument that alone is vital to his theory, proceed to argue about "the subject on which the change is wrought?" I infer from his argument that "*which*" is left out, and that "*who*" takes its place. Why, then, does he not reason about "the subject on *whom* the change is wrought?" But this is not exactly the subterfuge alluded to. And yet I am not ready to reach it until I point out another inconsistency of argument. Here it is: The "resurrection being a predicate of those *who*, rather than that *which* dies,' and the "*subject*" being our body—"the *subject* is *our body*,"—he proceeds to quote, "Who will change our *vile body*," and applies it to "*who*" for "*which*," and adds, "and shall fashion '*it*' like unto his glorious body." While the bishop plays on the grammatical construction of sentences, etc., where is his authority for "*it*" as applied to a *personal* "*who*?" It will be remembered that on page 158 he predicates the resurrection of the *person*, and if the *person*, then must the grammatical construction of the text undergo a reform. But in this reform, violence will be done the original; and getting away with the original, we are out at sea without compass, rudder, or chart. Should I speak of the resurrection of Mr. Smith (not his *body*, but the "*person*)," how would it sound to speak of *him* as "*it*?" Then, again, here comes up an irreconcilable contradiction. On pages 157–8 he predicates the resurrection of the dead, of the *person*, but on 177 he says, "The subject is *our body*." On page 158 he says, "In every case it is the resurrection of the *dead*—the

*person* WHO is *dead*. Or, more properly still, the resurrection of the *person* who has passed out of a body of flesh, and who is, therefore, separated from this life, and is hence said to be *dead*."

Does any one ever speak of the "*person*" that has passed out of this body of flesh, as "*dead*?" Death is predicated of the *body* and not of the *person*, and so is the resurrection. If space permitted I would expose more of like contradictions which appear in the argument, such as the statement that "the *body* is not once directly mentioned in the Scriptures as the subject" of the resurrection (158); and "that the *body* is the subject of the change appears in that entire discussion carried on in 1 Cor. xv." (178.) But to the subterfuge alluded to he says: "Here, again, the adjective implies nothing of *ethical quality* in the subject, but simply increased perfection of fashion and uses. . . . Our body will be changed from the present vile one to one fashioned after the glorious body of Christ."

What do we understand by "*ethical quality*?" Here the bishop alludes to it in connection with the body. Of course, he denies, as we all do, that there is any such a thing as "*ethical quality*" in the body. But the whole tenor of his argument throughout, as I understand it, is to prove that the future resurrection body possesses "*ethical quality*" which the present body does not possess. The future body is a thing of thought—a thinking object—an object of contemplation, of meditation, in fact, of "*ethical quality*." Now, who ever heard of a *body*—mark you, we are speaking of a *body* and not *person*—whoever heard of a body that possessed "*ethical quality*?" That a *person* possesses "*ethical quality*" all will admit; but the subject now mentioned is the body. The bishop says, "The subject is the *body*." I ask for the rare exhibition of a *body* which possesses "*ethical quality*." By implication he tells us that the future body will possess "*ethical quality*."

If then there is to be a body and that body the companion of the soul which now and ever will possess "ethical quality," are we to understand that that body and soul are each of them to possess in their distinctiveness of each other "ethical quality?" Two "ethical" individualities in one body is the heavenly monstrosity implied in the bishop's logic. There is much at stake in the handling of words in this manner and forcing them in their association with things with which they can have no possible connection.

But we may be told that the *body* alluded to is to be like Christ's glorious body. Very well. Are we to understand that Christ's "glorious *body*" possesses "ethical qualities?" If the bishop will place his finger on the particular text, or one that has the least glimmer of reference to the same, that would lead us to possess even a ghost of an inference that Christ's "glorious body" possessed "ethical qualities," I will surrender my pen and yield the argument. I venture the assertion that this use made of "ethical qualities" as not possessed by the present body, but inferentially a possession of the glorious body to distinguish it from this present body is a product of a "*groundless imagination.*" "Ethical qualities" do not belong to the *body* either before or after the resurrection.

He proceeds to say of 1 Cor. xv: "The change wrought is described with great beauty and minuteness of detail. *It is the body that is sown. No one can doubt this.*" But now begins another effort to confuse the argument by the statement: "What is meant by the *sowing* is not so plain, but there may be honest difference of judgment;" and he proceeds, after stating the views of some, to give his own, which evolves the same inconsistency of reasoning as that just exposed.

He begins: "The object is to describe the difference between the body in which we live now and the body in which we shall live hereafter." Two bodies are here

referred to, and not "the increased perfection of fashion and uses" of the same body, which he incidentally, or rather accidentally, admitted on page 178. That this is no misrepresentation is proven by his subsequent statement. He says: "The statement is deft and plain. 'It (the body we now have) is sown in corruption.' The word corruption describes the body we now have. The term signifies a tendency to decay—to ultimate decomposition. . . . This is its nature. The truth of the statement is indisputable. 'It is raised in incorruption.'"

He now enters upon another process of reasoning that is equivalent to subterfuge. He says on "It is raised in incorruption:"

"Some make much account of the relative in this comparison. Not another body, we are told, but *it*—the same body. The grammatical construction would seem to imply this, but is it certain that it was the meaning in the author's mind? We doubt."

I reply, first, that account must be made of the relative in this comparison. If not, then is the safety of Scripture interpretation gone, and every text made to accommodate itself to the whim of the heart that would conceive a theory of its own. He admits that the grammatical construction *seems* to favor the relative in this comparison in which "it" alludes to the same body in the resurrection that was laid in the grave. But the manner in which he evades this fact which he admits "seems" to be true is curious. It shows to what straits men will go when driven to make a point against their own inner convictions. He says: "The contrast is between the body a man has before death and the body he has after death."

This statement assumes two distinct bodies, "The body *before*" and "the body *after* death." This contradicts every correct rule of interpretation by which the passage is to be examined. More, it destroys the grammatical sense of the text. Paul here alludes to *the same body*, but under differ-



ent conditions—one, the condition of the body before death; the other, the condition of the *same body* after death. No rendering of the text or grammatical construction of words and sentences can alter this statement, if renderings and constructions are kept within the compass of truth. That I have not misrepresented the bishop's meaning is proven by the following, when he says: "It, the body a man has before death, is corruptible. It, the body he has after death, is incorruptible; they are not the same (body) but different (bodies.) 'It is raised in incorruption.'"

But "it" is the same body, but the *corruptible* has put on *incorruption*. And this is meant by the apostle when he says, "*It*," the corruptible *body* that was such before death, "is" after death "raised in incorruption."

The bishop continues: "The body of the resurrection life has no such tendency to disorganization," etc. Certainly not; but it does not follow that it is not therefore the identical body with the corruptible characteristics of its mortal state before death dropped out, and the body carried forward in the resurrection to incorruptibility.

"It is sown in dishonor." The bishop says: "There is probable reference to its *low uses*." The term "*low*," while acknowledged to apply to the body serving its uses well on earth, is also used in the argument to serve other purposes. He uses it in such an infinitely "*low*" sense that it is utterly lost sight of in all future considerations of the Divine Mind in the immortal state. The fact in the illustration is, that it is not to be applied as the bishop applies it at all, but is descriptive of the contrasted conditions of the same body before and after death. Hence the apostle adds that *that which* was sown in dishonor, in earthly conditions, however wisely and well served, is to be "raised in glory," to a higher sphere of existence—in fact, to a condition of immortality, and to an exalted glory which is the property of immortals.

The bishop makes much of the constituent elements of

the body. Are we sure that any allusion is directly made to such in the Scriptures? I am sure I find him alluding constantly to them, whether in the Scriptures or not. For instance, he says, on "it is raised in glory" that "the body that shall be will have none of these elements of degradation and badges of shame," etc., of the peculiarity of materiality, but to the contrary. Of course it will away with the badges of sin and shame, but does that logic do away with the body? He so reasons. His logic is, that the sin and shame of the body is got rid of by getting rid of the body, which is bad theology. I hold that the body is here alluded to under separate and distinct *states* or conditions of existence, and that it does not follow that, to believe this, we must believe in the destruction of the body and its substitution by another.

It is said again that the body is the seat of animal lusts, sins, etc., and it must be gotten rid of on that account. How does this accord with the idea previously advanced, that the body was irresponsible and the instrument of the soul? Yet here we have the example of another contradiction, in which he moves from that first position to the opposite, and holds that, as the body is the seat of evil, it must be gotten rid of. After holding it only as the instrument, he now makes it the responsible agent, and its dropping at death and substitution by another a penal act for the idea that it was the responsible seat of sin. We know the ancients held to something of that kind, and the boasted "advanced" thinking and "reasoning" of our bishop is an advance backward rather than forward. I hold that so far as the body is instrumentally *particeps criminis* with the soul that the New Testament Scriptures represent the office of redemption as applying to both soul and *body*. The soul instead of the body being the seat of sin, through it depravity extends to the body, and the redemption of the soul is followed by the redemption of our body. One thing is certain, that in

the ultimate work of redemption it extends to the body in its restoration to immortality. In order to this its resurrection must follow. Compare Rom. viii, 18-24.

The error in the grammatical construction of sentences also appears in the new argument. The bishop holds that the resurrection body is another *body* than that laid in the grave. Of this *other body* he says, "*It* shall have no more lusts," etc. Did "*it*" ever have them before, that "no more" is an admissible phrase? Christ says (Matt. xv, 19), "Out of the *heart* proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications," etc., and that lustful influences are of a depraved moral nature, and not of the body. They affect the body—the fruit of moral evil is felt in its effect upon flesh.

Again: "*It* is sown in weakness." What is thus sown? *This body*. The bishop adds, "Nothing is more apparent than that the present organism was not contrived for constant activity." "*It* is raised in power."

"*It*"—what is that? He answers, that *other body*. But, you see, the thing sown is the identical thing said to be raised. The bishop says that the body that is *raised* is not the body that is sown. Why talk about its being raised, when it has never been down—"sown?" "*It* is sown an *animal body*;" "*it* is raised a spiritual body."

To this he adds: "These last words are comprehensive of the whole change, and indicate the radical difference in the very nature and economy of the two bodies—the body that now is and that which is to come." *Two* bodies are kept before the mind. It is not said that that second body is the soul, so that the bishop is responsible for the account of a *third* body that appears in the human organism at the resurrection.

But I challenge the application the bishop makes of the text, "*It* is sown an *animal body*." While the body may be *animal*, yet will you remember that even in animal *flesh* there is a distinction made, and that in the apostle's application of it to the resurrection, superlatively in favor

of the "*flesh* of men." But I insist on the term "*natural*" being retained instead of the substitution of "*animal*." The bishop's construction is arbitrary and illegal, as is the construction of a majority of the passages with which he has essayed to prove his theory. The question in the apostle's mind is that of the *permanence* of the resurrection body. The first, being in the nature of its sinful condition, through the transgression of the soul placed in "*natural*" state—that is, in that state of natural impermanence which was characteristic of other creatures—is in the resurrection to be taken out of its "*natural*" impermanence and given that permanence which belongs to the spiritual state, and was originally designed to be the state of the body.

If Bishop Foster will open his German Bible to what appears in our translation the "*spiritual body*," he will find that the resurrection body is called a *soulish body*—that is, the properties of permanence of the resurrected material body will be of a *soulish* existence, as applied to its duration; and for this reason it is called a "*spiritual body*," because it will exist permanently with the soul. See Lange's German comment on the passage in question. But it always relates to the *body* that *died* taking on other forms of permanence, which constitute it incorruptible as the soul, non-perishable as the soul; hence, in contrast with its "*natural*" impermanence, it is called a *spiritual* or *soulish* body.

After allusion to other passages in the same connection with like application, the bishop says, "The glorious *new body* that shall be given us shall never more be subject to death—neither by inherent corruptibility nor by any decree of destruction."

"This glorious *new body*"—that is, *the old made new*—is the apparent sense of the apostle. In proof of this we have the positive teaching of the Master. So "the Master has spoken, and I dare not doubt."

But what has the Master said? Let us see. In Matt.

xix, after the rich young ruler was unwilling to forsake all and follow Christ, Peter, with somewhat of carnality of mind, said, "Behold, we have left all and followed thee; what shall we have, therefore?" Then Christ, to arrest the worldly tendency of the apostle's thoughts, carries him through the experience of sore temptation and humiliation here, then to await, after this life mission, for his glorification hereafter. "Verily I say unto you, That ye which have followed me, in the regeneration when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel;" and this is the "everlasting life" held up before those who forsake all "for his name's sake." By reference to any accepted authentic rendering of these words, it carries the scene of future glorification beyond the dying, beyond the grave, to the resurrection and ascension into glory.

This passage is final when Christ speaks of it as a "*regeneration*." "Ye which have followed me," in my temptation, toil, and death here, "*in the regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory*," etc. This applies to "*ye*" living men, body and soul, and the "*regeneration*" alludes to the change of the whole dual nature from temptation, death, etc., to glorification. The language does not specify soul from the body, nor body from the soul, but he applies it to the man in his entirety; the *glorification* contingent upon their following him, the *regeneration* predicated of the process of transforming mortality into immortality. If in regeneration we have a new nature, sometimes called the "new birth" when applied to the salvation of the soul from the guilt and power and dominion of sin, and yet continue the same identical soul, same individuality, same person, why not so in the case of the body, which, in its resurrection and glorification is said to have been *regenerated*? This term is comprehensive. It was generated in the narrative in Genesis, it was degenerated by sin to death, and here in the resurrection *it* is said to be *regenerated*.

It is not an independently new creation—that is, it is not a new creation in the sense of independence of the old—but is a *regeneration* of the body into immortal life, in which it was first conditioned in its genesis. “The Master has spoken,” and verily we dare not “doubt” the conclusion of his utterances.

If bodily decay and death, which we believe to be the result of sin, and which idea is everywhere present in the utterance of revelation concerning death and the resurrection; if, I say, there is no restoration equivalent to immortality of the body, the same body, then has death won a victory of immense significance. And the whole trend of the bishop’s argument is to prove, not that our victory over death is complete, but that its victory over us is permanent. This we can never admit.

#### SECTION XXV.

“The resurrection state is the culmination of glorified humanity.” (“Beyond the Grave,” page 181.)

This is a short saying, but it is long enough to reverse the whole order of revealed truth. Look at it again. “The resurrection state is the *culmination of glorified humanity*.”

We have proven that this is not so. But reverse the order and see how much more in accord with the facts of revelation the utterance will appear. Then it will read: “*Glorified humanity* is the *culmination* of the resurrection state.” The Bible throughout represents the saints as *first* resurrected, and *then glorified*. Men are put to severe straits to arbitrarily reverse the order of God that they may gain a point of their own making.

Once more: “The resurrection state” is “the change of the earthly *for* the heavenly.”

I answer, *No*. The Scriptures, as we have shown, teach throughout the resurrection state is the change of the earthly *to* the heavenly, and herein is the great miracle. Otherwise, it would be an *exchange* and not a *change*.

Again the bishop says: "The resurrection state . . . is the putting off of flesh and blood, and the putting on the spiritual body." The Scriptures do not say so; but that it is a transforming of the mortal into the immortal.

"The resurrection is the standing again after death; the body of the resurrection is the body with which the spirit is clothed for its celestial life."

But a short time ago the bishop argued hard against the "standing again" theory. Here two distinct bodies are alluded to in this last remark. But we have noticed this argument also. Just here we need a proof-text from the bishop. We have the same body out of the grave that went into it; but that, we are told, is not the resurrection body. Pray what knowledge have we, if the bishop is correct, of the disposition of this old body in the Scriptures? None. Pray tell me where the second body referred to by the bishop, which is not supposed to be the soul, and of which no mention is made in Scripture, comes from. Is it the body of which Paul speaks when he says something about being "clothed upon with his house which is from heaven?" I can conceive of no other. Well, that will never do, for Paul has no such a thought in his mind. Paul is simply in the face of death. His house will be indestructible in heaven. He evidently alludes to his soul. He will die in the hope of the resurrection, when, in that glorious morning his risen body will be clothed upon with immortality that belongs to the heavenly state. This, therefore, will not answer the bishop's purpose.

The references that are made at the idea of the exact oxygen and other elements of the body are all out of place, irrelevant and irreverent. For instance:

#### SECTION XXVI.

"If any imagine that they find comfort in the idea that the exact oxygen and other elements are gathered up,



a little reflection will suffice to correct the delusion." ("Beyond the Grave," page 182.)

The Scriptures, while wise enough for the wise, learned enough for the most learned, were, nevertheless, given for the people of simple, child-like, minds. They do not suppose that they are chemists. They do not suppose that when they speak to the people of the resurrection of the body that they are at once to enter the laboratory of universal chemistry, and study the question from the standpoint of oxygen, etc.; but that in every instance it is God who works the miracle, and that he has not intimated anywhere that it was ever to be tried in its *modes* of operation and manifestation by laws of even known scientific workings.

Once more: "It is the person we want, not the dust he wore, either in his youth or age. . . . Give us back the person with a *new* body of celestial mold, and we will embrace it with the old deathless affection."

Here we have "it," a "*new* body" embraced with "old" love. Can "old love" be felt for a thing of non-existence? The error is in losing sight of the dignity of the body. The whole argument has been to degrade the creature of God's own hand. If as much pains will be taken to be inspired with the sublime utterance of revelation of the body, its dignity, honor, and immortality, as has been taken to drink from a fountain that has been poisoned by a noxious *Bush*, then would he arrive at a better estimate of the honor and glory and immortality of the body.

The utterance of the bishop that I now give shows his abandonment of the true doctrine, and how far he has gone over to the false, namely:

"I wish to put on record here that, for myself, there is nothing in any particle of flesh or blood that ever belonged to my body that creates in me the least desire to ever see it again. This body of earthly matter I am perfectly willing to put off, that I may put on one that will

answer the higher ends of my existence better. That body which I look for, the resurrection body, with which my Lord will clothe me, I am sure will satisfy all my desires, whether it be simply a lineal successor of this unbroken continuity, or merely a partaker of its essence or made of its very substance. It suffices that I shall rise again in a deathless form, to be the inhabitant of a deathless world. For that body there is no pain, no want, no decay."

Comparing the last few sentences of this quotation with the bishop's previous argument, they appear vague and unsatisfactory. As to the first part of it, there is the outburst of a greatly biased mind. The thing involved in such can not be depended on in argument, for it is emotional, and may be the product of individual constitutionalities. The question is, *What is written?*

We may say of the bishop's warm and earnest protestation: We are all, in a certain sense, willing for any thing of God's appointment, but I venture, should that old body now beginning to totter be damaged in limb so as to threaten life, and promise to introduce him into that state so willing to be entered, the very best surgical talent would be sought, and no expense spared, that the entrance should be delayed as long as possible. I have suggested a delicate thought, but am I not reasonable in the position? If the bishop would deny my position, and assert his *indifference* to this life in such unnatural willingness to shuffle it off, I should adjudge him mentally deficient, or meditating a suicidal act. What does this clinging to life mean? And what is the life to which we thus cling? It is not that of the soul, for after that men or accidents have killed the body, they have nothing more that they can do. It means our "natural" life, our transient *life*, that every thing goes to perpetuate, but in spite of all will go out.

Well, God has promised to dignify this "natural" life by bringing it into the domain of immortality and spiritual

duration, and hence it will be raised in that respect "a spiritual body."

I have now closed my examination of the lectures on "Beyond the Grave," weighing them in the balances of reason and revealed truth and found them wanting. While I have, in the preceding argument, intimated a radical divergence of the bishop's theory from that of the plain teaching of the Scriptures, it is difficult to make one's self believe that one so devout in spirit and strong in intellect has lost positive faith in inspiration.

In perusing this argument, a strong friend of the bishop, as well as of the writer, remarked, "I can not help believing that in the bishop's argument he does show *respect* for the Scriptures." This we may admit—especially does he claim it, and vehemently assert it; but the conclusions drawn to the contrary I claim to have been the irresistible logical outcome of his argument.

But the Scriptures demand more than our *respect*; they demand our *faith*. We may have profound respect for persons and their principles, but we may not at the same time indorse either. Many men *respect* the Scriptures, but it is with that sort of cold skepticism that is equivalent to a denial of their teaching, unless the same can be construed to serve notions that have been the product of a heart rather than head, that has desired to evade the logic of inspiration.

How far this has been the case in "Beyond the Grave," it is not for me to say. I have studiously shunned evasion or equivocation, and have endeavored to give an intelligent reply to, perhaps, what is the strongest argument clothed in the most beautiful language of modern times against the "cherished doctrine" of the future life—beyond the grave—the resurrection of the body.

It has been my love of truth that has inspired my action; and if I have been able to give to them that ask, in the argument now closing, a reason of the hope

that is in me, and also contribute somewhat of defense for the faith once delivered to the saints, I shall thank God and take courage.

But a few months since, while our beloved bishop was presiding at one of our annual conferences, and addressing a class of candidates for holy orders, he emphasized the value and importance of preaching with earnestness the *doctrines* of the Church.

This is expected to be done in strict accord with the "cherished beliefs" of the Church. The "cherished belief" of Methodism with reference to the resurrection is that of a literal resurrection of the *body which dies*. The denial of this would be to promulgate what is termed in the ordination vows of a bishop "strange doctrines." Such we promise to "drive away." Let us guard well this "cherished belief" and hope of Israel against all encroachments of unbelief. "For the hope of the resurrection I am called in question." "I believed, therefore have I spoken."

The reader's attention is now called to a solution, so far as this pen is able, of some of the difficult problems suggested in the lecture on "*The Doctrine of Recognition*."

## CHAPTER VI.

## THE DOCTRINE OF RECOGNITION.

THE lecture on the Doctrine of Recognition in the bishop's book, in the main, is acceptable. As to the *fact* of future recognition there can be no differences of opinion. But the lecturer would adapt the doctrine of recognition to his previous argument. We must confess to somewhat of indefiniteness, that runs like a vein throughout the entire argument. To illustrate: The impression is made of the indefiniteness of the character of the future life, and that even of revelation this is true, that is, it alludes to the facts, and there we are hedged in with no positive knowledge. Then, right in the beginning of the last lecture, page 190, we are told that "truth is precise. It has no margins. It is this or that, or more or less; but never both. We need to understand *precisely* what that is which we believe and defend, or what it is not."

Thus we are introduced into one of the most beautiful palaces of thought that can ravish the soul, and the statements which follow pages 190-200 inclusive, are of vital interest and correct doctrinally.

If there is one mistake in the argument, it is the implied idea that all that is recognizable in the future is spirit. "Man is a spirit," is the burden of the preceding argument and all recognition is that of spirit. That there is much in this thought is very true; the most important of heavenly recognition is that of spirit, but not all. The fact that there is one feature of the future state of more importance than any other does not, necessarily, teach the non-existence of other things of vast importance.

The "spirit" thought suggested by the bishop is seen by implication on page 200, in the proof of the permanence of memory. The doctrine is correct; but in expressing it the argument incidentally suggests the kind of persons recognized. He says: "The passage from Matthew, in that wonderful twenty-fifth chapter, is irresistible. Therein it is declared that the *souls of all the dead* will stand before God," etc.

There is nothing in this passage that authorizes the phraseology here given. There seems blended in this expression of the bishop's, purported to be authorized by the narrative in the twenty-fifth of Matthew, three distinct passages, if this twenty-fifth chapter may be called one of them: first, that of the "*souls of them that were slain for the Word of God,*" and who are "under the altar" (Rev. vi, 9); and "I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God." (Rev. xx, 12.)

That the quotation from Matthew, to prove the permanence of memory, is well taken, all will concede; as the renderings on the day of judgment will be made with that understanding. But that the implied denial of a resurrection contained in the expression, "Therein it is declared that the *souls of all the dead* will stand before God," should be guarded against. Truth should not be set forth in such a manner as to suggest error.

(2.) That individuals are distinguishable, formally, is conceded in the doctrine of recognition.

This thought is interwoven in the religious faith of almost all peoples, and denied by but few.

But the case of Samuel's appearance to Saul is not well taken, save as an incidental illustration of how the witch presumed upon a generally accepted fact to accomplish her part with Saul. For a very interesting examination of this interview the reader will refer to the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, October number, of 1869.

I believe that there is not an instance of consciousness

in the future state referred to in the Scriptures but teaches the future imperishability of memory. I should be pleased to insert much at this point on the subject, but there are some thoughts I desire to hasten to, more vital to the argument. Calling attention here and there to some irreconcilable points in the bishop's argument as we pass along will be excused, for by so doing the reader will be the more able to arrive at the truth.

(3.) We agree that the scene presented in Matt. xxv is to represent veritable history that is yet to take place.

But the following quotation certainly gives us the bishop's views, accommodating his argument to that on the resurrection, where he does not deny that the body comes from the grave, but that it does not ascend—the ascension body is the resurrection body, and it was not in the grave—and if this is not the accommodated sense in which we are to take it, then is there a contradiction.

He says: "But if any should still find difficulty on the point of objection now noticed [the objection referred to is 'that the spirit, when disembodied, retains no resemblance to the former person, no marks or badges of any kind re-remaining'], the resurrection of the *body* must displace it entirely."

But the argument in this connection enshrouds in mist all that has gone before, when we are told in the next sentences: "No one is able to determine authoritatively what is the *precise* doctrine on the subject of the resurrection. Many claim to, but it is vain boast. There will be a resurrection of the dead—that we know. What the glory of it will be, we shall know hereafter."

Thus we are told that truth is "*precise*," has no "margins," is "either this or that," and every doubt of future recognition of *spirits* "the resurrection of the *body* must displace entirely;" but, sad to relate, "no one is able to determine authoritatively what is the '*precise*' doctrine of the resurrection."



I will hazard the assumption that with the recognition of spirit the recognition of friends beyond the grave will be predicated of the body that comes out of the grave immortal, and passes with the same into the glorified state. This thought will bear enlargement. I have not space to do it here. One thought I may suggest here, that *immortality may be taken on before the glorified state is entered into. Immortality does not necessarily mean a glorified body. The resurrection of the last day issues in immortality, but not necessarily a glorified state.* Character will determine the state. "Some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." Heaven is the opposite of hell. If the bishop admits, which I understand he does, that the *body* rises from the *dead*, and that the wicked are cast, "both soul and body, into hell," by this logic, the offset of perdition is, that the righteous go, just as verily, "both soul and body," to heaven—the glorified state.

(4.) Page 222-3: "It is objected that if saints are recognized and dearest friends should not be found among them, and so should be known or even supposed to be lost, it would spread a gloom over heaven. My answer is: The objection, viewed from our present stand-point, is confessedly grave and serious. Many answers have been made to it. I have never found one to satisfy my mind. I leave the difficulty to be relieved when things incomprehensible now will be made plain. It embarrasses the subject, but is only of the nature of a difficulty and not an overthrow.

"These two things remain certain: Saints will know and remember each other; saints will be perfectly happy. How they will be so, if they should miss dear ones from their circle, I do not know. I am willing to leave it where it is, waiting for the end to reveal it. These are the only objections I think of. To my own mind they bear nothing against our position."

The most difficult problem is here suggested, and while

it may not be satisfactorily solved, still, left in mystery as the bishop has left it, will leave too many hearts in gloom. It is plain to see that he in this part of his subject has but little light from revelation thrown upon it. One general remark I make at this point, that the divine government does not proceed upon any principle that would augment the misery of any of God's moral creatures, good or bad. I believe that a knowledge of God's renderings toward the lost will be upon a principle that will augment the happiness of heaven rather than disturb it, and that the wicked are sent to hell, not only for punishment, but God wants them also to be where they will be happiest, and, torment as it is, the lost are in perdition because they are happier there than they could be anywhere else. This I propose to establish as the rational and Scriptural basis of God's dealing with them. Then will it appear, also, that the righteous, recognizing the same facts, will find nothing in the divine rendering to mar their peace.

The key which solves much of this mystery may be found in the question, "Shall not the Judge of the whole earth do right?" As a simple question of right, there is much light thrown upon this subject. With a correct knowledge of the justice of that rendering which banishes the wicked from the presence of God and heaven the mind gives approbation. What is this approbation but one department of praise? To approve is to praise. Thus a wicked man conceding the justice of his punishment contributes to the honor of justice. But as happiness is based on virtue, and punishment on vice, let me ask, In which would a sinner, with enlivened conscience, be the happier: in heaven with the everlasting consciousness that he had no right there? or in perdition with the everlasting consciousness that he was receiving his just deserts? This proposition is made on the supposition that it were possible for the sinner to enter heaven permanently, and still having set aside all the means of the atonement and a holy life

by which heaven is obtainable, and alone by which it is enjoyable.

(5.) The supreme consciousness which takes possession of the redeemed in heaven, that the only true happiness of earth or heaven is based on what is *right*, and that God does only and strictly what is right, will clear away much of confusion that may possess the mind.

To further establish this point we are informed that, instead of a knowledge of the fact that some are lost on account of their sins casting a gloom over heaven, the justice of the divine rendering, which consigns to punishment, contribute to heaven's happiness.

A graphic proof of this thought is had in Rev. xviii, in the fall of Babylon. It is better to refer the reader to the chapter than to take space for its insertion here. Then, in chapter xix, it is said the scene that follows is located in heaven, showing the effect of the righteous judgments of God upon its inhabitants, be they angels or spirits redeemed from among men:

“And after these things I heard a great voice of much people in heaven, saying, Alleluia; salvation, and glory, and honor, and power, unto the Lord our God: For true and righteous are his judgments; for he hath judged the great whore, which did corrupt the earth with her fornication, and hath avenged the blood of his servants at her hand. And again they said, Alleluia. And her smoke rose up for ever and ever. And the four and twenty elders and the four beasts fell down and worshiped God that sat on the throne, saying, Amen; Alleluia. And a voice came out of the throne, saying, Praise our God, all ye his servants, and ye that fear him, both small and great. And I heard as it were the voice of a great multitude, and as the voice of many waters, and as the voice of mighty thunderings, saying, Alleluia: for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth. Let us be glad and rejoice, and give honor to him: for the marriage of the Lamb is

come, and his wife hath made herself ready. And to her was granted that she should be arrayed in fine linen, clean and white: for the fine linen is the righteousness of saints."

It was Abraham who asked, "Shall not the Judge of the whole earth do right?" And it was with reference to the destruction of Sodom. He said, "That be far from thee . . . to slay the righteous with the wicked: and that the righteous should be as the wicked, that be far from thee: Shall not the Judge of the whole earth do right?"

In the future life this question is applicable. God will do right. He will not punish the righteous with the wicked. He will not save the wicked with the righteous.

The "*peculiar*" loves of earth, which are for an earth purpose and temporary, will, indeed, give place to higher affection there. But there is the same higher affection here that rises even above our *peculiar* affections, that is above our natural affection. That affection rises to the acknowledgment of the claims of moral law as the basis of true love. Moral purity can only be served by this acknowledgment. Were it not for this there could be no moral justice, and moral justice is true justice. Without it there could be no government or happiness in earth or heaven.

Rev. Loren L. Knox, D. D., in his "Evangelical Rationalism," pages 239-243, says:

"What Christ has done for sinners is but the outward expression of what he is in his own essential nature. 'God is love;' and the views of his character, as well as of his redeeming work, which the souls of the saved are enabled to obtain as they come into his heavenly presence, can not fail to awaken toward him their supreme love and profound adoration. Gratitude, love, adoration; these are the ruling emotions in every human heart that has passed into the heavenly mansion. The highest and purest conceivable happiness is in these emotions. And as those

rejoicing spirits are now for evermore in the realized presence of him whose character and whose dying love awaken these emotions, their happiness can not be supposed to be subject to any interruptions from adverse influences, or to any shadowings from the fear that an end of those joys can ever come. Such is heaven. According to the indications of man's nature, as well as according to the teachings of the Bible, such is heaven, so far as the personal emotions experienced by the redeemed can go to constitute heaven. It is no wonder that hymns of praise, songs of gratitude, halleluiahs of adoration, and anthems of love frequently resound through the celestial mansions.

“But the disembodied Christian is a human being still, and, as here on earth our present conscious experiences do not wholly engross our minds, so, doubtless, it will be in the other world. Our thoughts will go out from ourselves; we shall recall the scenes of our probationary lives; we shall think of the friends with whom we lived in our earthly home, with whom we transacted the business of life, with whom we mingled in society. The question will often arise, Where are those friends now? Some of them will be with us in our home of bliss; and we shall talk over with them the events of the past. But others will not be with us; and we can not fail to think that, by their persistent rejection of God's truth and mercy, they brought upon themselves the doom of eternal woe. How can such a thought fail to spoil our heaven at once?

“To find a satisfactory answer to that question, two or three facts must be taken into consideration. One is, that the domestic and social ties which link persons so closely together here will not go over into the next world and prevail with the same nature and strength as here. In that world ‘they neither marry nor are given in marriage.’ The domestic affections, having fulfilled their intended purpose in securing the benefits of the family organization, will die, or materially change their character, as

indeed they do, in a great degree, in old age here. The family relation existing in this life will, of course, be remembered after death, and those relations on earth may seem nearer to each other there than other persons do. But the mutual dependencies and responsibilities of the family will be unknown there. Other affinities, moral and spiritual, will come into prevailing force, and will largely replace both domestic and social attachments.

*“Another consideration is, that when a person in heaven thinks of a friend who has been cast into hell, he will not think of him as suffering cruel and undeserved miseries. . . . We have endeavored to emphasize the truth so repeatedly asserted in the Word of God, that the retribution assigned to the wicked is a condition of exact and impartial justice. However terrible it may be to him who suffers it, he and every one else must know that it is exactly what he deserves to suffer. His friends in heaven may deeply regret that he merited such a doom; but their bliss can not be disturbed by the thought that he is receiving strictly and only what he merited. They will have such views of the supreme holiness of God, the perfect righteousness of his laws and the absolute justice of all his administrations, that they would be infinitely more pained by the thought that one of God’s decisions should be reversed or defeated, than by the knowledge that any earthly friend was forever eating the bitter fruits of his own sinful life.*

*“Another consideration bearing upon the subject deserves our candid notice. The happiness enjoyed by the inhabitants of heaven is very different in kind and vastly higher in character than that which most persons seek after in this world. The idea of happiness generally entertained is, that it consists largely in bodily ease and comfort, and in freedom of mind from all burdens of care or responsibility or fear of coming evil; in a word, it is a state of simple gratification or of exciting pleasure. Persons of high mental and moral culture know something*

of higher enjoyments; they have resources of happiness to which they can resort when the body is suffering with pain, when the mind is weighed down with responsibilities, when the heart is disturbed with anxieties and fears. To the Christian believer still higher and richer sources of enjoyment are accessible, resources from which he can draw adequate and unfailing support, and even triumphant consolation in the darkest hour of earthly grief. He knows something of the deep meaning of the apostle's declaration, 'For our light affliction which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory; while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal.'"

"Much more in the heavenly state will all causes of anxiety and sadness be neutralized by the continual reception of that divine fullness which must forever satisfy the soul that awakes with the divine likeness. Surely, that final settlement of human destinies which is satisfactory to God himself must satisfy the souls of those to whom God is all and in all."

(6.) The question of *affinity* also concerns the subject of future happiness of saints, when recollection of those lost comes up.

In Acts i, 25 it is said that Judas fell, "that he might go to *his own place*."

If in the wicked heart there is no affinity for heaven and the society of the pure, what good would it do were it possible for the impure to be there? When the church bells ring out for holy worship, why is it that the devout find their way to the sanctuary, while the indolent yawn lazily at home, the inebriate seeks his cups, the tippler the loafing place in the saloon, and the libertine his paramour? Suppose a train of passengers run into the city, under some principle or law; that on its arrival the authorities



should detail a policeman to take the libertine by force to prayer-meeting and place of Christian testimony and worship, the Christian passenger by force must go to the slums, the gambler must listen to a lecture on honesty, and the thief compelled constantly to recite "Thou shalt not steal," the pure forced to the fellowship of the impure, and the impure forced to the rigid morality of the pure—I say, suppose all this, what upheavals of complaint and revolt would be heard! Yet it seems that such is the idea some hold of heaven, that life is a sort of train that will eventually dump us all in one promiscuous mass into one sea of bliss. In such a heaven there would be about as much affinity as doves have for serpents, and serpents have for doves, save to devour. While we go into eternity with vastly changed characteristics of nature which may apply to soul and body alike, still *character* will not change there, and for any one to enjoy happiness in heaven they must possess the requisite heavenly character preparatory. "Without holiness no man can see God." "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." Suppose the nearest and dearest friend on earth fit for heaven could see the friend nearest and dearest to him, and yet there with no affinity for it. Purity of heart is the only ground of affinity. Do you not suppose that that friend would be more uncomfortable at the misery of the dear one in heaven, on the ground of a lack of affinity, than he would be at the thought of such being lost, and yet linked with the lost condition the thought that the lost one was where there were affinities of nature and state?

I do not say that there is happiness in hell, but I do say that it is possible that there is more comfort there for a lost soul than there is for such a sinner with such deserts in heaven.

(7.) To have followed up the thought of the bishop's, that the "peculiar loves" of earth are to be exchanged

for higher love would have evolved a better solution than he has given us.

It seems that he left the subject in the "sense" domain of which particular mention is made in his lectures on the resurrection.

It does also seem with many that the doctrine of punishment of some while others are happy, conflicts with true fatherly affection, even though that punishment be well deserved. God will not inflict upon the guilty one more stroke, be that stroke ever so light, than they deserve, and if it is right that they should receive it, it would be wrong not to inflict it. God will not do wrong. He will not apply a stroke that is wrong. If it is wrong for one to be punished God will surely not punish that one, but if it is right, then will God surely do it. That God does punish the guilty is proof that it is right that they should be punished, otherwise God would not do it. "The judge of the whole earth will do right."

True affection recognizes the claims of moral justice. It has its rewards and punishments. These are strictly appropriate to the nature of this government and the turpitude of the guilt. False affection is that which through tenderness (falsely so-called) and palliation or toleration of wrong in a child, that which may eventuate its ruin, that is, What seems *now* a real kindness will *then* be a real violence to the child. Reason this from cause to effect. That is a false affection which sets aside the claims of *right* and justice in evading justice and claims of moral government. This can not be done without jeopardy. Such a course may retard the course of moral law, but justice coming slowly will come no less surely.

(8.) Our affections sometimes come in the way of the solution of this problem. When they do, mark it, the law remains "holy, just, and good," but our affections develop selfishness.

I do not mean selfishness, commonly speaking, in the

offensive sense, but selfish in the better sense. Whatever virtue it may be possible to throw into the best selfish motive, still moral justice—the highest, best, and purest law in heaven and earth—would be estopped in its procedure by selfishness.

In the higher affections, on moral grounds, there can be no selfishness; hence, justice can do its work, and do it too, on the principles of goodness. There is no goodness save as it exists in strict accord with justice. In fact, true goodness is based alone upon the principles of true justice.

I saw a mother circulating a petition for the pardon of her son out of the penitentiary. In all justice, which should be supreme—natural affection or the claims of moral justice? The natural affection appealed to a tender chord, but back of it and above it was a higher law. What would society do with its over thirty thousand criminals now in the prisons of this country if the natural affection of the nearest and dearest friend of each on earth would be the tribunal before which these should be tried? Put the key of each criminal's cell in the hands of such keepers, and the flood of criminals that would be let loose upon society would awaken indignation in perdition; for in the region of the damned there is not one spirit there but is there through the application of the strictest principles of moral fairness or justice. The petition alluded to was a failure, for the *justice* of the infliction was known to those to whom the petition was presented.\*

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\* If we can solve the problem how this mother could be happy while she knew that her son was in prison, then have we a key that will unlock that other mystery of how friends in heaven are happy while they know some are unhappy; that is, let her recognize and exercise the higher love for the higher law and measure up her moral perceptions to that standard, and the strain on the "natural" affection will be greatly relaxed, if not obliterated. It is the absence of moral perceptions that forms one of the greatest—yea, the greatest obstacle to the progress of moral principles and reforms. A greater reformer

The selfishness is farther seen in this (and it is most natural) that, when the punished one is *our* child, or *our* friend, we think justice is hard, and conflicts with *our* affection (true *natural* affection at that; but we must remember that our affection, true naturally as it may be, is not the only factor that enters into human happiness—there is something else); but when the punished one is not our child, or our friend, we are disposed to say, *It is all right; such a one ought to suffer.* Why more *right* in the case of any body else's child or friend than it would be of ours, if the facts of guilt are established?

(9.) The truth is, that neither feeling nor affection of the natural type governs in matters of the divine rendering, only so far as these are in accord with what is morally right; and it is under this latter law that we are told that "God is no respecter of persons."

Many a parent has punished the child severely from a moral sense of its just deserts, though at the same time the parent was the greater sufferer, in the wounds that were made in his own natural feeling. But the judgment rose above this, and was governed by the higher law. We all recognize this, and it is the same principle that applies in God's dealing with the guilty. It may be reformatory in time; but in the future it is not reformatory, for in eternity character is fixed.

It is not a pleasure for the parent to inflict punishment; and so it is not a pleasure for God to do it. Some think God takes a delight in this; but he says; "I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth; wherefore turn ye, for why will ye die?" So God says in the face of the lost, in the face of the fearful consequence of sin, which is death, in the sight of the suffering, "*I have no pleasure in it: why WILL YE die?*"

could not arise than he who succeeds in awakening sensibility in moral perceptions. The curse of the age is in some instances the almost extinction of moral consciousness.

(10.) I do not say that either God or his people will be happy at the thought of the lost; but, their condition being in strict accord with the highest law of *right*, our happiness will not be impaired; that is, "The Judge of the whole earth will do *right*."

I believe the first thought of heaven will relate to that one point. The graphic description given in Revelation, referred to, does, first of all, call to great lamentation over the fall of the great city, Babylon, and this lamentation is universal upon the part of all intelligences who have cognizance of it; but the eyes that weep and the hearts that lament are suddenly called away to recognize the justice of the judgment, and from tears and lamentation they come to loud Alleluias—incidentally teaching that earth hath no sorrows, however intimately they may be connected with us, that heaven can not cure.

(11.) The first thought in heaven, when a redeemed soul gains entrance, is of earth.

The first question asked by the souls of them that were slain for the Word of God, etc., was of earth, "How long, O Lord," etc.? But they were white-robed, and told to rest for a season, until earthly problems were solved in suffering, which means the blessed truth that on the occasion of death human souls go to heaven concerned for earthly friends; but God dries their tears, robes them in white, and puts them to rest concerning earthly affairs, which are in his hands.

(12.) But answer this question. We know that in our country there are thirty thousand criminals suffering the just penalty of the law.

In the face of this fact, how do their nearest friends find earth tolerable? Simply on the ground that the punishment is right. If this is so here, will it not be superlatively more true in heaven?

(13.) But it is a poor rule that will not work both ways.

I believe if the devil has a law by which his fiendish

agents are happy while they know they are, and that, too, unjustly, making the good and pure unhappy on earth, that God is not so far behind that he does not have a law by which the good can be happy when they know that the misery of the lost is based upon the just desert of their crime.

(14.) "But are we not taught more tender lessons in nature?"

Some do speak of nature as superior in its instructions, and allude to it as speaking of nothing but love, verdant springs, bright Summers, golden Autumns, smiling flowers, gentle breezes, happy harvests, light and gladness. But, stop! Is that all? What means that convulsion of nature, that upheaval of earth, the opening of its hungry jaws by which a city without warning is swallowed at a single morsel, and the deep-toned thunders that follow as if it was enraged that the morsel was so small? What means the belching forth of nature, as if its very ribs were inlaid with pent-up fires that were impetuous and angry to do the work of death, and bury a city, a province in ashes? What of these angry elements on sea or land, the frightful lightnings, loud-voiced thunders, what do they all teach but that not God alone has his Sinai, but nature also? Justice sits pinnacled on nature's summit amidst the emblems of wrath as great as Sinai, but the principles of moral justice are not known to nature. The laws of nature are not all on the side of mercy. While the heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament showeth his handiwork, and also that God's tender mercies are over all his works, they also declare more, "a certain fearful looking for" of fiery indignation which shall devour the adversary," the violator of nature's laws. So, also, we are told that "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life." But that is not all inspiration teaches. It also tells us—the Son himself speaking—"He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and he

that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him." Mercy is a beautiful chord on which to play, but remember there is no such a thing as mercy, but as it is based in strictest justice, and justice is the fountain of true mercy. "For," says Scott, "to be wise beyond what is good is craft; to be good beyond what is wise is dotage; to be just beyond what is merciful is rigor; to be merciful beyond what is just is easiness."

I have dwelt thus at length upon the delicate question of the possibility of happiness in heaven while the saints had a knowledge at the same time of the unhappiness of the lost, because I know it to be a question pondered in all minds, and we should endeavor in some degree to clear away the mist that may hang gloomily over the mind when the question comes up.

The doctrine of recognition is established by the following proof: (1.) By Paul, when he says (Eph. iii, 14, 15) "I bow my knees unto the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named."

"One family we dwell in Him;  
One Church above, beneath;  
Though now divided by the stream,  
The narrow stream of death."

The oneness of the people of God as a family in unity is taught by Paul. God has no *families*, plurally, but a *family*, and it is named of him. This family includes the angels and the redeemed together. All created moral intelligences constitute *one* brotherhood, with God as their Father. See Eph. i, 10; Phil. ii, 10; Rev. xix, 10; compare Job xxxviii, 7:

(2.) The perfection of knowledge which we will realize in heaven in a sense superior to any experience of earth will relate also to recognition. If we know *more* and know it *better* than on earth, certainly then will we recognize our friends and know them better than on earth.



(3.) Recognition is a doctrine of universal belief. It is incorporated in all religions. It is not a doctrine of pagan origin incorporated into Christian beliefs. All doctrines of false religions that possess similarities to Christian truth, and in themselves part truth, have not given us our idea of those beliefs, but every phase of false religion that do possess truths similar to those held in common with us can trace their origin to Christian revelation. They are perversions of truth existing before.

(4.) Society implies recognition. If saints on earth know each other, when called to the fellowship of the saints in light they will know each other better. If there is fellowship, then is there recognition; if not, then is heaven an abode of everlasting exclusion, and each inhabitant a recluse.

(5.) Immortality in heaven is the consummation of Gospel hope. (Rom. viii, 24.) In this consummation of hope there is not one item that reason can invent that would be any addition to the happiness or its completeness as presented in the Scriptures. Subtract recognition from this sum total and there is a great blank.

(6.) Concede that heaven is a world of strangers, could you think of perfect happiness? There is an affectional idea in our nature—a high and holy idea on which heavenly fellowship is based. This is the love force, or power. We love. We want to be loved. God is love. He is the fountain of heavenly affection. The recognition and fellowship of heaven is equal and perfect when we are all alike acquainted with God—then we will know as we are known.

(7.) There can be no true and lasting affection without the recognition of the object on which it is placed. "Hope deferred maketh the heart sick." Affection may exist, but it must be fed on the hope of realization; if not, then will it turn to despair the opposite of heaven.

(8.) There is a near relation between piety and affec-

tion. You may love, but less than you would if piety was its fountain; or, if not love more, still better and purer. The more of heaven we have in our nature, the stronger, purer, and higher is our affection; and love is never perfect until touched and sanctified by the grace of God. If this is its effect on earth, what will it be when we behold the King in his beauty?

(9.) This recognition is inferred from the interest taken in our welfare by our friends who have gone before us to the heavenly state. Not only is this true of friends we have seen, but of those we have not seen. Hebrew xi: "Seeing we are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses," etc. If these are interested, much more are those with whom we have held sweet converse, who are now in heaven.

Again: This thought is no less applicable to angels whom we will know as well as others, and who will recognize us. (1 Cor. iv, 9.)

Recognition is further implied in 1 Thessalonians iv, 13-18: "But I would not have you to be ignorant, brethren, concerning them which are asleep, that ye sorrow not, even as others which have no hope. For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him. For this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord shall not prevent them which are asleep. For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God: and the dead in Christ shall rise first: then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord. Wherefore comfort one another with these words."

(10.) Allusion has already been made to the souls under the altar. (Rev. vi, 9-11.) Most beautiful thoughts may

be culled from this vision. They have in one common prayer the thought of earth upon their heart. This implies recognition.

(11.) The expression which frequently appears in the Scriptures of good men being "gathered to their people" at death, teaches recognition. At first thought, one might say that this meant gathered to the company of the dead in the burial-place. But it does not.

(a.) Abraham "gave up the ghost and *was gathered to his people.*" The simple narrative is, that while he was born in one place, he died in another. His nativity was in Chaldea—but he went a stranger from this—but "he died and was buried with Sarah his wife in the cave of Machpelah which he had purchased of Ephron."

(b.) Isaac "gave up the ghost, and *was gathered to his people.*"

(c.) Moses was commanded: "Get thee up in the mountain and die, *and be gathered to thy people*;" certainly not with Israel in Canaan, nor with the buried dead in Egypt. As no man knoweth of his sepulcher, it is by inference that his abode to which he was gathered was that of heavenly inhabitants.

(12.) Attachments do not die with death. This also implies recognition. See "Christ on Calvary," "Behold thy mother," "Behold thy son."

(13.) Recognition is proven by what Christ says of heaven. John xiv, 1-3, "In my Father's house are many mansions," etc.

(14.) It is also proven by the transfiguration of Christ. The scene may appropriately be called representative. Moses of the law, Elias of the prophets, and the apostles of the Christian dispensation, and Christ over all. The redemptive scheme was the topic of conversation. It is *the* theme of all ages, dispensations, earth and heaven.

(15.) Recognition is further implied in the dying requests that have been made. I stood by the side of a

dying mother. With faculties unimpaired, and physical strength sufficient to make her dying wishes plainly known, she requested that the little babe that had shortly preceded her, might be placed by her side in the same grave. As that babe had nestled in her bosom before, and she had looked into its eyes and it into the mother's, so that mother fully expected in the awakening at the last morning to press again to her bosom in heavenly recognition the little one, and hear its first warble of angelic song as she had heard its first bird-like cooing when an infant in her arms.

We call a halt for want of space for more proof that wells up in the mind, coming from inspiration and reason. The heart must be satisfied. Reluctantly is the pen laid down after writing its goodly words to the reader. May each of us live to enjoy the rest remaining for the people of God—the society of the redeemed in heaven and of angels and of God over all. Amen.

With profound reverence for and faith in the cherished doctrines of the Bible I close this argument, bidding the reader an affectionate adieu.

THE END.

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